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101. Changing Lakes State? Rin Tueny’s Inclusive Deterrence Approach in Practice

Author:
Jan Pospisil
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Rin Tueny has achieved success in pacifying parts of Lakes state, including the Greater Rumbek area. His methods, however, have prioritised security and deterrence over human rights and legal norms. Consequently, there is little meaningful institutional oversight. While Lakes state may appear to be a ‘success’ story, a relapse into turmoil is possible. Changing Lakes State? Rin Tueny’s Inclusive Deterrence Approach in Practice—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project—analyses the components of Rin Tueny’s ‘inclusive deterrence’ approach in Lakes state, South Sudan, and its blind spots. It also discusses the possibility of this approach being institutionalized at the national level.
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Africa, South Sudan, and Lakes State

102. China Maritime Report No. 33: China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: Organizational, Operational, and Strategic Implications

Author:
David C. Logan
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. nuclear threats and intimidation and therefore perceiving lower costs to conventional aggression, and potentially introducing escalation risks from conventional-nuclear entanglement to the maritime domain.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Maritime, Deterrence, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

103. US-Japan-Taiwan Dialogue: Deterrence Signaling, Domestic Politics, Defense Cooperation, and War Termination

Author:
Michael Beckley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The risk of a war over Taiwan is higher today than at any time in the past half-century. Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping has declared that Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland is an “inevitable requirement” for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and “should not be passed down generation after generation.” Yet peaceful means of reunification have all but disappeared because most Taiwanese are more determined than ever to maintain their de facto independence. This stance threatens China’s territorial integrity, as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Xi’s legitimacy as top leader. In response, China is brandishing its military option. Over the past three years, it has conducted the largest and most provocative show of force in the Taiwan Strait in a generation. Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more than fifty combat aircraft, menace Taiwan almost daily and often simulate attacks on Taiwanese, Japanese, or US targets. Meanwhile, China has been amassing ships, aircraft, and missiles as part of the largest military buildup by any country in decades. Its military budget increased tenfold from 1990 to 2020. From 2020 to 2023, it doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal. China now militarily outspends every other country in Asia combined. It wields the world’s largest ballistic missile inventory and navy by number of ships. Moreover, Beijing has become increasingly belligerent in its relations with neighbors from Japan to India. The United States has tried to deter Chinese aggression by declaring its support for Taiwan. But it is no longer clear that the US military could immediately respond to a Chinese assault on the island. Historically, the United States has relied on its manufacturing prowess to outproduce adversaries after a war starts. But now that China is the world’s leading manufacturing nation by output, it is possible that both sides could sustain a protracted conventional war—and might be tempted to break the stalemate by using nuclear weapons against military targets. These dangerous trends make deterrence and defense cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Taiwan extremely important. Toward that end, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) convened a US-Japan-Taiwan Track 2 dialogue in November 2023 to discuss deterrence and defense cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

104. Reinforcing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Diplomacy and Deterrence in the Pivotal Year of 2022

Author:
James J Przystup
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine presented the world with a dramatic challenge to the rules-based international order. Ukraine’s fierce and continuing resistance has earned the backing of Western democracies. Under the leadership of the United States, democracies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have rallied to provide political, diplomatic, and military support to Ukraine. As of this writing, despite difficult coordination on sensitive military issues, that unity remains intact. In the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought preexisting security challenges into sharper relief. Across the region, security concerns were heightened and acquired greater definition in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula. More broadly, Russia’s aggression called into question the staying power of the rules-based international order and, at the same time, raised recognition of the inseparable nature of that order. As the United Kingdom’s former Foreign Secretary Liz Truss told the Atlantic Council on March 10, “conflict anywhere threatens security everywhere. Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible.”1 This study begins with a consideration of the Indo-Pacific security environment as it evolved during 2022. It goes on to consider the measures by key regional actors—primarily but not exclusively the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and India—that strengthened deterrence in the face of an increasingly challenging environment. Expanding diplomatic coordination and security cooperation reflects a strategic commitment by the region’s democracies to support a rules-based order and advance a shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. At the same time, European democracies have continued to expand diplomatic and security engagement with Indo-Pacific partners. The policy challenge for the United States and Western democracies has been to resist Russia’s aggression in Europe in support of the rules-based international order and, at the same time in the Indo-Pacific, to strengthen deterrence against the use of force or coercion to change the status quo.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

105. EU-Pacific Talks: Taiwan and security dimension – lessons learned, Indo-Pacific containment

Author:
Adam Horry
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
During the first debate of the third edition of the EU-Pacific Talks, organised by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, participants engaged in a lively debate covering various aspects of Taiwan's status. They discussed the economic, military and value drivers behind Taiwan's importance, addressing concerns about China's approach and lessons from other global conflicts such as the war in Ukraine. Read what our guests debated in this report by Adam Horry.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Deterrence, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

106. Baltic Perspectives on Germany’s Role in NATO

Author:
Justinas Juozaitis
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the second brief in our “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States” series, Justinas Juozaitis considers Germany’s contribution to NATO from a Baltic perspective and looks at what might change under Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Germany’s contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, including in the Baltic region, is substantial, but does not match what might be expected given its economic strength. The Bundeswehr already struggles to meet its commitments to the Alliance and recent increases in the defence budget have not translated into major improvements in capability. Germany will most likely not meet in full the promises it has made to enhancing collective defence. Even then, the new government will have to face decisions that will be unpopular with the public, and within their own coalition. Germany’s continued political support for deterrence in the Baltic region will likely continue, but its own military contribution will probably be smaller than promised.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Economy, Regional Integration, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

107. Electronic Warfare: Russia's Approach

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia considers electronic warfare (EW) one of the key military capabilities in its ongoing confrontation with the West. EW provides a non-nuclear deterrence capability and helps Russia keep its great power status and strategic autonomy while also taking into account its long-term economic and demographic weakness. Russia has made significant advances in EW during the 2010s. However, at the beginning of 2020s, Russia still faces technological, technical, industrial, organizational, and political challenges that prevent Moscow from getting the EW capabilities it wants. Technological challenges are related to delays in developing air- and space-based EW capabilities, and to the need to unify EW systems. Technical challenges stem from the number of different types of EW systems that must be maintained, the relatively short lifespans of various EW systems, and issues integrating them with other combat systems and units. The last point also indicates why Russia has struggled to transform its quantity of the EW systems into a higher quality of combat capabilities. Industrial challenges are caused by the volatile dynamic of Russia’s arms procurements and R&D programs and the capacity of defense corporations to develop and produce advanced EW systems with acceptable costs. The main organizational challenge is that the number of EW troops that has already achieved its objective limit. Now EW troops need to be transformed from combat support into a combat branch. Finally, a political challenge appears in the confrontation between Russia and the West, which is the main driver for efforts related to EW. Russia is unable to compete with the United States and Europe in a symmetric way, and Russia’s political system does not allow Moscow to realize a “revolution in military affairs” because the centralized system struggles to implement a net-centric approach to the armed forces in effective way. For that reason, Russia has chosen a classic approach of asymmetric warfare with the goal of disrupting the command and control systems of a superior adversary. The coming decade promises to be challenging for Russia in terms of electronic warfare. Moscow will need to fix its previous EW efforts, pay more attention to the overall quality of electronic warfare rather than on the quantity of deployed EW systems, and bridge the evident gaps in EW on tactical, theater, and strategic levels. Moreover, after defense spending stabilized and even declined during the late 2010s, Russia has been forced to increase its defense budget again. This means spending for EW will also increase. Russia will try to fill gaps in air- and space-based EW capabilities, with the sea-based component continuing to play a secondary role in Russia’s military planning. It is also possible that Russia will chose to extend its ground-based EW infrastructure in Belarus with creation of an EW “chain” from Crimea to Kaliningrad.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Military, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

108. The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is poised to bring into being a new European security order. Although the last eight months have been full of surprises, that new order may very well be marked by unstable standoffs, buildups, and dangerous activities and incidents between both Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Ukraine’s Western backers. These will risk ever more dangerous crises, all with the threat of nuclear war looming. The last eight years of military deployments, near-simultaneous exercises, and other proximate activities by Russia and NATO offer some hints as to what this future may look like. These, notably, were undertaken not to prevent an escalation in Ukraine but to deter NATO from attacking Russia and vice versa. During this time, discussions about a return to conventional arms control in Europe to mitigate the dangers of military activities gained little traction with policymakers, and the agreements and arrangements that had been in place continued to deteriorate and dwindle. In late 2021, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the West offered Russia a return to conventional arms control solutions. Russia countered with demands that NATO return to its 1990s-era force posture and eschew any further enlargement, and then proceeded to roll its tanks into Ukraine. During the tense months prior to Russia’s invasion, the conventional arms control mechanisms that remained, such as the Vienna Document, made it possible to call out Russia’s buildup, but not reverse it or prevent attack. Although there is little logic and less appetite for new arms control deals now, an end to fighting in Ukraine will create new imperatives to make Europe safer than it is today. While sanctions can limit Russian capacity to some extent, they may well be inadequate to prevent substantial buildups. For this reason, NATO members and their partners should be thinking in advance about how they could limit Russian capabilities via negotiated arrangements with robust verification measures and repercussions for violations. Once the shooting stops in Ukraine, deals such as these could make a more secure Europe, bolstered by more reliable deterrence, attainable.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

109. Revisiting ‘Minimal Nuclear Deterrence’: Laying the Ground for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The prospects for nuclear arms control appear dim following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Instead of continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, the resulting new awareness of nuclear risks should inform bold nuclear disarmament measures in the long term. Drawing on previous debates on ‘minimal nuclear deterrence’, this paper argues that nuclear deterrence is possible at low numbers, and hence reliance on nuclear deterrence is not an obstacle to significant progress in nuclear disarmament. In particular, there is scope for reducing the vast Russian and United States nuclear arsenals, which risk planetary-scale destruction and stand in the way of multilateral nuclear disarmament. At the same time, recent military-technological evolution has raised the bar for minimal nuclear deterrence by questioning the survivability of nuclear forces. In addition to making recommendations on how to address such strategic challenges, the paper addresses some conceptual dilemmas traditionally associated with minimal nuclear deterrence.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Disarmament, Multilateralism, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

110. Multidomain Deterrence and Strategic Stability in China

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China has displayed a wide range of advances in military capabilities and infrastructure, including its test of a hypersonic glide vehicle coupled with a fractional orbital bombardment system and evidence of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. While China and the United States remain at political odds, there are indications that China’s strategies in space, cyberspace and nuclear domains are increasingly converging with those of the USA, as well as Russia. A key question is whether this strategic convergence is a stabilizing or destabilizing phenomenon. To answer the question, this paper explores the current state of Chinese discussions on multidomain deterrence and strategic stability, with a focus on active defence and proactive defence. It then examines how these concepts are manifesting themselves in China’s postural and technological indicators, including pre-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery platforms, expanded nuclear arsenal size, possible shifts towards launch on warning, integration of dual-capable systems, and advances in machine learning and autonomy. It concludes with a discussion of what these trends mean for future strategic stability talks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China and Asia