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161. U.S. SOUTHCOM Fights Through COVID-19

Author:
Michael T. Plehn
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
As I boarded my flight in Bogotá, Colombia, to return to the United States on March 14, 2020, after participating in the joint Colombia-U.S. Exercise Vita in the Guajira Peninsula, the reality of how the COVID-19 pandemic was going to affect our lives over the next year began to manifest. Arriving back in Miami, where I was the Military Deputy Commander for U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), I went straight home to begin a 14-day quarantine in accordance with new policies from the Department of Defense (DOD) for travelers returning from overseas. It was the first of many adaptations that we would make in the coming months. In May of 2019, shortly after assuming command at USSOUTHCOM, Admiral Craig Faller, USN, established three primary lines of effort to guide our activities: strengthen partnerships, counter threats, and build our team.1 Less than a year later, we were tested in all three areas by the pandemic. One of the great strengths of USSOUTHCOM is the network of engaged and willing partners in the region. We work closely with them as we guide all U.S. military activity across much of Latin America and the Caribbean. We are neighbors and friends who share common values, ties, and interests. Our neighborhood is not only rich in natural resources but also beset by many longstanding challenges and several emerging issues. While there is no current armed conflict between countries in the region, it is one of the most violent areas on the globe, much of it fueled by transnational criminal organizations and longstanding structural, societal issues. According to a 2019 global study on homicide by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the rate of intentional homicide in Central and South America is four times the global average.2 Particularly virulent, transnational criminal organizations—flush with cash—constantly seek to expand their lethal trade through extortion, corruption, intimidation, and violence. These actions, in turn, erode the power and legitimacy of local, state, and federal governments, reducing their ability to fight this scourge.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, COVID-19, and SOUTHCOM
Political Geography:
South America and United States of America

162. The Limits of Victory: Evaluating the Employment of Military Power

Author:
Michael H. Levine
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
On November 28, 1984, then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appeared before the National Press Club in Washington, DC, to deliver a speech titled “The Uses of Military Power.” The previous year had brought mixed results in the deployment of U.S. combat troops overseas. An invasion of the small West Indies country of Grenada wrested regime control from the one-party socialist People’s Revolutionary Government in favor of a relatively stable democracy. In Lebanon, however, the bombing of a Marine Corps barracks complex in Beirut killed 305 troops and civilians, including 241 Americans, and led to the withdrawal of the multinational peacekeeping force months later. Perhaps most central to Secretary Weinberger’s speech was the Vietnam War, an event that two decades later still struck deep into the institutional fabric of the U.S. military. The Secretary argued that combat forces should be deployed resolutely with “the sole object of winning” in cases where vital national interests are at stake.1 Moreover, the use of force must meet six criteria: vital national interests, wholehearted commitment, clearly defined political and military objectives, congruent ends and means, domestic support, and last resort. Seven years later, many viewed the U.S. triumph in the Gulf War as a vindication of this doctrine. Today, this way of thinking is known as the Powell Doctrine, in reference to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush gleefully declared, “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”2
Topic:
Defense Policy, History, Armed Forces, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

163. Persistent Challenges The future of the US presence in Iraq following the fourth round of the strategic dialogue

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
At the conclusion of the fourth round of the strategic dialogue between Baghdad and Washington, US President Joe Biden and Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi signed an agreement officially ending the US combat mission in Iraq by the end of 2021, more than 18 years after US forces entered Iraq. In return, Baghdad confirmed Iraq's commitment to protecting the international coalition personnel, who provide advisory and training assistance. According to the statements of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, the fourth round of the strategic dialogue between the two countries will be the last. Hence, the understandings that took place between the two sides will form the general framework governing the bilateral relations between the two countries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

164. Moscow's Central Role: Have the Rules of Engagement Changed in Syria after the recent Israeli Strikes?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On July 19, 22 and 25, Israel carried out three strikes in less than one week using surface-to-air missiles against Syria. These strikes are considered the first of their kind executed by the new Israeli "Bennett-Lapid" government. Although this type of strikes is not novel, the Russian reaction to it was different this time. The Russian Ministry of Defense engaged in the scene for the first time, sending indirect messages to Israel. This made analysts refer to a possible shift in the rules of engagement in Syria. The understandings between Moscow and Tel Aviv were based on Moscow turning a blind eye to Israeli fighters launching airstrikes in Syria against Iranian targets, in return for Israel not targeting Syrian regime forces or Russian forces, which provide direct support to the Syrian army against the armed opposition. The Russian position reflected a clear desire to weaken the Iranian military presence in Syria, particularly with the escalation of rivalry between Moscow and Tehran over economic and military influence there.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

165. The Attack on Karaj: Analysis of the attack on an Iranian atomic energy agency facility

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The ‘shadow war’ between Iran and Israel continues. The sabotage operations remain, evident in the attacks on Natanz, the most famous uranium enrichment facility in Iran in July 2020 and in April 202, and assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in Tehran. This is in addition to the mutual targeting of ships in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea between the two sides.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Violence, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

166. Unfulfilled Hopes: Strategic Implications of Re-opening Libya’s Coastal Highway

Author:
Mustafa Gamal Omar
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
While many Libyans look forward to implement the outcome of the Berlin II Conference on Libya and achieve stability across their country, others believe that the first steps towards such stability should be through breaking the deadlock on unresolved issues. Such issues require urgent but decisive action, and the most prominent of which is the reopening of the coastal road between Sirte and Misrata. The announcement on June 20, 2021, by head of the National Unity Government, Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah, that the main coastal highway will be re-opened, following months of talks on a ceasefire, has revived Libyan hopes. The move is projected to yield significant political, security and economic benefits for the country. However, according to media reports circulated in late June, the 5+5 committee, formally named the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission, decided to put off the re-opening of the vital highway, claiming that only damages will be repaired, which made the situation murky once again. The 5+5 committee, on July 2, dispelled the confusion by announcing that the highway linking Sirte to Misrata will be re-opened over the next week upon the completion of maintenance work. Member of the committee, Major General Faraj Al-Sousaa, confirmed that arrangements were underway for the re-opening.
Topic:
Government, Armed Forces, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

167. Early Warning Brief: Introducing the “New, New” China Coast Guard

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In the past decade, the China Coast Guard (CCG, 中国海警, zhongguo haijing) has experienced two major reforms. The first, which began in 2013, uprooted the service from the Ministry of Public Security—where it was organized as an element of the People’s Armed Police (PAP)—and placed it under the control of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), a civilian agency. In the process, the CCG was combined with three other maritime law enforcement forces: China Marine Surveillance (CMS), China Fisheries Law Enforcement (CFLE), and the maritime anti-smuggling units of the General Administration of Customs. The resulting conglomerate was colloquially called the “new” CCG, differentiating it from the “old” CCG of the Ministry of Public Security years. The second reform began in 2018, when the “new” CCG, now swollen with the ranks of four different forces, was stripped from the SOA and transferred to the PAP, which itself had just been reorganized and placed under the Central Military Commission (CMC) (China Brief, April 24, 2018). While much research has been done on the first reform, little is known about the second, at least in the English-speaking world. This article seeks to answer basic questions about the “new, new” CCG. What are its roles/missions, organization, and force structure? How does it differ from the CCG of the SOA years? How is it similar? What progress has been made two years after the second reform began?
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Armed Forces, Reform, and Borders
Political Geography:
China and Asia

168. China’s Use of U.S. Satellite Communications Technology in the South China Sea

Author:
Zachary Haver
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In recent years, the maritime law enforcement (MLE) forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have dominated the contested waters of the South China Sea (AMTI, December 4, 2020). While the exponential growth and increasing assertiveness of the China Coast Guard (CCG) have captured headlines, the evolving role of technology in China’s MLE operations has received less attention. New communications infrastructure and monitoring systems, for example, help Chinese MLE forces monitor and control contested maritime space in the South China Sea (CMSI, January 2021). These investments align with China’s broader pursuit of information superiority in the South China Sea, which involves building up electronic intelligence, counter-stealth radar, and other capabilities (JHU APL, July 2020).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Armed Forces, and Satellite
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea

169. Zapad 2021 and Russia’s Potential for Warfighting

Author:
Johan Norberg and Natalie Simpson
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
According to press information, on 10 September 2021, the Russian Armed Forces plan to start the one-week-long active phase of this year’s annual strategic-level exercise (STRATEX), Zapad (West) 2021, a bilateral large-scale Russo-Belorussian strategic-level exercise, primarily in Belarus and Russia’s Western Military District (MD, see map 1). Large-scale Russian exercises understandably attract much attention and speculation both in Russia and abroad. Most Western comments about Zapad 2017 addressed Russian and international political aspects and detailed several capabilities employed in the exercise and its scenarios or steps and phases. Few, if any, addressed what it meant for the potential of Russian forces to fight wars, which these exercises are all about actually. Russia’s warfighting potential is important for the West writ large for several reasons. Tensions between Russia and NATO are increasing. Russia perceives a growing military threat in its west. Russian strategic documents re-emphasise the importance of military power. Russia actually uses military force to achieve its geopolitical goals, such as in Eastern Ukraine and in Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Belarus

170. When armies enforce the law: Why the Ghana armed forces play a role in domestic security

Author:
Peter Albrecht, Fiifi Edu-Afful, and Festus Aubyn
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Ghana Armed Forces play a significant role in domestic security. To fully comprehend how and why requires a deeper understanding of the way that individual, local, national and regional factors interact. A blurring of the duties of the police and armed forces speaks to a never fully realized separation of who oversees internal and external security. The division of labour between a police force that deals with domestic security concerns and armed forces that defend the borders of a country against external threats has become a generally accepted ideal during the past 150 years. In practice, this separation has been historically tenuous, which was emphasized when the Cold War came to an end, and new security threats such as civil wars and international terrorism emerged. The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 strongly reinforced pressures towards the development of expeditionary security capabilities, which was done partially by expanding the roles and responsibilities of the armed forces in internal security. In Ghana, these international transformations in the role of the armed forces together with the country’s particular history of civil-military relations have led to an expansive set of functions for the Ghana Armed Forces domestically. Today, the armed forces play a consistent role in internal security operations, sometimes referred to in public debates as ‘internal peacekeeping’. Military personnel are deployed to deal with a wide range of law enforcement matters across the country, such as illegal mining, illegal logging, armed robberies (patrolling), and chieftaincy disputes.
Topic:
Security, Law Enforcement, Armed Forces, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana