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21. Is the United States undergoing a manufacturing renaissance that will boost the middle class?

Author:
Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
President Joseph R. Biden Jr. made the goal of his economic policies to “build back better.” He emphasized helping workers without college degrees in order “to grow the economy from the bottom up and the middle out.” The emphasis on a manufacturing renaissance is reflected in the special incentives for US manufacturing in President Biden’s programs: the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. Lawrence finds little evidence of a renaissance in US manufacturing as of July 2024: US manufacturing employment was barely above its pre-COVID levels. Manufacturing output has grown more slowly than GDP since the pandemic, and productivity in manufacturing has not increased since 2017. Moreover, the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that over the next decade, manufacturing employment will decline and manufacturing output will grow more slowly than GDP. However, Lawrence says, additional manufacturing employment growth could be in the pipeline because of investment projects that have been announced but not yet completed. Lawrence estimates the additional manufacturing employment potential of announcements compiled by the White House as of mid-2024, finding that these projects could boost demand for 1.7 million manufacturing workers—a growth of 13.3 percent above 2022 manufacturing employment levels. It should be noted, however, that these are not estimates of net overall manufacturing employment growth. Some of the increased demand will be offset by losses of fossil fuel–related jobs displaced by the investments as well as declines in manufacturing employment for other reasons. Moreover, the impact of all the projects is just over 1 percent of overall US employment and in most states far too small to significantly change the opportunities for most non-college-educated workers and disadvantaged communities.
Topic:
Economic Policy, Inflation, Manufacturing, and Middle Class
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

22. Spillover effects of the recent US monetary policy shocks on the South African economy: The role of monetary and fiscal policy coordination

Author:
Guangling Liu and Marrium Mustapher
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
This study examines how different policy mix regimes affect the impact of recent US contractionary monetary policy on South Africa’s inflation and business cycles. The study uses a small open economy New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with an integrated fiscal block to analyse these effects. Regime M (active monetary policy) is more effective at containing the spillover effects but leads to higher public debt, requiring larger future fiscal surpluses. The commitment to price stability under Regime M increases real interest rates, raising domestic debt service costs and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Regime F (active fiscal policy), in contrast, stabilizes debt more quickly but at the cost of higher inflation, as it does not use future surpluses to manage public debt. These spillover effects are more amplified under both Regime M and Regime F in the case of a complete exchange rate pass-through and a higher degree of trade openness, with Regime F exhibiting a stronger amplification effect.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Monetary Policy, Inflation, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, South Africa, North America, and United States of America

23. How Europe should answer the US Inflation Reduction Act

Author:
David Kleimann, Niclas Poitiers, André Sapir, Simone Tagliapietra, Nicolas Veron, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The 2022 United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a significant and welcome climate law. It also includes trade-distortive subsidies, including local-content requirements prohibited under World Trade Organisation rules – the first time the US has done this and a blow to the international trading system that could trigger protectionism in other countries. The expected IRA green subsidies are of similar size to those available in the European Union, except in renewable energy production, where EU subsidies remain far larger. However, there are important qualitative differences. Some IRA subsidies discriminate against foreign producers while EU subsidies do not. IRA clean-tech subsidies are simpler and less fragmented, and they focus mainly on mass deployment of green technologies rather than innovation. The IRA will likely harm Europe through its competitiveness effect, while it will likely benefit climate transition in Europe and most of the rest of the world. However, the magnitude of both effects is very uncertain, partly because the IRA will induce substitution away from Chinese inputs. By forcing the reorganisation of supply chains, the IRA may make the EU and other economies more competitive relative to China. It may also initially slow the green transition. But in the longer run, this effect should be outweighed by the reduction in the cost of clean tech driven by the IRA. In responding to the IRA, the EU should not just seek to protect its competitiveness relative to the US but to pursue broader aims, including competitiveness in general, speedy decarbonisation and broad foreign policy and development policy goals. These aims imply that the EU should not impose local-content requirements of its own, should not loosen state-aid rules and should not mimic the IRA’s approach to manufacturing subsidies. Rather, it should focus on boosting its structural competitiveness, formulate a trade policy response that includes reform of the international subsidies regime, and develop an instrument for EU-level subsidies that focuses on early-stage development and increasing EU resilience to trade disruptions.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Inflation, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

24. Energy investment in a time of inflation

Author:
Charles Lichfield and Joseph Webster
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
High rates of inflation across the world are forcing central banks to reluctantly tighten monetary policy despite accompanying recession risks. Moreover, restricted credit access could jeopardize energy investments, particularly for capital-intensive clean energy projects, potentially rendering the world more vulnera­ble energy to price shocks, which are a significant contributor to the current crisis. This paper briefly considers the macroeconomic drivers of inflation in late 2022, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and uncertainties around energy supply, supply-chain resets, and lingering COVID-19 disruptions, before examining the persistent energy underinvestment of the past decade and how this has left markets exposed to varying degrees. As such, this paper also considers how private capital can accelerate cleaner energy adoption, suited to different markets’ unique conditions and needs. Bor­rowing costs will rise, but this doesn’t have to bring the transition to a standstill. With the Great Moderation of low volatility, interest rates, and inflation perhaps a relic of the past, assets offering inflation protection, such as infrastructure, may become increas­ingly attractive to investors. There is a fear that global inflation will sharply curtail energy investment into emerging markets. The fear is justified. Higher interest rates in developed markets mean higher rates of return which will lure emerging markets investors back to the US and Europe. Still, it’s not all bad news for emerging markets. Quasi-state actors like Pension and Sovereign Welfare funds are interested in very long term, high-yield projects—two criteria to which emerging market energy infrastructure correspond. Disruptions to interest rates and inflation, triggered in part by energy underinvestment, will cause disparate impacts in different markets. Inflation is not, perhaps, everywhere and always a mone­tary phenomenon. Energy investment faltered from 2014 to 2020, despite low interest rates. Meanwhile, aggre­gate supply shocks—first due to COVID, then from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine—have pressured energy production and prices, raising inflation and necessitating interest rate hikes. The consequences of persistent energy underinvest­ment are now becoming apparent. The need for new energy infrastructure cannot be met without private investment. This was the case when infla­tion was lower; it is even more important now.
Topic:
Environment, Markets, Oil, Governance, Gas, Economy, Investment, Inflation, and Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. The Political Economy of the Cost of Living Crisis in the UK: What Is to Be Done?

Author:
Ozlem Onaran
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the political economy of the cost of living crisis in the context of the United Kingdom. The paper presents the long-term trends in the wage share, wealth inequality, labour’s bargaining power, and real wages in the UK. The first and second waves of inflation in 2021-22 are discussed presenting the trends in the profit margins. The policy responses by the conservative governments and the Bank of England are analyzed, and their limitations are assessed. The paper concludes with short-run and medium-run policy alternatives to the cost of living crisis
Topic:
Political Economy, Labor Issues, Inequality, Inflation, and Cost of Living
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

26. Sellers’ Inflation, Profits, and Conflict: Why Can Large Firms Hike Prices in an Emergency?

Author:
Isabella Weber and Evan Wasner
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
The dominant view of inflation holds that it is macroeconomic in origin and must always be tackled with macroeconomic tightening. In contrast, we argue that the US COVID-19 inflation is predominantly a sellers’ inflation that derives from microeconomic origins, namely the ability of firms with market power to hike prices. Such firms are price makers, but they only engage in price hikes if they expect their competitors to do the same. This requires an implicit agreement which can be coordinated by sector-wide cost shocks and supply bottlenecks. We review the long-standing literature on price-setting in concentrated markets and survey earnings calls and compile firm-level data to derive a three-stage heuristic of the inflationary process: (1) Rising prices in systemically significant upstream sectors due to commodity market dynamics or bottlenecks create windfall profits and provide an impulse for further price hikes. (2) To protect profit margins from rising costs, downstream sectors propagate, or in cases of temporary monopolies due to bottlenecks, amplify price pressures. (3) Labor responds by trying to fend off real wage declines in the conflict stage. We argue that such sellers’ inflation generates a general price rise which may be transitory, but can also lead to self-sustaining inflationary spirals under certain conditions. Policy should aim to contain price hikes at the impulse stage to prevent inflation from the onset.
Topic:
Political Economy, Inflation, Profit, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

27. Federal Reserve Anti-Inflation Policy: Wealth Protection for the 1%?

Author:
Aaron Medlin and Gerald Epstein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
The Federal Reserve has a dual mandate from Congress that directs it to conduct monetary policy as such to achieve “maximum employment” and “stable prices.” Yet the U.S. central bank typically chooses to address inflation as a top priority and focuses on employment only secondarily, if at all. Why? In this paper we argue that an important reason is that the Federal Reserve conducts policy so as protect the real wealth of the top 1% of the wealth distribution. We focus on the Fed’s fight against inflation in 2021-2022, when it rapidly raised its policy interest rates by almost 4 percentage points in the face of more than 6 percent inflation. Using a novel econometric analysis, we provide evidence that shows that this policy serves as a real net wealth protection policy for the 1% by restoring some of the lost wealth that they would otherwise lose due to unexpected inflation. The results of this policy for the top 10% of the wealth distribution are econometrically ambiguous. But to the extent that the Fed’s high interest rates generate higher unemployment or even a recession, this wealth protection for the 1% could have serious income costs for workers who find themselves or another member of their household out of a job.
Topic:
Political Economy, Monetary Policy, Inflation, Elites, and Wealth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

28. Inflation and Paid Care Services in the U.S.

Author:
Nancy Folbre
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Nancy Folbre offers a number of reasons why increases in average wages among the lowest deciles of the population are not likely to significantly buffer the effects of rapid inflation on families with incomes below the poverty line. It also raises a number of specific questions for future research.
Topic:
Poverty, Economic Inequality, Inflation, and Wages
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

29. EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS IN COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN BALKANS

Author:
Artan Hajdini, Lum Collaku, and Safet Merovci
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of corruption on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Western Balkans countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Albania. Secondary data from The World Bank, Transparency International, and International Monetary Fund databases were utilized to complete this study for 2012-2020. The built model of multiple linear regression included four independent variables, namely: Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Western Balkan Corruption Ranking (WBCR), Exchange Rate (EXG), and Inflation Rate (INFL), as well as FDI as a dependent variable, and data effects were analyzed through the SPPS scientific research software program. The results found that if CPI and WBCR were to increase by one unit, FDI would decrease by 0.088, namely 0.624, while if EXG and INFL were to increase by one unit, FDI would increase by 0.165, namely 0.236. In order to fight corruption and potentially attract more foreign direct investment, the governments of these countries should work to harmonize their anti-corruption laws with those of the European Union. In order to prevent the negative consequences of FDI inflows, they should also maintain a balanced rate of inflation, which entails stabilizing exchange rate fluctuations.
Topic:
Corruption, Foreign Direct Investment, Exchange Rate Policy, and Inflation
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Balkans

30. Radical Steps Are Essential to Jump-Starting the Replacement of the Flawed US Money Regime

Author:
Brendan Brown
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
A previous policy memo argued that flaws in the actual US money regime are responsible for the Great Pandemic Inflation.1 Now that reported inflation has been falling, some of us might imagine that addressing these flaws has become a non-urgent matter. After all, great supply shocks tend to come rarely. But such complacence does not fit the facts. The case for getting rid of the present rotten monetary regime is not simply based on the argument that it has malfunctioned so severely during the pandemic and war supply shock. That malfunctioning continues into the present, where there is now positive supply side news (the pandemic dislocation is fading, and a natural gas glut has emerged despite the continuing Russia-Ukraine War). The Federal Reserve and other central banks, still trying to navigate policy in an anchorless monetary system by choosing a path for short-term interest rates, are stumbling from one huge blunder to another, even if they have a rare lucky stretch in between. Beyond the woes of how the 2 percent inflation standard performed during the supply shock and subsequent supply restoration, this regime should be held responsible for a range of economic and social consequences that predate the pandemic and war. These include malinvestment (poor allocation of capital due to corrupted signaling in markets), advancement of monopoly capitalism, bloated government outlays, and punitive monetary taxation (in the form of inflation tax or monetary repression tax), all of which take their toll. Instead of enjoying a top-quality money with all its benefits, individuals have had to put up with a poor money and all its related costs, particularly the ongoing danger of serious loss of purchasing power.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Inflation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America