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41. A pillar of stability in an unstable world

Author:
Stefania Benaglia and Dylan Macchiarini Crosson
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The rising centrality of the Indo-Pacific is self-evident. What remains to be defined is the potential role the EU could play, notably as a security actor. Given capacity constraints, the EU’s objectives in the region should focus on credibility and on safeguarding shared interests – for example securing sea lines of communication, an objective also shared by Japan. Hard power remains the preferred language in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia unceremoniously dumping the French contract over US nuclear technology in the AUKUS affair, as well as India’s reluctance to take a position against Russia, a major provider of defence equipment, over its full-blown invasion of Ukraine demonstrate that being able to speak the language of power in a credible and reliable way takes precedence. While the EU will unlikely become a defence security provider à la the United States, it is now clear that it must evolve its global stance. The adoption of the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy and cross-references to it in the EU’s Strategic Compass represent an important milestone for bolstering its security and defence posture. The EU would do well to support its efforts to be a more credible security and defence actor in the Indo-Pacific by upgrading relations with its strategic partners, Japan in primis. Further operational, capabilities development, and industrial cooperation with Japan must be considered and reinforced by triangulation with other strategic partners in the region.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Political stability, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, and Asia

42. Britain, Germany, and the Rise of Competitive Virtue Signaling

Author:
Roderick Parkes
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
In 2016, British and German officials were clear: they wanted quickly to put Brexit behind them and cooperate on big ticket items like the international rule of law. Now, in 2022, the pair in fact seem to be competing more than they cooperate. Germany wants to shine in comparison with Britain, and the UK sees advantages for its own standing if Germany falls short. This “competitive virtue signaling” defines Germany and the UK’s post-Brexit rivalry, and – oddly – might lead to tighter relations.
Topic:
European Union, Brexit, Rivalry, Cooperation, and Competition
Political Geography:
Britain, Europe, and Germany

43. US-ROK Cooperation Can Improve IP Protection in Southeast Asia by a Strategic Focus on Online Counterfeiting

Author:
Seth Hays
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Mr. Seth Hays, Chief Representative, Asia-Pacific, at the International Trademark Association, explains that “both the US and ROK cooperate with ASEAN countries to improve IP protections, including on the issue of online counterfeits, most notably through their respective IP offices: the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Korean Intellectual Property Office.”
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Cooperation, and Counterfeiting
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

44. US-South Korea and the Philippines: Towards a Trilateral Security Initiative

Author:
Julio S. Amador III
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Julio Amador, Executive Director at the Philippine American Educational Foundation and Interim President of the Foundation for the National Interest, explains that “…A trilateral initiative would depend on two critical factors: 1) the growing ties between the Philippines and South Korea and 2) the extension of South Korea’s commitment beyond peninsular affairs to encompass the entire region.”
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Alliance, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, Philippines, North America, and United States of America

45. Examining Philippine-US Cooperation Amid the Covid-19 Pandemic: Setting a Broader Agenda for Educating Filipino Children and Youth

Author:
Glenda Lopez Wui
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Ma. Glenda Lopez Wui, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ateneo de Manila University, explains that “[t]he US Government has been providing support to the Philippines to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on Filipino students,” including providing nearly $3 million in funds and equipment to support education delivery.
Topic:
Education, Bilateral Relations, COVID-19, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Philippines, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

46. US-Japan Development Cooperation for Stability and Prosperity in the Pacific Islands Region

Author:
Hideyuki Shiozawa
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Mr. Hideyuki Shiozawa, Senior Program Officer, Pacific Island Nations Program Team, Ocean Policy Research Institute, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, accounts for regional complexities and Japan-US synergies as he outlines possible structures for Japan-US trilateral development cooperation with Pacific Island partners.
Topic:
Development, Political stability, Foreign Assistance, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

47. The Sky is the Limit: The Azerbaijan-Israel-Türkiye Trio and the Greater Middle East

Author:
Rusif Huseynov
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, the director of Azerbaijan's Topchubashov Center, Rusif Huseynov writes on the existing and potential security and economic cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan, as well as the strategic link both countries share with Turkey.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Azerbaijan

48. New Standard Indicators for German Development Cooperation: How Useful are “Numbers at the Touch of a Button”?

Author:
Heiner Janus and Daniel Esser
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
For years, German development cooperation (GDC) has been striving to become more results-oriented. In 2022, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) took an important step in this direction by introducing 43 standard indicators. The aim was to aggregate development results across themes and countries in order to present them to the public. The BMZ hopes for more effective communication with Parliament (Bundestag) and the general public, as well as more coherent reporting by Germany’s two main implementing organisations, the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – the German agency for international cooperation) and the development bank of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). From an international vantage point, Germany needs to catch up in respect to results orientation. Other major actors, especially the United Kingdom, the United States and multilateral development banks, introduced compre-hensive reporting systems back in the 2010s. These organisations report on 20 to 50 standard indicators to demonstrate how their activities contribute to measurable results. On this basis, they communicate more coherently with the public. BMZ aims to create a similar basis for improved communication. In a participatory process – and jointly with the GIZ and the KfW development bank – the BMZ has formulated indicators that are equally suited to implementing organisations’ political priorities and their needs. The administrative burden of collecting the standard indicators is limited by leveraging existing data. In addition, the BMZ has set methodological standards whose obligatory use is intended to increase the quality of the data collected. However, the introduction of standard indicators also entails risks: They can set perverse incentives that encourage reporting on short-term results. Such reporting can lead to a neglect of long-term effects, which are more difficult to measure. Research also shows that indicators no longer fulfil their original purpose of providing neutral representations of change if they are used to exert political control. In addition, there are methodological challenges, such as double counting across different benchmarks, as well as concerns about unrealisable expectations. Overall, we assess the development and introduction of standard indicators in GDC positively. Yet, some important decisions are still pending. The level of detail at which the data will be shared among stakeholders and the public has yet to be determined. The quality of the data collected and the transparency of reporting will in turn determine what larger effects towards an improved results orientation of GDC can be achieved. In view of the decentralised and fragmented structure of GDC, especially regarding monitoring and evaluation systems, we hope that the new indicators can foster the harmonising of the reporting systems of the GIZ and the KfW development bank. The standard indicators can also help make GDC more transparent. We therefore recommend that all data collected be made publicly available. Finally, the integrative potential of standard indicators should be harnessed to improve the division of labour between the ministry and the two main implementing organisations towards becoming learning-oriented – both in the data collection process and during evaluation.
Topic:
Development, Government, Development Aid, Cooperation, and Impact Evaluation
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

49. The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex

Author:
Raluca Csernatoni
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Is the European Union (EU) about to rise as a defense technological actor on the world stage? According to conventional wisdom, attempts at greater European integration in security and defense were not likely to amount to much, given that such policy fields have long been considered the reserved domain of the EU member states or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This working paper goes beyond this traditional state-centered approach by looking at past and recent institutional efforts to consolidate European security and cooperation on defense industry and technology. Such efforts have continued despite the disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic, owing to the bloc’s willingness to become a stronger security and defense actor on the global stage. The timing of this shift was facilitated by a set of circumstances that triggered a new European defense momentum. Contributing factors include the geopolitical pressures of Brexit, an unreliable transatlantic partner in the United States, concerns within European defense industries regarding dwindling national defense budgets and fierce global technological competition in high technology areas, and the European Commission’s growing supranational role in security and defense. This impetus was also facilitated by the privileged relationship between various EU institutions, European defense industrial actors, transnational interest and lobby groups, and organized expert bodies. In this respect, the defense industry and high-level expert and interest groups have occupied a central position in shaping EU policy processes, funding priorities, and security and defense research programs. Such a rapprochement between EU institutional structures and the European defense industry has allowed for the emergence of a so-called European defense technological and industrial complex (EDTIC). This European defense industrial ecosystem encompasses a wider variety of transnational actors beyond the political, military, and industrial groups typically present in national military-industrial complexes. It presents a dense, multilevel network of EU institutions and agencies; security and industrial stakeholders; national public authorities; and interest and expert groups, all of which both compete and cooperate to shape and set policy agendas. However, this rapprochement is also characterized by the absence of strong democratic control mechanisms and little political and public accountability concerning the surge in and direction of the European defense technological and industrial integration process. These transformations have the potential to make the union a more capable and strategically autonomous global defense technological actor. At the same time, they challenge existing EU democratic governance structures and processes. The EU’s security and defense policies remain tough areas for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight. The EU’s policymaking institutional machinery has been finely tuned to mediate power, keep things as technical and bureaucratic as possible, and to create package deals for certain defense industrial interests and member states’ political agendas. Yet, for real European integration in the field of security and defense, more political and democratic trust is needed across the continent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

50. Complementarity or Competition? Franco-British Cooperation and the European Horizon of French Defense Policy

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
What does future hold for the Franco-British defense partnership after Brexit? France and the United Kingdom have, for long, enjoyed a close defense relationship, thanks in part to their analogous strategic cultures. The 2010 Lancaster House treaties built on this proximity to expand cooperation in the fields of nuclear weapons, force projection, interoperability and industrial integration. In spite of genuine progress in the first years following the treaties, the Franco-British strategic partnership has had to face two pitfalls: on the one hand, Brexit and its political consequences for the United Kingdom, and, on the other hand, President Macron’s attempt to revive European defense and Franco-German cooperation. The tenth anniversary of Lancaster House should offer the opportunity to rethink the convergence between bilateral cooperation and the resolutely European horizon of French defense policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, and Germany