Search

Begin New Search Topic Military Publication Year within 3 Years

51. Restraining Moscow: What are the repercussions of Wagner's rebellion for the Russo-Ukrainian war?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Yevgeny Prigozhin, the chief of the Russian private military contractor group Wagner, announced that his forces had crossed the Ukrainian border into the city of Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia, threatening to destroy anyone who would obstruct their path, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu if necessary. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, instructing the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. Wagner issued a statement in response to Putin's speech, affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, and instructed the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. In response to Putin's speech, Wagner issued a statement affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. The defection of Wagner and the involvement of its forces in the conflict have significant implications for the Russo-Ukrainian war. The actions of Wagner and the response from the Russian government signal internal divisions and potential shifts in power dynamics within Russia. The situation remains highly volatile, and the repercussions of these events on the ongoing war are yet to unfold fully.
Topic:
Wagner Group, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

52. Military capabilities affected by climate change: An analysis of China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Adaja Stoetman, Dick Zandee, Ties Dams, Niels Drost, and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges of the present and the future. Rising temperatures and sea levels, as well as extreme weather events are manifestations of climate change that also influence military capabilities. Increased attention for the climate change-security nexus is visible both at the national and the international level: nationally through the incorporation of climate change in security strategies and internationally through incorporation in important strategic documents such as the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Given its transnational nature, governments around the world have a shared responsibility to face climate change. A particular role is laid down for the global powers, China, Russia and the United States, given their position in the world. It is, however, questionable whether the global powers’ interests align. They differ in their approaches to address climate change, and even more so in their views on how it affects the armed forces. China and particularly Russia are more reluctant towards depicting climate change as a matter of international security. This is for example visible in international forums, such as the UN Security Council. In contrast, in the US, support for climate action is subject to political preferences, but climate related security risks are widely recognised within the defence establishment. This report reviews various aspects of the relationship between climate and security, with a particular focus on the military. It discusses the role of climate change in a country’s security and defence strategy and, vice versa, the changing tasks and deployment of the armed forces in response to climate change, the effects of climate change on military infrastructure, and measures to realise a greener defence sector.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

53. Russia’s War Economy

Author:
András Rácz, Ole Spillner, and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Sanctions are a strong signal of Western resolve to oppose Russia’s war against Ukraine and have significantly weakened its ability to wage war. But Russia is adapting, turning its economy into a war economy, ramping up military production, and adjusting to sanctions. This Policy Brief looks at Russia’s economic adjustment with a focus on the shifting of resources to war purposes and the effect of sanctions on military production.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

54. PLA Logistics and Sustainment: PLA Conference 2022

Author:
George R. Shatzer, Roger D. Cliff, Kenneth Allen, Joshua Arostegui, and Justin Boggess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The US Army War College People’s Liberation Army Conference (PLA) Conference was held March 31 to April 2, 2022, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference focused on PLA logistics and sustainment. As the PLA continues to build and modernize its combat forces, it is important to examine if the capabilities meant to support combat operations are also being developed. Specific topics included: 1) China’s national-level logistics, including how China mobilizes national resources for the military and how it provides joint logistics support to the PLA Theater Commands; 2) the logistics capabilities of the different PLA services, especially the Army, Navy, and Air Forces; 3) PLA logistics in China’s remote regions, such as airpower projection in the Western Theater Command along the Indian border; and, 4) the PLA’s ability to sustain overseas operations at its base in Djibouti. Despite notable potential shortfalls and points of friction, the PLA has successfully sustained counterpiracy maritime operations for many years and conducted noncombatant evacuation operations well-distant from China. It is increasingly able to move forces across the vast distances of China and conduct large training exercises. Far more must be known about PLA sustainment and logistics before the hard questions about PLA operational reach and endurance can be answered.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, Logistics, Mobilization, Military, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Power Projection
Political Geography:
China and Asia

55. Government Courtesans in the Northern Military Areas -- A Lecture with Hyun Suk Park

Author:
Hyun Suk Park and Jungwon Kim
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
A 45-50-minute talk followed by Q and A. Professor Hyun Suk Park will discuss the courtesan culture of Chosŏn Korea by reflecting upon the intersections between state power, gender politics, and literary culture through travel writings and literary works.
Topic:
Politics, History, Culture, State, Literature, Power, Gender, and Military
Political Geography:
Asia and Korea

56. Imagining Beyond the Imaginary. The Use of Red Teaming and Serious Games in Anticipation and Foresight

Author:
Héloïse Fayet and Amélie Ferey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Red Team Defence demonstrates the Ministry of the Armed Forces' desire to appropriate new foresight tools. Thus, brain games or serious games aim to bypass the weight of the military hierarchy, the standardisation of thoughts and cognitive biases in order to avoid strategic unthinking. In September 2022, The New York Times revealed that the successful Ukrainian offensive on Kharkiv had been prepared in a series of wargames conducted that summer. Given this success, further wargames have been undertaken with a view to a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring. This rise in the popularity of wargames, which come in various forms, is due to their ability to immerse participants in a situation, helping them to become aware of their strategic and tactical blind spots and to identify their own vulnerabilities by putting themselves in the enemy’s position. The ability to anticipate crises and foresee conflicts is essential in order to maintain the initiative and ultimately win out. Thus, the aim of defense foresight is to understand the different forms future wars might take (asymmetric, hybrid, high intensity), the weapons systems that may be employed (drones, high-velocity missiles), and the factors that could trigger them. The use of wargames or scenario analyses to facilitate anticipation and foresight goes hand in hand with changes in the relationship between military and political leaders and civilians, who no longer hesitate to hold the former to account when they have failed to foresee a crisis. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck thus refers to the paradox of a society that is keen to predict the future because of its aversion to risk and the fact that it is now much more difficult to foresee what might happen in the short term due to very rapid technological developments. The modern world generates both risks and progress, and the inability to foresee strategic ruptures carries significant political costs, which explains why politicians set so much store in anticipation and foresight. The initiatives launched by Florence Parly after being appointed French minister of the armed forces in 2017 included promoting experimentation in new cognitive tools. Beyond the issue of technology, the aim was to rethink information management within the ministry in order to make it more agile and cross-cutting. In addition to a significant budget allocated to innovation in the 2019–2025 Military Programming Law, the Ministry of the Armed Forces has drawn inspiration from methods often originating in other organizational cultures, such as start-ups and the private sector, in order to improve its creativity and accelerate its adoption of digital technology.
Topic:
War Games, Military, and Anticipation
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

57. Russia's Influence in MENA After a Year of War in Ukraine

Author:
Matthew Czekaj, Iulia-sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
MEI Managing Editor Matthew Czekaj speaks with scholars Iulia-Sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas on Russia's current standing in the Middle East a year since re-invading Ukraine. How has Russian aggression in Ukraine redrawn Moscow’s relationships in the MENA region? And as the Middle East increasingly becomes a key area of global great power competition, is Russia still a meaningful player there, politically, economically, militarily, and diplomatically?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa

58. MILITARY SANCTIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN

Author:
Jonathan Honig
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
States frequently find themselves disbursing or receiving military aid, cooperation, and access to military products. Using foreign policy options like "military sanctions" (the suspension of military projects, aid, cooperation, and access) is a desirable, widely publicized way for one state to express its discontent to another while presumably influencing desired policy changes in the client state. However, the small amount of evidence on military sanctions indicates that they are ineffective, short-lived, and may even be counterproductive. This analysis attempted to elucidate this subject by advancing a theory stating that states will impose military sanctions in response to domestic audience pressures shortly after high-profile examples of undesirable behavior by client states. However, military sanctions will be eased as time progresses and public attention has waned. This analysis qualitatively examined Uzbekistan and its relationship with the US, finding support for this theory. It concluded that following high-profile incidents and periods of undesirable behavior by an aid-recipient state, military sanctions would likely be employed by the state providing the military aid and programs. Further, military sanctions are eased or scrapped as time moves from public incidents and attention involving human rights abuses.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, War on Terror, and Military
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Uzbekistan

59. The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?

Author:
Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Having been crumbling already for years, international arms control architecture is now in a perilous state. Existing arrangements have either been losing their effectiveness or outright failing due to Russia’s non-compliance, whilst Russia’s aggression against Ukraine might have delivered the final blow to this system. Even after the war in Ukraine has ended, it will take years to re-establish the level of trust necessary to, again, engage with Russia on arms control. The return to the pre-war ‘business as usual’, where the dialogue will resume as if never interrupted, is unlikely. Arms control dialogue with Russia ‘at any cost’ cannot produce an acceptable result. Arms control as we have known it, with its legally binding and verifiable agreements, may have come to an end. The trends emerging from the expert discussions are more focused on a different set of instruments, such as political commitments, risk reduction, or transparency and confidence building measures. Development of new technologies, proliferation of new weapon systems, the rise of China as a global player, and increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russian and Chinese military doctrines will all have an impact on global arms control. The fate of the New START Treaty will have a decisive effect on the future of arms control and the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime already under immense pressure. This report attempts to summarise the developments in arms control architecture over the last decades and accentuate the trends that might be consequential when designing the arms control system of the future. The year 2023 has already demonstrated that arms control is less relevant in Russia’s security thinking. Moscow exploits the existing arrangements mainly as leverage to influence the US and NATO’s policy towards Ukraine or obtain concessions regarding its proposals on the new European security arrangements. The role of arms control in European security might be in decline, but the key elements of European security architecture are still in place, and most states continue to implement them. NATO allies – when discussing and designing arms control or confidence-building measures – shall consider how these instruments advance the security of allies. Under the current circumstances, the priority is to strengthen defence and deterrence of the Alliance. This is the only way to lay the groundwork for a constructive arms control dialogue with Russia.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

60. Military Command and Control

Author:
Gintaras Bagdonas
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO's current military Command and Control (C2) structure was designed for forces engaged in crisis management and expeditionary operations, not territorial defence. It will thus not be suitable for implementing NATO’s new regional defence plans, or for building credible deterrence and defence. A new military C2 structure that clarifies the geographical areas of responsibility of the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and treats the Baltic Sea region as indivisible is needed. NATO must also improve C2 at the tactical level through the establishment of tactical- (component-) level commands, perhaps building upon the existing corps headquarters. The Baltic states, meanwhile, are establishing divisional structures which will further develop their military capabilities and give them new opportunities to act with Allies under corps command. They may, however, face challenges in implementing these ambitious plans due to a shortage of resources.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military, and Command and Control
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America