Why do states comply with international norms? The analogy of classical theories on individuals' compliance is useful to understand state compliance with international norms. For example, Friedrich Kratochwil lists three theories related to norm compliance in social life: The Hobbesian or realist position derives compliance with norms from force or the threat of force. A second class of theories explains compliance in terms of the long-term utilitarian calculations of actors, a perspective perhaps best identified with Hume's argument about the nature of conventions. Third is the idealist position of Durkheim, who conceptualizes norms and rules as “social facts” existing objectively and constraining individual choices.
International regimes have been a major focus of research in International Relations and Political Economy since the end of the 1970s. Theoretical regime studies owe a great deal of progress to the scholars researching international environmental protection, such as Peter Haas (1989, 1992, 1993), Oran Young (1977, 1982, 1989), Robert Keohane and Marc Levy (1993). From the Young's model of institutional bargaining (1989) to Haas's research on epistemic community activities (1989), we observed the importance of environmental decision-making structures for stimulating the study of institutional birth, maintenance and decline of international regimes.
Although Americans are extremely sensitive to American casualties, they seem to be remarkably insensitive to casualties suffered by foreigners including essentially uninvolved—that is, innocent—civilians. Several conclusions emerge from an examination of all the cases in which American troops have been deployed on a non-advisory basis since 1941 in situations that were actually or potentially dangerous.
Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, in their classic book Strategy and Arms Control, first published in 1961, use the term "arms control" to include "all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it." This paper updates their definition of arms control and refocuses it for the post-Cold War world, arguing that arms control in the twenty-first century can remain an important component of U.S. national security policy if defined broadly and applied innovatively. Traditionally an element of nation-to-nation relations and usually conducted bilaterally, in the next century arms control will be an increasingly multilateral affair. Threats to U.S. national security in the next century will increasingly shift from other states to individuals and small groups–sub-and trans-national threats. Defending against these threats in the conventional sense will be difficult, and the focus of arms control will shift to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to these groups. It is conceivable that both the parties to arms control agreements and provisions for their enforcement will similarly shift to non-state actors, including multinational corporations.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Globalization, and International Cooperation
The confluence of the end of the Cold War and the rise of ethnonationalistic conflicts has led to a proliferation of complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) around the world. Internal conflicts which combine large scale displacements of people, mass famine and fragile or failing economic, social and political institutions are becoming commonplace; war remains a common feature of the international landscape despite growing global interdependence. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of great power conflict, it has also decreased the perceived constraints on proxy wars, and as a result, over forty unresolved conflicts currently fester, simmer or rage. International peacekeeping forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most cases, but they can stop the fighting and assist in bringing about fair and lasting resolutions.
The continued drive to unify Europe holds numerous implications for the measurement of state strength. The emergence of the European Union as a powerful player in the post-Cold War international system still remains to be seen. This article examines the complications for state strength brought about by European unification. Particularly, I examine the impact of unification on state strength for the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy from 1960 to the current period. Although potentially construed as part of the pains and process of unification, this paper argues that European unification does not seriously erode the strength of these states. My results indicate that these more powerful states are influenced negatively by the processes of globalization but not regional integration.
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, and Italy
With comparative cases in North America and Europe as a reference point, this paper examines the recent emergence of international development NGOs (IDNGOs) in Japan and the role of state policies in supporting the growth of international civil society. In contrast to other advanced industrial nations where state-IDNGO cooperation in foreign aid programs developed extensively in the 1960s and 1970s, IDNGOs and NGOs were excluded from Japanese ODA policies until the late 1980s. The paper looks at changes in Japanese state policies vis-à-vis IDNGOs in 1989 and the early 1990s and shows how such changes in turn helped stimulate the creation of new citizen-organized international groups in Japan. To explain this shift in state policy, the paper turns to sociological institutional theories and argues that international norms promoted by international organizations and international actors have played an important role in expanding opportunities for IDNGOs in Japan.
Ask Israelis or Arabs to characterize the U.S.-Israel relationship and most, particularly on the Arab side, will argue that the picture is one of unwavering support for the Jewish state. Indeed, the outgoing Clinton administration has been widely perceived and labeled as the closest to Israel in the history of the U.S.-Israel relationship. Though the ties between the U.S. and Israel are indeed close, deep, and institutionalized, a closer examination reveals a constant tension between support for Israel and "evenhandedness" between Israel and the Arab world.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
United States, America, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia
Why is it that Israel's per capita GNP still lags substantially behind that of the leading countries of the world? Why is it likely to take decades for the Israeli economy to catch up? This is while the Israeli papers are full of news about very promising high-tech start-ups, and we even hear occasionally about payments of billions of dollars by major foreign firms to acquire Israeli businesses which were founded a few years ago and have at most several hundred employees.
A number of factors are impeding the implementation of privatization in the Israeli economy. Here I will review those factors based on my own experience, both as someone who has represented investors who purchased government companies through privatization processes, and (from the other side of the fence) in my positions in the Ministry of Finance, when I had an opportunity to observe the governmental process from the inside.