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31. Digital Governance: Technology Tensions with China and Implications

Author:
Alex He and Robert Fay
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
As a superpower that is deeply integrated in global supply chains, China is becoming an economic giant, but its use of technology to capture data using methods that may pose cyber- and national security risks is raising concerns. While some view China’s motivations as an attempt to advance its status from an upper-middle-income economy to a developed economy, others see more nefarious intentions behind its authoritarian, top-down governance model. Further complicating the situation is the growing technology competition between China, the United States and Europe over the control of data, the technologies that use this data and the values upon which they should be used. The Centre for International Governance Innovation’s second annual conference on Digital Governance in China explored these and other issues related to the global implications of China’s governance model in the digital age.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Governance, Economy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China and Asia

32. NATO's New Ambitions for Space

Author:
Béatrice Hainaut
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a devastating cyber attack targets Ukrainian army communications, exposing Western dependence and vulnerability to space technologies, and calling NATO's defensive posture into question. The longevity of the organization, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024, is partly due to its ability to adapt to the international context. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened its legitimacy and attractiveness. The massive use of space applications in Ukraine raises the question of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in providing space data and services to its member states: it does not have its own space capabilities, but its deterrence posture includes space. By equipping itself with a solid documentary corpus, space-focused centers, and access to national capabilities, the Alliance seeks to implement its vision of space as a theater of operations. This theater of operations aims at the integration and interoperability of the space assets of the various member states. For now, these are primarily American capabilities. NATO's space ambition then poses to the states the question of mobilizing financial and human resources. Moreover, deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU could presumably allow for the pooling of efforts.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Space

33. Exploring Law Enforcement Hacking as a Tool Against Transnational Cyber Crime

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Emma Landi
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In terms of revenue, 2023 will go down as a record-breaking year for ransomware, with over a billion dollars in payments going to hackers.1 The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports a record $12.5 billion lost to cyber crime more broadly over the course of that year.2 As the quantities of affected users and organizations, payoff amounts, critical services, and pilfered sensitive data continue to rise, Western capitals have in recent years come to treat transnational cyber crime as a major national security concern. Because cyber criminals often operate from third countries where prosecution or extradition are unlikely, policymakers often look to military and intelligence services as the best (or only) entities capable of operationally disrupting cyber crime syndicates. Yet another growing trend challenges this notion: Western law enforcement agencies (LEAs) also have been expanding their own abilities to cross both technical and national boundaries to take on cyber criminals. This trend is creating new opportunities and challenges for both domestic and international cyber policy.
Topic:
Crime, Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

34. South Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low Priority

Author:
Joe Devanny and Russell Buchan
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
During the decades of apartheid, South Africa was an international pariah. Since the country transitioned to majority rule in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated politics, and the ANC has itself transitioned from a national liberation movement to a party of government. Domestically, South African cyber strategy should be seen as part of the ANC’s wider political challenge of trying to deliver economic growth, development, and prosperity. Over thirty years, the ANC has struggled to deliver on this agenda in a profoundly unequal society with infrastructure and institutions that have weakened particularly over the past fifteen years. Alongside confronting domestic challenges, the ANC has also tried to reshape South Africa’s global role. This was perhaps most visible under its first president, Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), but it was arguably pursued most systematically under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008). This reorientation of South Africa in the world was an ambitious and complex project, the foundations of which were the country’s leading role in its region and continent as well as its ties within the wider Global South. The project entailed tensions between the progressive promotion of human rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the cultivation of instrumental relations with authoritarian and repressive states, on the other. These tensions continue to affect South African foreign policy, including its cyber diplomacy. South Africa identifies cybersecurity as a key national priority and has to this end adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and established a military Cyber Command. The reality, however, is that other issues have been consistently ranked above cybersecurity, such as addressing corruption, poverty, racial and social injustice, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Cybersecurity has therefore not been seen as a high priority by successive South African governments. This has left Cyber Command underresourced and unmotivated. This deprioritization means that South Africa is unlikely to emerge as a prominent military or intelligence cyber power anytime soon. The wider lack of national prioritization will also make it harder for so-called like-minded states—which are bound together by a mutual respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—to form an effective partnership with South Africa on the topic of cybersecurity. South Africa’s approach to international cyber governance debates has been cautious and noncommittal, reflecting cyber diplomacy’s relatively low priority in its national strategy. What position South Africa takes in cyber debates is, however, of keen interest to the international community. An important question is whether South Africa will support the existing multistakeholder approach to cyber governance that is championed by like-minded states or join China and Russia in their efforts to recalibrate this approach and push for greater state control over cyberspace. Indeed, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa has not yet published its national position explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. A related question is whether South Africa will join like-minded states in elaborating how existing international law applies to cyberspace or side with China and Russia to campaign for new, bespoke international law (for example, treaties) to regulate this domain. When examining these questions, it is important to recognize the context of the ANC’s long-standing ties with Russia, both during its thirty years in government and in its previous decades struggling for national liberation. This is helpful for understanding South Africa’s interactions with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (which form the BRICS bloc with South Africa) and forecasting its future positions in cyber governance debates. For example, South Africa has been reluctant to unambiguously condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it appears to have supported Moscow by covertly supplying it with weapons. In the longer term, South Africa’s positions in cyber diplomacy debates will likely be shaped by trends in both domestic politics—such as the ANC’s waning electoral performance—and the success of digital development. In this context, it is perhaps advisable for like-minded states, such as the United States, to focus on cyber capacity-building assistance and ensure that these efforts play into the wider development agenda in South Africa.
Topic:
Corruption, Poverty, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, and Racial Justice
Political Geography:
Africa, Iran, and South Africa

35. Tracing the Roots of China’s AI Regulations

Author:
Matt Sheehan
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In 2021 and 2022, China became the first country to implement detailed, binding regulations on some of the most common applications of artificial intelligence (AI). These rules formed the foundation of China’s emerging AI governance regime, an evolving policy architecture that will affect everything from frontier AI research to the functioning of the world’s second-largest economy, from large language models in Africa to autonomous vehicles in Europe. U.S. political leaders often warn against letting China “write the rules of the road” in AI governance. But if the United States is serious about competing for global leadership in AI governance, then it needs to actually understand what it is competing against. That requires examining the nuts and bolts of both China’s AI regulations and the policy process that shaped them. This paper is the second in a series breaking down China’s AI regulations and pulling back the curtain on the policymaking process shaping them. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government started that process with the 2021 rules on recommendation algorithms, an omnipresent use of the technology that is often overlooked in international AI governance discourse. Those rules imposed new obligations on companies to intervene in content recommendations, granted new rights to users being recommended content, and offered protections to gig workers subject to algorithmic scheduling. The Chinese party-state quickly followed up with a new regulation on “deep synthesis,” the use of AI to generate synthetic media such as deepfakes. Those rules required AI providers to watermark AI-generated content and ensure that content does not violate people’s “likeness rights” or harm the “nation’s image.” Together, these two regulations also created and amended China’s algorithm registry, a regulatory tool that would evolve into a cornerstone of the country’s AI governance regime. Contrary to popular conception in the rest of the world, China’s AI governance regime has not been created by top-down edicts from CCP leadership. President Xi Jinping and other top CCP leaders will sometimes give high-level guidance on policy priorities, but they have not been the key players when it comes to shaping China’s AI regulations. Instead, those regulations have been the product of a dynamic and iterative policymaking process driven by a mix of actors from both inside and outside the Chinese party-state. Those actors include mid-level bureaucrats, academics, technologists, journalists, and policy researchers at platform tech companies. Through a mix of public advocacy, intellectual debate, technical workshopping, and bureaucratic wrangling, these actors laid the foundations for China’s present and future AI regulations. This paper traces the progression of these regulations through the “policy funnel” (see figure 1) of Chinese AI governance. For both recommendation algorithms and deep synthesis rules, the initial spark for the regulation came from long-standing CCP concerns about the creation and dissemination of online content. For the former, the rise of the algorithmically driven news app Toutiao threatened the CCP’s ability to set a unified narrative and choose which stories are pushed to readers. In the case of deep synthesis, online face swap videos grabbed the attention of the Chinese public and led government regulators to consider the threat of deepfakes. Over the course of 2017–2020, these concerns made their way through China’s bureaucracy. Regulators took a series of stopgap measures in specific applications, while also tasking policy analysts and government-adjacent technical organizations with exploring different regulatory interventions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, East Asia, and Asia

36. The risk of artificial intelligence: China edition

Author:
Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL)
Abstract:
We should be worried about China’s AI capacities, not only because it enhances the powers of the Party-state, but also because it is exporting its population control technology and policy abroad.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, Social Control, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

37. Starr Forum: China: The Rise and Fall of the EAST

Author:
Yasheng Huang and Will Knight
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Speaker: Yasheng Huang, Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, and faculty director of the MIT-China Program at the Center for International Studies. Discussant: Will Knight, senior writer, Wired magazine, covers artificial intelligence and other emerging technology. He was previously a senior editor at MIT Technology Review, where he wrote about fundamental advances in AI and China’s AI boom.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

38. Deep fires and the British strategic posture: does the war in Ukraine validate it?

Author:
Eduardo Munhoz Svartman, Augusto W.M. Teixeira Junior, and Tamiris Pereira dos santos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine war presented an unintended chance to assess the British strategic posture regarding deep fires. The deployment of guided rocket artillery systems by Ukrainian forces in 2022 altered the land battle dynamics significantly, especially with the modern Western deep fires by the US, UK, and France. This study analyses the evolution of the UK defence policy and land force structure and the impact of deep fires in the first phase of the war, and discusses challenges ahead of Britain due to the ongoing conflict. This perspective might apply to other cases, including Brazil, as we drew upon critiques mainly directed to the over-reliance on technology over combat mass due to the re-emergence of conventional warfare.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, and Ukraine

39. The Evolving Landscape of U.S. Economic Security: The Confluence of Trade, Technology, and National Security

Author:
Andrea Viski
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the current evolution of U.S. economic security discourse to demonstrate the implications, challenges, and shortcomings of U.S. economic security tools and the catalyzing impact of technology. While component economic security considerations are broad and encompass issues from natural disaster planning to cybersecurity, this paper focuses specifically on the impact of trade and technology in the economic security context. It discusses the main influences and features of U.S. economic security policy as it relates to trade, technology, and the security of the supply chain. The paper includes sections on evolving notions of the dual-use concept; the need to manage and respond to technology flows with more effective strategies, and new foreign policy efforts and tools to strengthen economic security. The paper focuses on the trends forging the path for the United States to define economic security so closely with national security, and in exploring these trends, it delineates how the United States has implemented policies and adopted, reoriented, or created new policy tools designed to strengthen economic security. The paper also explores why the rapid evolution of emerging technologies has played such a defining role. Finally, the paper examines the effectiveness of the U.S. approach to economic security and its challenges and offers insights into how it can be strengthened in the future
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

40. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Author:
Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1 While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies. This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Korea, and United States of America