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521. Reconfiguring NATO: The Case for Burden Shifting

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
This explainer begins by recounting how an American-led NATO, a key element in U.S. global primacy, lived on despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat it was meant to deter—and, if necessary, defeat. The next section highlights the implicit bargain that has sustained NATO: U.S. preponderance in Europe, achieved by the American willingness to serve as the continent’s indispensable protector, in exchange for Europeans’ freedom to spend more on butter and less on guns. Next comes a set of proposals to move NATO from burden sharing, a perennial point of contention within the pact, to a more far-reaching change, burden shifting, an idea that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made even more feasible and prudent. The explainer concludes by assaying the prospects for burden shifting and challenging prominent counterarguments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

522. Don’t Fear Vacuums: It’s Safe To Go Home

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran,” President Biden said this July in defense of his administration’s continued commitment to the Middle East.1 His comments reflect a widely held misconception: that a U.S. military exit from the Middle East would empower U.S. adversaries, and thus somehow make Americans less secure.2 U.S. leaders and pundits have expressed similar fears about the danger of creating vacuums by leaving Syria, Afghanistan (before U.S. exit of course), and even Africa, where only smatterings of U.S. troops are stationed.3 Vacuum fears also fuel more general warnings against surrendering influence in the developing world. Chinese investments via its Belt and Road Initiative—a massive set of infrastructure-development loans—for example, are said to exploit a vacuum the United States should compete to fill. Chinese trade in South America, or Russian port calls there, are said to reflect a failure to exert U.S. influence.4 The burgeoning idea behind these claims is that “great power competition,” which once seemed a useful rationale for exiting conflicts and lingering endeavors of the global war on terror, demands winning an open-ended, ill-defined contest for influence with Russia and China in the greater Middle East and developing world, or what is now sometimes called the global south.5 Vacuums that could be said to follow a U.S. exit—not the terrorists or insurgents U.S. forces were deployed to fight—are the new justification for staying.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

523. No I in Team: Integrated Deterrence with Allies and Partners

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States faces a strategic landscape unlike anything it has encountered in its recent history. It faces a rising great power in China, a diminished but still dangerous Russian military threat, and myriad “lesser threats” in the form of Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations. Moving forward, the United States will need to deter aggression by two nuclear armed great-power adversaries while also keeping other threats at bay to protect the U.S. homeland and its global interests. But Washington finds itself in a precarious position where it may not have sufficient capacity, capability, nor readiness to contend with multiple advanced threats and crises. The Pentagon, therefore, needs allies and partners to help it deter Chinese and Russian aggression and manage the lesser but persistent threats that could grow if ignored. To overcome these challenges, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has advanced the concept of integrated deterrence in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Integrated deterrence seeks to integrate all tools of national power across domains, geography, and spectrum of conflict, while working with allies and partners. But what integrated deterrence entails in practical terms remains unclear, particularly to the very allies and partners Washington wants more from. This ambiguity raises the risk that integrated deterrence may find itself dead on arrival—and along with it, the ally and partner line of effort in the NDS. This risk is particularly high since the unclassified version of the NDS, which is the only one that is available to most allies and partners, was long delayed and finally released in late October 2022. To enable the DoD’s NDS implementation efforts and turn integrated deterrence from rhetoric to reality, the authors developed a framework to help the department think about and implement its strategy of integrated deterrence with allies and partners. This framework highlights three levels of integration between the United States and its allies and partners: tactical, institutional, and strategic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

524. Towards a deeper NATO-Japan cooperation

Author:
Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
While NATO and Japan have a long history of cooperation dating back to the 1990s, changes in their respective regional and global security environment are creating converging interests. This, in turn, presents new areas of potential cooperation. The developments driving convergence are Russia’s war with Ukraine and possible spill over effects in the Indo-Pacific, China’s growing global assertiveness and military posturing in the South China Sea, and a deepening security partnership between Russia and China. At the same time, NATO’s view is increasingly global, and Japan has signalled both a willingness and interest to deepen cooperation with NATO, exemplified by Prime Minister Kishida’s participation in the Madrid Summit last summer. While NATO’s short-term focus will be deterring and defending the Eastern flank, the current timing is right to consider deeper cooperation in the future. This could entail expanding cooperation beyond the ‘soft’ areas of humanitarian assistance and non-proliferation into defence through interoperability, cyber, and intelligence. There are already lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war that can assist in laying the groundwork for practical steps to NATO-Japan cooperation including a focused expansion of interoperability of forces, joint exercises in the maritime domain, political support, countering disinformation, and developing contingency plans for logistics and intelligence cooperation in the event of military conflict. Of all NATO’s partners in the Indo-Pacific, Japan spends the most on defence and represents the largest economy, about three times the size of the Republic of Korea (ROK) or Australia. Japan is the only non-NATO member of the G7, and as the longest-standing NATO partner beyond Europe, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described Japan as a “natural partner” with shared values and challenges.1 These factors alone warrant revisiting NATO-Japan relations in light of recent events.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

525. Finland and Sweden in NATO: the potential of new security providers

Author:
Hanna Ojanen
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO is occurring at an accelerated pace. In January 2022, neither government was considering NATO membership; in May 2022, they moved decisively into the application process. In response, NATO member states have rush processed their membership, with most NATO countries ratifying Accession Protocols. In November 2022, they are a mere two ratifications short of membership. Both Finland and Sweden are sending a strong message to Allies and Russia by joining NATO without preconditions as already active contributors and security providers within the Alliance. For its part, NATO would not only gain two new member states but also a new regional subgroup of Nordic countries that have their own perspectives and strategic cultures. Moreover, Finland and Sweden will bring a model for bilateral defence cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Sweden

526. Russia’s military after Ukraine: down but not out

Author:
Łukasz Kulesa(ed.)
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The June 2022 Madrid Summit decided on the next steps in enhancing the Alliance’s deterrence posture, describing Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.1 The poor performance of the Russian forces in the first months of their war against Ukraine and the scale of casualties and material losses they suffered should however prompt further reflection about Russia’s ability to recover and challenge NATO militarily. If the Russian military seems unable to prevail over Ukrainian forces (supported by a number of NATO countries), it may reasonably be asked whether unrolling “the biggest overhaul of our collective defence and deterrence since the end of the Cold War”2 is justified. This Policy Brief argues that NATO’s goals to shore up the Eastern flank are indeed warranted for three reasons – Russia’s political will to claim a victory, evidence of learning from past mistakes, and the existing Russian industrial capacity. In fact, the Russian military will probably experience a relatively speedy recovery. With the caveat that much is contingent on day-to-day developments and the ultimate outcome of the war, it is also plausible that Russia will “build back better” rather than simply rebuild a military which has proven to be ill-prepared for the operation against Ukraine.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Madrid Summit
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

527. U.S. SOUTHCOM Fights Through COVID-19

Author:
Michael T. Plehn
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
As I boarded my flight in Bogotá, Colombia, to return to the United States on March 14, 2020, after participating in the joint Colombia-U.S. Exercise Vita in the Guajira Peninsula, the reality of how the COVID-19 pandemic was going to affect our lives over the next year began to manifest. Arriving back in Miami, where I was the Military Deputy Commander for U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), I went straight home to begin a 14-day quarantine in accordance with new policies from the Department of Defense (DOD) for travelers returning from overseas. It was the first of many adaptations that we would make in the coming months. In May of 2019, shortly after assuming command at USSOUTHCOM, Admiral Craig Faller, USN, established three primary lines of effort to guide our activities: strengthen partnerships, counter threats, and build our team.1 Less than a year later, we were tested in all three areas by the pandemic. One of the great strengths of USSOUTHCOM is the network of engaged and willing partners in the region. We work closely with them as we guide all U.S. military activity across much of Latin America and the Caribbean. We are neighbors and friends who share common values, ties, and interests. Our neighborhood is not only rich in natural resources but also beset by many longstanding challenges and several emerging issues. While there is no current armed conflict between countries in the region, it is one of the most violent areas on the globe, much of it fueled by transnational criminal organizations and longstanding structural, societal issues. According to a 2019 global study on homicide by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the rate of intentional homicide in Central and South America is four times the global average.2 Particularly virulent, transnational criminal organizations—flush with cash—constantly seek to expand their lethal trade through extortion, corruption, intimidation, and violence. These actions, in turn, erode the power and legitimacy of local, state, and federal governments, reducing their ability to fight this scourge.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, COVID-19, and SOUTHCOM
Political Geography:
South America and United States of America

528. The Limits of Victory: Evaluating the Employment of Military Power

Author:
Michael H. Levine
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
On November 28, 1984, then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appeared before the National Press Club in Washington, DC, to deliver a speech titled “The Uses of Military Power.” The previous year had brought mixed results in the deployment of U.S. combat troops overseas. An invasion of the small West Indies country of Grenada wrested regime control from the one-party socialist People’s Revolutionary Government in favor of a relatively stable democracy. In Lebanon, however, the bombing of a Marine Corps barracks complex in Beirut killed 305 troops and civilians, including 241 Americans, and led to the withdrawal of the multinational peacekeeping force months later. Perhaps most central to Secretary Weinberger’s speech was the Vietnam War, an event that two decades later still struck deep into the institutional fabric of the U.S. military. The Secretary argued that combat forces should be deployed resolutely with “the sole object of winning” in cases where vital national interests are at stake.1 Moreover, the use of force must meet six criteria: vital national interests, wholehearted commitment, clearly defined political and military objectives, congruent ends and means, domestic support, and last resort. Seven years later, many viewed the U.S. triumph in the Gulf War as a vindication of this doctrine. Today, this way of thinking is known as the Powell Doctrine, in reference to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush gleefully declared, “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”2
Topic:
Defense Policy, History, Armed Forces, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

529. The 21st Century's Great Military Rivalry

Author:
Graham Allison and Jonah Glick-Unterman
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
A quarter-century ago, China conducted what it called “missile tests” bracketing the island of Taiwan to deter it from a move toward independence by demonstrating that China could cut Taiwan’s ocean lifelines. In response, in a show of superiority that forced China to back down, the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to Taiwan’s adjacent waters. If China were to repeat the same missile tests today, it is highly unlikely that the United States would respond as it did in 1996. If U.S. carriers moved that close to the Chinese mainland now, they could be sunk by the DF-21 and DF-26 missiles that China has since developed and deployed. This article presents three major theses concerning the military rivalry between China and the United States in this century. First, the era of U.S. military primacy is over: dead, buried, and gone—except in the minds of some political leaders and policy analysts who have not examined the hard facts.1 As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis put it starkly in his 2018 National Defense Strategy, “For decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted.”2 But that was then. “Today,” Mattis warned, “every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.”3 As a result, in the past two decades, the United States has been forced to retreat from a strategy based on primacy and dominance to one of deterrence. As President Joe Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his National Security Council colleague Kurt Campbell acknowledged in 2019, “The United States must accept that military primacy will be difficult to restore, given the reach of China’s weapons, and instead focus on deterring China from interfering with its freedom of maneuver and from physically coercing U.S. allies and partners.”4 One of the architects of the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy put it less diplomatically and more succinctly: “The era of untrammeled U.S. military superiority is over.”5
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America