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71. A Compass and a Concept: A Guide to the EU and NATO Strategic Outlooks

Author:
Ricardo Borges de Castro and Rita Barbosa Lobo
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 upended Europe’s security order. The invasion was a wake-up call that peace in the continent should not be taken for granted and a catalyst for change at European and transatlantic level. The EU adopted a long-term Strategic Compass for security and defense. NATO, no longer “braindead,” issued a new Strategic Concept for the coming decade and is expanding. While there is convergence in strategic outlooks, questions remain on how both organizations will cooperate and coordinate their actions, implement the investment, troops and capabilities’ goals set in each document as well as deal with countries such as China.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

72. NATO: The Importance of Activism in the Mediterranean Scenario

Author:
Lorenzo Somigli
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The secure defense of NATO members does not depend on the Kyiv frontline; the southern flank is the most unguarded. This paper deals with the Mediterranean, a closed sea without borders which globalized before globalization, examining some strategic alternatives for Western allies. The Mediterranean is a point of contact, a diaphragm, and a battlefield. In addition, the central Mediterranean is a relevant area where Russia and China have their foot in the door because of the disengagement of France and Italy and the lack of attention of NATO. It is precisely on this weaker frontier that NATO must relaunch its commitment and presence. Defending marine spaces determines the continent’s safety. So, losing the Mediterranean can be disastrous. And finally, it examines Italian policy in the Mediterranean to date and the reasons why Italy can and must correct the strabismus of the USA, which is completely looking at the Indo-Pacific, and of imagines a peripheral Europe without politics.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Activism
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

73. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Mine action has the potential to incentivise confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), because it could contribute to development and reconciliation through the creation of communities of practice among individuals from civil society and at the grassroots level as part of post-conflict reconstruction. Although many Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating States are contaminated by mines, mine action as a CSBM has scarcely been included in peace negotiations, because it is thought that it might hinder the peace process. Yet mine action, if “depoliticised”, could be implemented independently of peace negotiations through the creation of spaces for cooperation in demining projects of common interest to rival communities. The OSCE is well placed to propose these strategies, especially in Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are not only affected by protracted conflicts with limited engagement of the population in the peace process but are also highly contaminated by mines.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Violence, and Landmines
Political Geography:
Europe

74. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The global debate on weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) often focuses on futuristic “killer robots”, which risks overlooking the fact that these technologies are already part of the security landscape. Diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in states’ discourse pose a considerable risk for European security and stability. The impact of AI is not inevitable, and states should address this issue through political means, such as a political declaration with a commitment to ensuring human control over the use of force. With its inclusive membership, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can and should become the platform through which its participating States can take a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

75. Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Game Theory, Coercion, and International Competition
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

76. The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq

Author:
Heather S. Gregg
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The remarkable life of early-twentieth-century British adventurer Gertrude Bell has been well documented through her biographies and numerous travel books. Bell’s role as a grand strategist for the British government in the Middle East during World War I and the postwar period, however, is surprisingly understudied. Investigating Gertrude Bell as both a military strategist and a grand strategist offers important insights into how Great Britain devised its military strategy in the Middle East during World War I—particularly, Britain’s efforts to work through saboteurs and secret societies to undermine the Ottoman Empire during the war and the country’s attempts to stabilize the region after the war through the creation of the modern state of Iraq. As importantly, studying the life and work of Bell offers a glimpse into how this unique woman was able to become one of the principal architects of British strategy at this time and the extraordinary set of skills and perspectives she brought to these efforts—particularly, her ability to make and maintain relationships with key individuals. Bell’s life and work offer insights into the roles women have played and continue to play as influencers of grand strategy.
Topic:
History, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, World War I, and Gertrude Bell
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Mesopotamia

77. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:
Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

78. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

79. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

80. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine