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101. Is a compulsory military service feasible for Kosovo?

Author:
Gramos Sejdiu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
During the general elections of February, 2021 in Kosovo, one of the commitments of the “Vetëvendosje!” (VV) party was to introduce a national conscription model based on 3+3 months of service. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, coupled with increasing tension with Serbia, who maintains very close ties with Russia, has brought the conscription model into spotlight in Kosovo. However, as the country aspires membership in NATO, the transition from a professional military force into the conscription model could potentially undermine that process. Currently, there are 13 countries in Europe that apply the conscription-based model for the armed forces, each facing different challenges with the system. According to the media reportings, it seems that Kosovo’s approach is based on the models of Switzerland, Israel and Norway. However, it is clear that while Kosovo can learn a lot from other countries, it needs to develop its own approach and model to conscription, and in this context certain social, political and economic aspects should be considered. In order to accommodate changing mission profiles and lowering military expenditures, European armies have been reduced in size, lessening the need for recruits. Despite the war in Ukraine, armies across Europe have focused on modernization and international cooperation such as NATO for national security guarantees. Due to the evolving modernization of army equipment, armed forces “require increasingly higher training standards”. As a result, several nations have shifted towards professional armies in an effort to standardize their militaries and improve overall operational preparedness.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Conscription, and Military
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

102. China’s Future Military Capabilities

Author:
Roger Cliff
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America identifies China as the “pacing challenge” for the US military. This monograph examines the process by which China’s military capabilities are developed, the capabilities China’s military is seeking to acquire in the future, and the resulting implications for the US military. To date, all the extant studies have merely described the capabilities the People’s Liberation Army is currently acquiring. This monograph goes further by drawing on the Chinese military’s publications to identify and discuss the capabilities the People’s Liberation Army seeks to acquire in the future. The monograph finds China’s military is engaged in a comprehensive program to field a dominant array of military capabilities for ground, sea, air, space, and cyberspace warfare. Countering these capabilities will require the United States and its allies to engage in an equally comprehensive effort. The monograph’s findings will enable US military planners and policy practitioners to understand the long-term goals of China’s development of military capabilities and to anticipate and counter China’s realization of new capabilities so the United States can maintain its military advantage over the long term.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Strategic Planning, Future, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

103. Pashtun Cultural Transition between the Militants and Military

Author:
Syed Wasif Azim and Muhammad Naveed Akhtar
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Review of Human Rights
Institution:
Society of Social Science Academics (SSSA)
Abstract:
This article aims at discussing the violent conflict and its inter-relationship with militants and military in Swat, Pakistan. It argues that the term Badal may be recognized as having multiple forms and meanings. This paper demonstrates that in the initial phase of the conflict people used militant’s ‘tag’ while in post-military-operations period took the benefit of their ties with the military to take revenge from their opponents. This study underscores that this phenomenon has impacted the socio-cultural symbols and practices of badal negatively and has further defamed socio-cultural norms and values of the society. The study for being empirical in its methodology is based on 45 open-ended in-depth interviews, 05 focus group discussions and ethnographic observation, in Swat, Pakistan.
Topic:
Culture, Violence, Military, Pukhtuns, and Pashtuns
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

104. High-Intensity Warfare: What Challenges for the French Armed Forces?

Author:
Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The new French Military Programming Law for 2024-2030 resolutely commits the French armed forces to the path of high intensity. However, this term continues to be the subject of debate and confusion within the defense community. To better understand its scope and implications for France, we need to offer a strict definition of the notion. In military terms, high intensity refers first and foremost to a type of engagement deploying a high level of kinetic energy within a limited space and duration. Added to this energy factor is the level of technological sophistication of equipment (capital intensity) and the lethality resulting from these two elements. A concept of high capability intensity is thus emerging, based on the triptych energy-technology-lethality. This capability intensity must be distinguished from the political intensity, or virulence, of an armed conflict, which depends above all on the interests at stake. When the stakes are very high for one of the parties, the conflict takes on the aspects of a major war, in which its very survival is at stake. Conversely, when real but non-existential interests are at stake, the result is limited war. While military history offers examples of conflicts combining high political and military intensity, it has also recorded cases of limited wars involving high capability intensity. It is this configuration that seems most relevant to France, where, in principle, the nuclear deterrent protects against any threat to the nation’s vital interests. This then opens up a wide range of scenarios that fall short of vital interests but lie beyond the capability and operational horizons of the last three decades, which have been characterized above all by crisis management and on which the current format of the French armed forces has been constructed. Strategic solidarity within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance or defense agreements, confrontation with a large or medium-sized power in peripheral areas, confrontation with a “proxy” third-party actor supported by a powerful state, or confrontation in isolated common spaces (the high seas, exo-atmospheric space, cyberspace, the seabed, etc.) are all hypothetical scenarios that would fall within the scope of high capability intensity. With this in mind, the French armed forces must be prepared to operate in high-intensity environments. Missions in these environments will be characterized by two major factors. The first is high attrition owing to the lethality of a battlefield marked by quantity. To cope with this, we will need to rethink the trade-offs between volume (equipment, ammunition, etc.) and survivability. The second factor is the adversary’s contestation of the commons (air, sea, cyber, information), which will call into question all the elements of military superiority in the Western war model. As a result, operating in the high-intensity arena means giving priority once again to missions of environmental superiority, in order to regain a freedom of action that will be increasingly challenged. For their part, ground forces will no longer be able to take joint support for granted and will need to regain autonomy of maneuver in order to contribute to multi-domain action. High-intensity warfare is therefore an important prospect for the French armed forces, and one that cannot be brushed aside on the grounds that France has a permanent deterrent. The advent of an unstable world marked by multidirectional strategic competition calls for a thorough reconsideration of the conventional formats and missions of the French armed forces, if decision-makers are to retain their freedom of action on the strategic scale.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Army, Military, and High-Intensity Warfare
Political Geography:
Europe and France

105. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations

Author:
Dimitri Minic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Russian army is very critical of its war in Ukraine. Not just of the first phase of the failed special military operation (SVO), which was inspired by the theorization of bypassing, but also of the strategic deterrence phase that preceded it. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations Download 0.98 Mo Russian military theorists have commented on the profound lack of preparation not just for the SVO, but also—in many areas—for the heterotelic war the SVO has become. The Russian army’s weaknesses vis-à-vis the Ukrainian army are generally, and sometimes quite directly, recognized. The Russian military elites have made numerous recommendations for improving Russia’s military performance, primarily focusing on the ground and aerospace forces. Meanwhile, the Russian army has mostly adapted (more or less successfully) to the difficulties it has encountered in the last year and a half in Ukraine. Although the Putin regime is authoritarian and intent on reducing freedom of expression in Russian society, the existence and tolerance of a certain amount of truth-telling at this level of the military apparatus indicate that the Russian army’s and state’s ability to adapt should not be underestimated.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

106. The importance of the United States in Poland’s military security policy in the context of the war in Ukraine

Author:
Łukasz Jureńczyk
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The subject of the article is the importance of the United States in Poland’s military security policy in relation to the war in Ukraine. The article begins with an introduction discussing its main assumptions and a synthetic historical background of the importance of the US for Poland and its security. The main part of the article is divided into two parts, the first one discussing the importance of the US in Poland’s military security policy after the Cold War. The second part is devoted to the change in the importance of the US in this policy in connection with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the main factors that determine this change. The aim of the article is to identify and analyze the changes in the importance of the United States in the Polish military security policy as a result of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. The main research problem is whether the importance of the US in Poland’s military security policy increased as a result of the war, and if so, because of what main factors? The thesis of the article states that the war in Ukraine increased the importance of the US as the main external guarantor of Poland’s security and defense. This is due to the leading role played by the United States in military support for Ukraine and strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, in the absence of leadership from Western European powers. The research included interviews with scientists and analysts from research centers in Washington and New York.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Poland, and United States of America

107. Emile Bustani Seminar: "The Egyptian army in the 1967 Six-Day War: Lessons for the present"

Author:
Khaled Fahmy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Few events in modern Middle Eastern history were as central as the Six-Day War of 1967. Surpassed in its significance probably only by the Nakba of 1948, the Naksa, or “setback,” as the 1967 war was euphemistically called, saw Israel inflicting a decisive defeat on three of its Arab neighbors combined. Of all the belligerent countries, Egypt was the most deeply affected. Its army was obliterated; its territory occupied; its leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, once the undisputed leader of Egypt and the Arab World, was a broken man; and Nasserism was dealt a death blow. This talk looks closely into the performance of the Egyptian army in Sinai over the 36 hours of combat. It argues that while the defeat was inevitable, given Israel’s military, diplomatic and economic superiority, the scale, speed and depth of the Egyptian army’s defeat requires a close look at civil-military relations. Specifically, it looks at how the Egyptian army, starting from 1961, had deviated from its military mandate and encroached on all aspects of the economy, creating what was termed “a state within a state”. The paper also tracks the fatal steps undertaken by Abdel-Hakim Amir, the Army’s Commander-in-Chief, to snatch control of the army from Nasser, so much so that by the outbreak of the war in June 1967 Nasser was ignorant of his army’s true capabilities. The talk concludes by drawing comparisons with the present-day army under President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and asks to what degree the current army’s preoccupation running its economic empire has affected its fighting capabilitie
Topic:
History, Armed Conflict, Military, and Six-Day War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North Africa, and Egypt

108. Israel and the United States Did Not See the 1973 War Coming

Author:
Zaki Shalom
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Israel’s mistaken pre-war assumptions about the 1973 War caused it to fail to foresee the potential outbreak of a war with Egypt and Syria. What were these calculations based on and why did the United States follow suit? In early October 1973, Israeli intelligence agencies began to receive information regarding Egypt’s (and Syria’s) intention to launch a war against Israel in the coming days. The timing of the expected offensive was not yet known. Only in the early morning of October 6, 1973, would a highly reliable intelligence agent of the Mossad inform Israeli authorities that war would begin in the late afternoon hours. The exact time was not mentioned, but for one reason or another the Israelis believed the Egyptian military offensive would begin at 6:00 pm. Concurrently, Egypt began to deploy massive military power along the Suez Canal, very close to Israel’s military forces on the other side of the canal. The war broke out at 2:00 pm—four hours before the expected time.
Topic:
Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, Military, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Syria, Egypt, and United States of America

109. [Global NK Update] August 2023

Author:
Minah Kang
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
1) The recent developments in military cooperation between Russia and North Korea resulted in sanctions on entities that facilitated their arms deals. 2) The South Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit at Camp David laid a strong foundation for continuous and stable trilateral cooperation to address North Korean threats and bolster regional security. 3) North Korea’s second “satellite launch” has raised regional concerns and prompted trilateral action.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Cooperation, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, and North Korea

110. Mutiny as dialogue: Interrogating the rank-and-file complaints and revolt in the Nigerian counter-insurgency campaign

Author:
Patrick Afamefune Ikem
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
For over a decade, the Nigerian State has been confronting the ravaging insurgency perpetrated by Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP), which has been responsible for about 350 000 deaths, and the displacement of over 2.3 million people.1 It is estimated that over 15 million people have been affected by the insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in North-East Nigeria.2 The activities of these groups, coupled with the recent armed banditry, have triggered one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.3 Unfortunately, the police mandated to handle internal security have, since the commencement of the insurgency, been overstretched and overwhelmed due to poor training and inadequate funding. Because of the combined effects of the Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, kidnappings, separatist agitations, ethno-religious conflicts, and the farmer-herder crisis, the Nigerian military has been drafted to play a frontline role in quelling the multifarious security crises in the country. This situation, among others, has largely marked the overwhelming engagement of the Nigerian army in internal security operations. However, some analysts and scholars have posited the danger of an expansive role of the military in the ongoing fight against counterinsurgency, claiming that it may threaten civil-military relations.4 Recently, Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Lucky Irabor, stated that 80% of the country’s armed forces are presently engaged in internal security operations in all 36 states of the federation. This suggests, as several analysts have highlighted, that the Nigerian military has essentially taken over internal security, which is largely within the purview of police service.5
Topic:
Counterinsurgency, Boko Haram, Dialogue, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria