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571. High-Intensity Warfare: What Challenges for the French Armed Forces?

Author:
Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The new French Military Programming Law for 2024-2030 resolutely commits the French armed forces to the path of high intensity. However, this term continues to be the subject of debate and confusion within the defense community. To better understand its scope and implications for France, we need to offer a strict definition of the notion. In military terms, high intensity refers first and foremost to a type of engagement deploying a high level of kinetic energy within a limited space and duration. Added to this energy factor is the level of technological sophistication of equipment (capital intensity) and the lethality resulting from these two elements. A concept of high capability intensity is thus emerging, based on the triptych energy-technology-lethality. This capability intensity must be distinguished from the political intensity, or virulence, of an armed conflict, which depends above all on the interests at stake. When the stakes are very high for one of the parties, the conflict takes on the aspects of a major war, in which its very survival is at stake. Conversely, when real but non-existential interests are at stake, the result is limited war. While military history offers examples of conflicts combining high political and military intensity, it has also recorded cases of limited wars involving high capability intensity. It is this configuration that seems most relevant to France, where, in principle, the nuclear deterrent protects against any threat to the nation’s vital interests. This then opens up a wide range of scenarios that fall short of vital interests but lie beyond the capability and operational horizons of the last three decades, which have been characterized above all by crisis management and on which the current format of the French armed forces has been constructed. Strategic solidarity within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance or defense agreements, confrontation with a large or medium-sized power in peripheral areas, confrontation with a “proxy” third-party actor supported by a powerful state, or confrontation in isolated common spaces (the high seas, exo-atmospheric space, cyberspace, the seabed, etc.) are all hypothetical scenarios that would fall within the scope of high capability intensity. With this in mind, the French armed forces must be prepared to operate in high-intensity environments. Missions in these environments will be characterized by two major factors. The first is high attrition owing to the lethality of a battlefield marked by quantity. To cope with this, we will need to rethink the trade-offs between volume (equipment, ammunition, etc.) and survivability. The second factor is the adversary’s contestation of the commons (air, sea, cyber, information), which will call into question all the elements of military superiority in the Western war model. As a result, operating in the high-intensity arena means giving priority once again to missions of environmental superiority, in order to regain a freedom of action that will be increasingly challenged. For their part, ground forces will no longer be able to take joint support for granted and will need to regain autonomy of maneuver in order to contribute to multi-domain action. High-intensity warfare is therefore an important prospect for the French armed forces, and one that cannot be brushed aside on the grounds that France has a permanent deterrent. The advent of an unstable world marked by multidirectional strategic competition calls for a thorough reconsideration of the conventional formats and missions of the French armed forces, if decision-makers are to retain their freedom of action on the strategic scale.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Army, Military, and High-Intensity Warfare
Political Geography:
Europe and France

572. China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes: Discontinuities Between Land and Sea

Author:
Benjamin Jebb
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
When does China use force to settle territorial disputes? This paper leverages data from the Correlates of War project and Stanford’s Mapping Interstate Territorial Conflict repository to demonstrate that China takes different approaches to settling terrestrial and sea-based disputes. While China has tacitly accepted the territorial status quo and generally used force only after a rival challenged extant terrestrial boundaries, it has initiated revisions to the territorial status quo in the maritime domain. This paper contends that China takes different approaches to its terrestrial disagreements and maritime disputes due to the Chinese Communist Party’s internal risk calculus. While land-based disputes can stoke unmanageable levels of escalation, factors specific to the maritime domain are more likely to keep militarized incidents contained.
Topic:
Security, Territorial Disputes, Maritime, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China and Asia

573. Indo-Pacific Missile Arsenals: Avoiding Spirals and Mitigating Escalation Risks

Author:
Ankit Panda
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific region is on the cusp of a new missile age: inventories of short- to intermediate-range surface-to-surface missile systems are quickly growing in the region. Military planners and policymakers may view these capabilities as essential to preserving peace and maintaining deterrence, but this proliferation could intensify already complex security dilemmas, particularly related to North Korea and the Taiwan Strait, and heighten nuclear escalation risks. A new Carnegie report identifies the motivators of missile proliferation dynamics in Asia and offers recommendations for addressing the most salient risks.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Taiwan, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific

574. Arab Peace Initiative II: How Arab Leadership Could Design a Peace Plan in Israel and Palestine

Author:
Amr Hamzawy and Nathan J. Brown
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Past peace processes in Israel and Palestine failed to offer long-term solutions to the conflict, but they showed what makes negotiations work. In the latest round of hostilities in Gaza, key Arab governments are uniquely positioned to leverage relationships with all parties to lay out the conditions that could broker a lasting peace. An Arab Peace Initiative II, with multilateral oversight, would have to offer real benefits for all parties. But for any lasting framework to take hold, these important conditions need to be met. Palestinian and Jewish national identities should be recognized as legitimate and in need of institutional expression. Individual human rights in both communities need to be protected. Antisemitic, Islamophobic, and racist rhetoric and actions must be explicitly and unconditionally repudiated by all actors. Any targeting of civilians should not be merely rejected but actively combated by all actors. Settlement activities in the Palestinian territories and forced displacement of Palestinians to Egypt, Jordan, or anywhere else should be considered outlawed actions that all actors commit to fight against. Full diplomatic, political, and economic relations among participating states should be an outcome of the negotiation process. No stateless people should be left behind at the conclusion of any set of agreements.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Reform, and Occupation
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North Africa, and Egypt

575. Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine

Author:
Eric Ciaramella
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The moment has arrived for Western leaders to offer a practical vision for Ukraine’s long-term security. This paper lays out a detailed proposal for a sustainable multilateral security arrangement in which Ukraine has a strong military that is backed by legally codified pledges of support—training, equipping, and defense industrial cooperation—from the United States and Europe. The model outlined in this paper draws on official Ukrainian government proposals and lessons from the United States’ security relationships with close partners that are not treaty allies, notably Israel. It prioritizes a strategy of deterrence by denial: by fielding a robust, modernized, and well-trained military, Ukraine can raise the cost of future aggression to such a point that Russia would lose confidence in its ability to achieve its objectives there through force.1 Independent of battlefield developments, Ukraine and its partners must negotiate a long-term security arrangement now. Reaching a consensus sooner rather than later on a framework makes more sense than putting off controversial decisions until large-scale hostilities end. A security arrangement has the potential to undermine President Vladimir Putin’s conviction that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. It can also assure Ukraine that it will be able to defend its sovereignty even if it does not liberate its entire territory this year. Many of the elements contained in this proposal can be implemented during wartime—indeed, some of them are already in place—and strengthened after the war. The proposed security model is not necessarily an alternative to NATO membership, which enjoys strong support from Ukraine’s leaders and public. The allies have promised the country an eventual place in NATO, but they have made clear that this will not be on the agenda while the war is ongoing. Even once the war ends, they are unlikely to move swiftly to admit Ukraine. Therefore, the proposal here seeks to enhance the country’s ability to defend itself as it remains outside of NATO for the foreseeable future. At the same time, it emphasizes the critical role Ukraine’s EU accession will play in its long-term security. The United States must lead the conversation on a future security arrangement. Not only does its unparalleled capacity for security assistance and multinational coordination make it vital to the success of the arrangement, but a clear long-term U.S. pledge to Ukraine would also prompt Europe to increase its commitments, thereby ensuring proper burden-sharing. The proposed arrangement would be flexible enough to encompass commitments from the EU as a collective, from individual member states, and from other countries. To make the U.S. commitment to Ukraine credible and durable, the Biden administration must work with Congress to secure broad bipartisan support. This study identifies five elements that are critical to a future security arrangement: Strong political and legal codification that ensures the arrangement will endure regardless of electoral cycles and leadership changes in the United States and Europe A predictable, multiyear pipeline for military supplies that enables Ukraine to plan and sustain a future force structure capable of deterring Russian aggression Support for Ukraine’s defense industry, as well as targeted defense industrial investments in the United States and Europe to prepare for a long war and an extended period of Ukrainian military reconstitution Mechanisms for political consultations, information sharing, and coordination to ensure that Ukraine’s military needs are met in a timely fashion Clear linkage to Ukraine’s EU accession process and postwar reconstruction Much of the public debate to date has focused on Ukraine’s request for security “guarantees” in response to the failure of the previous “assurances” encapsulated in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. To avoid confusion, and in light of the historical baggage these terms carry, this paper uses “arrangement” or “commitment” to refer to the future legal and political framework in question.2
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

576. Mapping the Indian Ocean Region

Author:
Darshana M. Baruah, Nitya Labh, and Jessica Greely
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Indian Ocean region has been an important trade arena for centuries. Today, it remains critical to the security and stability of shipping lanes and trade routes, accounting for over one-third of the world’s bulk cargo traffic and two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments and ensuring global access to food, precious metals, and energy resources.1 Stretching from Africa’s eastern coast to Australia’s western coast, the region is home to thirty-three nations and 2.9 billion people. Given the region’s importance, many countries around the world work with regional partners to maintain open access to the Indian Ocean’s critical waterways and natural resources. For decades, the Indian Ocean region has been erroneously studied through the continental divisions of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. But to understand the true importance and strategic advantages of the region, it must be viewed as one continuous theater. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Indian Ocean Strategic Map does just that.2 Developed by Carnegie’s Indian Ocean Initiative, the map provides a coherent, continuous, and data-driven understanding of the players, security challenges, and other factors that shape the region (see figure 1). The first of its kind, it shows how the Indian Ocean’s economic, political, military, and geographic features interact to create a single geopolitical arena. This paper complements the map, further analyzing the areas of interest and contextualizing them within the current geopolitical environment. The first section summarizes the key players, both traditional and emerging, in the region. The second section examines the evolving security situation, including sovereignty disputes, climate impacts, illegal fishing, search and rescue zones, and choke points. The third section reviews the region’s economics, trade patterns, and oil flows. The fourth section assesses how regional organizations and multilateral partnerships enforce maritime laws and craft protocols.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Organizations
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Australia, and Oceania

577. How Climate Change Challenges the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
Jamie Kwong
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Climate change could have mission-altering impacts on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This paper examines the range of climate change challenges and threats that could detrimentally affect each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad in different and increasingly serious ways. In doing so, the paper helps to advance broader, ongoing efforts to account for climate change in U.S. national security policies. It also aims to inform and help initiate a larger conversation about the vulnerabilities of all nuclear weapons programs to climate change. Gaining greater clarity about these vulnerabilities now is essential to mitigating the worst effects of climate change on nuclear weapons in the future. The paper highlights the following key findings: Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay is vulnerable to rising sea levels and flooding that could significantly affect its capacity to service U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Because Kings Bay is one of two bases equipped to support the U.S. SSBN fleet, climate change effects there could have serious repercussions for the broader deterrence mission of the submarine leg of the nuclear triad. At Minot Air Force Base, warming temperatures may accelerate flooding that could impact the accessibility of the base’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and facilities. This accessibility issue could have cascading effects on the larger ICBM deterrence mission, potentially limiting the reliability of some missiles by delaying scheduled maintenance or deliveries. Increasing temperatures and incidences of extreme precipitation at Whiteman Air Force Base pose potential risks to the nation’s stealth nuclear bombers. Climate change impacts that prevent aircraft from freely taking off from or landing at Whiteman may have some implications for the readiness of the larger bomber leg, especially as related to the accessibility of nuclear weapons storage sites. Importantly, this analysis should be viewed as a descriptive assessment of potential future outcomes based on current trends, not as a prediction. What actually transpires will depend on how the United States prepares for, mitigates, and adapts to these challenges. The paper concludes by offering five recommendations for ways to do so: The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) should conduct climate change vulnerability assessments of all their nuclear installations and facilities to determine how and when climate change could impact each site’s unique nuclear systems, operations, and activities. The DOD should invest in dynamic climate change modeling and both interagency and nongovernmental partnerships to ensure U.S. nuclear decisions and planning are informed by the most accurate climate change projections. The DOD and other agencies should be required to complete forward-looking studies of potential climate change impacts on any future nuclear actions, including the construction and deployment of modernized nuclear systems. The DOD should adopt a mission-level focus in its climate adaptation planning and establish a workstream specifically focused on the nuclear mission. An initial deliverable of this work should be a dedicated climate action plan for the U.S. deterrence mission. The DOD should integrate climate change scenario exercises into nuclear planning to simulate potential climate-nuclear crises and develop mitigation and adaptation plans. Key considerations should include how the climate scenario may impact local and global nuclear operations, nuclear command and control assets, base personnel, and local communities, with the exercise results incorporated into nuclear planning efforts.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Deterrence, and Nuclear Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

578. The importance of the United States in Poland’s military security policy in the context of the war in Ukraine

Author:
Łukasz Jureńczyk
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The subject of the article is the importance of the United States in Poland’s military security policy in relation to the war in Ukraine. The article begins with an introduction discussing its main assumptions and a synthetic historical background of the importance of the US for Poland and its security. The main part of the article is divided into two parts, the first one discussing the importance of the US in Poland’s military security policy after the Cold War. The second part is devoted to the change in the importance of the US in this policy in connection with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the main factors that determine this change. The aim of the article is to identify and analyze the changes in the importance of the United States in the Polish military security policy as a result of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. The main research problem is whether the importance of the US in Poland’s military security policy increased as a result of the war, and if so, because of what main factors? The thesis of the article states that the war in Ukraine increased the importance of the US as the main external guarantor of Poland’s security and defense. This is due to the leading role played by the United States in military support for Ukraine and strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, in the absence of leadership from Western European powers. The research included interviews with scientists and analysts from research centers in Washington and New York.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Poland, and United States of America

579. Cultural Security in the Context of the Analysis of the Religiosity of Belarusian Students

Author:
Viktoryia Baretskaya
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Religion can become an instrument of manipulation and destabilization in society, everything depends on people who have access to the levers of power, the position of Church hierarchs and the level of religious literacy of the population. The article is devoted to the study of the concept of the correlation of national identity and Christian universalism, as well as the model of Church–State relations in the modern social teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church, in the context of the analysis of some aspects of the religiosity of the Belarusian student youth, namely quantitative indicators of trust in the Church, attendance of divine services, and confessional affiliation.
Topic:
Security, Religion, Culture, Students, and Identity
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Belarus

580. Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Violence targeting civilians has increased by 38% in Mali so far this year. The main perpetrators of these attacks are JNIM (over 180 events, 33%), Malian state forces and/or the Wagner Group (nearly 160 events, 29%), and IS Sahel (nearly 90 events, 15%). Battles and attacks have spread to new locations in northern Mali amid joint military and Wagner Group operations and the resumption of hostilities with Algiers Accord signatory armed groups. JNIM has also launched a new offensive, carrying out a series of large-scale attacks on military positions and imposing blockades on towns and major transit routes. Overall, in the wake of successive military coups promising to improve security across the region, political violence levels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have together increased by 5% relative to the same period last year, and by 46% compared to 2021.
Topic:
Security, Violence, Coup, Civilians, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali