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61. Into Uncharted Waters: Trade Secrets Law in the AI Era

Author:
Burcu Kilic
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence (AI) has many beneficial applications that can improve quality of life, but accountability and transparency can be elusive when problems arise. This paper looks at the tools, systems and measures needed to ensure that when AI systems do more harm than good, their administrators are held accountable. Trade secrets law protects the source code, algorithms and data sets upon which AI systems are built, but they also prevent those harmed by these systems from getting answers. Requests for disclosure, data sharing and due process are being denied in the name of trade secrets protection. Complicating the matter is that trade secrets are treated differently in various jurisdictions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Trade Secrets
Political Geography:
Global Focus

62. Explainable AI Policy: It Is Time to Challenge Post Hoc Explanations

Author:
Mardi Witzel, Gaston H. Gonnet, and Tom Snider
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
The focus of this paper is on policy guidance around explainable artificial intelligence (AI) or the ability to understand how AI models arrive at their outcomes. Explainability matters in human terms because it facilitates including an individual’s “right to explanation” and it also plays a role in enabling technical evaluation of AI systems. The paper begins with an examination of the meaning of explainability, concluding that the constellation of related terms serves to frustrate and confuse policy initiatives. Following a brief review of contemporary policy guidance, it argues that there is a need for greater clarity and context-specific guidance, highlighting the need to distinguish between ante hoc and post hoc explainability, especially in high-risk, high-impact contexts. The question of whether post hoc or ante hoc methods have been employed is a fundamental and often-overlooked question in policy. The paper argues that the question of which method should be employed in a given context, along with the requirement for human-level understanding, is a key challenge that policy makers need to address. A taxonomy for how explainability can be operationalized in AI policy is proposed and a series of recommendations is set forth.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

63. International Norms Development and AI in the Military Domain

Author:
Tim Sweijs and Sofia Romansky
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
The growing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in military applications has changed the way countries engage in war and in times of peace. With so many potential effects of military AI applications, both positive and negative, there is growing demand for international norms to govern their responsible use based on ethical and legal principles. While some argue that current international and human rights laws are sufficient, this paper makes the case for expanding norms to encompass the rapid growth of military AI use while looking at the challenges facing international norms development, current initiatives, and strengths and weaknesses in the normative landscape.
Topic:
Human Rights, National Security, Artificial Intelligence, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

64. Artificial Intelligence for Tibetan Knowledge Systems / Geshe Lobsang Monlam

Author:
Geshe Lobsang Monlam
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Monlam Information Technology has been at the forefront of advances in Tibetan language information technology for over two decades. At its forefront is Geshe Lobsang Monlam, PhD, a monk and scholar who has dedicated his life to integrating Tibetan knowledge into the digital world. Join us for a special presentation by Geshe Monlam on Monlam AI, his latest initiative to use artificial intelligence to provide accessible Tibetan knowledge systems for learning and spiritual growth, as well as The Monlam Grand Tibetan Dictionary project and app, and the forthcoming Tibetan Digital Library Project. Speaker bio: Venerable Geshe Lobsang Monlam, PhD, is a monk and scholar who has dedicated his life to integrating Tibetan knowledge into the digital world. He achieved his geshe degree at Sera Mey Thoesam Norling Monastic Institute, India, in 2013. A passion for computers and gadgetry led him to create Tibetan computer font and software applications, and to establish Monlam IT. His fonts, software, and apps are used by millions – and they are all distributed for free. Geshe Monlam's commitment to integrating Tibetan knowledge into the digital world is acknowledged by prominent religious leaders and by academic and science institutions worldwide. Geshe la earned a PhD in Library Science in 2023. Co-sponsored by C.V. Starr East Asian Library and the Modern Tibetan Studies Program at Columbia University.
Topic:
Language, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Knowledge Systems
Political Geography:
Asia and Tibet

65. If-Then Commitments for AI Risk Reduction

Author:
Holden Karnofsky
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
If-then commitments are an emerging framework for preparing for risks from AI without unnecessarily slowing the development of new technology. The more attention and interest there is in these commitments, the faster a mature framework can progress.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Risk, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

66. Time to Reset the U.S. Trade Agenda

Author:
Peter Harrell
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The strongest argument for rebooting U.S. trade policy ultimately may not be geopolitics, nor even the economic argument that trade deals will help an already-strong U.S economy. Instead, the best argument is that trade is a key element of solving global challenges that affect us all, like the green energy transition and the risks of AI and the digital economy.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Geopolitics, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Trade Policy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

67. Russia’s war against Ukraine: Lessons on infrastructure security and new technologies

Author:
Auriane Técourt and Maria Martisiute
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In 2022, Russia hit Ukraine with a major cyberattack and unleashed a full-scale war of aggression. This includes new technologies and AI-enabled capabilities such as the Bylina electronic warfare command-and-control system. Nord Stream and the Balticconnector also fell victim to sabotage attacks by hostile actors. In this Policy Brief, it is highlighted that the EU has stepped up its resilience and cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. However, the capacity to leverage innovative technologies and defensive AI remains underdeveloped. Furthermore, the protection of industrial control systems (ICS) remains unaddressed. As Russia upgrades its 2030 National AI Development Strategy, there is an urgency to integrate the security of industrial controls into the EU’s approach to the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure before Moscow strikes with deadlier offensives. It is also time to start building a measured, albeit scalable, deployment plan for new technologies that may be AI-enabled for European critical infrastructure in connectivity with Ukraine and Moldova. The Paper explains that the EU has strengthened cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure, but there is still room for improvement. Considering the pace at which new technologies and AI-enabled technologies are developing, the following steps would enhance the security of European infrastructure: Possible attack scenarios. Mandatory SOCs and cyber hubs. Industrial control systems (ICS). Synergies between the EU and NATO. A deployment plan for new technologies that may include AI.
Topic:
Infrastructure, European Union, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

68. AI and the Evolution of Biological National Security Risks: Capabilities, Thresholds, and Interventions

Author:
Bill Drexel and Caleb Withers
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Not long after COVID-19 gave the world a glimpse of the catastrophic potential of biological events, experts began warning that rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) could augur a world of bioterrorism, unprecedented superviruses, and novel targeted bioweapons. These dire warnings have risen to the highest levels of industry and government, from the CEOs of the world's leading AI labs raising alarms about new technical capabilities for would-be bioterrorists, to Vice President Kamala Harris’s concern that AI-enabled bioweapons “could endanger the very existence of humanity.”1 If true, such developments would expose the United States to unprecedented catastrophic threats well beyond COVID-19’s scope of destruction. But assessing the degree to which these concerns are warranted—and what to do about them—requires weighing a range of complex factors, including: The history and current state of American biosecurity The diverse ways in which AI could alter existing biosecurity risks Which emerging technical AI capabilities would impact these risks Where interventions today are needed This report considers these factors to provide policymakers with a broad understanding of the evolving intersection of AI and biotechnology, along with actionable recommendations to curb the worst risks to national security from biological threats. The sources of catastrophic biological risks are varied. Historically, policymakers have underappreciated the risks posed by the routine activities of well-intentioned scientists, even as the number of high-risk biosecurity labs and the frequency of dangerous incidents—perhaps including COVID-19 itself—continue to grow. State actors have traditionally been a source of considerable biosecurity risk, not least the Soviet Union’s shockingly large bioweapons program. But the unwieldiness and imprecision of bioweapons has meant that states remain unlikely to field large-scale biological attacks in the near term, even though the U.S. State Department expresses concerns about the potential bioweapons capabilities of North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China. On the other hand, nonstate actors—including lone wolves, terrorists, and apocalyptic groups—have an unnerving track record of attempting biological attacks, but with limited success due to the intrinsic complexity of building and wielding such delicate capabilities. Today, fast-moving advancements in biotechnology—independent of AI developments—are changing many of these risks. A combination of new gene editing techniques, gene sequencing methods, and DNA synthesis tools is opening a new world of possibilities in synthetic biology for greater precision in genetic manipulation and, with it, a new world of risks from the development of powerful bioweapons and biological accidents alike. Cloud labs, which conduct experiments on others’ behalf, could enable nonstate actors by allowing them to outsource some of the experimental expertise that has historically acted as a barrier to dangerous uses. Though most cloud labs screen orders for malicious activity, not all do, and the constellation of existing bioweapons norms, conventions, and safeguards leaves open a range of pathways for bad actors to make significant progress in acquiring viable bioweapons. But experts’ opinions on the overall state of U.S. biosecurity range widely, especially with regard to fears of nonstate actors fielding bioweapons. Those less concerned contend that even if viable paths to building bioweapons exist, the practicalities of constructing, storing, and disseminating them are far more complex than most realize, with numerous potential points of failure that concerned parties either fail to recognize or underemphasize. They also point to a lack of a major bioattacks in recent decades, despite chronic warnings. A more pessimistic camp points to experiments that have demonstrated the seeming ease of successfully constructing powerful viruses using commercially available inputs, and seemingly diminishing barriers to the knowledge and technical capabilities needed to create bioweapons. Less controversial is the insufficiency of U.S. biodefenses to adequately address large-scale biological threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. Despite COVID-19’s demonstration of the U.S. government’s inability to contain the effects of a major outbreak, the nation has made limited progress in mitigating the likelihood and potential harm of another, more dangerous biological catastrophe. New AI capabilities may reshape the risk landscape for biothreats in several ways. AI is enabling new capabilities that might, in theory, allow advanced actors to optimize bioweapons for more precise effects, such as targeting specific genetic groups or geographies. Though such capabilities remain speculative, if realized they would dramatically alter states’ incentives to use bioweapons for strategic ends. Instead of risking their own militaries’ or populations’ health with the unwieldy weapons, states could sabotage other nations’ food security or incapacitate enemies with public health crises from which they would be unlikely to rebound. Relatedly, the same techniques could create superviruses optimized for transmissibility and lethality, which may considerably expand the destructive potential of bioweapons. Tempering these fears, however, are several technical challenges that scientists would need to overcome—if they can be solved at all. The most pressing concern for biological risks related to AI stems from tools that may soon be able to accelerate the procurement of biological agents by nonstate actors. Recent studies have suggested that foundation models may soon be able to help accelerate bad actors’ ability to acquire weaponizable biological agents, even if the degree to which these AI tools can currently help them remains marginal.2 Of particular concern are AI systems’ budding abilities to help troubleshoot where experiments have gone wrong, speeding the design-build-test-learn feedback loop that is essential to developing working biological agents. If made more effective, emerging AI tools could provide a boon to would-be bioweapons creators by more dynamically providing some of the knowledge needed to produce and use bioweapons, though such actors would still face other significant hurdles to bioweapons development that are often underappreciated. AI could also impact biological risks in other ways. Technical faults in AI tools could fail to constrain foundation models from relaying hazardous biological information to potential bad actors, or inadvertently encourage researchers to pursue promising medicinal agents with unexpected negative side effects. Using AI to create more advanced automated labs could expose these labs to many of the risks of automation that have historically plagued other complex automated systems, and make it easier for nonspecialists to concoct biological agents (depending upon the safety mechanisms that automated labs institute). Finally, heavy investment in companies and nations seeking to capitalize on AI’s potential for biotechnology could be creating competition dynamics that prioritize speed over safety. These risks are particularly acute in relation to China, where a variety of other factors shaping the country’s biotech ecosystem also further escalate risks of costly accidents.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Biosecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

69. Feminist Technology Diplomacy: An FFP Approach to Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Elise Stephenson and Isobel Barry
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has rapidly gained global momentum, with technological developments spurred on by generative AI and increased automation across military, medical, humanitarian, and educational domains, hastening the need to prioritise good international governance. To realise the gains whilst mitigating the risks of AI, robust governance frameworks are required to which feminist foreign policy (FFP) approaches are relevant. AI regulation that focuses on mitigating harms toward minoritised groups, particularly women, should be a critical priority for governments and international organisations. Failing to address these issues risks disenfranchising half the global population, ultimately leading to missed opportunities for gains in productivity and efficiency driven by AI advancements.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Women, Feminism, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

70. Canvasing Variations in US-South Korea Cooperation on AI and Quantum Technology

Author:
Sanghyun Han
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper elucidates how Washington and Seoul cooperate on AI and quantum technologies, both recognized as critical emerging technologies essential to their national interests. Technology cooperation is denoted as government-to-government efforts aimed at cultivating and developing technology, focusing on national strategies and interests. In AI, the United States holds a dominant leadership position, while South Korea demonstrates strengths in certain areas, though not across the board. Cooperation in AI primarily focuses on standardization efforts, with significant involvement of the South Korean government in partnerships with the US private sector, as well as private-sector-led bilateral research initiatives. In contrast, South Korea’s capabilities in quantum technologies are far more limited. Nevertheless, cooperation in this domain is largely centered on research collaboration, with both governments actively participating alongside international research consortia led by the United States. The differing focuses—standardization in AI and research collaboration in quantum technologies—reflect the respective strengths and needs of the two countries in these critical fields. The progression of the US-ROK alliance in this direction is both natural and beneficial, as the development of advanced and sophisticated technology is incrsaneasingly beyond the capacity of any single state alone.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Artificial Intelligence, Private Sector, Standardization, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America