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81. The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative – Lessons from Ukraine

Author:
Aspen Digital
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a watershed moment, and unique in that a major nation-state had engaged in coordinated, convergent digital and physical attacks in an effort to conquer a neighboring country. Leaders will draw lessons from this conflict for years, but one is already clear: the ability to deliver cyber defense assistance must be a key national security capability. Informed by the ongoing work of a variety of organizations providing operational cyber support to Ukrainian institutions through the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative, this paper seeks to define cyber defense assistance, outline its primary component parts, and identify key lessons learned that can help inform how such assistance can be provided in future geopolitical conflicts. It also makes the case that an effective national security toolkit requires the ability to deliver cyber defense assistance to allies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

82. India in the Indo-Pacific: Pursuing Prosperity and Security

Author:
Christopher Conte
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
Research Papers in this compendium include: India, the Blue Economy and the Indo-Pacific’s Future (Amb. Rajiv Bhatia); Green Hydrogen: Securing the Energy Supply Chain in the Indo-Pacific (Amit Bhandari); Enhancing Regional Financial Intermediation in the Indo-Pacific (David Rasquinha); India’s Diaspora: Soft Power in the Indo-Pacific Countries (Sifra Lentin); India in the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative: Opportunities, Challenges & Possible Collaborations (Roger C. Liu); India’s Indispensable Role in Human and Economic Security in the Indo-Pacific (Cleo Paskal); Extending India’s Maritime Security Strategy in the Indo-Pacific (Cdr. Amrut Godbole); India’s Current and Potential Contribution to Cyber Resilience in the Indo-Pacific (Sameer Patil); Digital Public Goods for the Indo-Pacific: A Techno-legal Approach to Data Empowerment & Protection (Sanjay Anandaram & Manjeet Kripalani); India’s Role in Equipping Earth Observation Satellites for the Indo-Pacific (Dr. Chaitanya Giri).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Economy, Maritime, Prosperity, Supply Chains, Hydrogen, and Satellite
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Indo-Pacific

83. Russian Perceptions of Military AI, Automation, and Autonomy

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
President Vladimir Putin declared 2021 to be the Year of Science and Technology in Russia, with November named as the month of artificial intelligence (AI), signaling Russian leadership’s strong interest in this umbrella term. The Russian defense sector is particularly captivated by the opportunities associated with AI-based technologies. In recent years, AI, robotics, as well as the further integration of automation and autonomy into weapons systems and military decision-making have all been highlighted as priorities for modernizing the Russian armed forces. In 2017, Putin famously said that “artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind … Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” Quoting these words, analysts often attribute Russia’s development, testing, and use of weaponized AI to the necessity of competing in the so-called global AI race or the global tech race with the current leading AI developers: the United States and China. While the perceived need to compete and catch up is part of Russia’s motivations, its interest in military AI should not only be attributed to a quest for relative power. Understanding the depth and complexity of the debates surrounding AI, autonomy, and automation in Russia requires an examination of discussions about its strategic implications for the Russian army, the perceived benefits and risks of autonomy, and, more broadly, the importance of technological modernization and innovation for Russia’s place in the world. This report aims to provide an overview of the different conceptions and motivations, both oriented towards domestic and international audiences, that have been and are guiding Russian political and military leaderships in their ambitions to pursue weaponized AI. First, it outlines the various factors, both external and internal, behind the quest for pursuing AI, autonomy, and automation in the Russian military. Second, it presents some of the Russian plans in this area, what is known about their capabilities, and the challenges to strengthening them. Third, it dives into Russian debates on autonomy, and especially autonomous weapons systems, as well as discussions on the ethics of developing so-called “killer robots,” or autonomous combat robots (боевые роботы, or военные роботы), a term often used in the Russian-language literature. The analysis is based on a survey of open-source materials, including media reports, press releases, official statements and speeches, peer-reviewed articles and think tank reports, as well as publications in Russian military journals. The author would like to present it as the first step in an ongoing doctoral research project, as well as a contribution to the emerging English-language literature on how weaponized AI is perceived in Russia.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, Automation, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

84. Electronic Warfare: Russia's Approach

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia considers electronic warfare (EW) one of the key military capabilities in its ongoing confrontation with the West. EW provides a non-nuclear deterrence capability and helps Russia keep its great power status and strategic autonomy while also taking into account its long-term economic and demographic weakness. Russia has made significant advances in EW during the 2010s. However, at the beginning of 2020s, Russia still faces technological, technical, industrial, organizational, and political challenges that prevent Moscow from getting the EW capabilities it wants. Technological challenges are related to delays in developing air- and space-based EW capabilities, and to the need to unify EW systems. Technical challenges stem from the number of different types of EW systems that must be maintained, the relatively short lifespans of various EW systems, and issues integrating them with other combat systems and units. The last point also indicates why Russia has struggled to transform its quantity of the EW systems into a higher quality of combat capabilities. Industrial challenges are caused by the volatile dynamic of Russia’s arms procurements and R&D programs and the capacity of defense corporations to develop and produce advanced EW systems with acceptable costs. The main organizational challenge is that the number of EW troops that has already achieved its objective limit. Now EW troops need to be transformed from combat support into a combat branch. Finally, a political challenge appears in the confrontation between Russia and the West, which is the main driver for efforts related to EW. Russia is unable to compete with the United States and Europe in a symmetric way, and Russia’s political system does not allow Moscow to realize a “revolution in military affairs” because the centralized system struggles to implement a net-centric approach to the armed forces in effective way. For that reason, Russia has chosen a classic approach of asymmetric warfare with the goal of disrupting the command and control systems of a superior adversary. The coming decade promises to be challenging for Russia in terms of electronic warfare. Moscow will need to fix its previous EW efforts, pay more attention to the overall quality of electronic warfare rather than on the quantity of deployed EW systems, and bridge the evident gaps in EW on tactical, theater, and strategic levels. Moreover, after defense spending stabilized and even declined during the late 2010s, Russia has been forced to increase its defense budget again. This means spending for EW will also increase. Russia will try to fill gaps in air- and space-based EW capabilities, with the sea-based component continuing to play a secondary role in Russia’s military planning. It is also possible that Russia will chose to extend its ground-based EW infrastructure in Belarus with creation of an EW “chain” from Crimea to Kaliningrad.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Military, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

85. Why Belgium Needs a Cyber Command

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 19 October 2022, the Belgian Ministry of Defence declared the Initial Operating Capability of its new Cyber Command. Responding to the trend of states seeking competitive advantages in a new operational domain – as illustrated by several high-profile cyber-attacks on Belgian State institutions – the choice for developing a new instrument of statecraft has been made. This Egmont Policy Brief outlines the growing importance of developing cyber defence capabilities, discusses the organisational set-up for this Cyber Command, and finally zooms in on the challenges ahead.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

86. U.S.-ROK Strategy for Enhancing Cooperation on Combating and Deterring Cyber-Enabled Financial Crime

Author:
Jason Bartlett
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The May 2022 U.S.-ROK Summit between President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk-yeol revitalized previous bilateral commitments to establish a joint cyber working group to address the growing issue of cyber-enabled financial crime with specific emphasis on cryptocurrency, blockchain technology, and illicit North Korean cyber activity.1 This report provides specific policy recommendations for Washington and Seoul to incorporate within the cyber working group to enhance cooperation on combating and deterring cyber-enabled financial crime, especially from state-sponsored actors. North Korea has become the greatest state-sponsored threat to the global financial services sector. From 2021 to June 2022 alone, North Korean cyber operatives and their facilitators stole more than $1 billion (in U.S. currency, as throughout this report unless otherwise indicated) in digital assets through hacking cryptocurrency exchanges and laundering the stolen funds using various financial technologies and obfuscation techniques, including cryptocurrency mixers and foreign over-the-counter brokers. Pyongyang will likely maintain this position as long as the potential gains of cyber operations against financial services are greater than the potential risks and resources needed to conduct these operations. Washington and Seoul must work together to change this reality. This report compiles the findings of a year-long research project to generate actionable policy recommendations for Washington and Seoul to incorporate within their joint cyber working group to strengthen joint deterrence against state-sponsored cyber-enabled financial crime that continues to target both U.S. and South Korean social, financial, and cyber infrastructure. Based on intensive field research and interviews with U.S. and ROK stakeholders, this report outlines current challenges to enhancing U.S.-ROK cyber coordination, details the evolution of North Korea’s cyber program and modern-day threats, provides policy recommendations for the joint cyber working group, and includes an appendix with all relevant U.S. and ROK agencies that can contribute valuable expertise to the group.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Financial Crimes
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

87. Following the Crypto: Using Blockchain Analysis to Assess the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of North Korean Hackers

Author:
Jason Bartlett
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Under heavy and sustained pressure from decades of economic sanctions, North Korea has rapidly expanded its illicit activity within the cyber domain. In particular, Pyongyang has demonstrated an increasing interest in using evolving financial platforms, such as cryptocurrency and blockchain technology, to compensate for the fiscal losses related to economic sanctions on more traditional forms of commercial activity. Since 2014, the Pyongyang-led cybercrime organization known as the Lazarus Group has transformed from a rogue team of hackers to a masterful army of cybercriminals and foreign affiliates, capable of compromising major national financial networks and stealing hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of virtual assets. The international community and national governments often incorrectly correlate North Korea’s lack of access to modern computer hardware within its borders to its ability to successfully execute software-reliant cyberattacks. While Beijing and Moscow captivate the attention of most democratic governments concerned about pending cyber intrusions, Pyongyang continues to defy miscalculated expectations by successfully employing myriad sophisticated cyberattacks that target new and developing financial technology. North Korea will likely continue to adapt its cybercrime tactics targeting cryptocurrency to circumvent obstacles presented by economic sanctions on more traditional forms of financial activity and commerce. This report provides in-depth analysis of North Korea’s demonstrated ability to exploit financial technologies, in particular cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, to procure funds for its illicit nuclear and ballistic weapons development programs. This research was supported through blockchain analysis conducted in partnership with TRM Labs, a leading blockchain intelligence firm that seeks to monitor, investigate, and mitigate crypto fraud and financial crime. Through analyzing three case studies of major North Korean hacks, this report outlines key strengths and vulnerabilities in the Lazarus Group’s campaigns to infiltrate cryptocurrency exchanges and steal, launder, and liquidate funds. The report also provides a snapshot of key policy oversights within the regulatory environment in the crypto space of central stakeholders and countries, such as China, the United States, and South Korea. Lastly, this study offers a prospective look into the future of North Korea–led crypto hacks and provides a series of policy recommendations to strengthen cyber resilience against these efforts.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Cybersecurity, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

88. Cybersecurity and Human Rights in the Western Balkans: Mapping Governance and Actors – Case Study Serbia

Author:
Maja Bjelos and Marija Pavlovic
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
Despite a solid legal framework, Serbia’s fight against cyber attacks and crime progresses slowly due to the chronic lack of qualified staff, as well as the politicized priorities of the competent institutions. This is one of the conclusions of the latest publication on the cybersecurity context in Serbia. Official statistics indicate an increasing trend in the number of cyber attacks and cybercrime cases in Serbia. About 26 million significant cyber attacks on information and communication technology (ICT) systems occurred in 2020 – the most common of which involved attempted intrusions into ICT systems and unauthorized data collection. Serbian citizens also witnessed massive violations of their right to privacy and personal data during the pandemic, as well as an increase in the number of attacks against human rights defenders and political dissidents in the digital and physical space. In late 2021, the idea of using biometric surveillance to counter terrorism and organized crime was reintroduced. However, due to the rapid backsliding of democracy and the rule of law, citizens fear that the new face recognition technologies will be directed against them, rather than against criminals and potential terrorists. Since the beginning of 2022, there have been several attempts to commit internet fraud and steal the identities and data of users of the Raiffeisen Bank and the Post of Serbia. In the most recent incident, a hacker attacked the country’s cadastre and shared electronic reports about bombs planted in various public and private institutions, causing widespread concern in society and temporarily disabling the day-to-day work of the institutions affected. Threats to journalists via social networks have also become more frequent. Cyber attacks are now a part of daily life in Serbia, and threats posed by the internet and social networks are likely to intensify and become more complicated in the future. It is therefore important for state authorities to be prepared to respond to any challenge, risk, or threat quickly and effectively, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy addresses the topic of cybercrime from the perspective of human rights and the rule of law. In this context, the centre conducted a baseline analysis and 22 interviews with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in Serbia, from mid-January to end March 2022, to assess the level of legal and institutional development of the competent authorities in the area of information and cyber security, as well as the challenges facing cybersecurity and human rights in the country. This publication is part of the larger report that focuses on mapping cybersecurity-related human rights opportunities and challenges, and represents an area that is under-explored in the region. There are six chapters in total, one for each economy in the Western Balkans. Each begins with essential conceptual background information regarding the cybersecurity and human rights contexts of each economy. They then each explore four core thematic issues: cybersecurity and the right to privacy, cybersecurity and freedom of expression, cybersecurity and freedom of peaceful assembly (and, where relevant, freedom of association), and cybersecurity and anti-discrimination. Finally, they present ways forward, with concrete recommendations for stakeholders. The study as a whole aims to offer recommendations for the inclusion of human rights standards in cybersecurity governance and for better implementation of cybersecurity norms within the human rights frameworks of the Western Balkans region.
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

89. AI Startups and the Fight Against Mis/Disinformation Online: An Update

Author:
Anya Schiffrin, Hiba Beg, Pablo Eyzaguirre, Zachey Kliger, Tianyu Mao, Aditi Rukhaiyar, Kristen Saldarini, and Ojani Walthrust
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The events following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have shown again the power of online mis/disinformation. As it continues to grow and spread, there are new and continuing attempts to address this problem. These include supply-side and demand-side fixes (including media-literacy programs, fact-checking and, in Europe, new regulations) but few of these have scaled. This paper looks at one kind of supply-side attempt to tackle the prevalence of online mis/disinformation: the market for tech-based solutions that use some form of artificial intelligence (AI) machine/deep learning for content moderation, media integrity, and verification. This paper presents the findings of interviews of 20 niche firms that use AI to identify online mis/disinformation, many of which were previously surveyed for a 2019 paper on the role of AI startups in the fight against disinformation. These companies did not release their revenue figures but it seems that the market for their services is smaller than many entrepreneurs had originally hoped, and that Google and Facebook are not relying on such firms for help in identifying online mis/disinformation. The cost of the services provided by these startups and the desire to keep things in-house and protect their activities from outside scrutiny are part of why the tech giants do not rely on small startups for help with screening online mis/disinformation. This may be why funding for these startups does not seem to have grown significantly and so more than half of them are now focusing on the business-to-business market, selling mis/disinformation mitigation services to, for example, insurance companies, large public entities, and governments, among others. There also appears to be a limited market for business-to-consumer solutions for detecting mis/disinformation. However, continuing advances in AI as well as forthcoming regulation by the European Union and the United Kingdom will continue to spur innovation, which may stimulate demand. University initiatives, academics, journalism organizations, and cybersecurity experts are all also trying to come up with ways to identify and control the spread of mis/disinformation. Ultimately, despite its advances, technology alone will not solve the online mis/disinformation problem. Giant social media platforms have few financial incentives to crack down on this—quite the opposite, in fact. To push social media platforms to act against online mis/disinformation and illegal speech, regulation must deftly address the issue while preserving freedom of expression. There is a further problem in the form of the political polarization that has intensified in the United States and other parts of the world. Fixing this is likely to be well beyond the role of business and technologists.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Startup
Political Geography:
Global Focus

90. NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security

Author:
Merle Maigre
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace.
Topic:
NATO, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus