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52. The “One China” Issue in U.S.-China Relations
- Author:
- Zhiqun Zhu
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Armenia in September 2022 caused some limited geopolitical commotion, as most readers of Baku Dialogues are keenly aware. Without downplaying its regional significance in the slightest, it was, however, her visit to Taiwan in August 2022 that made global headlines and triggered a new round of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. At the core of that controversy is the status of Taiwan. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) condemned the visit as a violation of the “one China principle,” the U.S. government and Pelosi herself insisted that it was consistent with America’s “one China policy.” Five decades after U.S. President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China, the Taiwan issue remains the most difficult and potentially most explosive dispute between the United States and China. While Beijing maintains that the “one China principle,” with the PRC representing all of China, is the foundation of U.S.‑China relations, Washington emphasizes that its “one China policy” treats Taiwan as a separate entity from the PRC. Meanwhile, Taipei, under the rule of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has asserted that Taiwan is already independent and the two sides across the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other. As the U.S.‑China rivalry intensifies, Taiwan has quickly re‑emerged as the biggest hot‑button issue between the two great powers. The Taiwan issue is so serious that it routinely tops the agenda of meetings and phone calls between Chinese and U.S. officials, including calls between PRC President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden. Shortly before Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Xi warned that “those who play with fire will get burned” during a phone call with Biden.
- Topic:
- Security, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Leadership, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
53. Don’t Get Caught in the Middle: A Geo-Economic Strategy for Germany to Survive US-Chinese Rivalry
- Author:
- Markus Jaeger
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The economic fallout from the war in Ukraine has been very significant. The consequences of a war in East Asia involving the United States and China would be much worse. And even if a Sino-US military confrontation can be avoided, geo-economic conflict between the two powers is going to intensify. Washington will put increasing pressure on Germany and Europe to align their policies with Washington’s geo-economic strategy.
- Topic:
- Economics, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, Germany, North America, and United States of America
54. Australia’s Strategic Responses to the US-China Rivalry and Implications to Korea
- Author:
- Ina Choi, Sunhyung Lee, Jaeho Lee, and So Eun Kim
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- As in other Asia-Pacific countries, boosting trade with China has provided a growth engine for Australia's economy. Australia shared concerns over security threats posed by China’s military expansion, but up until the mid-2010s hard balancing against China did not seem to be an option for Australia. Australia’s recent moves against China, however, signal that Canberra has reset its China policy, with an overhaul of its national security and defense strategy. The shift of Australia’s China policy is an interesting case to explore how the regional order is likely to evolve in the growing US-China competition. Assessing Australia’s recent foreign policy is also relevant to Korea, both in terms of navigating Korea’s relations with the US and China and enhancing strategic ties between Australia and Korea. Against this backdrop, this study unravels Australia’s strategic responses to the changing regional order and draw implications for Korea's foreign policy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, Economy, Trade, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, South Korea, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
55. The Collapse of One China
- Author:
- Ivan Kanapathy
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- As the One China policy accommodation unravels and China’s military attains a credible capability to mount a cross-strait invasion, the United States and its allies should stop hedging and adopt enhanced measures to deter Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
56. Renew SBIR, Just Defend the Recipients against China
- Author:
- Charles Wessner and Sujai Shivakumar
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- An April 2021 internal report by the Department of Defense (DOD) found that companies funded by the DOD’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program are being targeted by state-sponsored Chinese firms. Based on an examination of a sampling of SBIR award recipients, the Pentagon study concluded that “nearly all cases show that China, not the U.S., is the ultimate beneficiary of DoD and other U.S. government research investments, some of which are significant in size.” The study’s authors cautioned that the study sample was small and that their methodologies warrant review, but their findings are clearly a matter of concern for U.S. policymakers. This justified concern, however, seems to have morphed into quite a different approach. Citing the Pentagon study’s findings, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), the senior Republican on the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee, said in June 2022 that he would not support reauthorizing the SBIR program “without reforms to strengthen research security and stop abusive behavior by bad actors lining their pockets with taxpayer dollars.” In a move unrelated to national security, Senator Paul and several other lawmakers are also seeking limits on the number of awards that can be made to individual SBIR companies. (There is no empirical basis for such a restriction, nor could it be effectively implemented, but the proposed measure emerges anew as SBIR comes up for reauthorization.) The risks, however, are real. The Wall Street Journal reported in July that SBIR and the related Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program face “an overhaul or outright extinction” if Congress does not renew their budgets and funding runs out at the end of September. The DOD has already canceled a round of SBIR award solicitations “because of uncertainty over the program’s future.”
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Business, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
57. It's Moving Time: Taiwanese Business Responds to Growing U.S.-China Tensions
- Author:
- Scott Kennedy
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- A new report by the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics interprets a formal survey of over 500 Taiwanese business executives, documenting their views about the evolving environment on the island and beyond. The Washington policy community is quite familiar with the views that U.S. and European companies hold toward China, but less clear are the views of Taiwanese companies that are central to the story of the world’s interaction with China. Their opinions have implications for Taiwan’s economic trajectory, cross-strait relations, global supply chains, and the effectiveness of U.S. policy in the region. The report documents that Taiwanese companies are highly concerned about their potential overdependence on the Chinese economy and the possibility of a military conflict. As a result, there is significant support for expanding trade and investment ties via regional arrangements and bilaterally with the United States, as well as for maintaining Taiwan’s technological edge through more spending on research and development and broadening restrictions for technology transfer to China. But perhaps the most noteworthy finding is that Taiwanese companies appear to be moving their businesses at record levels from Mainland China, but also from Taiwan. This report, by Trustee Chair Scott Kennedy, explains how the survey was carried out, then analyzes the sources of Taiwanese companies’ anxieties and the ways they are responding, and concludes by considering the policy implications for all parties involved. The report’s appendix provides a full summary of the original survey results.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, Business, Conflict, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
58. Choking off China’s Access to the Future of AI
- Author:
- Gregory Allen
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration announced a new export controls policy on artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor technologies to China. These new controls—a genuine landmark in U.S.-China relations—provide the complete picture after a partial disclosure in early September generated confusion. For weeks the Biden administration has been receiving criticism in many quarters for a new round of semiconductor export control restrictions, first disclosed on September 1. The restrictions block leading U.S. AI computer chip designers, such as Nvidia and AMD, from selling their high-end chips for AI and supercomputing to China. The criticism typically goes like this: China’s domestic AI chip design companies could not win customers in China because their chip designs could not compete with Nvidia and AMD on performance. Chinese firms could not catch up to Nvidia and AMD on performance because they did not have enough customers to benefit from economies of scale and network effects. Because of the new export controls, revenues that formerly flowed to U.S. chip companies will now go to Chinese chip companies, offering a viable path to economies of scale and competitive performance. In the short term, this policy will significantly harm Chinese AI data center companies. However, blocking U.S. AI chip designers from selling their world-leading chips is actually good for China in the longer term because it will strengthen China’s domestic chip design ecosystem. While the reasoning in this criticism is sound, it does not imply that the Biden administration’s actions are self-defeating. Rather, it shows how the policy as disclosed in September was incomplete. A policy like this would not make sense if that is the only step the administration planned to take. Clearly something was missing, and industry experts have been waiting for the other shoe to drop ever since. On October 7, the other shoe dropped. The Biden administration announced a massive policy shift on semiconductor exports to China as well as revised rules for how the lists of restricted parties are managed. In recent decades, U.S. semiconductor policy has been primarily market driven and laissez faire. With the new policy, which comes on the heels of the CHIPS Act’s passage, the United States is firmly focused on retaining control over so-called “chokepoint” (or as it is sometimes translated from Chinese “stranglehold”) technologies in the global semiconductor technology supply chain. The most important chokepoints in the context of this discussion are AI chip designs, electronic design automation software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and equipment components. The Biden administration’s latest actions simultaneously exploit U.S. dominance across all four of these chokepoints. In doing so, these actions demonstrate an unprecedented degree of U.S. government intervention to not only preserve chokepoint control but also begin a new U.S. policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Hegemony, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Emerging Technology
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
59. Colombia’s Relationship with the PRC
- Author:
- Evan Ellis
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- From October 6 to 16, the author traveled throughout Colombia to speak with businesspeople, academics, and other professionals about the country’s security panorama, its commercial and other relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and prospects for evolving those relationships under the new government of Gustavo Petro. This white paper, the first of two on those interactions, addresses the country’s important and deepening relationship with the PRC and its companies. In recent years, Colombia’s political and security relationship with the PRC has been limited. This arguably reflects Bogotá’s perception that deepening political and security ties with the PRC might damage its close and important relationship with the United States. Nonetheless, despite perceptions that the PRC is more of a threat than an opportunity in the commercial arena, the presence of Chinese companies and their representatives in the country has expanded remarkably. Under the Petro government, all dimensions of Colombia’s relationship with the PRC, from political and security affairs to economic ones, are poised to expand and shift in ways that may cause unease in Washington.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Colombia, and South America
60. A Seismic Shift: The New U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls and the Implications for U.S. Firms, Allies, and the Innovation Ecosystem
- Author:
- Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- On October 7, 2022, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced sweeping revisions to its export controls, which are aimed at restricting China’s ability to obtain certain high-end semiconductor devices with potential military applications, develop and maintain supercomputers, and manufacture advanced semiconductor devices. This announcement, the most expansive export control action in decades, represents a fundamental shift in the traditional strategy underlying the U.S. and allied export control regime. As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan put it , until now, “we previously maintained a ‘sliding scale’ approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. That is not the strategic environment we are in today. Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.” In effect, the new measures are intended to dramatically slow, if not freeze Chinese developmental capability.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Innovation, Rivalry, and Semiconductors
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America