35081. Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Control Policy
- Author:
- Richard D. Sokolsky
- Publication Date:
- 02-2001
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- There has been a tectonic shift in the strategic landscape since the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations concluded in the early 1990s. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are defunct. America and Russia are no longer enemies and the nuclear arms race between the two countries is, for all intents and purposes, over. The threat of a surprise nuclear attack has all but vanished along with any plausible scenario between the two countries that could escalate to a nuclear war. The strategic warning time for reconstitution of a credible conventional military threat to Europe can now be measured in years. The likelihood that Russia could marshal the economic resources for clandestine production of new nuclear weapon systems on a militarily significant scale is extremely remote. The most serious security threats emanating from Russia today—poorly safeguarded nuclear warheads and materials and the potential proliferation of such material and expertise to states of concern—reflect profound weakness. Simply put, the proliferation risks attendant to a Russia in the throes of a long-term structural crisis are a far more serious security threat than SS–18 heavy missiles destroying U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in a preemptive first strike.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, and Europe