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11. Unfulfilled Hopes: Strategic Implications of Re-opening Libya’s Coastal Highway

Author:
Mustafa Gamal Omar
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
While many Libyans look forward to implement the outcome of the Berlin II Conference on Libya and achieve stability across their country, others believe that the first steps towards such stability should be through breaking the deadlock on unresolved issues. Such issues require urgent but decisive action, and the most prominent of which is the reopening of the coastal road between Sirte and Misrata. The announcement on June 20, 2021, by head of the National Unity Government, Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah, that the main coastal highway will be re-opened, following months of talks on a ceasefire, has revived Libyan hopes. The move is projected to yield significant political, security and economic benefits for the country. However, according to media reports circulated in late June, the 5+5 committee, formally named the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission, decided to put off the re-opening of the vital highway, claiming that only damages will be repaired, which made the situation murky once again. The 5+5 committee, on July 2, dispelled the confusion by announcing that the highway linking Sirte to Misrata will be re-opened over the next week upon the completion of maintenance work. Member of the committee, Major General Faraj Al-Sousaa, confirmed that arrangements were underway for the re-opening.
Topic:
Government, Armed Forces, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

12. In Russia's Hands: Nagorno-Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Nearly five months have passed since the 9 November 2020 ceasefire that ended the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The conflict broke out as a culmination of tensions that had been mounting for years, and had already resulted in two smaller flare-ups (one in April 2016 and another in July 2020). The war took a heavy toll on the lives of Azerbaijani and Armenian civilians, as well as claiming the lives of altogether more than 5,000 fighting personnel, and resulted in the displacement of approximately 70,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. This Brief analyses to what extent the ceasefire agreement has provided the ground for a lasting, stable and sustainable settlement. While the overall stability of a post-conflict situation may depend on a range of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables that could affect the resilience of the post-war status quo in the medium and long run. The first and second of these – the stability of the present post-war territorial configuration and the uncertain future legal status of the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that continue to be administered by the separatist de facto authorities – constitute underlying, inherent weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement. The third and probably most important factor is the Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed to Azerbaijan in order to maintain the ceasefire, because it brings in Russia’s political will as an independent variable that could fundamentally shape the overall settlement process. The deployment of Russian troops into Azerbaijan deserves special attention, because there is a theoretical possibility that it may lead to a new ‘freezing’ of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, instead of politically settling the conflict itself. The core problem is that should Moscow decide to keep its troops on Azeri soil even after their original five-year mandate expires, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan could prevent such a scenario. The Brief is structured as follows: in the first section, the weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement are analysed, while in the following section the role and potential future outcomes of the Russian peacekeeping mission are examined. The concluding section offers a forward-looking perspective on the post-war status quo.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, War, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

13. What does the Deraa surrender mean for Iran and Russia in Syria?

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In the southwest, the outside powers of relevance are Iran and Russia. The arrangement in place from July 2018 until now was the product of an uneasy standoff between them.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

14. A Ceasefire with Feet of Clay: The Potential Spoilers of Peace in Libya

Author:
Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
On 23 October 2020, negotiators from the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, the dialogue format between the forces of the UN-recognised Government of the National Accord (GNA) and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), signed a ceasefire in Geneva. Two days later, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) announced the launch of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), whose first round took place in Tunis between 9-15 November, after virtual sessions started on 28 October. Delegates agreed on a date for elections (24 December 2021) but not a new government, and will reconvene to continue negotiating at the end of November. While the announcement of the ceasefire and the political dialogue held in Tunis is obviously good news, the road ahead remains rife with challenges. The acting UNSMIL head, Stephanie Williams, has warned that many will seek, “for narrow personal and purposes, to corrupt and disrupt” the process. Looking ahead, four dynamics can spoil the process, undermining the prospects for a more sustainable political settlement in Libya: Haftar’s role; the situation of the global oil market; Turkey’s regional ambitions; and the economic interests of militia groups in Tripoli.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, United Nations, Conflict, Negotiation, Peace, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Libya and North America

15. Beyond the Ceasefire in Libya

Author:
Anas El Gomati and Ben Fishman
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Publicly committing to a ceasefire is a positive development, but many details still need to be resolved with active U.S. support, especially security arrangements in central Libya and the speedy resumption of oil exports. On August 21, the political leaders of the two main factions in Libya’s civil war—Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Speaker Aguila Saleh of the eastern-based House of Representatives—issued separate statements declaring a ceasefire and a freeze in military positions around Sirte and al-Jufrah. The move followed extensive diplomatic efforts by Germany, the United States, and the UN. Many of the deal’s terms will require further negotiation, but so far they entail establishing a demilitarized zone in central Libya and lifting the oil blockade that has cost the country $8 billion to date. Saleh also called for reformatting the Presidential Council and moving it from Tripoli to Sirte, while Sarraj called for holding national elections next March. The announcements grew out of the stalemate that set in after GNA-aligned forces pushed to the outskirts of Sirte in June. Since then, Egypt and Turkey have escalated their threats of direct military action, spurring intensified Western diplomacy to stave off a regional war. Of particular significance is Saleh replacing eastern military commander Khalifa Haftar in the negotiations. The latter’s sponsors in the United Arab Emirates and Egypt lost confidence in him after his fourteen-month offensive against Tripoli collapsed this May. In response to the new ceasefire, Haftar’s spokesman in the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) dismissed Sarraj’s statement, vowed to remain in Sirte, and completely ignored Saleh’s parallel statement, indicating deep divisions in east Libya and raising questions about who has authority over the LNA’s fighting forces. Saleh has not been a reliable diplomatic interlocutor in the past and remains under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. Thus, while Haftar is politically marginalized for now, he or other eastern commanders could still undermine the ceasefire.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Oil, Conflict, Proxy War, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

16. The Precarious Lull in Northeast Syria

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
New Year, Same Chaos in Syria.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, Ceasefire, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria