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211. The Implications of Withdrawing American Troops from Germany

Author:
Alexander Luck
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
On June 6, the Wall Street Journal set off an avalanche of commentary by reporting that U.S. President Donald Trump ordered a drastic reduction in U.S. troops deployed in Germany within a space of only six months. The move was met with significant pushback in Washington and Brussels, causing Congressional Republicans to raise their concerns in letters and public statements. Trump’s announcement, however, was in fact an extension of earlier plans mooted in June 2019, when the administration first suggested moving at least 1,000 troops from Germany to Poland. At the time, Trump suggested that the proposed move was to “affirm the significant defense cooperation between our nations.” Washington picked up this potential troop move again in a rather unrelated context following a spat over the German refusal to participate in a naval mission in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran, reinforcing the notion Trump keeps using American deployments in Germany as a bargaining chip for any interaction on foreign policy with the Merkel government.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

212. Striking the Balance: US Army Force Posture in Europe, 2028—A Study Sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of the Army

Author:
J. P. Clark and C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Within the context of Europe, the US Army must develop a force posture that best navigates the tensions between deterring or defeating armed conflict at an acceptable cost, successfully competing below armed conflict, and maintaining global responsiveness and institutional flexibility through the global operating model and dynamic force employment. While Russia’s economy, and consequently military capability will likely shrink over the next 10 years, which can make them more dangerous as the Kremlin continues to try to punch above its weight. The ideal force posture needs to accomplish a range of on-going and contingency missions and also be adaptive enough to remain viable despite any number of potential swings in resources, military balance, or the domestic politics of allies. This study recommends five possible strategic approaches and specifies what conditions and priorities optimize each. The principal investigators recommend investing in a multidomain alliance. This strategic approach enables the joint force and multinational partners to get the most of their capabilities and makes the best use of the Army’s top modernization priorities, such as long-range fires in a way that alters the strategic balance of a theater to avert a potentially catastrophic, albeit low probability, scenario of armed conflict. More importantly, this strategic approach is far more stable in a crisis, as it does not place policymakers in having to rush this critical, escalatory capability into theater at a moment of high tension. Moreover, invest in a multidomain alliance has the flexibility to allow a later build-up of heavy forces if conditions still warrant.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Alliance, Army, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

213. 2019: A Changing International Order? Implications for the Security Environment

Author:
Christopher Ankersen, Prof. William G. Braun III, Ferry de Kerckhove, Carol V. Evans, Kathryn M. Fisher, Samit Ganguly, Anna Geis, Sara K. McGuire, Kim Richard Nossal, Ben Rowswell, and Stefanie Von Hlatky
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
KCIS2019 examined the implications of the changing international order for international security. It studied the hypercompetitive, multipolar environment in which we find ourselves, marked by a persistent struggle for influence and position within a “grey zone” of competition. This edited collection features contributions from academic and military experts who have examined the future of the liberal international order and what is at stake. These evidence-based examinations discuss the challenges to the order, and why it has been so difficult to articulate a compelling narrative to support the continuation of American leadership.
Topic:
Security, International Affairs, Armed Forces, and Army
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

214. Special Commentary: COVID-19 and the Ethics of Military Readiness

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As is well known, then acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly fired Captain Brett Crozier, captain of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, after he wrote a letter arguing that all but ten percent of the crew should disembark the ship to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Doing so, he acknowledged, would diminish the carrier’s readiness and slow its response time in a crisis. Justifying that decision, however, he argued, “We are not at war. Sailors do not need to die. If we do not act now, we are failing to properly take care of our most trusted asset — our Sailors.”1 The problem for the captain, of course, was not the content of the letter as much as it was the subsequent leak to the San Francisco Chronicle. Setting aside the fiasco that resulted in his firing, and led to Modly’s sudden resignation, 2 the captain raises some important concerns regarding what the risks sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines3 should be required to take in peacetime. Because it is peacetime, he argues, “[W]e … cannot allow a single Sailor to perish as a result of this pandemic unnecessarily.”4 Of course, even in war no one should die unnecessarily; however, the captain raises a good question: “what risks are necessary in peacetime?” To answer that question it is first important to understand what risks are necessary in wartime
Topic:
War, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Risk, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States of America

215. Special Commentary: After COVID-19: American Landpower in Transatlantic Context

Author:
John R. Deni
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Over the last month, an array of analysts and experts has attempted to ascertain what the post-pandemic world might look like from strategic, policy, or institutional perspectives. Several of these assessments feature dramatic predictions of a new world unlike what existed just months ago. It’s reasonable to expect change following a global crisis, but the near breathlessness detectable in some of these analyses evinces a lack of nuance or an appreciation for stasis. Moreover, few of these or other analyses have addressed the implications in a transatlantic context, or suggested specific mitigation steps. This brief essay reflects a more balanced attempt to fill these gaps, identifying recommendations for the US Army and Department of Defense to leverage the crisis and mitigate the damage across the transatlantic community.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Transatlantic Relations, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

216. Special Commentary: Memorandum for SECDEF: Restore “Shock” in Strategic Planning

Author:
Mr. Nathan P. Freier, Robert Hume, and John Schaus
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to re-institutionalize horizon scanning for “strategic shock” and integrate this perspective into its strategy, plans, and risk assessment. Defense-relevant “strategic shocks” are disruptive, transformational events for DOD. Though their precise origin and nature are uncertain, strategic shocks often emerge from clear trends. Shocks are often recognized in advance on some level but are nonetheless “shocking” because they are largely ignored. Too often, rapid strategic shock catches the DOD off guard because leadership fails to account for it. To be sure, accounting for shock is a value judgment. Many may actually see what ultimately becomes a shock well in advance. However, readying for shock requires leadership to understand a contingency event’s potential for strategic-level hazard. Failing that, and once confronted with shock, leadership frequently mischaracterizes it as defying reasonable prediction and prior planning.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Army, COVID-19, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

217. Special Commentary: COVID-19 and Indo-Pacific Strategy: Korea is Up, China is Down, and the US (For Now) is Out

Author:
John Schaus and Mr. Nathan P. Freier
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to over three million confirmed infections and more than one hundred thousand dead globally. In the United States, over sixty thousand people have died and more than 1 million have been infected. According to epidemiologists, this is only the first phase. Thus, near-term “success” against the outbreak reflects a current snapshot in time, not necessarily a permanent outcome. In light of our very preliminary understanding of the long-term impact of the outbreak and national-level responses, there are discernible trends about how countries’ responses are impacting their standing in key regions and around the world. Few regions offer such stark contrast in stories as the Indo-Pacific. In that region, South Korea is up, China is down, and the United States is out. These shifts may or may not endure. What is increasingly clear, however, is that ineffective responses—perceived at home or abroad—will limit policymakers’ freedom of action for some time to come.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

218. Special Commentary: The Impact of COVID-19 on Civil-Military Relations

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
There has been a great deal of speculation regarding how the current COVID-19 pandemic could affect civil-military relations in the United States. Oona Hathaway observes that after the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001, which killed approximately three thousand Americans, the United States “radically re-oriented” its security priorities and embarked on a two-decadelong global war on terror that cost $2.8 trillion from 2002 to 2017. Given that COVID-19 could kill more than one hundred thousand Americans, she argues that it is time to re-orient those priorities again.1 Of course, simply re-orienting security priorities by themselves will not be transformative. Nora Bensahel and David Barno, for example, argue that diminished defense budgets resulting from shrinking revenues will make less funds available to maintain expensive forward bases and legacy weapons programs. Moreover, they argue, the increased sense of vulnerability will give the National Guard and reserve components a greater priority than active forces given their more prominent role in addressing the current crisis.2 They are probably right that these things will occur. However, a smaller active force and an empowered National Guard and reserve components will not fundamentally alter the role the military plays in American society. That kind of transformation requires not only taking on new missions, but more importantly, taking on new expert knowledge. Since a profession’s status is contingent on a distinct body of expert knowledge, and the autonomy to apply that knowledge within a given jurisdiction, prioritizing human security will require developing expertise in more than the use of force. Doing so will shift the military’s focus from lethality to the prevention, or failing that, the alleviation of suffering, potentially blurring the lines between military and civilian realms. Of course, such an outcome is not inevitable and the US military has played a role in disaster response before without re-orienting its security priorities. However, the COVID-19 pandemic may prove a pivotal moment but not simply because of reduced funding for military expenditures or increased vulnerability to pandemics. Diminishing external security threats, due in some part to the effects of the virus, coupled with increasing demand to assure human well-being both in the United States and abroad, could lead to a rethinking of the military’s role in American society. This rethinking could include the redistribution of roles between the military, civilian agencies, and other organizations, which extends beyond simply decreasing funds spent on defense.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

219. Special Commentary: Post-COVID Transformation: DOD Goes into the Matrix?

Author:
Nathan Freier, Robert Hume, Al Lord, and John Schaus
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
These are complex, turbulent, and uncertain times to be sure. The Department of Defense (DOD) is at an important inflection point. COVID-19 has irrevocably altered the dynamics of international security and reshaped DOD’s decision-making landscape. As a result, DOD will have to adapt to significantly different strategic circumstances post-COVID than those assumed operative in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS18). We recommend that DOD recognize this to be true, seize the initiative, create opportunity from crisis, and recraft defense strategy to re-emerge from COVID as a stronger, more hypercompetitive institution. The past is definitely prologue in this regard. DOD’s current strategic circumstances mirror those of the immediate post-9/11 period. The wars that followed 9/11 forced a substantial strategic course correction on DOD. By 2003, it was clear that the azimuth set in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR01) was fundamentally compromised by the stark reality of the Iraq and Afghan wars and the wider “Global War on Terrorism.” There was corporate recognition at the time that the path described in QDR01 was not likely to position the American military for the demands of the post-9/11 environment. Just as war reshaped DOD’s strategic agenda then, COVID-19 will change the dynamics of great power rivalry and the defense choices associated with it going forward as well. By itself, we suggest this necessitates a thoughtful re-examination of the assumptions and approach described in NDS18. To use a pop culture analogy, DOD’s current situation is reminiscent of “Neo’s choice” in the dystopian movie The Matrix. In the film, rebel leader Morpheus offers protagonist Neo the choice of a red pill or a blue pill. The red pill extends to Neo an unvarnished view of “the matrix” and its broader and more difficult set of governing facts. The blue pill, on the other hand, returns Neo to his prior blissfully naïve existence plugged into a land of computer make-believe. The blue pill is all about doubling down on a comfortable yet already discredited past. The red pill offers Neo the opportunity to boldly enter a difficult but nonetheless transformational future. In the end (spoiler alert), Neo chooses red. Like Neo, DOD has its own difficult “red or blue” choice on the near-horizon. COVID forced the issue. DOD’s choice is between prudent risk-taking, transformation, and increased hypercompetitiveness (red) on the one hand, and status quo, steady decline, and inevitable loss of position in key regions and domains on the other (blue). As in the case of Neo, we suggest that DOD choose the former (red pill) transformational option.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

220. The Arakan Army in Myanmar: Deadly Conflict Rises in Rakhine State

Author:
David Scott Mathieson
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Armed conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine State between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw, the national army, has escalated sharply in the past two years. This development has been largely eclipsed, however, by the continuing international focus on the human rights crisis of the Rohingya Muslim minority. As this report explains, if this new conflict continues to expand in scope and ferocity, the hope of repatriating Rohingya refugees will recede into the future and the rest of the country will suffer from the increasing violence and destabilization.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Minorities, Refugees, Ethnic Cleansing, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar