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51. Intergovernmental checkmate on cyber? Processes on cyberspace in the United Nations

Author:
Erik Kursetgjerde
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Cyberspace is an increasingly controversial field on the international agenda. Despite the fact that processes on the thematic have been going on in the UN since 1998, a more significant international agreement is needed on what basic principles should apply in cyberspace. Small states have the opportunity of pushing cybersecurity as a thematic priority in the United Nations Security Council – a path Norway could pursue in its forthcoming 2021–2022 Security Council term. The attribution of the assumed Russian cyber operations toward the Norwegian parliament earlier this year actualizes the addressing of the issue in the Council. The policy brief discusses the GGE negotiations on cyberspace in 2015 and 2017 - and gives policy recommendations on the way forward.
Topic:
United Nations, International Affairs, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

52. Cyber War and Cyber Peace: Past and Future Cyber Clashes in the Middle East

Author:
Selena Larson, James Shires, and Thom Langford
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Although the cyber domain is an emerging field of conflict, it is no longer a new frontier – many battles in cyberspace have been fought and it is imperative they be understood to begin imagining how the future of warfare online may look. As the United States, the Middle East, and policy community globally begin to consider how a Biden administration will approach conflict and cyber conflict in the region, this panel is an opportunity to study the history of cyber warfare in the Middle East as context for the policy challenges that will arise in the next four years. This panel is sponsored by SentinelOne, a cybersecurity solution encompassing AI-powered prevention, detection, response and hunting in a single autonomous platform.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

53. Operation “Olympic Games.” Cyber-sabotage as a tool of American intelligence aimed at counteracting the development of Iran’s nuclear programme

Author:
Mariusz Antoni Kamiński
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The purpose of the article is to analyse Operation “Olympic Games” including, in particular, to indicate the political background to the activities aimed at preventing the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, and to examine the preparation and conduct of the operation, the involvement of the US and Israeli intelligence services, and the use of intelligence methods and sources. An equally important objective is to indicate the real consequences of the cyberattack with the Stuxnet virus. In the research process, a critical analysis of literature in the field of Intelligence Studies and source materials (including legal acts, strategies, reports, and other official studies of the entities forming the US Intelligence Community) was carried out. The example of Operation Olympics Games shows that complex cyber-sabotage operations resulting in the destruction of critical infrastructure on a large scale require the involvement of numerous state resources and advanced cyber activities, and the use of many different methods and intelligence sources. Thus, strong states with well-developed intelligence capabilities are much more capable of effectively using cyber-sabotage on a large scale.
Topic:
Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Cyberspace, and Sabotage
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

54. Enduring Cyber Threats and Emerging Challenges to the Financial Sector

Author:
Adrian Nish, Saher Naumaan, and James Muir
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Cybersecurity is a unique challenge for the financial sector. To prevent massive financial losses, banks and other financial institutions should understand how cyber threat groups could launch complex new cyber attacks. At the time of writing, several financial services firms are working to restore their networks following disruptive cyber attacks. Banks in Chile and Seychelles, as well as financial technology companies like Silverlake Axis, a supplier of core banking systems throughout the Asia-Pacific, are all reportedly victims of separate ransom and extortion attempts. Elsewhere, the threat from cyber criminals triggered a suspension of automatic teller machine (ATM) transactions overnight, and hackers recently knocked websites associated with a stock exchange offline using distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Such disruptions not only impact customers of these services, but also undermine the confidence of peers in the financial services community. Regulators have been taking increasing notice of these cyber threats, and operational resilience has shot to the top of agendas around the world. A few years ago, targeted attacks on financial services sector firms were still relatively rare. However, cases have increased in recent years as capabilities and specialisms such as network intrusion have advanced. BAE Systems in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has documented public examples via the Timeline of Cyber Incidents Involving Financial Institutions. This timeline serves as a useful resource in tracking trends, even though public cases are just the tip of the iceberg and the true volume of incidents and near misses is much greater.
Topic:
Security, Finance, Non-Traditional Threats, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

55. The Fundamental Conceptual Trinity of Cyberspace

Author:
Bruno Pauli Medeiros and Luiz Rogerio Franco Goldoni
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contexto Internacional
Institution:
Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:
This article is based on the premise that the increasing human interaction in cyberspace elevates it to the level of a strategic domain and, as such, raises theoretical and practical challeng- es for International Relations. It is founded on an epistemological reflection on the fundamental assumptions of the paradigms that permeate International Relations. The main objective is to con- ceptualise cyberspace as the strategic domain in the 21st century, as well as to develop an analytical framework that will both provide evidence and investigate the resilience of the foundations of cur- rent International Relations, these being specifically, the following precepts: i) sovereignty based on territoriality, ii) state monopoly of power, and iii) accountability between international actors. With this in mind, the approach refers to defence documentation and scientific sources in order to reach a definition that will characterise cyberspace, considering its technical, scientific and strategic aspects. At the same time, the bibliographic work underpins the development of the analytical tool known as the Fundamental Conceptual Trinity of Cyberspace, based on the characteristics of the cyberspace domain: i) deterritoriality, ii) multiplicity of actors, and iii) uncertainty.
Topic:
International Relations, Accountability, Monopoly, Cyberspace, and Territory
Political Geography:
Global Focus

56. Conceptualizing Foreign Interference in Europe

Author:
Kristine Berzina and Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe has been at the forefront of confronting asymmetric attacks from foreign adversaries. Disinformation campaigns have been used against the European public since the Soviet era, and with the advent of social media platforms, they have become a regular phenomenon across the continent. Cyber-attacks have become a frequent occurrence too, particularly since 2007, when Russia conducted a campaign of cyber-attacks on Estonia.1 Even so, it was the 2016 U.S. presidential election that accelerated European measures against interference in democracies. National governments across Europe have launched holistic efforts to counter interference. In 2018, France announced the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, which calls for cooperation to “prevent malign interference by foreign actors.”2 Over one thousand national and local governments, civil society, and industry groups have signed on, and multi-stakeholder communities have formed to advance the principles laid out in the Paris Call. Sweden is applying the concept of “total defense” to educate and protect its population. Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency sent a booklet to all households in 2018 with guidelines on how citizens should protect themselves from false information and cyber-attacks as well as many other threats.3 Finland and Latvia are applying the same “total defense” strategy in their own political systems. Increasingly, European Union institutions are also turning their attention to interference. The newly elected European Parliament passed a resolution in October denouncing foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and European democratic processes.4 And European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has given her commissioners a mandate to protect democratic systems and institutions from “external interference.”5 Amid this burgeoning activity, however, one thing is missing. There is little consensus on what exactly “interference” is, and how the term “interference” is similar or different from other related concepts, such as “influence.” The lack of a common framing of “interference” across Europe can delay or complicate lawmakers’ initiatives and muddy civil society’s efforts to build awareness and rally opposition against incursions into democratic processes. Defining interference comes with risk. Policymakers can create a definition that is either too broad,6 which could inhibit the freedom of expression or put undue burdens on political participation, or one that is too narrow to cover certain forms of malign behavior in a quickly evolving field, inhibiting democracies from protecting themselves because an attack does not “fit” within said definition. Establishing a definition that merely catalogues commonly-used tactics (for example: cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and malign finance) would also prove inadequate because any definition of interference should be flexible enough to capture new technologies and approaches. Moreover, a list of tactics fails to explain the underlying factors driving interference activities. To contribute to the definition-setting debate, this paper addresses why a definition could be helpful for countering interference, lays out the state of play in the EU on defining interference, provides a review of existing government and academic definitions related to interference, and discusses the concept of legality and interference. Finally, this paper suggests two core criteria to assist in the determination of whether any given activity constitutes interference: (i) intent (including the factors of timing, coordination of behavior, and scale of effects), and (ii) transparency. An act does not need to match both criteria to constitute interference, but they are certainly mutually reinforcing.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Interference, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

57. Iran’s Authoritarian Playbook: The Tactics, Doctrine, and Objectives behind Iran’s Influence Operations

Author:
Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
According to a 2013 indictment by the U.S. Department of Justice, hackers backed by a foreign power gained access to the controls of the Bowman Avenue Dam, a small dam in the New York City suburb of Rye, New York. Cyberattacks on infrastructure have long been a concern in the United States: Russia has targeted the U.S. power grid and other critical infrastructure in the past—at times successfully.1 Hackers backed by the People’s Republic of China have targeted U.S. utilities companies.2 However, neither of these strategic adversaries was behind this bold foray into U.S. suburbia: the culprit, according to the indictment, was the Islamic Republic of Iran.3 Over the past decade, Iran has emerged as an important national security challenge for the United States. A novel part of the regime’s effort—facilitated by the advent of the information age and new technology—is its development of a playbook and toolkit designed to undermine the United States at home just as, in the eyes of Tehran, Washington does in Iran. This makes the current Iranian challenge more subtle and nuanced than has been the case for most of the Islamic Republic’s existence. Iran has gradually expanded its capabilities to compete against the United States for influence within the region, and it is now also taking this competition into the United States and even Europe. One hundred days before the 2020 U.S. elections, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence put a fine point on this threat when National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director William Evanina released a statement noting that, “at this time, we’re primarily concerned with China, Russia and Iran,” who are all looking to “use influence measures in social and traditional media in an effort to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, to shift U.S. policies, to increase discord and to undermine confidence in our democratic process.”4 The statement characterized the Iranian threat as follows: “Iran seeks to undermine U.S. democratic institutions and divide the country in advance of the elections. Iran’s efforts center around online influence, such as spreading disinformation on social media and recirculating anti-U.S. content.”5 The Islamic Republic’s authoritarian toolkit is unlikely to become as sophisticated as that of China or Russia in the near-term. After all, Iran’s economy is in shambles, its capacity restrained, and the model of society and governance it tries to offer profoundly limited in its appeal. And even the flagship tool used by Iran to interfere in democracies, namely its online influence operations, continues to suffer from such basic shortcomings as misspelled names, the repeated use of the same tactics and techniques, and a lack of proper research into the target and familiarity with its behavior.6 However, a perceived existential threat posed by the United States, an inability to match the conventional capabilities of the United States and its allies, and a strong desire to compete with the same, have encouraged Iran to double down on efforts to develop a set of asymmetric tools allowing it to overcome its shortcomings. In this sense, Iran is not dissimilar to Russia. “Authoritarian learning” (including partnerships with both Beijing and Moscow) has likely helped Tehran to overcome challenges and to develop its toolkit quickly and effectively. The result is that Iran is becoming a significant authoritarian actor challenging democracy in the United States and Europe. Tehran’s influence operations span traditional and digital media. The regime has built a sprawling web of traditional media outlets, as well as networks of accounts on all major social media platforms (even as it bans and limits access to these websites at home), allowing it to reach millions of users abroad. The content Iran creates, distributes, and amplifies is multilingual and seeks to adapt to democracies’ social, cultural, and political contexts—with fairly mixed results. Among the objectives of Iran’s information manipulation efforts are sowing tensions in democracies, dividing democratic nations internally and from each other, and alleging hypocrisy in democratic states’ foreign policies, undermining democratization in Iran and elsewhere. Iranian hackers routinely target U.S. persons, academic institutions, companies, non-profit organizations, and government agencies and departments. And Iran’s illicit finance schemes are considerable; although, they are currently focused on sanctions evasion and support of information operations, rather than used as a standalone vector to undermine democracies. Some of these tools and the tactics used by Iran are similar to those employed by both Russia and China—and both Beijing and Moscow have lent Tehran a hand in developing some of its capabilities,7 particularly in the realm of information manipulation. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese state media and associated social media accounts echo and amplify each other’s messaging. But there are also some differences in how Tehran deploys these tactics. This is in part due to differences in the political culture and structure of the country, the Islamic Republic’s own ideology and worldview, and the country’s status in the international system. Another significant set of differences arises from Iran’s shortcomings vis-à-vis both its adversaries (including the United States) and its authoritarian partners in Russia and China. For example, Russia and China can leverage their vast nuclear arsenal and enormous economic weight, respectively, to compete directly with the United States. Iran is ill-equipped to compete with the United States in either of those domains and, as such, sees this set of tools and efforts to undermine democracy as a means to elevate its level of competition rather than an end in itself. Hence, Tehran’s toolkit is more limited than those of Beijing or Moscow, leading the Islamic Republic to be more deliberate and selective in the programs it develops and, perhaps, more forceful in how it deploys them. As a result, though Iran’s growing efforts to undermine democracy should not be ignored and should be addressed adequately, for now, the Islamic Republic remains a lesser threat than China and Russia. This report tries to make sense of these activities and provide a framework for understanding Iran’s intentions and capabilities. It provides one of the first comprehensive discussions of Iran’s authoritarian toolkit, doctrine, and objectives. It must be noted that unlike other key Iranian initiatives—such as its nuclear program, missile activities, support for non-state actors, and regional interventions—Iran’s authoritarian toolkit remains scarcely studied in the academic literature. Understanding Tehran’s objectives in undermining democracy and the means it leverages to do so is important for a few reasons. First, Iranian activities over the past few years have shown that the regime is increasingly active in this space. And as Iran’s objectives and the tools it employs are different from those of other key malign actors, understanding their strengths and weaknesses and developing specific responses to them is a worthy exercise. Second, authoritarians learn from each other, and observing the Iranian case allows us to better identify the trends and comprehend the ways in which less powerful malign actors (as opposed to Russia and China, for example) may engage in similar activities designed to undermine democracy.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Cybersecurity, Foreign Interference, Cyberspace, and Influence
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Global Focus