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91. Defensive lawfare and deterrence: Analysis of Latvia’s approach to legal bases in the context of hybrid warfare (2014-2022)

Author:
Valerijs Bodnieks
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Following the ‘hybrid form’ of Russian aggression in Ukraine that emerged in 2014, the period after February 24th, 2022 is referred to as the ‘new reality’. Hence, the question that needs to be addressed is how to deter and prevent Russian aggression of this kind. The national legal framework against the aggressor is a part of the deterrence policy and can be construed as defensive lawfare. Focusing on Latvia, the aim of the paper is to analyse defensive lawfare and deterrence in the context of hybrid warfare. The following research question has been identified: What is Latvia’s approach to establishing defensive lawfare in terms of hybrid warfare? For the empirical analysis, the chronological framework has been set from 2014 to 2022. To complete the empirical analysis of the present paper, both qualitative and quantitative research has been implemented comprising document analysis and semi-structured interviews, as well as content analysis, respectively. The improvement of a regulatory base and the development of deterrence, whilst using regulatory acts, is an element of deterrence and a way to act legally. The law can be used as a weapon. Lawfare, a concept with three definitions, has two forms: defensive a nd offensive. Latvia’s legal base includes a regulation to overcome hybrid threats and to implement a broad-spectrum of defence measures. Latvia’s regulatory framework is designed for defence purposes, whilst also being a way of promoting deterrence. Decision makers must be able to manoeuvre with the powers assigned to them.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Hybrid Warfare, Lawfare, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Latvia, and Baltic States

92. The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Anya Fink
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, and even before February 2022, the Russian government has conducted intense nuclear rhetoric and actions. This behavior is a specific approach to strategic deterrence that seeks to incorporate nonmilitary and military (nuclear and nonnuclear) means into a continuous spectrum of actions for deterrence, escalation management, and warfighting. Nuclear weapons are the foundation of credible strategic deterrence and signaling with these and other strategic capabilities could in theory be instrumental for deterring the escalation of a local conflict to a regional war. Russian signaling varies from aggressive declarations from Putin himself but also Russian officials such as Medvedev or journalistic cronies, to medium to large scale strategic exercises like the infamous Grom. Likewise, on the international stage, Russia has shown restraint by reimplementing the Reagan-Gorbachev declaration, but also deliberate disrespect of arms control agreements, notably by suspending its participation to the New START treaty. In practice, however, Russia’s use of strategic deterrence signaling in this conflict has been met with mixed results insofar as it has not compelled the cessation of or constraints on Western lethal aid to Ukraine, even though it may have, at least in the eyes of Russian officials, deterred direct Western intervention. Consequently, there might be more to expect from Russia, depending on the evolution of the daily battlefield in Ukraine. If the use of a nuclear weapon is still very unlikely, some other strategic moves in the hybrid domain (cyberattacks, attacks on undersea cables, information manipulation) could also serve as signaling.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

93. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations

Author:
Dimitri Minic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Russian army is very critical of its war in Ukraine. Not just of the first phase of the failed special military operation (SVO), which was inspired by the theorization of bypassing, but also of the strategic deterrence phase that preceded it. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations Download 0.98 Mo Russian military theorists have commented on the profound lack of preparation not just for the SVO, but also—in many areas—for the heterotelic war the SVO has become. The Russian army’s weaknesses vis-à-vis the Ukrainian army are generally, and sometimes quite directly, recognized. The Russian military elites have made numerous recommendations for improving Russia’s military performance, primarily focusing on the ground and aerospace forces. Meanwhile, the Russian army has mostly adapted (more or less successfully) to the difficulties it has encountered in the last year and a half in Ukraine. Although the Putin regime is authoritarian and intent on reducing freedom of expression in Russian society, the existence and tolerance of a certain amount of truth-telling at this level of the military apparatus indicate that the Russian army’s and state’s ability to adapt should not be underestimated.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

94. How Climate Change Challenges the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
Jamie Kwong
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Climate change could have mission-altering impacts on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This paper examines the range of climate change challenges and threats that could detrimentally affect each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad in different and increasingly serious ways. In doing so, the paper helps to advance broader, ongoing efforts to account for climate change in U.S. national security policies. It also aims to inform and help initiate a larger conversation about the vulnerabilities of all nuclear weapons programs to climate change. Gaining greater clarity about these vulnerabilities now is essential to mitigating the worst effects of climate change on nuclear weapons in the future. The paper highlights the following key findings: Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay is vulnerable to rising sea levels and flooding that could significantly affect its capacity to service U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Because Kings Bay is one of two bases equipped to support the U.S. SSBN fleet, climate change effects there could have serious repercussions for the broader deterrence mission of the submarine leg of the nuclear triad. At Minot Air Force Base, warming temperatures may accelerate flooding that could impact the accessibility of the base’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and facilities. This accessibility issue could have cascading effects on the larger ICBM deterrence mission, potentially limiting the reliability of some missiles by delaying scheduled maintenance or deliveries. Increasing temperatures and incidences of extreme precipitation at Whiteman Air Force Base pose potential risks to the nation’s stealth nuclear bombers. Climate change impacts that prevent aircraft from freely taking off from or landing at Whiteman may have some implications for the readiness of the larger bomber leg, especially as related to the accessibility of nuclear weapons storage sites. Importantly, this analysis should be viewed as a descriptive assessment of potential future outcomes based on current trends, not as a prediction. What actually transpires will depend on how the United States prepares for, mitigates, and adapts to these challenges. The paper concludes by offering five recommendations for ways to do so: The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) should conduct climate change vulnerability assessments of all their nuclear installations and facilities to determine how and when climate change could impact each site’s unique nuclear systems, operations, and activities. The DOD should invest in dynamic climate change modeling and both interagency and nongovernmental partnerships to ensure U.S. nuclear decisions and planning are informed by the most accurate climate change projections. The DOD and other agencies should be required to complete forward-looking studies of potential climate change impacts on any future nuclear actions, including the construction and deployment of modernized nuclear systems. The DOD should adopt a mission-level focus in its climate adaptation planning and establish a workstream specifically focused on the nuclear mission. An initial deliverable of this work should be a dedicated climate action plan for the U.S. deterrence mission. The DOD should integrate climate change scenario exercises into nuclear planning to simulate potential climate-nuclear crises and develop mitigation and adaptation plans. Key considerations should include how the climate scenario may impact local and global nuclear operations, nuclear command and control assets, base personnel, and local communities, with the exercise results incorporated into nuclear planning efforts.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Deterrence, and Nuclear Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

95. The role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis

Author:
Gregory Weaver
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The potential for a conflict over Taiwan is increasing due to China’s nuclear and conventional military buildup and the threat of two simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia, which would severely stress the ability of US and allied conventional forces to win in both theaters. Nuclear weapons will cast a long shadow over a Taiwan conflict and could play multiple roles in the deterrence and warfighting strategies and operations of both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A conflict over Taiwan has a number of attributes that will shape those roles. Those attributes make the potential for limited nuclear escalation real and uncontrolled nuclear escalation possible. In order to prevent war and escalation in war, US policymakers and military planners must take the role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict seriously. The United States should communicate four focused deterrent messages to China and reassure its allies and partners that it can deter Chinese nuclear use. The United States should reevaluate its theater nuclear capability requirements for a Taiwan conflict and carefully analyze options to defeat a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan with limited nuclear strikes if necessary. Finally, the United States must credibly address the potential for collaborative or opportunistic aggression by China and Russia in an environment in which both are peer nuclear adversaries. This requires determining what the US strategy should be to address the two-peer threat, optimizing US and allied conventional forces to address it, and reshaping US nuclear capabilities if necessary. The United States needs to know now whether it is going to require a nuclear force that is larger, or different, or both, because changing the current modernization program requires immediate action to address the threats in time.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

96. Fifty shades of red: where does Russia draw the line?

Author:
Polina Sinovets
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
From the outset, the war on Ukraine came with a particular feature attached: the threat of nuclear escalation. As President Putin stated in his 24 February speech, “whoever tries to hinder us or threaten our country or our people should know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead you to consequences that you have never faced in your history.”1 Rather than deterring any type of support to Ukraine, this has instead led to a discussion about what exactly would trigger a nuckear escalation: where do Russia's red lines really lie? This paper is structured as follows: it defines what “red lines” are in international relations theory, and outlines the narratives and timeline associated with their use in the war on Ukraine. It then proposes three shades of red to categorize the different degrees of threat they represent. It concludes that Russia’s nuclear rhetoric has decreased rather than increased the chances of a major escalation of the conflict.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Relations Theory, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Red Line
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

97. The Iran nuclear deal: consequences of moribund diplomacy

Author:
Mark Fitzpatrick
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
On 4 November 2022, United States President Joe Biden privately remarked that the 2015 Iran nuclear accord known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was “dead”, but that the US would not formally say so.1 US working- level officials insist a return to the deal remains possible, but efforts to revive it are increasingly fraught. For months, Iran’s leaders have appeared uninterested in complying with the deal, instead conditioning their country’s return on unrealistic demands that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cease investigation into signs of Iran’s past nuclear weapons development. Since mid-September 2022, Western attention has been distracted by other aspects of Tehran’s foreign and domestic policy, including the regime’s brutal crackdown of domestic protests against female veiling rules, its complicity in Russian drone attacks in Ukraine, and its dubious detention of US and European citizens. With political room for a diplomatic solution rapidly evaporating, and Iran’s “breakout period” for producing weapons- grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) shortened to a few days, NATO member states must anticipate that states like Israel could opt for a kinetic “Plan B” solution to Iran’s nuclear programme, with potential negative spill-over. With escalation likely before a UN ban on missile trade with Iran expires in October 2023, concerned states should intensify pursuit of peaceful alternatives.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, JCPOA, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

98. Making Collective Deterrence and Defense Work in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
David Santoro and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific security architecture is undergoing fundamental transformation to address rising challenges, most notably those posed by an increasingly confident, assertive, and capable China. Pacific Forum has started a multi-year unofficial dialogue with experts and officials from the United States and key allies and partners to share views of this evolving regional security environment and identify common interests and concerns as well as areas of divergence. The inaugural Pacific Forum Defense and Deterrence Dialogue, which included participants from the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, took place in Tokyo on February 2-3, 2023. It was run at the Track 2 level, although diplomatic officials and military officers from each country also attended as observers. Pacific Forum’s goal is to identify ways to shape this evolution to ensure that it meets U.S. national security needs, particularly integrated deterrence of, and defense against, regional adversaries—with China as the foremost concern. Responses to these changes have taken several forms. Bilateral alliances are being modernized. Other security relationships are being strengthened, such as those between Japan and Australia and Japan and the United Kingdom. There is also talk of new coordination among Five Eyes and other partners. In other cases, new initiatives have been launched, such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States “enhanced trilateral security partnership” (AUKUS) or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Recent developments, such as the election of conservative Yoon Yuk-soul as president in South Korea, are hopeful signs of the revitalization of currently moribund defense and security arrangements, notably U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation. There is also reportedly talk of renewed interest in the Trilateral Security Dialogue that includes the United States, Australia, and Japan. All these initiatives are designed to better compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defend against adversaries determined to rewrite the regional order in ways that align with their interests. While the notion of an Asian equivalent to NATO is out of sync with regional needs (and there is broad recognition of that fact among key allies), current momentum could herald the emergence of an Indo-Pacific defense community reminiscent of the one created by trans-Atlantic nations after the Second World War. That community was forged to defend against the Soviet Union. Today, the nascent group in the Indo-Pacific is focused on China, although it is not the only threat. Understanding how regional governments see and rank those diverse threats is a critical step in ensuring that the new arrangements are most effective. One thing is certain: the current situation—in which there is no coordination mechanism among the existing and emerging arrangements—is not tenable in view of the mounting China challenge. To succeed, this process must be nurtured. The United States must better understand the forces at play and the views driving national action, and it must work to ensure that those changes are effective to counter China and other challenges. Work is needed to understand how all these pieces fit together in a coherent regional deterrence and defense architecture, particularly to deal with strategic conflict. This is not easy. The above- mentioned initiatives and relationships are new and evolving. It is difficult to appreciate each on its own, much less the overlap between them, and their convergences and divergences. Plus, in some cases, governments are also focused on other ways to deter. DTRA’s chief concern is the warfighter, who must be prepared to address a range of threats that extends from “strategic” military problems (including those related to nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and other domains) to gray zone issues, but some regional initiatives also address other issues, notably climate change, vaccine diplomacy, and emerging technologies. It is critical that the United States understand how allies and partners see this menu of items and their goals and priorities, even as the focus of our proposed effort is strengthening regional deterrence and defense. Plainly, a cumulative, comparative assessment is critical because effective deterrence and defense demand a comprehensive analysis and there needs to be shared understanding of how these mechanisms can be coordinated to ensure that needs are met and that participating governments maximize and make the most efficient contributions. From a U.S. perspective, building a collective deterrence and defense architecture in the Indo-Pacific is urgent and the only realistic way to compete effectively against China. As a landmark report from the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney has found, “a strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.”1 Failure to build an effective Indo-Pacific deterrence and defense architecture would shift the regional balance of forces to the detriment of the United States as it addresses the China challenge.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

99. Al-Aqsa Flood: The Collapse of Israeli Deterrence and Attempts to Restore It

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The Palestinian resistance dealt a significant blow to the Israeli occupation, leading Israel to retaliate by launching an aggressive campaign on Gaza with full Western support. The objective was to eradicate Hamas and establish a pro-Israel authority in Gaza. However, several factors may impede this outcome, as seen in comparable conflicts.
Topic:
Occupation, Deterrence, Hamas, Armed Conflict, October 7, and Al-Aqsa Flood
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

100. Finland in a nuclear alliance: Recalibrating the dual-track mindset on deterrence and arms control

Author:
Matti Pesu and Tapio Juntunen
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Finland’s NATO bid was partly triggered by a sense of susceptibility to nuclear coercion. Seeking the protection of extended nuclear deterrence was seen as necessary to maximize Finnish security. The Finnish domestic environment is rather permissive towards Finland’s contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy. That said, nuclear deterrence may become a topic of debate as Finnish NATO policy evolves. Finland has several options in its contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy, ranging from a passive low-ambition strategy to medium- and high-ambition approaches. Finnish historical affinity with the non-proliferation regime will likely continue to characterize its nuclear disarmament policy as a NATO member. Although the time is not currently ripe for new arms control proposals, Finland has a self-interest in promoting NATO’s efforts in nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland