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141. Emerging Technologies and Nuclear Deterrence Relationship

Author:
Hirofumi Tosaki
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The implications of emerging technologies have been an important issue in the debate on nuclear posture and deterrence relationship. Although the concrete objectives, concepts, plans and states of development of the nuclear-armed states regarding the introduction of emerging technologies into their nuclear weapons systems are not necessarily clear, a particular focus of discussion has been the potential impacts of introducing artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technology and other emerging technologies into intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3). With regard to ISR for early warning, threat detection, situational awareness and attack/damage assessment, the development of remote sensing technology through quantum sensing, for instance, could improve the ability to detect an adversary's offensive capabilities, and increase the possibility of addressing them before they are used. The use of cloud computing, ultrahigh-speed high-capacity data communications and AI is expected to enable the efficient collection and prompt analysis of vast amounts of information.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, Deterrence, Artificial Intelligence, and Destabilization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

142. Principles of Nuclear Deterrence and Strategy

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This Research Paper seeks to describe and explain the principles of nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy. It does not defend or take sides – in favour of or against – a particular thesis, concept, idea or school of thought. While it mostly applies to Western conceptions and debates (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, France, NATO), most of the points made seem widely shared.1 The paper is structured as an investigation of nuclear strategy, moving stage by stage from the conceptual level to the planning level before setting out the issues that revolve around nuclear deterrence. Following an initial conceptualization of deterrence, the paper looks at its implementation in the nuclear domain. It then describes the various notions associated with nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy, as well as the related interactions with weapons systems. It also explains the main dilemmas and questions associated with nuclear strategy, offering food for thought on the future of nuclear deterrence. One author suggests that there have been four waves of nuclear deterrence analysis.2 The first of these, in response to the invention of the atom bomb, conceptualized the basis of nuclear deterrence. The second focused on formal theorizing (with the occasional help of game theory), in a world of increasingly diversified nuclear arsenals. The third wave, based on trends observed over a period of many years, used case studies to judge how efficient nuclear weapons had been in deterring aggressions. The fourth wave, leveraging advances in cognitive sciences to challenge the initial “rational actor assumption”, grappled with post-Cold War problems such as so-called rogue states and terrorist networks. We may now be entering a fifth wave, as the expansion of cyberspace and the advent of artificial intelligence and quantum computing may have ramifications for nuclear deterrence. This Research Paper seeks to take stock of this corpus of studies, so as to produce a contemporary framework designed for policy-makers, practitioners and scholars.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

143. Sharpening the Blunt Tool: Why Deterrence Needs an Update in the Next U.S. National Security Strategy

Author:
Kyle J Wolfley
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy appeared to bring deterrence back: departing from its predecessor, the document prioritized the concept by including “preserving peace through strength” as a vital national interest. From nuclear weapons to cyberspace, the strategy emphasized the logics of denial and punishment, which were hallmarks of the classical deterrence theory that emerged after World War II. However, recent thinking on deterrence has evolved beyond these simple logics. Now emerging concepts such as tailored deterrence, cross-domain deterrence, and dissuasion offer new ideas to address criticisms of deterrence in theory and practice. Therefore, the most vital question for the new administration is: how should the U.S. revise its deterrence policy to best prevent aggression in today’s complex environment? A review of the problems and prospects in deterrence thinking reveals that in addition to skillfully tailoring threats and risks across domains, U.S. policymakers should dissuade aggression by offering opportunities for restraint to reduce the risk of escalation.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

144. Deterrence through denial: A strategy for an era of reduced warning time

Author:
Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia now needs to implement serious changes to how warning time is considered in defence planning. The need to plan for reduced warning time has implications for the Australian intelligence community, defence strategic policy, force structure priorities, readiness and sustainability. Important changes will also be needed with respect to personnel, stockpiles of missiles and munitions, and fuel supplies. We can no longer assume that Australia will have time gradually to adjust military capability and preparedness in response to emerging threats. In other words, there must be a new approach in Defence to managing warning, capability and preparedness, and detailed planning for rapid expansion and sustainment. This paper addresses those issues, recognising that they’re a revolutionary break with the past era of what were much more comfortable assumptions about threats to Australia. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, we have identified further areas for research, including at the classified level.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Australia

145. #NATO2030: Credible Deterrence in the Baltic Region

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO put renewed focus onto its primary task of collective defence and deterrence. It has taken several important steps, but it would be a mistake to believe that NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltic region is complete. In the fourth of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Mārtiņš Vargulis of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs looks at how NATO has responded since 2014 to the threat from Russia to enhance deterrence in the Baltic region, and proposes what more needs to be done to ensure a credible deterrence posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, International Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

146. Risky Business: Future Strategy and Force Options for the Defense Department

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the overarching strategic priorities laid out by the Biden administration and initial indicators provided by the Department of Defense (DoD), it is unclear how the next National Defense Strategy (NDS) will prioritize threats and the primary role of the U.S. military. Will the DoD clearly preference China (and to a lesser extent Russia)? Or will it hedge and try to more equally meet the expanded list of threats detailed in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance? Is the Pentagon’s priority to compete below the threshold of armed conflict, or is it to prepare to defeat a great-power adversary in a large-scale war to strengthen deterrence? Answering these questions is critical to developing a clear strategy that emphasizes the right priorities, activities, and resources. To consider the next defense strategy and the tradeoffs associated with different options, we developed three possible strategies—high-end deterrence, day-to-day competition, and full-spectrum competition—that alter the factors highlighted above and reflect the Biden administration’s stated priorities. Our analysis of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 budget indicates that the DoD is trying to do more than constrained budgets can support over the next few years and is moving toward what we term as a strategy of “full-spectrum competition.” It appears as if the Biden administration is pursuing a strategy that seeks to strike a balance between competing in the near term while still enhancing preparedness for great-power conflict, as well as hedging against a range of threats and mitigating risk over time. The forces and posture that are necessary for this competition are quite different from those that are needed to defend against a conventional fait accompli attack by China on Taiwan or Russia on the Baltics. It is unlikely that the United States can build a force that can achieve both of these objectives with the current topline. Our testing of the budget-constrained force associated with the full-spectrum competition strategy finds that it could not successfully fulfill its two primary aims: defeating sub-conventional aggression and Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics, and building a force capable of defeating a great-power adversary attack on its neighbor. Moreover, this strategy risks significant overstretch, the potential for long-term technological overmatch, and inadvertent escalation. The other two strategies focus on China, but day-to-day competition emphasizes the daily military contest with Beijing and the threat of sub-conventional conflict, while high-end deterrence focuses on defeating conventional aggression and achieving a long-term military technological advantage. The day-to-day competition strategy would lose a high-end conflict in East Asia and Europe; it also would fail to halt or overturn sub-conventional land grabs. The competition strategy bets that a large and visible force that actively contests daily military provocations will deter both sub-conventional and conventional aggression, even if the force is not capable of stopping either type of attack. The risk that this assumption fails grows over time because this strategy forgoes investments in advanced technologies, while China and Russia are rapidly seeking to wrest the military technological advantage from the United States. There are also significant escalatory risks associated with an approach that regularly and assertively contests Chinese and Russian forces. We conclude that it is unlikely that competition can be won by the military, even one optimized to face this challenge. More optimistically, our analysis suggests that it is possible to build a force capable of winning one big conflict and overturning sub-conventional aggression with this topline—but only if the department is willing to accept some near-term risk in competition, against other threats, and in other regions. The high-end deterrence strategy mitigates the temporal risk by making near-term improvements in combat capabilities, including expanding stockpiles of preferred long-range munitions, investments to improve the resiliency of U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and additional investments in cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. It also relies on frontline allies and partners to be responsible for the daily competition. We assert that the high-end deterrence strategy is the best path forward, but it requires a better delineation and ranking of threats and responsibilities for the joint force and strategic discipline over the long run. Congress must also support this strategy and allow the Defense Department to make the hard choices, such as cutting capacity and retiring weapons systems, that are required to rebalance the force for this mission and to sustain its military technological advantage over the long run. Senior Pentagon leaders will need to partner with Congress to help them understand how specific changes are connected to higher order objectives. It is important to note that the FY22 budget is largely an inherited one and the Biden administration is making some significant investments that align with a high-end deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, the 2022 NDS and the FY23 budget will need to accept more risk and further prioritize to prepare the force for the most challenging and consequential threats. If the Biden administration does not make these hard choices or Congress refuses to support this strategy, the chasm between U.S. strategic and military objectives and the costs of achieving them will only grow significantly. Trying to do too much is a risky business that could result in the United States losing its military technological edge and, ultimately, a war against a great power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Risk, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

147. Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence

Author:
Steve Fetter
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Nuclear forensics is the analysis of nuclear materials, devices, emissions, and signals to determine the origin and history of those nuclear materials and devices. At the request of the Secretary of Energy, and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence evaluates the U.S. government's nuclear forensics capabilities. A 2010 National Academies report, Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk, characterized the precarious state of the national technical nuclear forensics (NTNF) program at that time: NTNF relied almost entirely on staff dedicated to and residual funding from other related programs. This summary report addresses the current state of U.S. NTNF capabilities relative to the National Academies evaluation in 2010 and recommends ways to improve the NTNF program through improvements in policy, operations, and research and development efforts.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

148. Strategic Risk Reduction between Nuclear-Weapons Possessors

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The topic of nuclear risk reduction has gained momentum in the international security debate among policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and experts. The current and expected demise of the traditional arms-control architecture, the renewed strategic competition, and the polarization of the multilateral debate on nuclear weapons have contributed to this renewed salience. Building upon the 2019 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, this report defines strategic risk reduction as the set of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures that aim at lowering the likelihood of nuclear weapons use through improved communication, predictability, and restraint, and underlines the need to adopt a strategic approach to nuclear risk reduction. Risks emanating from conflict dynamics between nuclear powers are different in nature and severity from those arising from technical incidents. This report argues that in a context of growing geopolitical rivalries, diplomats should prioritize mitigating the former type of risk. Risk reduction efforts should aim at hindering the most dangerous behaviors in crisis time, through measures focusing both on nuclear forces and on nonnuclear capabilities, whose impact on strategic balances keeps growing. Strategic risk reduction can strengthen international security and strategic stability by complementing arms control measures and deterrence policies. It is therefore crucial to ensure that diplomatic initiatives aimed at limiting nuclear risks do not ultimately, and paradoxically, increase the risk of war. Historical experience shows not only the feasibility of such an approach, but also the concrete security benefits that can be derived from it, by channeling the behavior of nuclear powers in times of tensions, reducing the ambiguity inherent in certain strategies and behaviors, or laying the foundations for international regimes based on operational and strategic restraint as well as on transparency.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Deterrence, Strategic Stability, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, India, North Korea, France, and United States of America

149. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

150. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:
John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America