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111. Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos: ¿una potencia militar emergente en Oriente Medio?

Author:
Santiago Ott
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
En el año 2014, el periódico norteamericano The Washington Post publicó un artículo que versaba en torno a las capacidades militares y el rol desempeñado por las fuerzas armadas de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos (EAU) en diversas operaciones de combate en Medio Oriente. Según reza la nota, el por entonces general retirado del Cuerpo de Marines, James Mattis, junto con otros oficiales de los servicios armados de los Estados Unidos, habían comenzado a dirigirse al pequeño estado del Golfo Pérsico bajo el apodo "little Sparta," en clara referencia a la antigua ciudad-estado griega conocida por sus destacadas tradiciones marciales. Mientras que para algunos esta etiqueta puede resultar exagerada, la misma refleja en buena medida el espíritu que ha tenido la política exterior y de seguridad internacional llevada a cabo por la federación en los últimos años.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East and UAE

112. The Conventional Wisdom About the Chinese Military Challenge: Incomplete and Unpersuasive

Author:
Steven Kosiak
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Now possessing the world’s largest economy and backed up by an increasingly capable military, in recent years China has grown into an ever more significant and complex concern for the United States, its friends and allies, and others in the Indo–Pacific region. It has become not only stronger and more capable but, in a variety of areas, including the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, more assertive. In this light, it is only prudent that the United States remain engaged in the region and, along with its allies, maintain robust military capabilities. At the same time, however, it is difficult to understand some of the main features of what has emerged as the conventional wisdom concerning the magnitude, scope and shape of the challenge China represents, particularly in its military dimensions. Among other things, shortcomings in the conventional wisdom include the unsettling degree to which mainstream assessments of the Chinese military challenge have: • devoted enormous attention to various Taiwan contingencies and, by comparison, remarkably little attention to the Chinese military’s capacity — or lack thereof — to directly conquer or coerce any of the major powers in the region; • equated defending Taiwan, and other relatively small nearby economies, with preventing Chinese regional hegemony, without providing significant analytical support for the presumption; • argued that Taiwan is defensible, in part because of the vulnerability of seaborne invasion forces to precision-guided munitions, as well as the difficulties inherent strategies aimed at punishing adversaries into submission (e.g., through bombardment or blockade) — while seeming to ignore the logical inferences of those conclusions for the defensibility of the major powers in the region, which are larger, economically stronger and generally located much farther from China; • analogized the challenge posed by China today to the threats posed by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War Two and the Soviet Union during the Cold War in ways that — because of differences in, among other things, geography, technology, nationalism, and China’s role in the global economy (including its great dependence on international trade) — may do more to obscure than illuminate the challenge. These analytical shortcomings need to be addressed through additional, more rigorous and better focused research and analysis. While clearly needed, however, it seems unlikely that this additional analysis will come close to fully redeeming the conventional wisdom about the Chinese military challenge as articulated today, including the necessity of some key components of the U.S. military’s existing force structure, modernization and other plans. Taken together, the gaps, weaknesses, blind spots, and analytical leaps upon which the conventional wisdom rests appear too pervasive and deep for such to be the case. Given this reality, rather than the current U.S. strategy, embracing something akin to the Active Denial strategy proposed by a Quincy Institute panel in 2022 would seem to represent a more prudent approach. 1 This strategy embraces some cuts to force structure — especially among ground forces — yielding significant budgetary savings. But it retrains robust air, naval and other forces that would leave the U.S. military with a powerful capacity to deter and, if need be, counter Chinese aggression in the Indo–Pacific and, specifically, to support key U.S. allies and friends in the region. And better addressing the areas noted above could go far towards facilitating the refinement of this more restrained strategy, and ensuring that it is both as effective as possible and can be supported at an affordable and sustainable price.
Topic:
Nationalism, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Influence, and Military
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and United States of America

113. March of the Four–Stars: The Role of Retired Generals and Admirals in the Arms Industry

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The revolving door between the U.S. government and the arms industry, which involves hundreds of senior Pentagon officials and military officers every year, generates the appearance — and in some cases the reality — of conflicts of interest in the making of defense policy and in the shaping of the size and composition of the Pentagon budget. This report looks at the post–government employment records of a subset of the larger flow of “revolvers”: four–star generals and admirals who retired between June 2018 and July 2023. Among the findings are the following: 26 of 32 four–star officers who retired after June 2018 — over 80 percent — went to work for the arms industry as board members, advisors, executives, consultants, lobbyists, or members of financial institutions that invest in the defense sector. The biggest category of post–retirement employment for four–stars, by far, was as board members or advisors for small and medium–sized arms contractors, with 15 choosing that option. This compares to five who became board members, advisors or executives for one of the top 10 arms contractors. Five retired four–stars became arms industry consultants, five became lobbyists for weapons companies, and four joined financial firms that make significant investments in the defense sector. This brief recommends a number of measures designed to limit undue influence and potential conflicts of interest on the part of retired four–star generals and other retired Pentagon officials and military officers who pass through the revolving door. Bar four–star officers from working for firms that receive $1 billion or more in Pentagon contracts per year. Extend “cooling off” periods before retired Pentagon officials and military officers can go to work on behalf of the arms industry. Increase transparency over post–government employment and activities on the part of retired Pentagon and military officials working on behalf of arms contractors, including reporting on their interactions with Congress and the executive branch. The most comprehensive current proposal to address the revolving door issue is Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Department of Defense Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act. 1 The bill would encompass many of the recommendations put forward in this report.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Industry, Military, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

114. People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force Order of Battle 2023

Author:
Decker Eveleth
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China is currently in the process of radically expanding its arsenal of conventional and nuclear land-based missile launchers. Over the past decade China has doubled the number of combat missile brigades in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), and has unveiled a myriad of new capabilities, including missiles capable of firing both conventional and nuclear warheads, and missiles equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles designed to evade missile defenses. The technologies and deployment patterns of these weapons are important indicators of the direction of China’s force posture: they not only indicate China’s military capabilities, but also its fears and its conceptions about how future wars in the region will be conducted. Deployment of particular systems with certain capabilities to certain regions can inform us of what, how, and when China might strike certain targets, which in turn can help us understand what China prioritizes as a threat. The current expansion of China’s missile forces suggests a possible departure from China’s previously restrained second-strike nuclear posture to a posture capable of deterring at multiple levels of conflict and an increased shift towards nuclear warfighting. As the Sino-American relationship becomes increasingly volatile over the status of Taiwan, gaining accurate data on China’s conventional and nuclear missile forces becomes more important than ever. Since China first established a ballistic missile force, that force has historically been quite small, kept at low levels of readiness, and constrained by a policy forswearing the first use of nuclear weapons. A little over a decade ago, China only possessed around 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), of which only the 18 DF-5 ICBMs in silos and 12 DF-31A mobile launchers could reliably reach the contiguous United States. 1 After Xi Jinping elevated China’s missile forces into a full branch of the People’s Liberation Army in 2015, the number of missile launchers deployed by the PRC has increased rapidly. The PLARF, responsible for the operation of all non-tactical ground-based surface-to-surface missile systems in China’s inventory, operates both conventional and nuclear missiles for a variety of strategic missions. This could include utilizing short, medium, and intermediate-range missiles to neutralize Taiwanese defensive installations, striking US warships at long-range while those warships are at sea or in port, or a retaliatory nuclear strike mission. The PLARF is now on track to deploy more than 1,000 ballistic missile launchers by 2028, including at least 507 nuclear capable launchers, 342 to 432 conventional launchers, and 252 dual-capable launchers. At least 320 solid-fueled fixed ICBM silos and 30 liquid-fueled fixed ICBM silos are currently under construction in addition to China’s growing arsenal of mobile ICBM launchers. And this tally does not even touch launchers operated by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The dramatic multiplication in missile forces, both in terms of those missiles capable of reaching the United States, and those missiles that offer China new capabilities in a regional war, have serious implications for the strategic balance in East Asia as well as the future direction of China’s nuclear posture. The direction of the posture is difficult to assess due to the lack of sources coming out of China. As the Chinese government has not officially commented on the buildup or acknowledged its scope, any concrete data, like statements and records from the PLARF itself or Chinese strategists, is hard to come by. Because of this, analysis of what the PLARF is actually deploying and in what quantity is one of our only windows into developments into how the PRC thinks about its nuclear weapons arsenal and how to use it. Open-source intelligence techniques allow researchers to collect this data. By utilizing publicly available information and commercial satellite imagery, researchers can examine foreign military organizations in a level of detail that was previously only available to state intelligence agencies.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

115. The Egyptian Army’s Counterinsurgency: History, Past Operations, and the Sinai Campaign

Author:
Hossam el-Hamalawy
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Why did the Egyptian military, which had long avoided serious involvement in the police-led 1990s domestic War on Terror and the later fight against armed militants in Sinai, embark on a major counterinsurgency in Sinai following the 2013 coup? Why did it take the Egyptian military almost a decade to pacify the peninsula at a very high cost for Sinai residents and the military itself, despite the small size of the insurgent force and the relatively confined terrain where it operated? This paper will attempt to answer those questions, but first, it examines some catastrophic precedents where the army deployed its personnel in counterinsurgency operations, before delving into the recent Sinai war and what it tells us about the military’s mindset.
Topic:
Security, Counterinsurgency, History, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, Egypt, and Sinai Peninsula

116. Wings of Change: The Coming Drone Proliferation in the Western Balkans

Author:
Filip Ejdus and Vuk Vuksanović
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
What are contributing factors to the rise of drones in the Balkans and how might they change the military balance of power in the region? Find out in the BCSP analysis written by the BCSP Senior Researcher Vuk Vuksanović, and Filip Ejdus, a professor in security studies at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade and the Member of the Executive Board at the BCSP. In May 2023, Turkey delivered to Kosovo five Bayraktar TB2 attack drones to be used by its Kosovo Security Forces (KSF). The transaction was done seven months after the signing of the contract, and as Kosovo was close to hosting a large US-led military exercise, Defender Europe 23. This transaction might signify things to come, that is, the proliferation of armed drones in the Western Balkans. The reasons for this potential proliferation of armed drones are multiple. First, they include that drones are becoming an unavoidable hallmark of the global security landscape, used by superpowers like the US and in various regional conflicts worldwide. Second, the fact that Serbia is ahead of its neighbours in the number of drones it operates creates an impulse with its neighbours to match that capability. Third, the extant regional arms control regime in the Western Balkans has loopholes related to the more modern weapons systems like drones. Fourth, the acquisition of weapon systems like drones is a powerful political instrument for local nations to increase their regional and international bargaining power, as well as for the powers supplying them to boost their influence in the Balkans. Finally, investing in armed forces, including acquiring modern systems like drones, is a powerful method of domestic political promotion for the local elites. This combination of factors makes regional drone proliferation in the Western Balkans highly probable.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Military, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Serbia and Western Balkans

117. Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia

Author:
Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Gustav Gressel, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to last many years, even if the violence may subside at times. To sustain Ukraine during this conflict, Europeans should draw up a four-part ‘long-war plan’. This plan would comprise military assistance to Ukraine in the form of a ‘security compact’; security assurances that respond to scenarios of Russian escalation; economic support, giving Ukraine access to the EU’s single market; and help to secure Ukraine’s energy supply. Besides its practical impact, this plan will signal Europeans’ commitment to assisting Ukraine, showing Kyiv, Moscow, and the wider global community that the EU is in it for the long haul. The long-war plan will also provide clarity to anxious publics in member states. Together, these proposals would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and help create the long-term conditions for a resolution to the war – if and when a more constructive attitude emerges in the Kremlin.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Conflict, Military, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

118. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russian Military Logistics

Author:
Ronald Ti
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the third brief of the series, Dr Ronald Ti examines Russia’s failures in planning and executing logistics operations for its war in Ukraine. In large part, these failures can be attributed to systemic weaknesses such as its ‘push’ (rather than ‘pull’) approach to expeditionary logistics, overly centralised command, a lack of non-commissioned officers, and a culture of bullying and corruption. Ronald Ti, PhD candidate at War Studies Department of King’s College London, cautions that Baltic and other planners should not assume that the Russian military will repeat their poor performance in Ukraine against other adversaries in the future, but also notes that Russia’s military culture is highly resilient and therefore difficult to change.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Logistics, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

119. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Early Air War

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The fifth brief of the series looks at the early air war. Russia’s failure to conduct a devastating air offensive and secure air superiority, despite having all the advantages on paper at the start of its war in Ukraine, was a great surprise to observers and had major strategic impact. In this brief, ICDS research fellow Tony Lawrence describes the recent historical context for Russia’s air campaign, its failures in the air in Ukraine, the role of Western assistance, and the importance of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles. The intertwining of the air war and information war is a common theme throughout.
Topic:
War, Air Force, Information Warfare, Military, Aerospace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

120. Russia’s War in Ukraine: WMD Issues

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the eighth brief of our “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series, Hudson Institute’s Richard Weitz examines issues related to weapons of mass destruction. Throughout the war, Russia has regularly threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and against Western states. Analysts are divided on the credibility of these threats and on the risk that the war in Ukraine may escalate to the nuclear level, but Russia’s careless rhetoric is at least likely to set back prospects for nuclear arms control and increase the incentives for nuclear proliferation. While the nuclear taboo has remained unbroken, Russia’s use of hypersonic missiles and its readiness to disrupt civil nuclear operations may have created precedents with huge future consequences. Although Russia’s hypersonic missile attacks—a world first—have not been game-changing, they have sent important signals and, no doubt, advanced Russia’s quest to operationalise these weapons. Of more immediate concern have been Russia’s readiness to ignore basic safety protocols at Chornobyl and its recklessness in conducting offensive military operations near the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Meanwhile, its disinformation about Ukraine’s chemical and biological capacity has raised the spectre of the use of chemical or biological agents in a war in Europe. Weitz concludes that the non-use of weapons of mass destruction in the Ukraine War has contributed to emboldening Western states in their supply of advanced weapon systems to Ukraine.
Topic:
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Hypersonic Weapons, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine