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121. EU Defense Cooperation: Progress Amid Transatlantic Concerns

Author:
Erik Brattberg and Tomáš Valášek
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
European defense cooperation has made unprecedented strides since 2014 and further progress is expected under the new European Commission. Driving these developments are a combination of internal and external factors. Among them is a more challenging security environment in Europe, the disruptive impact of the Brexit negotiations and the election of U.S. President Donald Trump, demands for deeper European Union (EU) integration in the wake of the 2009 eurozone debt crisis, and defense industrial rationales. As the 2016 European Global Strategy makes clear, the EU’s ambition is to become a more strategically autonomous security player capable of taking more independent action, especially in its own neighborhood. But this will require the decisionmaking structures that can act swiftly and autonomously in crises, the necessary civilian and operational capabilities to carry out these decisions, and the means to produce the necessary capabilities through a competitive high-tech European defense industrial base. The evolving EU defense cooperation goes far beyond crisis management operations. At its core, it has the goal of leveraging EU tools to strengthen European security. In particular, new EU defense initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EDF), though still nascent, are potential game changers in this regard. PESCO operates as a platform for groups of member states to cooperate on defense capability projects. The EDF, as an internal market instrument backed up by European Commission co-funding, has the potential to spur and incentivize collaboration on the development and acquisition of new capabilities between member states. These initiatives lay a framework upon which stronger cooperation can gradually be structured. Nevertheless, these new European defense schemes will have to have the right level of ambition, be successfully implemented, and contribute to strengthening both European and transatlantic security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

122. The Case for Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Erik Brattberg and Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The evolving strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific are of paramount importance for the future of the rules-based international order. While the United States is redirecting strategic focus to the region as part of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, Europe is also stepping up its role—leveraging a strong economic profile, long-standing bilateral ties, and active engagement in various regional multilateral forums. The European Union (EU) and its member states can make distinct contributions to an open, transparent, inclusive, and rules-based regional order, though not necessarily always in lockstep with Washington. Though few European countries have formally acknowledged the new U.S. strategy, the concept’s emphasis on rules-based order and multilateralism bears many similarities to the EU’s own outlook. The EU and many of its member states are becoming more ambivalent about Chinese power and are seeking to counter certain problematic Chinese economic behaviors, and the Indo-Pacific offers opportunities for transatlantic cooperation, though U.S.-EU diplomatic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump are significantly strained. However, the U.S. administration’s fixation on short-term transactional diplomacy, lack of commitment to multilateralism, and strong emphasis on Chinese containment are putting a damper on such collaboration with EU members. Admittedly, Europe does not aspire to be a traditional hard power in Asia, lacks significant military capabilities in the region, and is reluctant to pick sides in the escalating U.S.-China competition. Only two European middle powers—France and the United Kingdom (UK)—can project serious military force in the region, as Europe has long underinvested in defense spending and needs to prioritize more immediate security threats. But Europe can amplify its political and security role in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the growing Franco-British presence and better utilizing the EU’s collective role. Key European countries have already expanded their security footprint in the Indo-Pacific through a more regular naval presence, bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, arms sales, and various other forms of defense cooperation. Europe’s economic role is already considerable too, as the EU is a top trade and investment partner of most regional states. Washington should welcome greater European involvement in the Indo-Pacific. A greater European presence in the region advances the U.S. objective of promoting a tighter regional security architecture with vital partners like Japan and India. Similarly, the EU’s support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can help foster a more multilateral, cooperative Asian security architecture. As for economic and trade policy, U.S. and EU interests in the region largely overlap but do diverge in significant ways. While both Europe and the United States are keen on increasing trade flows and addressing unfair Chinese economic practices, the EU’s emphasis on free trade has allowed it to either complete trade agreements or launch new negotiations with regional partners like Australia, Japan, and Singapore. Despite the limitations constraining the transatlantic diplomatic agenda, meaningful joint and/or complementary European and U.S. action in the Indo-Pacific remains achievable, particularly between France, the UK, and the United States, though other European countries and the EU could get involved too. While the EU is not likely to formally endorse the U.S. slogan of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Europeans can still meaningfully advance its objectives, which are overwhelmingly consistent with the EU’s own interests and values. Washington should encourage this trend and simultaneously seek to do more to incorporate European players as key partners on the implementation of its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.
Topic:
Security, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

123. The Poison Pill: EU defence on US terms?

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It took two letters. One, sent to Brussels on 1 May 2019 by two US undersecretaries, accused the EU of damaging transatlantic cooperation and hindering US access to Europe’s defence market through the rules it plans to set for the participation of third states in the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The other, sent to Washington on 16 May 2019 by senior EU officials of equal standing, refuted these claims by showing the objective and transparent way in which the EU had established the EDF and PESCO. Unlike the letter from Washington, which was laced with robust language and questionable accusations, the EU response argued that, even with the introduction of the two initiatives, the European defence market would remain more open than that of the US. The EU institutions also stated that by creating the EDF and PESCO, the Union was showing its collective determination to reduce European capability duplication and enhance interoperability, while also ensuring the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry. In essence, the EU pointed out that its security and defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing – something the US has been requesting from European allies for some time. While the US welcomes that the Fund allows for the participation of third states, it objects to the fact that recipients and subcontractors supported by the EDF will not be permitted to transfer sensitive information and/or Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) outside of the EU.1 Additionally, the US fears that the unanimity principle governing PESCO could ensure that any future US participation in the initiative could be vetoed by a single EU member state. At the core of Washington’s fears is the idea that EDF and PESCO could lock US firms out of the European market. However, the EU has made it clear that the EDF and PESCO will not alter EU defence procurement rules, lead to EU-owned defence capabilities, affect bilateral defence agreements between the US and individual member states and/or harm NATO defence planning targets and processes. Furthermore, given the US’ own long-standing and legitimate protection of its core defence industrial interests, there is a certain irony to its accusations of the EU because the Union has equally legitimate security interests. Following the exchange of letters between the partners, a number of questions have surfaced. First, despite a sustained campaign of influencing the EU to adopt favourable conditions for the US,2 why has Washington raised tensions with the Union now? Second, given that €13 billion has been earmarked under the EDF, and its own defence budget stood at $650 billion in 2018, why is the US so concerned? With a view to answering these questions, this Brief begins with an analysis of US government data that shows the asymmetry between US and EU defence markets. It then moves on to a discussion about a web of regulations and laws which effectively provides the US government with the discretionary power to control its defence market and technologies. The Brief ends with some reflections on why the US has decided to formally raise objections about the EDF and PESCO now and the deeper reasons underlying American concerns.
Topic:
European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

124. Taking Responsibility in a Dangerous World

Author:
Federica Mogherini
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The NATO partnership is indeed evolving, and some analysts describe a growing rift across the ocean. Yet transatlantic cooperation today is more important than ever. Beyond any disagreement we might have, European and American interests very often coincide. On most foreign policy issues—from Ukraine to Syria, from Africa’s security to North Korea—transatlantic cooperation is in great shape. During the five-year term of the current EU leadership, the European Union and NATO have signed two historic Joint Declarations, which have opened a whole new phase in our partnership. Our two organizations share 22 Members and the same set of values: our mandates are different but—most importantly—they are complementary. While NATO remains the pillar of Europe’s collective defense, there are tasks that can only be performed by an organization of a different nature, such as the European Union (EU). The EU contribution to our common security is unique and increasingly relevant in our dangerous world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

125. Shifting Global Politics and the Middle East

Author:
Marc Lynch and Amaney Jamal
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
What is the current structure of international relations, and how does this shape the politics of the Middle East? For decades, the answer was clear: international structure was unipolar, and American predominance shaped the alliance choices of both its allies and its adversaries. In recent years, this clarity has been overtaken by confusion. American primacy has perhaps declined, or at least shifted in its application, but no rival power has yet risen to take its place. How has this perceived change in global structure affected regional politics in the Middle East? In October 2018, POMEPS, Princeton University’s Bobst Center, and the American University of Beirut brought together nearly two dozen scholars from the United States, Europe and the Middle East at AUB to discuss the impact of shifting global structure on regional dynamics. This collection features sixteen essays ranging across diverse perspectives on the evolving relationship between the global and the regional. Taken together, they offer a fascinating window into the relationship between the global and the regional, and the implications for contemporary regional politics.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Poverty, Power Politics, European Union, Partnerships, Inequality, Brexit, Arab Spring, Alliance, Conflict, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

126. Understanding the Dispute over the Treatment of Products Exported to the European Union from the Occupied Territories in the Context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

Author:
Oskar J. Chmiel
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
While the European Union (EU) does not recognize any legal Israeli sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, it does not grant preferential access to the EU market for goods produced in the Israeli settlements in this area, contrary to the preferential treatment for goods produced in Israel. This situation is different, however, as regards the United States (U.S.) trade policy, which does not make any distinction between goods pro- duced in Israel and in the Occupied Territories, since it grants the preferential access to both. Furthermore, the currently suspended negotiations of the super-regional trade agreement called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), spurred the enacting of a law that set the principal negotiating objectives of the U.S. regarding commercial partner- ships, which included some provisions to discourage politically motivated economic actions against the State of Israel. As TTIP embraced the free trade agreement between the EU and the U.S., the EU differentiation policy could become problematic for the two partners, which despite the failure of the negotiations, revealed much about economic diplomacy. Conse- quently, this article attempts to show the different approaches adopted by the two trading powers, in order to deal with the dispute over the treatment of products exported to the EU from the Occupied Territories.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, European Union, Investment, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and North America

127. The European Dimension of Nuclear Deterrence: French and British policies and future scenarios

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
While the idea of a “European nuclear deterrent” has a long history, it has recently made a comeback in the light of Russian aggression on the continent, growing tensions in the transatlantic relationship since the election of Donald Trump, as well as the British decision to leave the European Union. Voices are being heard in Germany in particular, arguing for stronger European nuclear autonomy. This paper analyses how the French and British deterrents could play a broader and stronger role in ensuring the security of the continent. Discarding the idea of a single “European deterrent”, it suggests possible credible pathways to enhance European nuclear cooperation based on French and possibly British forces, preferably outside the EU context. Furthermore, it suggests that future US decisions and policies towards Europe will be a critical factor in defining the range of realistic scenarios and outcomes.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, European Union, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Europe, France, and North America

128. After the West? A Positive Transatlantic Agenda in a Post-Atlantic Age

Author:
Hudson Institute
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The golden age of transatlantic relations is behind us. It is tempting to reduce the reasons for this change down to the personalities of the leaders involved, and particularly to the peculiarities of U.S. President Donald Trump, but such an approach would ignore the deeper trends that have been affecting both the European and American sides for years. The relationship between the United States and Europe does not have the centrality it once had for policymakers on either side, and matters ever less to their publics. Part of the reason for the diminution of the relationship’s importance should be cause for celebration: the main strategic adversary that justified America’s deep commitment to the European continent—the Soviet Union (USSR)—has collapsed. Despite divisions and setbacks, most of Europe is reunited and the past two decades have seen a tremendous expansion of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to new members. The Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas have given new impetus to NATO and underscored the willingness of allies to stand together. Setbacks in the rule of law in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, and divisions over the management of the Eurozone and the refugee crisis, should not obscure the tremendous success the last three decades have seen for the transatlantic alliance and European unity. Yet there is much that is sobering in the current diminution of ties and cooperation. Other challenges and threats have emerged to demand attention: terrorism, instability in the Middle East, and the rise of China all present new challenges. The financial crisis and failed foreign interventions have fueled skepticism over the role of the United States on the international stage. Internal divisions in Europe and the euro crises have turned European attention inward even as the past two American presidents have pressed Europeans to do more externally and spend more on their own security. Leaders on both sides have pursued different priorities, occasionally differing in their worldviews. The American withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA) on May 8th has sparked yet another “crisis of transatlantic relations,” but focusing on specific decisions obscures the deeper trends. Successive American presidents have paid but lip service to their European allies in making decisions beyond the transatlantic sphere and examples of potential cooperation on crises such as Libya or Syria have ended in failure.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

129. “Pax Americana”: the United States and the transformation of the 20th century’s global order

Author:
Patrick O. Cohrs
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
This article seeks to re-appraise the transformation of America’s international role and its influence on the transformation of the 20th century’s global order. It focuses on a re-appraisal of US aspirations to construct a “Pax Americana” and their impact on an unprecedented peace system that was first conceptualised after 1918 but only consolidated after 1945: the cold war’s transatlantic peace order. Yet my analysis also highlights important distinctions between American conceptions and behaviour vis-à-vis Europe and the superpower’s more hierarchical and often neo-imperialist approaches to “global order” and other regions during the cold war, including East Asia and Latin America.
Topic:
Cold War, History, Peace, Transatlantic Relations, International Order, and Pax Americana
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

130. 2018 Summit on the Future of Europe Back to Square One

Author:
Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University
Abstract:
The Summit on the Future of Europe is an initiative of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies (CES) at Harvard University. Since 2014, this annual conference has convened scholars and public leaders to debate critical challenges facing Europe. The 2018 Summit convened at Harvard on November 7, 2018 and was a partnership of CES, the Harvard Kennedy School’s Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, the diaNEOsis Research and Policy Institute, the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Central European University (CEU), and Real Colegio Complutense (RCC) at.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Political stability, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and North America