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241. Financing Capital Assets: The Missing Link in Defence Procurement

Author:
Vern Kakoschke
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Defence procurement in Canada has had some well-known challenges in recent years. Many commentators have suggested possible strategies for fixing the defence procurement system. The identified problems include overspending on defence programs, unnecessary and undue delays in re-equipping Canada’s fleet of aircraft, ships and ground transport, and defence budgets that remain unspent. The problems also include procuring authorities experiencing a shortfall in manpower and expertise, the inability to execute on defence procurements, unjustified sole-sourcing without a proper competition, political interference in selection issues, and the list goes on. The proposed solutions often address process-related matters: establish a single agency responsible for defence procurement or perhaps a cabinet secretariat to manage the involvement of three of four government departments who are often not on the same page. To date, not much has been written or discussed in public policy forums on a critical question: How should the necessary capital assets be financed? At one extreme, Canada could simply write a cheque and pay for them up front, thereby placing the assets on Canada’s balance sheet. At the other extreme, Canada could drop the financing obligation into the laps of private-sector bidders and let them worry about the most efficient way of raising the necessary capital. A middle-ground solution could involve a public-private partnership (P3) structure, a model which seeks to balance the interests of the public and private sectors in a manner that leads to a better solution for all parties. Any public policy discussion often begins with first principles. What is the government’s policy objective? It is to procure the best available equipment, with the most benefit to the Canadian economy or local interest groups and at the lowest possible cost. All three goals must be balanced in a manner that is politically acceptable, meets budget constraints and withstands public scrutiny. In major procurements, capital can be the largest single cost of a defence procurement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Armed Forces, Finance, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

242. Pruebas de ingreso como predictores del rendimiento académico en los aspirantes a soldados del Ejército (Entrance Tests as Predictors of Academic Performance in Army Soldier Applicants)

Author:
Germán Geovanny Muñoz Gualán and Efrain Eduardo Zambrano Rosales
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
El rendimiento académico del aspirante a soldado es el conjunto de indicadores de materias académicas, preparación física y actitud militar que presenta dentro del instituto de formación militar, puesto que el producto que se pretende entregar al Ejército y la sociedad, es un individuo disciplinado y preparado académica, militar y físicamente, acorde a los estándares establecidos en el Modelo de Educación Militar de Fuerzas Armadas y el plan de carrera en ciencias militares de la Universidad de Fuerzas Armadas – ESPE. Además, es necesario complementar esta formación al inculcar la convicción de hacer una carrera militar profesional y ética. Es así, que el objetivo planteado fue establecer los resultados de las pruebas de ingreso que predicen el rendimiento académico de los aspirantes a soldados de segundo año militar, promoción 2018-2020, de la Escuela de Formación de Soldados del Ejército Ecuatoriano “Vencedores del Cenepa”. Por lo cual, esta investigación presenta un enfoque cuantitativo, con diseño no experimental, de tipo transversal y un alcance correlacional. Se utilizó los promedios de las pruebas de ingreso y rendimiento académico por períodos académicos y corte anual de cada aspirante a soldado, del archivo y base de datos de la Escuela de Formación de Soldados “Vencedores del Cenepa”, para su tabulación en una matriz de Excel prediseñada y el posterior análisis estadístico en el programa SPSS. De modo que se observa una correlación significativa moderada, entre las pruebas académicas y físicas de ingreso con el rendimiento académico, una correlación baja con la actitud militar de los aspirantes a soldados y la no existencia de correlación con la deserción estudiantil. Además, las pruebas de ingreso que predicen de forma moderada el rendimiento académico y de forma baja la actitud militar de los aspirantes a soldados son las pruebas académicas y físicas de ingreso.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Army, and Academic Performance
Political Geography:
South America and Global Focus

243. The Russian Way of War in Syria: Implications for the West

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian Federation’s intervention in Syria is a watershed event. However the war there ends, its impact on Russia is likely to be profound. For the first time in its post-Soviet history, Russia’s military is fighting outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. In doing so, it is exercising military capabilities that had atrophied from long lack of use. Moscow is also rebuilding its diplomatic muscle through its role in Syria by managing a diverse coalition, leading a parallel peace process, and forcing the United States to take the Kremlin’s preferences into account when making decisions in the Middle East. Through Syria, Russia has reemerged on the geopolitical stage. The war is not over, and there are many ways in which things could still go badly for Russia. Moscow may find that a return to geopolitical prominence entails costs and risks at least as great as the rewards that status brings. Nevertheless, the West will be dealing with a Russia that has changed fundamentally through its experience in the war. Understanding these changes and their implications for Western governments is the focus of this conclusion chapter. It is structured around two questions. First, what does Syria tell us about how Russia fights its wars? Second, how has Russia’s experience in Syria affected the capabilities of its armed forces? Answering these questions should increase our understanding of Russia as a geopolitical actor and allow Western governments to make more effective policy on issues where Russia is a factor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

244. A Plan for U.S. Withdrawal from the Middle East

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Thinking through the process of transiting U.S. forces completely out of the Middle East gives additional depth to conversations on force reductions and further normalizes the idea that the United States can eventually leave the region. The underlying social and economic forces that produced the Arab Spring demonstrations of 2011 have not been adequately addressed. They will likely spark additional instability in the years ahead. This fact should affect not only U.S. considerations about decamping the region, but also the pace and speed of a withdrawal. Iranian missile capabilities—as demonstrated in the retaliatory attacks following the death of Qassem Soleimani–allow Tehran to increasingly contest U.S. presence in the region. This will be a long-term factor in U.S. basing decisions, regardless of force levels. The center of gravity for U.S. presence in the Middle East is the “core four” of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They account for more than half the total number of U.S. troops in the region and also host the most substantial physical basing infrastructure. The direction of a U.S. withdrawal should be away from the center and toward the periphery, with forces flowing from the Persian Gulf west and south toward redoubts in Jordan and Oman. A measured timetable of four years would allow the United States to significantly reduce its presence by as much as 50,000 military personnel when rotational deployments (like carrier deployments) are factored in. At the end of the four-year period, the United States would be postured to return to a role as offshore balancer with an option to completely withdraw from the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

245. The trip from Donbas: Ukraine’s pressing need to defend its veterans

Author:
Lauren Van Metre and John Boerstler
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The war in the Donbas is entering its sixth year no less violent, and no closer to a peace agreement, than when it began. When Russia invaded in 2014, the Ukrainian army was wholly unprepared. Many officers were corrupt, had long-standing relations with the Russian military from their days in the Soviet army, and lacked combat experience.1 Maidan revolutionaries became volunteer soldiers, and private-security-turned-militia groups sped to the front to stop the Russia-led separatist offensive. Six years later, Ukraine struggles to care for and reintegrate the 385,000 Donbas veterans and volunteer combatants, thirteen thousand of whom are legally disabled.2 A lack of support for veterans creates a critical void in Ukraine’s national security and hobbles its transition to democracy. Ukraine’s new Ministry of Veterans Affairs (MVA) consolidates approximately twenty disparate social services for veterans. With its establishment, politicians and civil society leaders agree that the country needs a comprehensive strategy for veterans care. The lack of care exacerbates several crises confronting veterans, including high rates of suicide, under- and unemployment, divorce, and domestic violence.3 It also leaves them alone to counter disinformation targeted at veterans by Russia. They are also vulnerable to recruitment by right-wing and oligarch-sponsored security services, as they seek employment and to recreate the unit solidarity of the front.4 An unfit veterans support network that provides little care risks veterans’ political and social disaffection, declining levels of recruitment and retention for the military, and the fracturing of families. Setting up a responsive veterans care system furthers Ukraine’s democratic transition. Citizen soldiers make up half of the army’s recruits. Architects, engineers, teachers, accountants—citizens from all walks of Ukrainian life—enlist on a regular basis for time at the front. The Ministry of Veterans Affairs needs to reinforce Ukraine’s emerging democratic political culture that honors citizen service and places constituent needs at the heart of governance. Care and protection for Ukraine’s veterans is also in the strategic interest of the United States, the European Union, and NATO, which seek a peaceful, stable, and undivided Europe. NATO continues to support Ukraine’s efforts to bring its security and defense sector closer to Alliance standards and practices, including strengthening civilian control and democratic oversight over the sector, improving planning and budgeting processes, and reforming the nation’s security services. Reform of Ukraine’s veterans policies bolsters NATO efforts by providing a roadmap for civilian oversight of veterans affairs and security service reform in the form of post-deployment transition and reintegration support for soldiers. A robust, comprehensive veterans support program aids recruitment and retention, leading to a stronger Ukrainian military more prepared for its combat operations in the east—a war whose outcome will determine European security for decades.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Veterans
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Donbas

246. Far, Far More Than Meets the Eye: Extended Deterrence in Complex Crises in Northeast Asia

Author:
Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Pacific Forum, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), brought 41 officials and experts from the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), along with eight Pacific Forum Young Leaders, all attending in their private capacity, to Maui, Hawaii, Sept. 5-6, 2019 to explore the three countries’ thinking about extended deterrence and prospects for and obstacles to strengthened trilateral security cooperation. A two-move tabletop exercise (TTX) was focused on concerted and coordinated efforts by China and North Korea to revise the status quo in Northeast Asia. Key findings include: Despite political difficulties, there was little difference among participants regarding assessments of the situation and dynamics in Northeast Asia. They were generally aligned and this was evident in responses to the TTX: they sought to prevent opportunism, provide off-ramps for adversaries, and didn’t rush to connect the incidents.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Armed Forces, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia

247. The US Troop Withdrawal Plan: Bogus Strategic Claims and a Warning Signal for Europe

Author:
Heinrich Brauß
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
President Trump wants to withdraw US troops from Germany because it spends too little on defense. US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, however, is trying to present the decision as the result of a strategic analysis. That seems grotesque. The withdrawal not only weakens NATO, but also the security of Europe and America’s ability to act. The Europeans must finally close their capability gaps, and Germany must make its armed forces fully operational earlier than planned.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

248. Fitness OSINT: Identifying and tracking military and security personnel with fitness applications for intelligence gathering purposes

Author:
Cyprian Aleksander Kozera
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of tracking and identifying military and other security personnel, operating in secretive or restricted areas. Such exposure might have dire consequences from the perspective of counterintelligence or physical security. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Social Media Intelligence methods and techniques were employed to gather and analyse information on security and military personnel and expose their activities on-line. The case studies presented in the article exemplify utilisation of the new “Suunto” fitness application for open-source-based intelligence research. Despite general Operational Security rules that require all personal data such as names, pictures and habits to be kept discreet, open-source based research with one of the most popular fitness applications allowed the identification of military personnel and government agents operating in Afghanistan, Mali, Syria or working at national military facilities. In a single case, it took the author less than thirty minutes to identify personal details of a US Army soldier in Afghanistan and a Special Forces officer in one of the European countries and obtain their home addresses and pictures of them and their families. The results of the research show how OSINT techniques concerning fitness applications are useful both for intelligence and counterintelligence, specifically for malicious and terrorist purposes, and how necessary it is to make fitness and other, supposedly personal, activity private, especially for those who carry out sensitive missions and work in a restricted or secretive environment.
Topic:
Intelligence, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, and OSINT
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Syria, Mali, and Global Focus

249. Operational control over non-state proxies

Author:
Filip Bryjka
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The intention of this paper is to clarify how state patrons control non-state proxy forces fighting on their behalf. In order to address the subject matter thoroughly, specific attention was paid to a number of questions including a) the criteria determining patronproxy relations, b) factors influencing the selection process of proxy forces, and c) principles governing the maximisation of potential benefits of using proxies, whilst simultaneously reducing risks and associated costs. The author applied a neo-realistic research paradigm to his work. Patron-proxy relations were presented in the context of the principal-agent theory, as well as through detailed analysis of ongoing scenarios involving Iran and Hezbollah, Russia and the Donbass separatists, Pakistan and Kashmiri militias, the US and Syrian rebels. The essence of war by proxy is to influence the strategic result of an armed conflict without direct, full-scale, military intervention. The use of non-state proxy, external actors is aimed at maximising their political goals and strategic interests whilst maintaining “plausible deniability”. By supporting non-state proxies, indirectly or by providing limited direct assistance, sponsors operate below the threshold of war. Empirical analysis of proxy war cases proves that such models may both guarantee “strategic victory” or become a “double-edged sword”. One of the key challenges for external powers engaged in war by proxy is to avoid unintended consequences (blowback). The author argues that elements such as ideology, ethnicity or religion do not necessarily ensure control over proxies, whilst the range of common goals and interests, and the level of the proxy’s dependency, are crucial.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Special Operations, Proxy War, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Global Focus

250. Turkey’s approach to proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The last decade has seen a growing trend towards the use of proxies in the Middle East and North Africa following the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In this context, the issue of Turkey’s approach to proxy war in these regions has received considerable attention since 2016. Thereby, the purpose of this article is to investigate the essential characteristics of Turkish proxy war strategy in Syria and Libya. As such, this study intends to trace the development of Turkish proxy war strategy by making use of the conceptual frameworks proposed by Groh (2019), O’Brien (2012) and Art (1998). The most obvious finding to emerge from the analysis is that Turkey changed its indirect intervention strategy from donated assistance to proxy warfare in Syria and Libya when it saw a greater need to influence the result of the conflicts. In the case of Syria, this study has shown that the controlthrough-centralisation approach towards the Armed Syrian Opposition has enabled Turkey to carry out an effective proxy war strategy from 2016 onwards. In Libya, the results of this investigation have shown that theTurkish Army has pursued a proxy war strategy since Ankara and the Government of National Accord (GNA) signed an agreement on security and military cooperation in December 2019. The article concludes that Turkey has centralised many revolutionary groups under an Islamist-nationalistic vision and partnered them with its own military in order to expand its influence in the Middle East and North Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Syria