Search

Begin New Search Topic Reform Publication Year within 3 Years

171. How Iran’s Protests Differ from Past Movements

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The unrest has shown that many young people are not only rejecting the regime, but also steering away from long-time actors such as the clergy, reformers, and dissident politicians inside and outside the country. Since erupting on September 16, Iran’s latest wave of street protests has begun to pose a serious security and political challenge to the Islamic Republic, placing regime leaders in a uniquely puzzling situation. Interestingly, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has not commented on the turmoil, which was ignited by the torture and death of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, at the hands of the regime’s morality police (Gasht-e Ershad, or Guidance Patrol), reportedly for disrespecting regulations on wearing a hijab. Yet he and his circle are no doubt concerned about the movement’s novel aspects. Anti-regime protests are nothing new in the Islamic Republic. The largest one was sparked by massive fraud in the 2009 presidential election, bringing millions of people to the street until authorities cracked down on the movement’s leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi (Mousavi is still under house arrest to this day). The most recent round of widespread protests took place in 2019, after the government’s sudden decision to raise gasoline prices. At the time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and police forces killed more than 1,500 people, a shocking record even by the regime’s brutal standards.
Topic:
Social Movement, Reform, Democracy, and Protests
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

172. Scoring Iraq’s New Government: Metrics for Preserving U.S. Interests

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The protracted post-election process has been a step backward for Iraqi democracy, so Washington will need to closely monitor the new leadership’s actions and hold Baghdad to measurable benchmarks. Iraq’s stalled government formation process finally lurched forward on October 17, with new president Abdul Latif Rashid taking office more than a year after the 2021 election. Incoming prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will now try to ratify his cabinet during a parliamentary session on October 22. If he succeeds as expected, Baghdad will finally close perhaps its most troubled electoral cycle yet—a chapter in which a clear popular vote nearly failed to produce a peaceful transition of power, and the losing factions spurred the biggest winner to abandon parliament through corrupt judicial rulings. Under these sad circumstances, the U.S. government and its partners need to quietly but insistently push for early, inclusive elections to restore legitimacy to the democratic process. Simultaneously, all of Iraq’s friends must watch the new government like a hawk to ensure that militias and corrupt politicians do not attempt to purge technocrats, conduct witch hunts against Western-leaning officials, cover up past graft, or initiate a new wave of “asset-stripping” via state institutions. After many false alarms, the survival of Iraq’s close relationship with the West is truly at stake right now, and only firm expectation-setting can ensure that the partnership continues.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Government, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Military
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

173. The Tenacity of Young Iranians in the Protest Movement

Author:
Haleh Esfandiari
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Despite the regime's crackdown, Iranian protestors are showing unprecedented resilience and unity in their demands, making the international community's next steps even more crucial. Once again, Iranians have come out into the streets to protest against their government, its policies, and its leaders. Once again they face a regime that has proved itself tone-deaf to widespread public discontent—responding instead with brutality, arrests, mass trials, and executions. But this recent wave of protests has proved different. The regime is being confronted by its own children—a generation of young women and men who seek not just reform, not just an easing of controls, but a regime change. The protest movement was triggered when 22-year old Mahsa Amini died while in police custody, beaten to death by the morality police on September 16 because the form of her hijab was not to their liking. Protests quickly erupted immediately after her death, and they are now in their third month.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Reform, Democracy, Economy, Youth, and Protests
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

174. Hamas at 35

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A look back at the group’s track record and unchanging core ideology shows why its gestures toward democracy and inclusivity should not be mistaken for true moderation. On December 14, Hamas celebrated the thirty-fifth anniversary of its founding. In addition to unveiling a new logo, the group held a rally in Gaza City, where it showed off the gun of slain Israeli soldier Hadar Goldin, released numerous statements reiterating its goals, and hinted at future conflicts with Israel. Such hostile displays are no surprise given the course of the group’s ideological and political development over the past four decades.
Topic:
Economics, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, Hamas, and Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

175. The Rise and Fall of Military Strategic Communications at National Defence 2015-2021: A Cautionary Tale for Canada and NATO, and a Roadmap for Reform

Author:
Brett Boudreau
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
On November 2, 2020, the Ottawa Citizen ran the front-page headline “Canadian Military Wants to Establish New Organization to Use Propaganda and Other Techniques to Influence Canadians.” This seemed an unbelievable story, and one initially denied by a spokesperson for the minister of National Defence. Just three days later, though, then-chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Gen. Jonathan Vance shuttered the group in question, terminating an initiative more than five years in the making that called into question the Department of National Defence’s (DND) commitment to objective and appropriate public communication, at a time when truth decay, misinformation and disinformation have gained much traction around the world and in Canada. In June 2021, the day Parliament adjourned for the summer, DND acknowledged to select media that acting CDS Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre and then-deputy minister Jody Thomas had determined the initiative was “incompatible” with government communications policy and the vision, mission and principles of DND Public Affairs. In a surprising self-indictment, the leaders also admitted a lack of “institution-wide strategic level direction and guidance,” to build information-related capabilities that were “governed by appropriate authorities and oversight.” Deliberate influence campaigns by malign state, non-state and increasingly by domestic actors to disturb, disrupt and create disorder in democratic societies have become widespread and commonplace. The volume of vitriol is increasing. This is fast eroding citizen faith, trust and confidence in government and public institutions and may be the greatest contemporary threat liberal democracies face – arresting this trend and then restoring trust, the ultimate challenge. National Defence’s entire program – to be successful on operations; secure sufficient funding; recruit, train and retain; effect culture change; reconstitute the force post-pandemic and procure the equipment needed to contest, confront and defeat adversaries – will largely depend on whether the institution can modernize its approach to strategic communications to manoeuvre more agilely and to better effect in a complex, frenetic and hostile information environment.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Communications, Reform, Propaganda, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

176. Will the Xi Jinping Leadership Take Up Reformist Policies After the 20th Party Congress?

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
That President Xi Jinping and his faction will dominate the 20th Party Congress is apparent from the Politburo announcement that the week-long, five-yearly conclave will take place on October 16. The Politburo meeting, which was held on August 30, said that the guiding principle of the party and country would remain “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” (Gov.cn, October 16). The Politburo reasserted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would follow principles laid down by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and above all, Xi Jinping. However, the dictums on reform and the open door – as well as the “lie low” foreign policy – promulgated by “Chief Architect of Reform” Deng in the 1980s and 1990s were conspicuously absent from the Party Congress announcement. Instead, the communique emphasized the so-called “three continuances” (三个继续, san ge jixu). This is a reference to Xi’s efforts to uphold Mao Zedong-style “common prosperity” (共同富裕, gongtongfuyu); to sustain “party construction” (党的建设 (dang de jianshe) in order to ensure the loyalty of cadres; and to work toward the formation of a “community with a shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体,renlei mingyun gongtongti) (Xinhua, August 30; Ming Pao, August 30).
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

177. Algeria’s social support policy: Economic costs and the need for reform

Author:
Hami Hassan
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
With the ratification of the 2022 budget in Algeria, the issue of budget allocations for social support and social benefits has resurfaced once again. This paper attempts to understand the repercussions of state intervention in economic affairs, and the historical and ideological underpinnings of the welfare state in Algeria as a rentier state based on the nationalization of all economic relations in crisis political contexts, the effects of which extended to the state’s relationship with society and the relations of production within it.
Topic:
Economics, Reform, Finance, and Social Order
Political Geography:
Africa and Algeria

178. The impact of the quota system on women parliamentary representation in Morocco: A series of reforms or a regressive path?

Author:
Aberrafie Zaanoun
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
While the gradual improvement of the quota system increased the number of women in parliament, experiences so far show that the quota system has been used as an electoral tool by a political class that exploited affirmative action measures to seize more representative seats through kinship and personal connections. This paper looks at the contexts surrounding the implementation of the women’s quota in the Moroccan electoral system, its advantages and disadvantages, as well as the possibility of redirecting the quota system to achieve true political empowerment for women.
Topic:
Reform, Elections, Democracy, Representation, and Parliamentarism
Political Geography:
Africa and Morocco

179. Youth political participation in post-2011 Tunisia: Exploring the impact of the youth quota system through the prism of local municipal councillors

Author:
Malek Lakhal
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Introduced as way to induct youth into institutional politics, Tunisia modified its electoral code in 2014 to include a youth quota, with a mandatory representation of youth on electoral lists for local elections. In April-May 2018, Tunisia held elections for local councils, representing the first mandatory iteration of these youth quotas in practice. The mandatory character of the quotas has theoretically meant that a greater number of young people ran during these elections and are today participating in institutional politics at the local level. What has been the impact of these youth quotas in stimulating youth meaningful participation in the political process? To answer this question, the Arab Reform Initiative conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with ten young local councillors at the municipalities of Kasserine, Foussana, Medjez El Beb, Kairouan, Hajeb Laayoun,e and Chebika. The research sought to understand what distinguished these young councillors from the rest of their age cohort, and in particular to understand what factors led them to become active in the political realm. The research also sought to explore the impact of political socialization on them, as well as their own values and understandings of politics. Finally, the research explored the difficulties they have encountered or are still encountering as young councillors working in public institutions that are new to them. The research has found that primary and secondary socialization are behind youth’s political participation. Young councillors entered politics with the “help” of their primary socialization (family) and secondary socialization (civil society, volunteering, etc.); nonetheless, all of the councillors we met were solicited by older people in their environment (family, friends, professors) looking for young people to add to their list. In other words, none had initiated their own electoral bids, and only a couple were thinking of running for the elections before being solicited. The research has also found that for these young councillors, age difference and gender are perceived as sources of tension. Age difference among the councillors, as well as with the mayor, are perceived as having a negative impact on the youth’s work at the council. This age difference can also take the shape of an experience gap that plays to the detriment of young councillors, as many of the older councillors held the same positions during the Ben Ali era. Likewise, gender intersects negatively with age for young women councillors. Most women councillors noticed that older male councillors adopt certain attitudes to belittle them during the meetings. Moreover, they state that men tend to take advantage of women’s temporal and spatial limitations (their inability to stay out late at night or sit in men’s cafés, for instance) to take decisions in their absence. Yet, alliances based on age are difficult to create, and the only alliance formed was between three young women in Chebika. Despite the difficulties they encounter because of their age and gender, most councillors are gaining experience and self-confidence, leading them to consider running for re-election. Learning, understanding, and ultimately seeing one’s impact in the local environment have been raised as the most motivational aspects of being a councillor. Nonetheless, youth councillors still harbor distinct ideas regarding electoral politics: all of the councillors reject political parties, even those who ran under party banners. They see the “country’s interest” as their main political compass, yet some consider their mandate to be to fight against their region’s historical marginalization. Currently none of the councillors interviewed is affiliated to a political party, and most expressed clear rejection of parties. They perceive them as inefficient and detrimental to the “country’s interest” which held a central place in the councillor’s evaluation of the political landscape. Political parties were mainly depicted as going against the “nation’s interest,” a notion that transcended political affiliations, ideologies, or social class. The youth quota system thus appears to be efficient in inducting youth into institutional politics to the point where most of the councillors we met are considering renewing and deepening (as in running for legislative elections, for instance) their participation in the political landscape. However, the youth quota reaches a limit given the lack of diversity of the youth whose entrance it permitted. The quota opens the way to the most educated portions of youth, that is university graduates, but does not reach young people who left school early. Moreover, these young people have been for the most part socialized into politics through their family or through affiliations such as student unions and local NGOs. Given this, the youth quota – still in its nascent stage – has only a limited impact as it exclusively reaches young people who have predisposition for entering the political realm in the first place.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Arab Spring, Youth, and Participation
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

180. The 25 July 2022 Scenarios in Tunisia: Uncertainty after the Referendum

Author:
Zied Boussen
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The referendum on 25 July 2022 will mark yet another important date in Tunisia’s history. This paper seeks to examine these different scenarios, analyze their consequences, study their stakeholders, and determine their likelihood.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Elections, Referendum, and Participation
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia