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91. The Post-COVID Consensus

Author:
Shahid Yusuf
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Development economics is turning a full circle with a difference. This paper addresses the circling back to the policies in vogue during the 1980s and earlier, including industrial policies, coupled with protectionism; accounts for the regression to earlier certitudes after an extended spell of globalization underpinned by market fundamentalism; and indicates how a transforming global environment has enlarged the policy agenda. There is a new policy consensus in the making, which borrows some elements of the Washington Consensus but goes beyond to encompass a broader policy agenda.
Topic:
Development, Markets, Poverty, Inequality, Economic Development, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

92. Rethinking Gas Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Major gas finds in the eastern Mediterranean seabed over the last ten years have fuelled ambitions to link the region’s energy markets and, in turn, bring its countries in conflict to the negotiating table. These great expectations have proven outsized, but smaller-scale objectives are achievable.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Markets, Gas, and Energy
Political Geography:
Turkey and Eastern Mediterranean

93. Polanyi, Market Fundamentalism, and the Institutional Structure of Capitalism

Author:
Leonardo Burlamaqui
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The basic proposition of this paper is that the so-called "new economic sociology", which is rooted in key ideas of Karl Polanyi, is an indispensable "tool" for two tasks: a) it provides us with a powerful critique of market fundamentalism, and b) it allows us to analyze the economic performance of contemporary capitalism by accessing the working of its institutional structure. From an analytical perspective, the paper suggests that Polanyian Economic Sociology is an essential complement to both the Schumpeterian and the Post-Keynesian perspectives in economics. This is especially so when it comes to the discussion of "socioeconomic stability" and, more precisely, as Keynes himself stated in the General Theory: to explain why capitalist economies manifest themselves in different ways and degrees, in spite of encompassing inherent elements of instability and unpredictability.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Political Economy, Sociology, and Capitalism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

94. The Impacts of EU Strategy Autonomy Policies – A Primer for Member States

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU governments should be much more sceptical and critical of the EU’s strategic autonomy agenda and the new polices intended to achieve the EU’s “long-term” industrial and technological ambitions. The long-term costs for Member States’ economies and the process of economic convergence are largely ignored by the agenda. Negative impacts of strategic autonomy on trade openness and the international rules-based trading system are also greatly understated. Many EU strategic autonomy ambitions are inherently guided by a “European Union First” impulse. Policymakers follow the assumption that EU values are superior to those in other parts of the world and EU regulation should be different from third countries. Major strategic autonomy aspirations represent a relapse of the EU to the old policy of EU member states designing and enforcing their own laws without considering the economic and political costs of regulatory fragmentation and economic disintegration from others. Recent strategic autonomy policies are estimated to create income losses in the EU of between 0.08% and 0.15% of EU27 GDP. These losses correspond to short-term economic harm resulting from changes in the use of productive resources in the EU. Long-run impacts, which reflect losses to productivity and innovation, could be up to 3 to 5 times higher with national income per capita falling by up to 0.5% to 0.75%. The costs are not evenly distributed across the EU27. Larger countries like France and Germany are less impacted than smaller ones, notably Ireland and the Baltic states. The impacts on Ireland, for example, are close to 4 times bigger than they are for France, the impacts on Estonia close to twice those on Germany. Strategic autonomy ambitions have failed to account for negative impacts on developing countries. To the extent that the EU’s policy stance further fragilizes rules-based multilateralism, there are longer-term impacts stemming from a less certain legal environment and higher barriers for cross-border trade and investment. EU strategic autonomy policies have the effect of empowering vested interests in developing countries to engage in lobbying for their own protectionist policies. Accordingly, EU strategic autonomy policies risk encouraging the diffusion of protectionist policies globally, particularly in countries with weak institutional capacity. EU Member States should examine their options and ask themselves whether there are better long-term strategies to pursue than those currently proposed at the EU level, strategies guided by the spirit of an open society – a society embracing the principles of free trade, non-discrimination, and economic freedom. Europe’s policymakers should aim for closer market integration and regulatory cooperation with trustworthy international partners such as the G7 and the larger group of the OECD countries. It is in the EU’s self-interest to advocate for a rules-based international order with open markets. It is neither in the EU’s economic nor its political interest to disintegrate from partner countries.
Topic:
Markets, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Trade, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe

95. Current Capabilities and Future Potential of African Textile & Apparel Value Chains: Focus on West Africa

Author:
Lindsay Whitfield
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
African countries export very little of what is traded within apparel global supply chains and across the African continent, except in the case of cotton, but import a large amount of what the rest of the world produces. Africa’s fabric and apparel production is biased towards cotton, especially in yarn and fabric production, with little participation in production and export of man-made fibre, yarn and fabric. Most apparel exports from the continent come from North Africa, followed far behind by East and Southern Africa. Apparel exports from the African continent go largely to Europe and then North America. Currently, only 8% of Africa’s textile and apparel imports are supplied by other African suppliers. Southern Africa and especially South Africa is the largest supplier of intra-African imports of apparel. Inputs and intermediate textile products account for a significant share of intra-African textile and apparel imports in Southern, East and North Africa. Notably, under the free trade area in the Southern African Development Community, trade in clothes and home textiles increased, but trade in fibre, yarn and fabric did not significantly change. Overall, intra-African sources still account for a small share of these countries’ overall supplies of imported inputs, which indicates a substantial untapped potential. West Africa produces about 60% of Africa’s cotton but accounts for the bulk of its exports outside the continent, accounting for about 5% of the world cotton production and about 15% of world exportation. However, West African countries have little modern production capabilities in spinning, weaving, knitting or dyeing. A significant portion of the population in West Africa buys wax print cloth and has their clothes tailor made. The majority of the greige fabric used by the wax printing companies in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, which supply the rest of the sub-region, is imported from Asia. Only Ghana has industrial or mass apparel production for export, and it is small, comprised largely of two firms that started exporting in the late 2010s with foreign investment. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have some small-scale local firms producing for the domestic market, but most of these firms do not have the capabilities to grow into large firms that could produce using industrial methods. The governments of Togo, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana are adopting new strategies to develop apparel exports in their countries. However, only the Togolese government has started implementing its strategy, which centres on an eco-industrial park and vertically integrated knit factories established through a public-private partnership with Arise Integrated Industrial Platform. Given the disruptions to globalized apparel supply chains during the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting increased cost of shipping, buyers in the US and Europe are looking for shorter supply chains that are more resilient in the face of global shocks. Localization and regionalization of apparel production closer to end-markets are attractive to global apparel brands and retailers. However, global apparel buyers are no longer concerned just with cost, quality and speed to market when making sourcing decisions. They now must balance those criteria with sustainability goals. CBDS Working Paper 2022/3 5 Given the global trends outlined in this report that will reshape textile and apparel global supply chains over the next five to ten years, the textile and apparel industry should be reconceived as a sunrise and not a sunset industry. New fibre and recycling technologies are in a phase of fast innovation to produce more sustainable and circular man-made fibres. The raw material for clothing production will become manufactured fibres that rely on advancements in chemical technologies and biofabrication. Virgin cotton will be of less importance, as it is replaced by natural fibres that are less resource intensive and by manmade cellulosic fibres that feel like cotton. In the transition stage, cotton will move to organic and regenerative as well as become blended with other natural and man-made cellulosic fibres. Future fibres will have a high technology content and require licensing technology, both man-made cellulosic fibres and the new wave of synthetics that seek to replace polymers. African countries have the opportunity to build sustainable textile and apparel industries from the start, which can give them a competitive advantage as apparel-supplying countries in South and Southeast Asia do not (yet) have ‘green’ industries. The cost of renewable energy technology is falling and renewable energy technologies to power industries are evolving. New fibre and recycling technologies also offer a window of opportunity to leapfrog into the next generation of technologies. Taking advantage of this window of opportunity requires that the African government look forward and not backward, that they think in terms of building new and not rebuilding the existing textile industries. African textile and apparel domestic and regional value chains should be based on mastering the next generation of fibre production and recycling technologies. Such a strategy involves taking risks to invest in building the knowledge and skills required for this new technology, but not taking risks will mean that African countries miss the opportunity to move to the technological frontier. Furthermore, African countries can go beyond becoming competitive in the new textile and apparel global supply chains but also use them to drive broader green industrialization processes. Such a strategy also involves building diversified regional textile bases as well as regional value chains, which can harness the efforts of more economies and larger market demand as well as create a stronger platform of capabilities with which to engage in global export markets. AfCFTA negotiations on the rules of origin for the textile and apparel sector are on-going, and the AfCFA Council of Ministers responsible for trade is still working on reaching a consensus. The evidence assembled in this report shows that the textile production capabilities in the major apparel producing and exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are not significant enough to support trade under a double transformation rule. Therefore, major investments in spinning, knitting, weaving, dyeing, and finishing are required before countries could take advantage of the preferential market access for textile and apparel in the AfCFTA with a double transformation rule. The quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in this report on the impact of the double transformation rule under SADC indicates that it did not encourage new investments in textile production, and thus regional integration was limited by existing textile production capabilities. CBDS Working Paper 2022/3 6 Trade rules are not strong enough incentives to encourage investments in textile production. In general, trade policy is a rather blunt instrument for addressing a task that requires a range of more sophisticated industrial policy tools. Instead of relying solely on trade policy tools, governments should design and develop industrial policies that actively support the learning processes of local firms. Part of the industrial policy tool kit to support local firm learning is attracting the ‘right kind of foreign direct investment’ and assisting local firms in leveraging technology from these foreign firms. Governments also need to make public investments in creating the industry-specific knowledge and skills for textile and apparel, which includes building the foundation for moving into new fiber and recycling technologies through investment in basic chemistry education and supporting partnerships in research between local and foreign firms and researchers.
Topic:
Markets, Business, Trade, Supply Chains, Value Chains, and Textile Industry
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

96. Fiscal Policy in the Regulation of Adult-Use Cannabis in Colombia

Author:
Anníbal Ramírez Rodrígues, Luis Felipe Cruz-Oliveira, and Isabel Pereira-Arana
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Dejusticia
Abstract:
The document is divided into five sections. The first is an introduction, where we describe the background of the regulatory debate and the goals we propose for marijuana regulation in Colombia. In the second section, we present the theoretical framework for explaining why it is necessary to create a legal space for marijuana and what fiscal policy and human rights principles would be applicable to that process. In the third section, we explore comparative experiences, focusing on measures to raise revenue and resource allocation, and analyze lessons learned for the Colombian case. After that, in the fourth section, we home in on the Colombian context, considering how marijuana production and use has evolved in the country, and describing the places where production takes place and their needs. Finally, in the fifth section, we unveil our proposal: the cannabis fiscal principles.
Topic:
Markets, Regulation, Fiscal Policy, Drugs, and Cannabis
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

97. Microchips and Semiconductors: The U.S. Seeks Autonomy

Author:
Andrzej Dąbrowski
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The United States has turned to support of the domestic microchip industry in response to the increased risk of Chinese aggression against Taiwan, one of the leading producers, as well as to address disruptions in supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. A law on this passed with bipartisan consent and is intended to help finance a more resilient American sector towards global changes in manufacturing these components. Thanks to the CHIPS Act, the U.S. can reduce its dependence on microchip imports and undermine China’s ability to dominate the market.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, Autonomy, Industry, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Microchips
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. Don’t look only to Brussels to increase the supply of safe assets in the European Union

Author:
Francesco Papadia and Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
A sufficient supply of safe assets denominated in euros is critical if the European Union is to achieve full banking and capital markets union while fostering the euro’s international role. The European debate on developing the supply of safe assets has so far focused on the possible creation of a common safe asset. This has tended to underplay the potential contribution of sovereign assets. Expanding the supply of national safe assets, notably through the gradual implementation of fiscal and growth-oriented structural policies in euro-area countries, leading to upgrading of their sovereign ratings, provides a promising, and perhaps more feasible, option. An upgrade to triple A of those euro-area countries that are currently rated double A could produce substantially more safe assets than most common safe asset proposals, including those based on the development of ‘synthetic’ safe assets. There has been a remarkable increase in the share of supranational assets in the stock of euro-based safe assets since 2008, reflecting downgrades in sovereign ratings and the EU’s financial responses to the euro-area crisis and the pandemic. However, safe assets in euro remain dominated by those issued by euro-area governments. Although common safe assets have certain advantages over national safe assets, reflecting their built-in risk diversification properties, there is currently not much political appetite for such proposals. Meanwhile, sovereign safe assets already offer many of the advantages of common safe assets. Sound fiscal policies and growth-stimulating reforms, which are in any case desirable, should be implemented to improve the credit ratings of euro-area sovereigns. This might not be politically feasible in the short-term, given the difficult economic environment currently faced by the EU, but it should be a key component of the EU’s medium-term safe asset strategy. Should the political consensus be found to create a common safe asset, such an asset could be incorporated into the euro area’s existing safe asset system, reinforcing its positive effects.
Topic:
Debt, Markets, Monetary Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, European Monetary Union, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe

99. An assessment of Europe’s options for addressing the crisis in energy markets

Author:
Conall Heussaff, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, wholesale prices for electricity and gas in the European Union have risen five to fifteen-fold, with severe impacts for households and businesses. The crisis is also creating liquidity problems for energy companies, with contagion risks for the financial sector. In response, European governments have taken a range of actions. Some have introduced measures at retail level, while others have introduced windfall-profit taxes on energy companies. Some countries have provided emergency liquidity to energy companies facing soaring collateral costs. Some energy companies have even been nationalised. Emergency-intervention proposals should be evaluated against three principles. First, energy supply must meet demand at prices that do not cause major damage to the European economy. Second, the most vulnerable consumers must be protected. Third, measures should be consistent with the case for investment in a sustainable energy system, in order to safeguard Europe’s ability to decouple structurally from fossil-fuel imports. Gas price caps have been proposed as an emergency measure in different forms: a cap on Russian gas only, a cap on gas used in electricity generation, a cap on all wholesale gas. All entail significant risks. The first might lead to a full stop of Russian gas into the EU. The second might increase gas demand from the electricity sector. The third might raise gas demand and also undermine Europe’s ability to attract much-needed gas supplies. Instead of capping gas prices, the EU should engage collectively with external gas suppliers and negotiate new long-term contracts with provisions to limit price volatility. A September 2022 European Commission proposal involving electricity demand reduction, a revenue cap on inframarginal generation, solidarity payments from fossil-fuel companies and consumer support measures, is broadly positive, notably because it emphasises demand reduction. However, it is not sufficient. A more comprehensive plan needs to ensure that all countries bring forward every available supply-side flexibility, make real efforts to reduce gas and electricity demand, keep their energy markets open and pool demand to get a better deal from external gas suppliers. In the longer term, measures to split the markets for energy generated from renewables and fossil fuels should be examined.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Energy Sector, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

100. A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe’s energy system faces unprecedented physical and institutional stress. The policy response so far has been excessively nationally focussed and could undermine the goals of calming energy markets over the next 18 months and achieving ambitious decarbonisation targets. At the basis of the crisis is a post-COVID-19 global energy imbalance. While demand bounced back quickly as economies re-opened, supply did not. A particular challenge is that the reducing supply of fossil fuels in line with climate targets has not been matched by a commensurate reduction of fossil-fuel demand. Russian manipulation of European natural gas markets since summer 2021, exploiting its significant market power, has deepened the crisis. Finally, events including weak French nuclear output and the ongoing drought, which has cut hydropower generation, have further escalated the situation. In response to high and volatile prices and forced demand reduction, European governments have tended to opt for narrow and uncoordinated measures that prioritise national security of supply and affordability over an integrated European approach. Subsidising energy consumption instead of demand reduction has been a common and misguided approach. Governments run the risk that energy consumption subsidies become unsustainable, eroding trust in energy markets, slowing action in sanctioning Russia and increasing the cost of the net-zero transition. An integrated European approach and a coordinated plan is essential to address the crisis. European Union leaders must strike a grand energy bargain based on four broad principles: (i) all countries bringing forward every available supply-side flexibility, (ii) all countries making comprehensive efforts to reduce demand, (iii) a political committing to maintain energy markets and cross-border flows, (iv) compensation for the most vulnerable consumers. This grand bargain can be the first step on a new course towards united energy policy at EU level.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Crisis Management, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe