The naming of St Petersburg appears to form a distinct pattern. The city emerged in the context of early modern Russia and gained a name that signalled - by having Dutch and German rather than Russian connotations - some degree of mental openness. The choice was very much in line with the overall endeavour of breaking the isolation caused by Russia's somewhat peripheral location in view of the rest of Europe.
The North is no longer as immobile and sedimented as before. It does not just mark something local and extremely peripheral but has turned into an increasingly legitimate marker of Europeanness in the form of the EU's Northern Dimension Initiative. The marker is not just used to frame some space in the margins of the European configuration; it is also used as an umbrella in co-ordinating the relationships between specific regional formations such as Nordic, Baltic, Barents and Arctic co-operation. This added centrality of the North raises a host of questions about the unfolding of political space in the northern part ofEurope. Our aim here is to tackle some of them by exploring in particular the encounter that is now unfolding between the new North and the more traditional Norden, two configurations that to some extent compete for the same space. Essential relationships are being re-negotiated, this enforcing various actors to choose between different representational frames, each with their own specific identities and spatial coverage. Above all, we seek to provide the encounter with a temporal background in viewing both of them as discursive constructs that are condusive to change.
Several major interrelated events overshadowed others within the relationships between NATO and the countries of the South-eastern Europe last few years. Among them seems to be on the top of the list the NATO enlargement process, the NATO engagement in the Kosovo conflict, and the transformation of NATO's role or mission.
Intra-state conflicts are not a new phenomenon. Since 1945 they have been more frequent and more violent than inter-state warfare (SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook, 1998: 13-25). With the end of the Cold War these tendencies exuberated following mostly in the lines of ethno-national and separatist-armed conflicts, bringing a significant shift in the perception of security issues and alternative approaches to it, especially in Europe. In particular, the changing dialogue of sovereignty, identity and security and international responsibility appears to be increasingly significant. Considering that the prepositions in IR depend on both empirical validity and logical soundness a theoretical exercise on the case of intra-state conflicts questions the validity of the traditional state developed concept of security. The path is open for new interpretations and understanding of normative, operational and structural issues in contemporary world politics.
“There is only one way to escape these dangers, which is to emulate the progress of the Europeans in science, industry and military and legal organization, in other words to equal them in civilization. And the only way to do this is to enter European civilization completely” (Ziya Gökalp1876-1924). These words of Ziya Gökalp, the most prominent nationalist intellectual of the late Ottoman Empire, whom Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself called the “intellectual father of the new Republic”, nicely reveal the historical paradox behind Turkish-European relations. They are an expression of both Turkey's desire to be acknowledged as a European state and the deeply rooted Turkish mistrust vis-à-vis the intentions of Europe. The victim of European power politics wants to be equal to its victimizers. On the basis of this paradox, this article claims that the mutual suspicions that have marred Turkish-EU relations cannot be understood without taking the historical legacies of Ottoman-European relations into account. In particular, it presents a critique of the flawed strategy of some circles that try to facilitate Turkey's EU accession by exploiting the country's geo-strategic assets. In putting the focus on security issues, the article will unmask the contradictions in this strategy, which rather contributes to maintaining the historically caused, distorted and sometimes hypocritical communication between Turkey and the EU.
This paper is an attempt to trace the link between processes which are usually bundled under the label “globalisation” and the eroding state monopoly of legitimate violence. In a nutshell, I will claim that globalisation has the dual effect of displacing politics and of diffusing authority, there by diminishing the state's legitimacy and capacity to monopolize violence respectively.
In the context of the present sociological turn in International Relations, this paper aims at relating theoretical discussions in International Relations to Niklas Luhmann's social theory. It proposes a dialogue through the analysis of power in Luhmann's theory, a concept which is often considered central in IR theorising. Given the frequently tautological use of power in social theory (and in particular in IR), many social theorists have tried to circumscribe the role of power in their theories. But Niklas Luhmann is one of the few non-individualist theoreticians who ends up having a very reduced role for power in his social theory.
The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the strategic rationale for territorial nuclear deterrence have raised fundamental questions in relation to French military doctrine. Significant territorial threats have disappeared, and the main role for military instruments now lies on the peripheries of Europe or further beyond. For those who had invested faith in nuclear deterrence and strategic stability—and that concerns most actors not only in France but also elsewhere among NATO allies—this change of events has been a severe challenge. President Mitterrand symbolizes the pains of adjustment in many ways as he never seriously considered changing track and became instead an ardent opponent of profound reform.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, and Reform
While the instruments of war, including the weaponry, are surely important, one of the timeless verities of war is that it is fought by people against other people. It therefore matters how armies are raised, as this has, among other things, an impact on the loyalty, “morale” and fighting spirit of the troops, hence also on the military power available to the State. The choice between a militia structure, universal conscription or professionalization (or even privatization) also has implications for civil-military relations and may thus have a (beneficial or detrimental) impact on state-building.