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11. Nobody wins unless everybody wins: The Coles review into the sustainment of Australia’s Collins-class submarines

Author:
Andrew Davies
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In 2003, Australia became the proud owner of the last of six new-build Collins-class submarines. Less than a decade later, the fleet was in a poor state of repair, and at times only one or two of the boats were available to the Royal Australian Navy. This account by Andrew Davies explains how the situation was remediated by bringing in a team of highly experienced naval professionals to take an uncompromising look at the arrangements in place to manage a vital national defence asset. Despite a public perception that the submarines were inherently defective, the problems were in fact almost entirely due to dysfunctional and often rancorous organisational dynamics between the key players. In the space of just a few years, and with remarkably little required in the way of additional funding, the situation took a dramatic turn for the better. As with earlier ASPI case studies on defence projects, Nobody wins unless everybody wins is designed to help those in Defence, industry and parliament and other interested observers to better understand the complexities of the business, all with the aim of improving how Australia equips and sustains its defence force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Defense Industry, and Submarines
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

12. The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence budget brief 2024-2025

Author:
Bec Shrimpton
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia needs to spend more on defence—and it needs to do so immediately. The strategic imperative has been firmly established in the government’s own major defence documents. The Albanese government and the Coalition opposition agree that we are in the gravest geopolitical period in generations and this is only going to intensify. But as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s latest Cost of Defence report finds, the rhetorical urgency is not being matched by action in the form of defence investment. The May budget is the latest demonstration of this mismatch, lacking spending for swift increases in capabilities that the Australian Defence Force would need if our region were to deteriorate quickly. In particular, this year’s budget priorities are not directed towards strengthening the Australian Defence Force’s ability to fight in the next decade. This is not doom-mongering; the government has acknowledged that the warning time before any conflict, which had long been set at 10 years, has shrunk to effectively zero time. We have war in Ukraine and the Middle East, aggression and increasingly dangerous and unprofessional behaviour from China causing instability and confrontation in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait, erosions of the rule of law and revisionist agendas from authoritarians. Instability is heightened by foreign interference, economic coercion and artificial intelligence-enabled dangers such as cyber attacks and disinformation. If war were to break out at any time in the next 10 years, our military would essentially fight with the force it has today. Based on current resourcing, nothing significant will change over the decade. Most of the major new capabilities in the government’s defence investment blueprint are two decades away from being fully fielded. That blueprint does contain some shorter-term enhancements, but these will not be fielded until the 2030s. The welcome $5.7 billion in new defence spending over the four-year forward estimates period is devoted to just three priorities: the AUKUS submarines, the next fleet of surface warships and investment in long-range strike, targeting and autonomous systems. But two thirds of this funding doesn’t arrive until 2027-28. The relatively impressive longer term plan leaves us vulnerable in the immediate period ahead. More money immediately is not a silver bullet, and ambition must be balanced with how much Defence can actually spend each year. But the nation’s security requires a two-pronged strategy of enhancing our existing force to meet threats within the decade while investing in long term capabilities. Other countries are furiously pursuing new capabilities that can be put into action quickly—such as creating masses of small drones and prototyping and developing new technologies. We talk about technology and asymmetric advantage—playing to your strengths and finding effective means to exploit an opponent’s weaknesses–yet we lack a credible pathway to bring them into operation to bolster the force we have today. Over the longer term, the picture starts gradually to improve. The $50 billion in additional spending over the next decade is an important commitment, even if far away. The plan for a complete recapitalisation of the surface combatant fleet will eventually give us the biggest and most capable navy Australia has had since World War Two. But, so far, we are failing to grasp the opportunity to link our traditional large platforms such as submarines and warships to more modern developments in warfare—drones and various small uncrewed and smart capabilities. AI, robotics, electronic warfare and space capabilities remain aspirational, without any pathway for inclusion and integration into a truly focused force capable of meaningful deterrence and warfighting. That is why it is so important to realise AUKUS Pillar II, which is dealing with these capabilities. It’s easy to criticise; harder to do. All governments are grappling with tight budgets amid competing demands and the unremitting expectations of voters and taxpayers. As a nation, we need to accept the need for higher defence spending. Hoping that conflict won’t come is not a viable strategy. If we are prepared for war, we have a better chance of deterring and hence averting it. Europe is living that lesson now, having put all hope in the judgment that global trade and economic entanglement would bring security. Now it is clear that military investment is imperative to deter war or best prepare nations for it. The government has a vital responsibility to speak plainly to the nation about the geopolitical risks and the possibility of conflict. We need to grasp the challenge that is in front of us today, not in three or five years’ time. Otherwise, we risk delivering on Macarthur’s famous two word warning: “The history of failure in war can almost always be summed up in two words: “Too late.” Too late in comprehending the deadly enemy. Too late in realizing the mortal danger. Too late in preparedness. Too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance.” Why take the risk of only acting after a crisis and saying better late than never? The world in turmoil demands we act in real time to both deter crises and be best prepared for them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Budget, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

13. A national strategic warning intelligence capability for Australia

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia’s strategic warning time has collapsed—in response to profound geopolitical shifts. As the ADF is adapting to the hard implications of this change, so must the national intelligence community (NIC). Australian Government decision-makers need time and insight to identify and prioritise threats (and opportunities) and devise effective responses. Strategic warning intelligence enables and empowers them to do so. But it must be done in a way that keeps up with the rapid pace of geopolitical and technological change, and a widening array of non-traditional strategic threats, and in a fashion best suited to Australia’s circumstances. To meet this need the NIC should develop a discrete, institutional strategic warning intelligence function—an Australian Centre for Strategic Warning (ACSW). This would recognise the distinct skills, analytical focus and interface with decision-making entailed—and the vital national interests at stake. In implementing an ACSW, much can be learned from our own and other intelligence communities’ ongoing efforts to adapt to threats other than invasion—notably terrorism and pandemics. This will be especially pertinent in its application to grey-zone threats such as economic coercion. Done right, an ACSW would be an important addition to the suite of Australia’s statecraft tools.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Intelligence, National Security, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Australia

14. Non-state armed groups in the sky

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The proliferation of inexpensive and user-friendly, civilian-grade drones represents an escalating security concern for states. Currently, over 65 non-state actors are known to possess drones, and the unregulated nature of drone usage suggests that this number will continue to rise unchecked.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
Global Focus

15. A Political Economy of Zawiya: Armed Groups and Society in a Western Libyan City

Author:
Wolfram Lacher
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Since 2015, the coastal city of Zawiya has witnessed endemic violence, but never an all-out war between its main forces. Due to this, the city has become emblematic of Libya’s power struggles. Despite its significance, however, no in-depth studies exist on its armed groups and their evolution. A Political Economy of Zawiya: Armed Groups and Society in a Western Libyan City—a new report from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment In North Africa (SANA) project—seeks explanations to this puzzle in the economic interests of armed groups and their varying relations with local society, and shows how Zawiya’s armed groups gradually came to take on a particularly abusive and predatory character.
Topic:
Security, Political Economy, Armed Forces, and Society
Political Geography:
Libya, North Africa, and Zawiya

16. A Political Economy of Tripoli’s Abu Salim: The Rise of the Stability Support Apparatus as Hegemon

Author:
Adam Hakan
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Once a hotbed of pro-Qaddafi resistance, Abu Salim is now a stronghold dominated by Abdelghani al-Kikli (widely known as ‘Ghaniwa’) and his Stability Support Apparatus (SSA). Ghaniwa has consolidated power over Abu Salim—the main southern gateway into the Libyan capital of Tripoli—through violence. A Political Economy of Tripoli’s Abu Salim: The Rise of the Stability Support Apparatus as Hegemon—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment In North Africa (SANA) project—examines how Ghaniwa’s methods have reshaped Abu Salim’s political economy, and how the hegemonic nature of this military consolidation has allowed the SSA to take on an outsized role in Libya’s broader political and economic spheres.
Topic:
Political Economy, Hegemony, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:
Libya, North Africa, and Tripoli

17. Persistent Perils: Illicit MANPADS in the MENA Region

Author:
Matt Schroeder
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Since 1970, armed groups have hit dozens of civilian aircraft with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), killing more than 1,000 civilians. The international community has taken numerous steps to reduce illicit proliferation, but armed groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continue to acquire and use these systems. Persistent Perils: Illicit MANPADS in the MENA Region—a new Report from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment In North Africa (SANA) project—provides an in-depth analysis of the proliferation of MANPADS in North Africa and the Middle East from 2015–23. Drawing on imagery and data collected since 2015 to identify the type, model, generation, and country of design/manufacture of illicit MANPADS in the region, the Report assesses the implications of recent proliferation patterns for regional security and international norms and agreements.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Armed Forces, Weapons, Trafficking, and MANPADS
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

18. Contemporary Trends in Militarisation

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This report provides two new approaches to understand the capabilities of the world’s militaries by country. The first analyses and tracks changes in a range of militarisation indicators. The main finding of this approach is that while military expenditure is rising in absolute terms, as a percentage of GDP it has fallen and is around half of the peaks seen at the height of the Cold War. Concurrently, as military sophistication increases, troop numbers are declining, highlighting a growing reliance on technology. The second approach is the development of a new and original methodology that calculates the military capacity of countries by weighting the generations of their military assets. These capability scores substantially change the ranking of countries when compared to traditional approaches that count just the number of military assets, or compare military expenditure. The US has the highest capability score, well ahead of China, which ranks second. Russia follows China closely in third. Countries such as Iran and North Korea, despite having large fleets of fixed wing planes, drop considerably in the rankings, because their assets represent older technology. These trends occur as the world is at a crossroad with the number of conflicts, 59, at an all-time high since WWII. These conflicts are becoming more internationalised, with 92 countries involved in a conflict beyond their borders, rising competition between the major powers, and more middle level powers also becoming more assertive. Unresolved conflicts are at the highest levels since WWII, opening more opportunity for major conflicts to erupt.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Conflict, Militarization, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. China Maritime Report No. 41: One Force, Two Force, Red Force, Blue Force: PLA Navy Blue Force Development for Realistic Combat Training

Author:
J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since the mid-2010s, there has been a concerted effort to professionalize a PLAN “blue force” as an opposition force, or OPFOR, in maritime exercises and training. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely refers to its blue forces as metaphorical “whetstones” used to sharpen the PLA for a future fight against enemies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts to develop a PLAN blue force appear to have accelerated over the past several years in response to Chairman Xi Jinping’s decade-long demand for more realistic combat training. This report examines recent developments in the PLAN’s blue force. It comprises four sections. Part one provides background on PLAN efforts to professionalize its maritime blue force. Part two describes the PLAN’s blue force training units. Part three examines companies producing equipment and virtual environments for China’s blue force units, while part four discusses current blue force capabilities. The report concludes with a summary of findings and implications for the United States, its allies, and partners.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Maritime, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Training
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

20. China Maritime Report No. 39: A Hundred Men Wielding One Gun - Life, Duty, and Cultural Practices Aboard PLAN Submarines

Author:
Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Submarine performance is not just measured in technical terms, but also in how crews operate over time. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly deploys its submarine force beyond the near seas on long-distance combat readiness and training missions, studying the force’s human components benefits a broader understanding its overall effectiveness. This report explores work and living conditions, crew endurance, service culture, political requirements, and approaches to resolving human issues in the submarine force. An inherently dangerous and challenging profession, the submarine force has gradually developed numerous solutions to address various challenges to prevent non-combat attrition among crews. Life and duty in the “Dragon Palace,” both an internal joke and the overarching embodiment of PLAN submarine culture, reveals a professional community focused on secrecy, safety, and expertise that is working to enhance its human performance.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia