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1. Turkey’s Vision Transforms Post-Assad Syria

Author:
Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Ankara aims to establish lasting influence through military expansion, strategic infrastructure projects, and economic agreements, including maritime treaties. Through its assertive Neo-Ottomanist policies Ankara aims become the primary architect of Syria’s future while countering rival powers like Iran and Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Bashar al-Assad, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

2. South Africa as a Leading Regional Power in Africa? An Analysis of the Implementation of the African Union, Auda-Nepad and Agenda 2063

Author:
Murilo Gomes da Costa
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The article analyzes South Africa’s role in the African Union’s Agenda 2063. It examines South Africa’s position as a leading regional power post-apartheid. The study contends that Pretoria has developed a strategy towards its region. The argument is supported by a descriptive analysis of the implementation of Auda-Nepad and South Africa’s efforts to broaden the thematic scope of the AU. The results show that South Africa’s strategy as a leading regional power in Africa has been achieved through Pretoria’s role as a paymaster in both the AU and Auda-Nepad, alongside the development of its own Agenda 2063 projects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, African Union, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

3. Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Rivalry that Remade the Middle East

Author:
Hassan Hassan
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Observers often liken Iran’s strategic policy thinking to the intricate and patient process of crafting a Persian rug.1 The analogy illustrates how Tehran’s strategies, like the rug’s final inscriptions, only become clear upon completion, as seemingly random daily actions gradually reveal a coherent pattern. The comparison is apt for Iran’s traditional approach to power projection but may also be appropriate considering recent changes that have affected both Iran’s coveted rug market and the country’s regional and international outlook. Iran has successfully emerged from a series of geopolitical challenges beginning with the war against Iraq in the 1980s, followed by the U.S. invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2003, and culminating in popular uprisings after 2011—which were backed by its adversaries and threatened its allies in the region. In spite of Iran’s emergence from such challenges, factors such as the sanctions imposed by the United States under the Donald Trump presidency have crippled the Iranian economy and undermined Tehran’s ability to project power effectively.2 In the four decades following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran has been a prominent player in regional conflicts, particularly against Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the other side of the Persian Gulf. 3 Iran has largely maintained the upper hand in the wake of these confrontations, contrary to expectations after the eruption of the Arab uprisings in 2011.4 The Islamic Republic outlasted Saddam Hussein’s 1980-1988 war, extended its influence via proxies across multiple nations, and cemented its presence in four Arab capitals, namely in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This apparent dominance peaked on 14 September 2019, when two major Saudi oil facilities—the Abqaiq oil processing facility and the Khurais oil field—were attacked using drones. 5 The attack roughly halved Saudi Arabia’s oil production and affected around 5 percent of the global oil supply. 6 Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels claimed responsibility. Although Iran denied any involvement, Saudi Arabian officials and the United States nonetheless suggested that drones and cruise missiles of Iranian origin were used.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Rivalry, Regional Power, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

4. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

5. China, Russia, and Power Transition in Central Asia

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since the days of Thucydides, scholars have written about—and policymakers have wrestled with—the dangers of power transition, which occurs when a rising power challenges the previously dominant power in a system. In the 5th Century BCE, this dynamic led to decades of war between alliance systems led by Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta eventually defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the real winner was the Persian Empire, which snatched up territory from the exhausted states of the Hellenic system after the war ended. Much scholarship on the so-called Thucydides Trap focuses on the United States and China, asking if the powers two can negotiate the latter’s rise without conflict. But there is another, more acute power transition underway: that between Russia and China in Central Asia. In the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia’s power and legitimacy in Central Asia has declined in absolute terms. The erosion of Russian power relative to that of China, however, is more important than the decline in Moscow’s absolute power. Power transitions are notoriously hard to navigate and can strain even amicable relationships, turning erstwhile partners into competitors, or worse. The China-Russia partnership is a relatively recent phenomenon after centuries of mostly competitive relations. This means that Beijing and Moscow do not have a reservoir of goodwill built over decades to draw on as they navigate the erosion of Russian power in a region critically important to both. While this power transition is unlikely to lead to outright war between China and Russia over Central Asia, it is already leading to competition between the two, especially in the economic realm. Competition between Beijing and Moscow is made both more likely and more consequential by several unique features of the region. First, it is geographically contiguous to both. Next, both have high-order political, economic, and security interests at stake there. Finally, the US footprint in the region is light, removing a strong incentive for Chinese-Russian cooperation there. The United States is in many ways the binding agent between China and Russia: Where it is present, their shared resistance to Washington’s influence gives them a focal point for cooperation. Where the United States is absent—as it is in Central Asia, at least with respect to China and Russia—that focal point is removed. This report first analyzes Chinese and Russian influence and interests in Central Asia. It then examines how each pursues its political, military, and economic goals in the region. It concludes with an analysis of how and where their interests are most convergent and divergent and the implications for their overall relationship. If Beijing and Moscow can negotiate their power transition in Central Asia and maintain their overall partnership, this implies that the partnership is deep and durable. But it is Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the world, that will test Chinese-Russian ties.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Central Asia

6. Tokyo Has an Opportunity to Become a Financial Hub

Author:
Mark Siegel
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On his September trip to the United States, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida attended the United Nations’ annual General Assembly session, and later gave a well-received speech at the Economic Club of New York. His remarks included a comment about how his administration was actively considering a series of policy steps intended to reinvigorate Tokyo’s place in the global financial system; raise Tokyo’s profile as an important financial hub for Asia; and implicitly, regain market share that had been long lost to Hong Kong, and more recently to Singapore. The prime minister’s intentions are laudable, and his suggestions are worth taking seriously. In any case, the proposals under consideration are generally good for financial markets in Tokyo. Cynics will ask whether the horse has left the barn. In a world where continuous face-to-face interaction is less and less necessary for financial transactions, it is fair to ask what it really means to be a financial hub in the twenty-first century. But Japanese officials are not wrong to be concerned about revitalizing Tokyo as an international financial center. Let’s start by acknowledging that the Japanese government—including the prime minister’s office, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Financial Services Agency (FSA), and other official bodies—is serious and prepared to take steps to make Tokyo an attractive place for international financial firms to situate their Asian headquarters. After years of asking market participants for recommendations, policymakers have in hand a menu of policy adjustments that make a lot of sense. The list is long, with proposals ranging from offering official business documentation in English, to having special one-stop and fast-track approval processes, to adjusting tax law. Adjustments to tax law are a major issue: for example, the creation of a temporary tax resident status, relaxation of exit tax rules for foreign nationals, and adjustment of tax rules related to the transfer of overseas assets are constructive, long-standing suggestions. Similarly, adjustments to immigration rules related to foreign domestic workers would make it easier for expats to replicate some of the lifestyle benefits that they enjoy in other areas of East Asia.1 Some of the proposals are easy-to-implement, low-cost, measures that would make life less difficult for foreign firms and expats who want to make Tokyo a regional base. And some of them (e.g., major changes to financial sector law and regulation) are harder to imagine, but possible. The three following observations can be made. First, essentially all of the world’s major financial centers of the twentieth century had common law–based legal and regulatory systems. Japan, like France, has a civil law–based system. This difference matters. Both systems function smoothly in the operational sense, but international finance has been dynamic precisely because it rests upon a legal framework that tends to be permissive with guardrails, as opposed to restrictive with an only-allowed-with-permission structure. The point here is not to litigate the virtues and failings of the world’s two most prominent legal systems. The point is that the Japanese government should be honest with itself about the legal and regulatory norms that it collectively thinks of as Japanese, in the context of attracting foreign financial firms to Tokyo. The right kind of policy shifts could be transformative. That said, from a political perspective, some of them will appear to be very challenging. Second, timing matters, and now may be the right time to take policy risks; a window of opportunity may be closing. The reabsorption of Hong Kong into the People’s Republic of China that started under Carrie Lam is now well advanced, and the city has gone from being the preeminent regional hub for Asian finance to being something much less. It continues to lose vitality. A city that had Anglo law with Chinese characteristics (and geography) is now a different place, having adopted Chinese rules with a superficial Anglo form. That transformation has been an unhappy experience for the cosmopolitan residents of the former crown colony, but it is an opportunity for competing financial centers. Singapore, to pick the obvious example, has benefited from Beijing’s heavy-handed approach to Hong Kong. With common law already in place, an existing and well-developed financial community, and not-dissimilar geographic advantages, Singapore is a natural option for regional headquarters and staff as the Hong Kong business environment deteriorates. But Singapore is physically smaller than Hong Kong, and if the latter occasionally felt like the Chinese version of the financial Wild West, the former feels more like a very buttoned-down, engineered community. So while some of what had been Hong Kong’s centrality, and commercial verve, has moved slightly west, a lot of it has been dispersed far and wide. Dubai has picked up some of the slack, and no doubt some of the business has moved back to London and New York—maybe as an interim step, or maybe for good. There is no preeminent Asian financial hub today. It is still in play, and that is a window of opportunity. Third, the metaphorical pie may be shrinking. What if—in a post-COVID world—a central fact of our new environment is that financial centers, like money itself, have been substantially dematerialized? Even the undisputed global financial centers—New York and London—have experienced some of this new reality. Bank and broker-dealer headquarters are no longer beehives of activity, creativity, and deal-making. They are more like corporate conference centers and operation hubs, only housing activities that require collective physical groups on an as-needed basis. Those activities should not be devalued, but these places are relatively empty shells compared to the Before Times (pre-2020). The large banks’ financial statements tell us that these changes have not hobbled actual financial activity, but the staff does not come to the office every day, and does not want to.
Topic:
Economics, Finance, Banking, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Tokyo

7. Beyond proxies: Iran’s deeper strategy in Syria and Lebanon

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi and Julien Barnes-Dacey
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The war in Gaza is pushing the shadow conflict between Iran and Israel out into the open. There is a grave risk that this escalates further in Lebanon and Syria – where Iran wields powerful influence – and spirals into a full-blown regional war. The intensifying conflict in Syria and Lebanon is the result of Israel’s escalating response since Hamas’s attacks on 7 October and Iran’s “forward-defence” strategy, which aims to confront potential threats before they come close to Iranian borders. Iran’s strategy is underpinned by a decades-long effort to embed its influence in Lebanon and Syria. Western governments will not find this easy to dislodge, and an intensified coercive strategy to push Iran out of the Levant would likely be counterproductive. But Iran’s focus on preserving its influence and deterrence capability – which trumps its ideological commitment to supporting Palestinians and fighting Israel – offers opportunities to prevent a wider war. Europeans should now focus on de-escalating tensions in Lebanon and Syria; increasing conditional support for actors in both countries to advance local stabilisation goals; and intensifying their backing for structural reform that can slowly dilute Iran’s dominance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transnational Actors, Regional Power, and October 7
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria

8. An Interaction Between Regional Power and Liberal International Order (LIO): A Case Study of India and Indonesia

Author:
Saroj Kumar Aryal
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The main aim of this paper is to find a pattern in the possible way the regional and global order interact with each other. To analyse the interaction, India and Indonesia are presented as the case studies. The rationale behind choosing India and Indonesia is, that both of them since their independence have had similar foreign policies and approaches to international order. On the other hand, both of the countries have been coined as the rising power in the current international relations. While the system-led analysis generalizes the top-to-bottom approach to explain the interaction between regional and global order, the increasing multiplicities in the distribution of power made it more difficult to simply generalise it. Thus, this article attempts to fill that gap.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Liberalism, International Order, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
South Asia, Indonesia, India, and Southeast Asia

9. Turkey Wants to Stitch Iraq and Syria Back Together (Part 2)

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Ankara’s push for “soft recentralization” in Iraq will likely include more intensive efforts to establish the Development Road and prioritize Baghdad’s interests, though without abandoning the Kurdistan Region. As discussed in Part 1 of this PolicyWatch, Turkey’s Syria strategy is rather circuitous, potentially involving simultaneous negotiations with the Assad regime and the United States while running the risk of damaging relations with Washington if the two governments fail to coordinate their moves. In contrast, Ankara’s Iraq strategy—which boils down to promoting Turkish money over Iranian guns—is more straightforward and likely to receive U.S. backing. To this end, Ankara has conceived the Development Road, a proposed trade network that would run across Iraq and Turkey, connecting Asian and European markets via the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. Initially, the project ran counter to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a U.S.-proposed route stretching from India through the Arabian Peninsula and Levant to Europe. Yet the Gaza war and ongoing Houthi maritime attacks have raised security concerns about commercial shipping through the Red Sea, suddenly boosting the prospects of the Development Road at IMEC’s expense. With Gulf money behind the project, Turkish policymakers predict the Development Road’s initial routes could open as early as 2027. Washington should consider throwing its support behind this initiative as well, particularly if it needs to counterbalance Iranian influence in Baghdad following a full or partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

10. Borders Without a Nation: Syria, Outside Powers, and Open-Ended Instability

Author:
Kheder Khaddour and Armenak Tokmajyan
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In Syria’s border regions, changes in demographics, economics, and security mean that an inter-Syrian peace process will require consensus among main regional powers that Syria must remain united, that no one side can be victorious, and that perennial instability threatens the region.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Syrian War, Borders, Regional Power, and Instability
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria