Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) develops the Strategic Master Plan (SMP) as the capstone document of the command's Integrated Planning Process (IPP). The SMP presents the AFSPC Vision, outlines a strategy to implement that Vision, and defines a 25-year plan. That plan is integrated across the AFSPC mission areas to provide the space capabilities required to achieve the Vision.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Science and Technology
In political Washington, one can get the impression that everything is “spin”, that there are no real truths. In the news media different views are aired and debated, but one view is said to be no better than another, and certainly political views cannot be proven the way we learn mathematical proofs in school.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Science and Technology
The American Physical Society's July 16 study on boost-phase intercept missile defense programs provides an exhaustive and objective analysis of the science and technology behind the programs. However, it lacks one key element: the cost of boost-phase intercept.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Science and Technology
For the most “official” figures: As of July 21, the Department of Defense's “Defend America” site acknowledges the following fatalities. (Note: the DoD's figures lag behind most major news sources by a few days but details tend to be more accurate overall)
North Korea's military threat and somewhat peculiar approaches to international relations have been a central difficulty in dealing with the isolated regime during the past decade. In the early 1990s, North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), was expected by many observers to collapse, just as communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Soviet Union
John Bolton, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, triggered a furor when on May 6, 2002, he stated, “The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort.” Two days later, I was meeting with a representative from the Cuban Interests Section on an unrelated matter when I posed the question, “How would Cuba respond if CDI asked to bring a group of experts down to learn more about these charges?” I had no expectations of hearing any more about it. But less than two weeks later, I was told that not only was there an interest, but that we were invited to bring anyone, come anytime, and visit anywhere we wanted. Clearly, Bolton's comments had struck a nerve in Havana.
Topic:
Security, Human Welfare, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
What kind of question is: “What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd did a National Defense Review?” Sun Tzu, if he existed at all, has been gone some 2,500 years. The late Col. John R. Boyd, U.S.A.F., while intimately involved in fighter aircraft design during his active duty years, wrote practically nothing on hardware or force structure after he retired, when he created the strategic concepts for which he is best known today.
In 2001, prior to the attacks of Sept. 11, the Center for Defense Information published a national security review and force structure entitled Reforging the Sword: Forces for a 21st Century Security Strategy. Happily for the authors of Reforging, the Sept. 11 attacks did not make it obsolete. To the contrary, its emphases on working more closely with allies, on lighter, more agile forces, on intelligence, and on the importance of nonmilitary components of a conflict were important elements of the conduct of the counterattack by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush. The events of Sept. 11 and Operation Enduring Freedom have reinforced the need raised in Reforging to prepare for new threats, and have enhanced the prospects for some of its proposed new directions, particularly in the area of allied collaboration if a multilateralist administration took office. This report updates Reforging the Sword in light of events on and since Sept. 11, 2001. The suggestions here use as a foundation the predilections spelled out in Reforging for working with allies, for taking the nonmilitary elements of modern war into consideration, and for trying to keep humans in the war-fighting loop.
This issue of the defense monitor provides basic information about U.S. and foreign military forces, including facts on size, equipment, and cost. It is intended as a snapshot reference guide — more data is available on the CDI website at www.cdi.org/ news/vital-statistics/ and on the government Internet sources listed at the back of the issue.
Philip E. Coyle, Rachel Stohl, Winslow Wheeler, Theresa Hitchens, Victoria Garcia, Colin Robinson, Krista Nelson, and Jeffrey Lewis
Publication Date:
10-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
Few things are more routinely abused than facts when people in government — any party, any branch — set out to make a decision. I've been reminded of this truth watching the current administration parry revelations that it manipulated “facts” about weapons of mass destruction as a pretext for the war against Iraq that Congress authorized a year ago this past week. But I'd learned it the hard way much earlier. During a 31-year career as an evaluator for the General Accounting Office and a staffer for four different U.S. senators from both parties, I spent a lot of time trying to use facts to influence decisions made by the U.S. government. The facts took a beating all too often.