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51. How Chinese Propaganda Works

Author:
Grigol Julukhidze
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
China is becoming an ever more powerful player in the international political arena. Once a regional power, it now represents the main rival to US global dominance. Over the last few years, Beijing has actively started to apply “propagandistic methods” in order to increase its importance and demonize actual or potential foes. From this point of view, the visibility of the Chinese propaganda model is not as high in Georgia as, for example, the Russian. The main task of the below-presented expert opinion is to illustrate and analyze one of the most powerful machines of disinformation in the world and answer the question, “How does Chinese propaganda work?”
Topic:
Propaganda, Disinformation, and International Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Georgia

52. Cognitive War in Ukraine

Author:
Adam Paweł Olechowski
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The article aims to identify social impact activities in the context of information operations conducted by Ukraine during the 2022 war. An analysis of the creation and spread of information threats as a result of Russia’s ongoing conflict is driven by the increasing impact of communication on global security. The content of the study highlights the impact of trends in the creation of information threats, which are the determinants of social risks. In the article, an analysis of creating information threats, including producing and reporting information in propaganda and the traditional and modern media, is of significant importance. The impact and role of mass media on awareness-raising is presented, revealing mechanisms for influencing public opinion.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Media, Disinformation, Russia-Ukraine War, and Social Impact Mechanisms
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

53. Social Implications of Infodemic Concurrent with COVID-19

Author:
Juliusz Sikorski
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The scale of disinformation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic has been called infodemic. It involved disseminating various messages and theories that had a significant negative impact on limiting the spread of the disease but also exacerbated existing social antagonisms and emboldened and radicalised fringe groups. Infodemic, to a large extent manifested in social media, also fostered the formalisation of denialist circles, who transferred their sometimes very aggressive sentiments from the web to the real world. Negation and contestation of the pandemic were partly born spontaneously but were also created as part of postmodern hybrid activities. Consequently, narratives of infodemic led to difficulties in functioning health services, but above all, to an increase in morbidity and mortality related to COVID-19. The consequences of the infodemic would also include various economic effects, such as increased medical expenses for unvaccinated people or turbulence in the labour market.
Topic:
COVID-19, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Infodemic
Political Geography:
Global Focus

54. Resilience Against Disinformation: A New Baltic Way to Follow?

Author:
Dmitri Teperik, Solvita Denisa-Liepniece, Dalia Bankauskaitė, and Kaarel Kullamaa
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Baltic states, although not immune to disinformation, have accumulated unique experience and developed effective methods to resist and combat this malice. This report is based on in-depth semi-structured interviews and supplementary surveys conducted with the representatives of several clusters – media, civil society organisations, state institutions, think-tanks/academia and business communities. It aims to assess risks and vulnerabilities, as well as the three nations’ preparedness to counteract foreign-led disinformation. This report also reviews the existing indices that lead to a greater understanding of the intricate nature and interdependences of resilience-shaping factors at various levels, while contributing the unique Baltic perspective to the evolving, global study of disinformation. Multiple overlapping crises of 2020-21 – ripple effects from the political upheaval in Belarus, surge in illegal migration engineered by the regime in Minsk, the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying socio-political perturbations, as well as China’s economic and diplomatic coercion against Lithuania – served as a reminder that no country could afford neglecting national resilience. The start of a major inter-state conventional war in Europe in 2022 has triggered a multitude of changes in the information environment of the Baltic states and prompted some radical adjustments and responses. Although the report does not cover the developments since 24 February, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion against Ukraine, neither foreign exploitation of vulnerabilities nor the responses of the Baltic governments that have been on display since then come in a vacuum. This report provides useful background and context that will help to understand what conceptual, legal, policy, institutional, political and societal precursors shape the current situation and determine successes or failures of disinformation and counter-disinformation efforts. The general strength of the Baltic states arises from their historical memory of totalitarianism and occupation, as well as their unique regional context. However, Western-focused internationalisation in all spheres of life has proven beneficial to combatting foreign-led disinformation, which strengthens electoral integrity and ensures continued democratic traditions. That said, efforts to improve civic education and strengthen cognitive security of the societies must be redoubled. National resilience to disinformation must be maintained and further increased by investing in national and especially local high-quality media. Resilience – as a whole-of government and whole-of society effort – requires all stakeholders to continuously cooperate, creating a multi-layered cross-sectoral network, or a team-of-teams approach, able to identify and counter malignant influence campaigns. These and other insights and experiences of the Baltic states highlighted in the report remain as relevant in the post-24/02 world as during the global and regional crises of 2020-21.
Topic:
Resilience, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Baltic States

55. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Propaganda War

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The ninth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns Russia’s propaganda war. Igor Gretskiy, a Research Fellow of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the ICDS, examines key elements of Russia’s propaganda and disinformation that were crucial in the years long preparation of the invasion of Ukraine. He describes how the Kremlin’s official narratives were used to pave the way for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, and how Russia’s propaganda has changed as the war has progressed. He states that the Kremlin began to prepare the Russian public for the invasion of Ukraine after the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva on the 30th of June 2021. He analyses Moscow’s language of war and concludes that Soviet-style narratives about Nazism and Western anti-Russian conspiracies became the main premises of the propaganda offensive. He also concludes that Russia’s president most likely began to plot the outright aggression after his re-election in 2018. Gretskiy further states that the Russian mainstream media failed to provoke the populations and local authorities in eastern Ukraine into mass defections to the Russian side and lost the battle for the Ukrainians’ hearts and minds. It rather intensified the Russian domestic neo-imperial narrative.
Topic:
Propaganda, Disinformation, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

56. AI Startups and the Fight Against Mis/Disinformation Online: An Update

Author:
Anya Schiffrin, Hiba Beg, Pablo Eyzaguirre, Zachey Kliger, Tianyu Mao, Aditi Rukhaiyar, Kristen Saldarini, and Ojani Walthrust
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The events following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have shown again the power of online mis/disinformation. As it continues to grow and spread, there are new and continuing attempts to address this problem. These include supply-side and demand-side fixes (including media-literacy programs, fact-checking and, in Europe, new regulations) but few of these have scaled. This paper looks at one kind of supply-side attempt to tackle the prevalence of online mis/disinformation: the market for tech-based solutions that use some form of artificial intelligence (AI) machine/deep learning for content moderation, media integrity, and verification. This paper presents the findings of interviews of 20 niche firms that use AI to identify online mis/disinformation, many of which were previously surveyed for a 2019 paper on the role of AI startups in the fight against disinformation. These companies did not release their revenue figures but it seems that the market for their services is smaller than many entrepreneurs had originally hoped, and that Google and Facebook are not relying on such firms for help in identifying online mis/disinformation. The cost of the services provided by these startups and the desire to keep things in-house and protect their activities from outside scrutiny are part of why the tech giants do not rely on small startups for help with screening online mis/disinformation. This may be why funding for these startups does not seem to have grown significantly and so more than half of them are now focusing on the business-to-business market, selling mis/disinformation mitigation services to, for example, insurance companies, large public entities, and governments, among others. There also appears to be a limited market for business-to-consumer solutions for detecting mis/disinformation. However, continuing advances in AI as well as forthcoming regulation by the European Union and the United Kingdom will continue to spur innovation, which may stimulate demand. University initiatives, academics, journalism organizations, and cybersecurity experts are all also trying to come up with ways to identify and control the spread of mis/disinformation. Ultimately, despite its advances, technology alone will not solve the online mis/disinformation problem. Giant social media platforms have few financial incentives to crack down on this—quite the opposite, in fact. To push social media platforms to act against online mis/disinformation and illegal speech, regulation must deftly address the issue while preserving freedom of expression. There is a further problem in the form of the political polarization that has intensified in the United States and other parts of the world. Fixing this is likely to be well beyond the role of business and technologists.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Startup
Political Geography:
Global Focus

57. Disinformation against UN Peacekeeping Operations

Author:
Albert Trithart
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, a growing barrage of disinformation has targeted UN peacekeeping operations, particularly the missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). This includes false allegations that UN peacekeepers are trafficking weapons to armed groups, supporting terrorists, and exploiting natural resources. This disinformation makes it harder for peacekeeping operations to implement their mandates and has put the safety of peacekeepers at risk. This paper provides an overview of the recent rise in disinformation against MINUSCA, MINUSMA, and MONUSCO. It also examines how these three peacekeeping operations have been addressing disinformation and the challenges they have faced. While these initial efforts have tended to focus on strategic communications, disinformation is not only a strategic communications issue; it affects all mission components, and effectively tackling it requires situating it in the broader political context and understanding its drivers. This paper offers the following questions the UN Department of Peace Operations and individual missions could consider as they develop policies, guidelines, structures, and activities to address disinformation: How can missions develop a cross-cutting, strategic approach to disinformation? Disinformation is more than a technical or tactical issue; it is a political and strategic issue that requires the proactive attention of mission leaders. How can missions better monitor and analyze disinformation both online and offline? Monitoring disinformation is critical not only so missions can address it; tracking rumors also has intrinsic value by helping missions better listen to and understand the sentiments of local populations. How can missions respond to disinformation more quickly? For many UN personnel, the slowness of the UN response is one of the biggest challenges inhibiting their efforts to address disinformation. How can missions reshape anti-UN narratives? Anti-UN disinformation is woven into a broader anti-UN (and anticolonial) narrative that is grounded in both great-power politics and legitimate public grievances. In countering individual falsehoods, missions should consider whether and how they could also respond to this broader narrative. How can missions contribute to a healthier information environment? From the perspective of civil society, the most important shift the UN can make would be to focus more on supporting local journalists. Does the scale of the problem call for a more decisive shift in approach? Any shift in approach should be premised on the principle that under no circumstances should missions respond to disinformation with disinformation of their own.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Central African Republic

58. Suppressing the truth and spreading lies: How the CCP is influencing Solomon Islands’ information environment

Author:
Blake Johnson, Miah Hammond-Errey, Daria Impiombato, Albert Zhang, and Joshua Dunne
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is attempting to influence public discourse in Solomon Islands through coordinated information operations that seek to spread false narratives and suppress information on a range of topics. Following the November 2021 Honiara riots and the March 2022 leaking of the China – Solomon Islands security agreement, the CCP has used its propaganda and disinformation capabilities to push false narratives in an effort to shape the Solomon Islands public’s perception of security issues and foreign partners. In alignment with the CCP’s regional security objectives, those messages have a strong focus on undermining Solomon Islands’ existing partnerships with Australia and the US. Although some of the CCP’s messaging occurs through routine diplomatic engagement, there’s a coordinated effort to influence the population across a broad spectrum of information channels. That spectrum includes Chinese party-state media, CCP official-led statements and publications in local and social media, and the amplification of particular individual and pro-CCP content via targeted Facebook groups. There’s now growing evidence to suggest that CCP officials are also seeking to suppress information that doesn’t align with the party-state’s narratives across the Pacific islands through the coercion of local journalists and media institutions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Solomon Islands, and Asia-Pacific

59. Frontier influencers: the new face of China’s propaganda

Author:
Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report explores how the Chinese party-state’s globally focused propaganda and disinformation capabilities are evolving and increasing in sophistication. Concerningly, this emerging approach by the Chinese party-state to influence international discourse on China, including obfuscating its record of human rights violations, is largely flying under the radar of US social media platforms and western policymakers. In the broader context of attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to censor speech, promote disinformation and seed the internet with its preferred narratives, we focus on a small but increasingly popular set of YouTube accounts that feature mainly female China-based ethnic-minority influencers from the troubled frontier regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, hereafter referred to as ‘frontier influencers’ or ‘frontier accounts’. Despite being blocked in China, YouTube is seen by the CCP as a key battlefield in its ideological contestation with the outside world, and YouTube’s use in foreign-facing propaganda efforts has intensified in recent years. Originally deployed on domestic video-sharing platforms to meet an internal propaganda need, frontier-influencer content has since been redirected towards global audiences on YouTube as part of the CCP’s evolving efforts to counter criticisms of China’s human rights problems and burnish the country’s image. Alongside party-state media and foreign vloggers, these carefully vetted domestic vloggers are increasingly seen as another key part of Beijing’s external propaganda arsenal. Their use of a more personal style of communication and softer presentation is expected to be more convincing than traditional party-state media content, which is often inclined towards the more rigid and didactic. For the CCP, frontier influencers represent, in the words of one Chinese propaganda expert, ‘guerrillas or militia’ fighting on the flanks in ‘the international arena of public opinion’, while party-state media or the ‘regular army’ ‘charge, kill and advance on the frontlines’. The frontier accounts we examine in this report were predominantly created in 2020–21 and feature content that closely hews to CCP narratives, but their less polished presentation has a more authentic feel that conveys a false sense of legitimacy and transparency about China’s frontier regions that party-state media struggle to achieve. For viewers, the video content appears to be the creation of the individual influencers, but is in fact what’s referred to in China as ‘professional user generated content’, or content that’s produced with the help of special influencer-management agencies known as multi-channel networks (MCNs). For the mostly young and female Uyghur, Tibetan and other ethnic-minority influencers we examine in this report, having such an active presence on a Western social media platform is highly unusual, and ordinarily would be fraught with danger. But, as we reveal, frontier influencers are carefully vetted and considered politically reliable. The content they create is tightly circumscribed via self-censorship and oversight from their MCNs and domestic video platforms before being published on YouTube. In one key case study, we show how frontier influencers’ content was directly commissioned by the Chinese party-state. Because YouTube is blocked in China, individual influencers based in the country aren’t able to receive advertising revenue through the platform’s Partner Program, which isn’t available there. But, through their arrangements with YouTube, MCNs have been able to monetise content for frontier influencers, as well as for hundreds of other China-based influencers on the platform. Given that many of the MCNs have publicly committed to promote CCP propaganda, this arrangement results in a troubling situation in which MCNs are able to monetise their activities, including the promotion of disinformation, via their access to YouTube’s platform. The use of professionally supported frontier influencers also appears to be aimed at ensuring that state-backed content ranks well in search results because search-engine algorithms tend to prioritise fresh content and channels that post regularly. From the CCP’s perspective, the continuous flooding of content by party-state media, foreign influencers and professionally supported frontier influencers onto YouTube is aimed at outperforming other more critical but stale content. This new phenomenon reflects a continued willingness, identified in previous ASPI ICPC reports,1 by the Chinese party-state to experiment in its approach to shaping online political discourse, particularly on those topics that have the potential to disrupt its strategic objectives. By targeting online audiences on YouTube through intermediary accounts managed by MCNs, the CCP can hide its affiliation with those influencers and create the appearance of ‘independent’ and ‘authoritative’ voices supporting its narratives, including disinformation that it’s seeking to propagate globally. This report (on page 42) makes a series of policy recommendations, including that social media platforms shouldn’t allow MCNs who are conducting propaganda and disinformation work on behalf of the Chinese party-state to monetise their activities or be recognised by the platforms as, for example, official partners or award winners. This report also recommends that social media platforms broaden their practice of labelling the accounts of state media, agencies and officials to include state-linked influencers from the People’s Republic of China.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Social Media, Propaganda, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

60. Countering Disinformation and Misinformation in Humanitarian Relief Work

Author:
S. Nanthini
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Humanitarian organisations are trying to adjust to the rapid transformation of information and communication technology. The rise in disinformation and misinformation poses significant challenges to the sharing of accurate information in times of need. Humanitarian organisations must invest more in efforts to adapt to the realities of the information landscape today.
Topic:
Disaster Relief, Humanitarian Aid, Science and Technology, Humanitarian Crisis, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Global Focus