That U.S. policy toward the Baltic region should merit discussion is in itself an indicator of how much has changed in the last decade. That U.S. policy toward the Baltic should have come to embody an intellectual revolution is nothing less than extraordinary. Nonetheless, this is in fact the case.
In recent years the relationship between the European Union and the United States has become increasingly contentious. The principal European critique laments what many Europeans see as America's blatant disregard of global norms and what Chris Patten, the EU's External Affairs Commissioner, has labelled America's "neuralgic hostility to any external authority over its own affairs". In its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the establishment of an International Criminal Court, its reluctance to pay its dues to the United Nations, and its eagerness to scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Europeans often see America as lurching towards a unilateralist stance based on America's military preponderance, whilst multilateral organisations, legal conventions and international norms are pushed aside.
Most people writing on the subject recognise that within the Russian discourse, the concept of human rights is used somewhat differently compared to Western Europe or the United States. However, the nature of these differences is yet to be properly studied. It is not enough just to say that 'the Western notions of human rights undergo certain transformations when transplanted to the Russian soil. At a superficial glance, the post-Soviet notions of human rights are identical [to the Western ones], but upon a more curious consideration their content turns out to be somewhat different' (Chugrov 2001:3). The essentialist concept of 'the Russian soil' as different from the Western one is of little help since it takes cultural differences as given, and thus all the researcher has to do is to register the differences in political practice, while the explanations are known in advance. More sophisticated essentialist approaches do no more than provide labels for the cultural features (e.g. 'nominalism' of the Western culture and 'collectivism' of the East –see Panarin 1999), but are unable to account for the interaction of these two fundamental principles in the Russian political process. As far as foreign policy studies are concerned, there is also the handy realist option of reducing the differences to an assumed national interest, which, of course, in itself is a social construct that is to be studied, and not a conceptual tool for research of other matters.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and Nationalism
St. Petersburg enjoys the image of being the most European of Russia's cities. The stories about the past and the present of Russia's northern capital resonate with such concepts as 'the new Hansa', the Baltic Rim or the Northern Dimension of the EU. However, the image of St. Petersburg – the capital of imperial Russia – might also be conducive to processes preserving or (re)creating dividing lines in the Baltic Sea region and in Europe as a whole. The present-day St. Petersburg certainly finds itself in search of new discursive departures that could show the way out of the present situation, which is generally regarded as unsatisfactory. This search is developing along various paths, some of which remain embedded in 'traditional' discourses, whilst others dare to step into the unknown.
The article argues that globalisation is altering the nature and meaning of the state monopoly on legitimate violence. It is accentuating the tensions around the meaning of “legitimacy”. The relativism implied in the idea that states can define which use of violence is “legitimate” (and which is not) is increasingly contested both by the international society of states and in a world society of transnational actors. At the same time a profound redefinition of what it means to have a “monopoly” of violence is going on. Increasing the private ownership and allocation of the means of coercion are blurring the responsibility of states beyond their own borders and, for some states, even within them. As a consequence the differentiation among states is growing, private actors are central to war and peace, and the system of national states might be undergoing a fundamental change.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Globalization, Peace Studies, and War
The European Union has been furnished with a Northern Dimension (ND). The initiative, taken originally by Finland in 1997, has landed on the Union's agenda yielding policy documents, high-level conferences and some projects pertaining to Europe's North. It outlines, in terms of the spatial markers used, a sphere that reaches far beyond the northernmost North. The initiative aims, in one of its aspects, at turning northernness into a representational frame and regime that nurtures communality and influences the relations between the Union, its northern member states, some accession countries and Russia as well as Norway as non-applicants. The neo-North embedded in the move offers a joint arena for those already 'in', actors on their way 'in' and the ones that remain 'out'. In essence, it mediates in their relations, and contributes to what Christiansen, Petito and Tonra have called the "fuzziness" of the European Union by blurring established divisions.
The aim of this paper is to elaborate the role of the University in democratization, developing human rights and transforming ethnic conflicts in the Balkan states proposing creative and applicable solutions. The main conclusions are, first, that if a system cannot be qualified as democratic one, appears the complex dilemma what could and should come first: developing democracy (including the university education) or transforming ethnic conflicts or preventing their escalations/deescalating them. Second, during conflict escalation, the Balkan and other University's duty is to offer to country's decision makers and the rest of the society and the world the knowledge residing on scholars in peace and conflict studies, philosophers, historians, economists, engineers, political scientists and many other fields that can help understand the goals, attitudes, interests, identities, and/or behaviors of the other and our conflict side as well as of the mediators, arbitrators, etc.
There are two main ways to approach the general topic “International Political Economy and war”. One consists in adding a list of items to a definition of war already known. This usually includes a longer list of strategically important economic resources for which countries might go to conflict or they might need in a conflict. Some of this comes now often under the grandiose name of “geo-economics”. Another approach, however, would look what a different understanding of human motivation and the international system makes to our very understanding of war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, International Organization, and War
This paper will try to take the reader on a journey from conceptual analysis, used as a means for variable construction, to concept formation as conceptual history through a series of stops which will add different contextual layers to the analysis. This step by step introduction is meant to show the basic connectedness, and indeed crucial importance, of all this layers for constructivism-inspired scholarship where concept formation is not simply a means but an important end in our knowledge. Throughout the journey, references will be made to the concept of power which, in this indirect way – so I hope – will be shown as variable, as core concept in a social theory, as well as a performative speech act, embedded in a certain historical and cultural context, with the effect of "politicising" issues.
There is a tendency for political protestors and academic critics of 'glo bal-isation' to focus their attention on the institutions of Global Governance. The meetings of the EU and WTO have to placed in far off, complicated location to be safe from the p hysical threats of the pro testors. And there is literally a flood of critical writings on the impact of the IMF, the World Bank or the G7 on developing countries. However, in this article I want to shift the focus to another, and it seems to me potentially more threatening tendency: the tendency towards 'ungovernance'. In particular I want to dis-cuss the role of mercenaries as an example of this d evelopment.