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111. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:
Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

112. Behind the rise of ransomware

Author:
John Sakellariadis
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief investigates the drivers of the ransomware surge that menaced the United States in the summer of 2021, explains why these attacks remain a persistent threat today, and offers recommendations for mitigating the problem in the future. The 2021 surge in ransomware activity stems from a change in how criminals launch ransomware attacks. Between 2016 and 2019, cybercriminals shifted away from automated ransomware campaigns that emphasized scale to targeted extortion operations against organizations and established businesses. This adaptation made ransomware more disruptive and more profitable, eventually attracting the attention of well-organized cybercrime gangs. The intensification of the ransomware epidemic from that point until the attack on Colonial Pipeline resulted from the growing adoption of this new extortion model among criminals. Though the US government has devoted more attention to ransomware over the ensuing months, ransomware remains a significant and long-term threat to the US economy. Three factors drive the persistence of the problem: the presence of a vast pool of security-poor organizations, the availability of a poorly regulated monetization pipeline in the form of cryptocurrency, and criminals’ ability to evade law enforcement by exploiting jurisdictional boundaries. Mitigating just one of these conditions, let alone all three, will demand years of sustained effort. Because the US government cannot eliminate ransomware overnight, it must begin planning how to manage the problem over the long term. To do so, it should start by investing in new efforts to improve the defenses of small- to medium-sized entities. The ease of compromising these organizations has been key to fueling the appetite for ransomware attacks. Yet, many of these organizations lack the personnel, incentives, and contracting power to secure their own networks. Moreover, the US government should require all US-based organizations to report ransomware payments to the government and publish quarterly reports with anonymized versions of the data. Comprehensive payment transparency offers the best way to measure success against ransomware over the long term. It will ensure that success against targeted ransomware is judged in terms of the overall volume of ransomware payments, not just the absence of attacks on high-risk or high-profile entities.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Ransomware
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

113. China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

Author:
Bulelani Jili
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives. For the Chinese government, investment in surveillance technologies advances both its ambitions of becoming a global technology leader as well as its means of domestic social control. These developments also foster further collaboration between state security actors and private tech firms. Accordingly, the tech firms that support state cyber capabilities range from small cyber research start-ups to leading global tech enterprises. The state promotes surveillance technology and practices abroad through diplomatic exchanges, law enforcement cooperation, and training programs. These efforts encourage the dissemination of surveillance devices, but also support the government’s goals concerning international norm-making in multilateral and regional institutions. The proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology and cyber tools and the associated linkages between both state and private Chinese entities with those in other states, especially in the Global South, is a valuable component of Chinese state efforts to expand and strengthen their political and economic influence worldwide. Although individual governments purchasing Chinese digital tools have their local ambitions in mind, Beijing’s export and promotion of domestic surveillance technologies shape the adoption of these tools in the Global South. As such, investigating how Chinese actors leverage demand factors for their own aims, does not undercut the ability of other countries to detect and determine outcomes. Rather it demonstrates an interplay between Chinese state strategy and local political environments. This paper specifically focuses on key features in China’s surveillance ecosystem, while the companion to this report will focus on the key ‘pull factors’ from African countries and their significance for US interests.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

114. The Two Technospheres Western-Chinese Technology Decoupling: Implications for Cybersecurity

Author:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Decoupling of digital innovation, systems, and data flows between Western nations and China is a growing global issue with high potential to destabilize the digital world. Through a series of workshops and an analysis of existing efforts, the Multilateral Cyber Action Committee (MCAC) has provided an assessment on the current status of technology decoupling and the growing divergence of the Western and Chinese technospheres. The report provides a set of recommendations for action to mitigate the growing cybersecurity risks posed by technology decoupling.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and North America

115. A Shared Responsibility: Public-Private Cooperation for Cybersecurity

Author:
Eugenia Lostri, James Andrew Lewis, and Georgia Wood
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Cybersecurity is a priority for Congress and for the Biden administration as online crime and espionage reach unparalleled heights. To improve cybersecurity in federal agencies and in critical infrastructure, the administration has built a strong team, elevated the positions of White House officials dealing with the issue, and released a series of policy directives. In Congress, 157 pieces of legislation addressing cybersecurity were introduced during 2021, with proposals ranging from capacity building and workforce development to updating federal policy. Crime and espionage have made cybersecurity a national priority, and action on cybersecurity is more likely than ever in 2022. CSIS convened two private roundtables with senior government officials and senior information security executives from major enterprises in a range of U.S. industry sectors. The goals of the roundtables were to identify common challenges, discuss best practices, and outline avenues for cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Governance, Cybersecurity, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

116. Creating Accountability for Global Cyber Norms

Author:
James A. Lewis
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The year 2021 saw all UN member states agree in the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, based on norms developed in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2015.1 The OEWG formalized global agreement on the 2015 norms. This consensus agreement means that the framework for responsible state behavior is now politically binding for all member states. Global agreement on the obligations for responsible state behavior is a substantial step forward in building international cybersecurity in a rules-based environment. Unfortunately, international experience since 2015 has shown that agreement on norms, even when politically binding, is by itself not enough to ensure their observation or create stability in cyberspace. This has shifted discussion from what norms are needed to how to build accountability and what to do when norms are ignored. While the norms agreed to by all member states will ultimately reinforce international stability, to make progress, it will be necessary to develop a collective diplomatic strategy to improve the observation of norms and increase accountability when they are ignored. A strategy of sustained engagement and the imposition of consequences is necessary for norms to have effect. Our assumption is that accountability for malicious cyber actions can only be strengthened if there are consequences for a state’s decision not to observe norms. If nothing else, a failure to take action in response to transgressions seems to only encourage opponents. An immediate task is to define the conditions for collective action. There has been an initial and informal agreement among like-minded democratic nations that accountability requires the imposition of consequences for a failure to observe norms, but several issues must be addressed. These include agreement on standards for attribution of the source of a malicious action and agreement on a proportional, lawful, and effective response. A collective approach is essential if efforts to create accountability are to succeed, and any response to a cyber incident will require political heft and sustained engagement.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, United Nations, Cybersecurity, Accountability, Transparency, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

117. Will Artificial Intelligence Hone North Korea's Cyber “All-Purpose Sword”?

Author:
Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Jenny Jun, and Diana Myers
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How is the increasing spread of artificial intelligence (AI) likely to shape the cyber capabilities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea) in the coming years? Over the past decade, cyber tools have become an important enabler of the Kim Jong Un regime’s quest to achieve its policy objectives. Today, as a result of sustained investments by Pyongyang, the DPRK has developed an increasingly sophisticated set of cyber capabilities, which it has used to substantial effect against foreign militaries, banks, companies, media outlets, and individuals. While the regime has been able to achieve much through cyberattacks relying on traditional human operators, there are some areas where automating cyberattacks may prove attractive to the North. At the same time, demand for trained cybersecurity professionals usually far outstrips supply, and AI for cyberdefense may be an area where the regime ultimately feels compelled to invest, either to offset human capital shortfalls, or as adversary AI-enabled cyberattacks grow more sophisticated. Is North Korea about to make the leap to AI-enabled cyberattacks or cyber defense? Or will the country’s international isolation impair its ability to pair up AI with its existing cyber capabilities?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

118. Countering global oil theft: responses and solutions

Author:
Etienne Romsom
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
This second of two papers on global oil theft discusses ways to reduce oil theft, misappropriation, and fraud. At US$133 billion per year, oil is the largest stolen natural resource globally, while fuel is the most smuggled natural resource. Oil theft equates to 5–7 per cent of the global market for crude oil and petroleum fuels. It is so engrained in the energy supply chain that thefts are priced in by traders and tolerated by many shipping companies as petty theft. Oil theft and related insecurity have substantial negative economic effects on developing countries, whether they produce oil or not. In 2012, non-oil-producing Benin saw a 28 per cent drop in taxable income after a spate of oil tanker hijacking incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in 2011. In Nigeria, the oil capacity shut-in and amount of oil deferred is more than twice the amount estimated as stolen, with a US$20 billion annual loss in petroleum profit tax—63 per cent of total government tax revenue in 2019. Organized oil crime syndicates are often transnational and conduct theft and fraud professionally, exploiting gaps in jurisdiction and adapting their practices when law enforcement becomes more effective. They evolve from ship piracy to stealing tanker cargoes to kidnapping tanker crews; from physical ransom of assets to digital hijacking via ransomware. The proceeds of oil theft often finance other organized crime, and it triggers violence against the community and in crime-on-crime activities. Twelve commonalities in oil theft and fraud have been identified that can direct international solutions, in three target areas: stolen oil volumes, stolen oil transport, and stolen oil money. Prosecution for acts of bribery offers opportunities for action: transport of or payment for illegal oil could constitute a bribe under the US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act if government officials were involved in the transaction or shipment. Bribe charges could be raised for paid ‘services’ that facilitate oil theft (through action or non-action).
Topic:
Corruption, Oil, Piracy, Cybersecurity, Fossil Fuels, Tax Evasion, and Theft
Political Geography:
Global Focus

119. Cybersecurity for innovative small and medium enterprises and academia

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer, Melanie J. Teplinsky, and Robert J Butler
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Innovation is fundamental to United States global leadership, critical both for the economy and for national security. Yet the resilience of the US innovation ecosystem against adversary cyber espionage and attack—most specifically from China—has not received the attention required, particularly given the essential innovation roles played by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and by academia. In response to that challenge, this report sets forth a proposal for expert-provided cybersecurity resilient architectures for SMEs and academia that are engaged in the development and operation of key emerging and advanced technologies. Such cybersecurity resilient architectures would be operated by the private sector and funded through the establishment of transferable cybersecurity investment tax credits. The use of such architectures for the protection of emerging and advanced technologies would play a key role in ensuring that the United States maintains its worldwide innovation leadership.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Innovation, Academia, and Resilience
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

120. What do we know about cyber operations during militarized crises?

Author:
Michael Fischerkeller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Department of Defense (DoD) will soon kick off the drafting of its cyber strategy and cyber posture review to align US cyber capabilities and operating concepts with the foreign policy objectives of the Joseph Biden-Kamala Harris administration. Given that the administration describes China as the “pacing threat,” debates over the best use of cyber operations and campaigns will likely be framed by US-China interaction in day-to-day competition, and by a potential militarized crisis and war over the status of Taiwan. This essay focuses on how cyber operations employed during militarized crises are likely to impact escalation management. Policymakers may be attracted to the idea that cyber operations could serve as de-escalatory offramps in a crisis. Such expectations should be tempered, if not completely set aside, for two reasons. First, there is no experience with cyber operations employed during a militarized crisis between two nuclear-armed peers. Absent direct experience, all one can rely on is academic research. Yet, secondly, deductive and empirical academic research provides no basis for confidence that cyber operations are either de-escalatory or non-escalatory in the context of militarized crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, Crisis Management, and Militarization
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America