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1. The Impact of Stereotyping on International Cyber Norm‑making: Navigating Misperceptions and Building Trust

Author:
Fan Yang
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Over the past three decades, cyberspace – a digital realm shaped by both technological and social dynamics – has evolved into a domain where a wide range of human activities now take place. These activities are marked by their anonymity, which complicates attribution, and their instantaneity, which challenges timely regulation. To address these challenges, states focus on two approaches: applying existing laws and creating new ones. While there is a general consensus that cyberspace should be governed by the rule of law, including international law, the application of existing legal frameworks to cyberspace remains an evolving challenge both in terms of state practice and academic discourse. At the same time, the international community has consistently sought to develop new norms to promote good governance in cyberspace. Against this backdrop, states – especially those with advanced cyber capabilities – are engaging in a competitive game of norm-making, striving to exert influence in shaping international rules to govern cyberspace. As part of this process, states often categorise each other by trying to highlight their counterparts’ most distinct characteristics. While such labelling is common in diplomatic interactions, it is particularly problematic in the context of international cyber norm-making. Labels reflect and reinforce stereotypes, which often oversimplify the complexities of states’ behavioural patterns in cyberspace and their underlying logic. States are thus roughly grouped by opposing indicators, such as those viewing cyberspace as a global commons versus sovereign territory, those advocating for an interconnected free Internet versus a fragmented “splinternet”, or those favouring multistakeholderism versus multilateralism as the dominant approach to the governance of cyberspace. Once established, these stereotypes are difficult to dismantle and can lead to distorted perceptions that obstruct constructive dialogue. This GCSP Policy Brief aims to identify the potential security challenges posed by stereotyping in international cyber norm-making processes. It then illustrates the policy implications of this problem and offers policy recommendations.
Topic:
Security, Cybersecurity, Norms, Cyberspace, and Trust
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Cybersecurity Implications of Quantum Computing and Its Combined Use with Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Andrea G. Rodriguez
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Quantum computing presents new market opportunities, but also significant challenges, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity. Although still in its infancy, quantum computing is maturing rapidly. If quantum computers can provide countries with new offensive capabilities - often in combination with artificial intelligence - it is arguably investment in the quantum communications agenda - in particular quantum networks - that can provide measures and actions to improve cyber defence.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Machine Learning, Encryption, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. The Global Terrorist Threat Forecast in 2025

Author:
Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The global terrorist threat remains persistent and pervasive as the world moves into 2025. Armed conflicts from Ukraine to Gaza and destabilisation by both State and non-State actors are redefining international stability. The influence of groups such as Islamic State, al-Qaeda and Iranian-backed militias underscores the enduring risks. Key challenges include geopolitical rivalries, radicalisation and increasingly sophisticated cyber and physical attacks. With the Middle East at the epicentre of escalating tensions and Africa emerging as a new hotspot, coordinated international efforts are essential to prevent and counter threats. States must strengthen cooperation in intelligence, security and strategic foresight to deal with a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous global landscape.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Collaboration, Threat Assessment, 2023 Gaza War, Transnational Threats, and Salafi-Jihadism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Global Focus

4. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Author:
Ian Brzezinski
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties. While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities. To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, International Organization, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. Cybersecurity at Risk: How the EU’s Digital Markets Act Could Undermine Security across Mobile Operating Systems

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU’s fight against cybersecurity threats risks being undermined by the over-enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Article 5(4) could force mobile operating system providers to allow unregulated external links, bypassing critical security controls and exposing millions of smartphone users to cyber threats. The DMA focuses on market structure, overlooking how differences in operating system design affect security vulnerabilities. A one-size-fits-all approach ignores platform-specific security needs, leaving European users exposed to cyber threats. This risks undermining the EU’s economic security agenda, including initiatives like the Cybersecurity Strategy, Cyber Resilience Act, and NIS2 Directive, which aim to strengthen digital defences. The unintended consequences of this regulatory approach are already evident in Apple’s recent decisions to withhold certain features – such as advanced AI functionalities and enhanced app security tools – from the EU market due to DMA-related concerns. As a result, EU consumers face reduced access to innovative technologies, diminished user experiences, and weaker security protections compared to users in other regions. Now, Android, a widely used open-source system, may also be compromised by DMA enforcement, potentially limiting its flexibility, security, and the broader ecosystem of app developers and device manufacturers that rely on its open architecture.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Achieving Minimum Viable Cyber Resilience: A Leadership Top Ten “To-Do” List

Author:
Steve Hill
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
I t is a reflection of the growing maturity of the cybersecurity industry that when the UK’s Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Pat McFadden, a senior cabinet minister responsible for national security, claimed in a speech to the November 2024 NATO Cyber Defence Conference that Russia “can turn the lights off for millions,” he was roundly criticized for hyperbole. Pragmatism has replaced alarmism as the driver for persuading the state and the C-suite to invest in cybersecurity. The world has neither ever been more complex nor more fast-moving. But that is not the same as saying that the world is more dangerous. The same inter-connectedness that creates supply-chain fragility also acts as a disincentive for governments whose priorities are primarily inward-looking (domestic stability and growth) to escalate conflicts to outright regional or global warfare that will likely undermine that domestic agenda. We see therefore brinkmanship and “grey conflict” taking place throughout the world. This includes targeted assassinations, arson attacks, disruption of underseas cables, drone activity, social media election influence campaigns, and all kinds of cyber-attacks.
Topic:
NATO, Cybersecurity, Gray Zone, Resilience, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America

8. NATO's New Ambitions for Space

Author:
Béatrice Hainaut
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a devastating cyber attack targets Ukrainian army communications, exposing Western dependence and vulnerability to space technologies, and calling NATO's defensive posture into question. The longevity of the organization, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024, is partly due to its ability to adapt to the international context. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened its legitimacy and attractiveness. The massive use of space applications in Ukraine raises the question of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in providing space data and services to its member states: it does not have its own space capabilities, but its deterrence posture includes space. By equipping itself with a solid documentary corpus, space-focused centers, and access to national capabilities, the Alliance seeks to implement its vision of space as a theater of operations. This theater of operations aims at the integration and interoperability of the space assets of the various member states. For now, these are primarily American capabilities. NATO's space ambition then poses to the states the question of mobilizing financial and human resources. Moreover, deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU could presumably allow for the pooling of efforts.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Space

9. Exploring Law Enforcement Hacking as a Tool Against Transnational Cyber Crime

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Emma Landi
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In terms of revenue, 2023 will go down as a record-breaking year for ransomware, with over a billion dollars in payments going to hackers.1 The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports a record $12.5 billion lost to cyber crime more broadly over the course of that year.2 As the quantities of affected users and organizations, payoff amounts, critical services, and pilfered sensitive data continue to rise, Western capitals have in recent years come to treat transnational cyber crime as a major national security concern. Because cyber criminals often operate from third countries where prosecution or extradition are unlikely, policymakers often look to military and intelligence services as the best (or only) entities capable of operationally disrupting cyber crime syndicates. Yet another growing trend challenges this notion: Western law enforcement agencies (LEAs) also have been expanding their own abilities to cross both technical and national boundaries to take on cyber criminals. This trend is creating new opportunities and challenges for both domestic and international cyber policy.
Topic:
Crime, Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. South Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low Priority

Author:
Joe Devanny and Russell Buchan
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
During the decades of apartheid, South Africa was an international pariah. Since the country transitioned to majority rule in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated politics, and the ANC has itself transitioned from a national liberation movement to a party of government. Domestically, South African cyber strategy should be seen as part of the ANC’s wider political challenge of trying to deliver economic growth, development, and prosperity. Over thirty years, the ANC has struggled to deliver on this agenda in a profoundly unequal society with infrastructure and institutions that have weakened particularly over the past fifteen years. Alongside confronting domestic challenges, the ANC has also tried to reshape South Africa’s global role. This was perhaps most visible under its first president, Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), but it was arguably pursued most systematically under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008). This reorientation of South Africa in the world was an ambitious and complex project, the foundations of which were the country’s leading role in its region and continent as well as its ties within the wider Global South. The project entailed tensions between the progressive promotion of human rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the cultivation of instrumental relations with authoritarian and repressive states, on the other. These tensions continue to affect South African foreign policy, including its cyber diplomacy. South Africa identifies cybersecurity as a key national priority and has to this end adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and established a military Cyber Command. The reality, however, is that other issues have been consistently ranked above cybersecurity, such as addressing corruption, poverty, racial and social injustice, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Cybersecurity has therefore not been seen as a high priority by successive South African governments. This has left Cyber Command underresourced and unmotivated. This deprioritization means that South Africa is unlikely to emerge as a prominent military or intelligence cyber power anytime soon. The wider lack of national prioritization will also make it harder for so-called like-minded states—which are bound together by a mutual respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—to form an effective partnership with South Africa on the topic of cybersecurity. South Africa’s approach to international cyber governance debates has been cautious and noncommittal, reflecting cyber diplomacy’s relatively low priority in its national strategy. What position South Africa takes in cyber debates is, however, of keen interest to the international community. An important question is whether South Africa will support the existing multistakeholder approach to cyber governance that is championed by like-minded states or join China and Russia in their efforts to recalibrate this approach and push for greater state control over cyberspace. Indeed, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa has not yet published its national position explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. A related question is whether South Africa will join like-minded states in elaborating how existing international law applies to cyberspace or side with China and Russia to campaign for new, bespoke international law (for example, treaties) to regulate this domain. When examining these questions, it is important to recognize the context of the ANC’s long-standing ties with Russia, both during its thirty years in government and in its previous decades struggling for national liberation. This is helpful for understanding South Africa’s interactions with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (which form the BRICS bloc with South Africa) and forecasting its future positions in cyber governance debates. For example, South Africa has been reluctant to unambiguously condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it appears to have supported Moscow by covertly supplying it with weapons. In the longer term, South Africa’s positions in cyber diplomacy debates will likely be shaped by trends in both domestic politics—such as the ANC’s waning electoral performance—and the success of digital development. In this context, it is perhaps advisable for like-minded states, such as the United States, to focus on cyber capacity-building assistance and ensure that these efforts play into the wider development agenda in South Africa.
Topic:
Corruption, Poverty, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, and Racial Justice
Political Geography:
Africa, Iran, and South Africa