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241. How Saudi Arabia Bent China to Its Technoscientific Ambitions

Author:
Mohammed Al-Sudairi, Steven Jiawei Hai, and Kameal Alahmad
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Technoscientific cooperation between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Arab states has blossomed in recent years.1 The phrase itself has become an official “watchword” (tifa) in the context of Sino-Arab relations, suffusing nearly every official policy paper or statement on the Arab world from Beijing, including its Arab Policy Paper (2016), the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum Action Plan (2020), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Report on Sino-Arab Cooperation in the New Era (2022).2 Yet this newly hailed “breakthrough” (tupo) has attracted both scrutiny and concern from Western officials and academics worried about their states’ influence in the Middle East and, perhaps more pertinently, the outcome of their perceived ongoing global competition with China. The anti-Huawei campaign waged across the Gulf states by American officials during the end of Donald Trump’s presidency and the beginning of Joe Biden’s was animated by questions shaped by these anxieties: Will access to, and adoption of, Chinese technologies lead to the diffusion of new distinctively “Chinese” norms and standards (such as Chinese conceptions of cyber sovereignty) or barriers to unfettered Western market access over the long run? Will these same technologies compromise national digital ecosystems and infrastructures, thereby allowing the PRC to access sensitive information surrounding Western technologies and military deployments in the region while imposing its own distinctively Chinese vision on the region? And to what extent will these processes of technoscientific borrowing embolden authoritarianism and potentially take these states out of a Western security orbit?3 Such questions are neither new nor limited to the Middle East. The PRC’s complicated entanglements in Africa over the past few decades have produced similar-sounding concerns from the West surrounding a range of issues including Chinese “debt trap diplomacy” and resource exploitation, to which scholars such as Deborah Brautigam, Ching Kwan Lee, and Lina Benabdallah have provided nuanced counternarratives.4 Inspired by these works’ emphasis on local factors that China adapts to rather than the “Chinese ways” that Beijing and its proxies ostensibly impose, and also seeking to address some of the (primarily) Western apprehensions on Sino-Arab technoscientific cooperation, this paper focuses on a single regional actor—the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a major comprehensive strategic partner (quanmian zhanlüe huoban) of the PRC.5 The paper is anchored by the contention that technoscientific development in Saudi Arabia reflects, above all, the objectives and strategies of the Saudi state in its pursuit of technoscientific self-strengthening. In approaching this topic from a local perspective, this analysis seeks to upend conventional narratives that view these transformations mainly through the prism of China’s rise, or that of the U.S.-China rivalry. There are dreamers and planners beyond those in the Beltway and Zhongnanhai, such as those in al-Yamamah Palace, and their ambitions must be taken into account in understanding the nature, scope, intensity, velocity, and specifics of their collaborations with China. The paper is divided into three sections. The first discusses the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s approach to technoscientific development. It serves to shed light on the underlying logic guiding the kingdom’s global search for technoscientific partnerships. The second focuses on Chinese-Saudi technoscientific cooperation and localization projects, providing a general overview of the history of such cooperation followed by a discussion of some of its structural trends and impediments in terms of human resources, the circulation of capital, and the role of the state versus the private sector. The third and final section dwells on some of the key takeaways and contextualizing lessons based on the previous sections’ findings.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

242. The Consolidation of the Brazilian Space Program: Changes and Challenges in the Third Space Age

Author:
Marco Aurélio Chaves Cepik, Jaíne Garcia de Souza, and Vanessa Redel Dal-Berto
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The article aims to understand what stage the Brazilian Space Program (PEBR) is in in the Third Space Age. In this context, it illustrates the growing presence of States in the space region, resulting in the rise of emerging space powers, as is the case of Brazil. In addition, it addresses the achievements and challenges present in the PEBR since the 2000s to understand the reason for the stagnation of the national space program. The conclusion of this research points out that through the false retakes carried out in recent decades, the PEBR experienced minimal national advances in the space sector and accommodated itself to a position of space periphery, in which it depends on other space powers.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Space, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Brazil and South America

243. Starr Forum: Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity

Author:
Daron Acemoglu and Fotini Christia
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
A thousand years of history and contemporary evidence make one thing clear: progress depends on the choices we make about technology. New ways of organizing production and communication can either serve the narrow interests of an elite or become the foundation for widespread prosperity. Today, digital technologies and artificial intelligence threaten jobs and democracy through excessive automation, massive data collection, and intrusive surveillance. Will the next decades bring shared prosperity or a further move in the direction of two-tiered societies? Join us for this important discussion with Daron Acemoglu, the co-author of Power and Progress.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Inequality, Elites, Prosperity, and Production
Political Geography:
Global Focus

244. How US chip controls on China benefit and cost Korean firms

Author:
Martin Chorzempa
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Export controls have become one of the most contentious battlegrounds in US-China technology competition. US semiconductor export controls aimed at China, however, have also embroiled allies such as South Korea. These controls largely do not affect Korean firms' chip sales to China, but Korean firms are vulnerable because they have large chip production facilities in China, which make around 40 percent of the memory chips for these firms. Those facilities in China rely on access to semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) or servicing from not only the United States but also other countries that have imposed controls on exporting advanced SME to China. Although the United States is unlikely to shut off access to the technology needed to keep the plants running for the foreseeable future, it has signaled that it will not allow new technology needed to upgrade those facilities, so they will become uncompetitive over the next few years and will need to be shuttered or sold off. For future production, Korean firms will need to build new facilities at great (albeit subsidized) expense, amortizing the sunk costs of operations in China over the coming years. At the same time, the controls have created significant benefits for Korean firms by shutting off Chinese competition for their memory businesses. Yet benefiting from the tensions between superpowers comes with serious risks. Firms and governments must deal with much greater uncertainty and evaluate the risk of their dependence on both the United States and China.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Business, Exports, Manufacturing, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, and United States of America

245. How the United States solved South Korea’s problems with electric vehicle subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act

Author:
Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
South Korea felt “betrayed” when President Joseph R. Biden Jr. signed his administration’s flagship climate legislation, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022, into law. This paper first shows how the Biden administration addressed Korea’s concerns about the law’s effect on its sales of electric vehicles (EVs) in the United States. Thanks in part to the Treasury Department’s regulations written to implement the law, Korean exports of EVs to the United States grew even after the IRA went into force. Whether these actions by the Biden administration are enough to assuage the concerns of the Koreans—and other allies adversely affected by the IRA—remains to be seen. Furthermore, the US accommodation of Korean concerns came with tradeoffs by offsetting key incentives Congress may have intended in passing the IRA. The paper examines the potential impact of the law on South Korean battery companies, and it provides an initial exploration into how the Korean government responded to the IRA by adjusting its own policy mix of EV consumer tax credits and industrial policy for its EV plants and battery makers.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Inflation, Energy, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

246. Green innovation and the transition toward a clean economy

Author:
Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, Lint Barrage, and David Hémous
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
To combat climate change without sacrificing long-term economic growth, innovation must be redirected toward green technologies. The authors review recent literature that has developed a directed technical change framework where innovation can be endogenously targeted either toward fossil-fuel enhancing technologies or clean energy sources (such as renewables). They provide empirical evidence of path dependence in firms’ choice between green and dirty innovation. They then draw implications of this path dependence for the design of environmental policy and for economic growth. In particular, they show that their framework has distinctive implications regarding unilateral environmental policies, international cooperation, the use of intermediate energy sources such as natural gas, and the role of civil society.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Innovation, Energy, Green Transition, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

247. North Korea's Advanced Technologies

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter DPRK or North Korea) has been pursuing technological development in a very different way from the standard path of global technology growth due to its unique historical background and other factors and sought to develop its own science and technology to establish a complete socialist nation in line with its self-reliance (juche) philosophy. Its isolation was intensified by the international sanctions imposed as a consequence of its weapons-of-mass-destruction development programs since 2006. Throughout its existence, it has been leading the life of a recluse nation with a closed economy, resulting in a low level of technology compared to that of advanced economies. In the meantime, its political structure bestows absolute power that allows the supreme leader to allocate resources in whichever sector he wants. Major industries, such as power, mining, metal, machinery, and coal, are being developed. The DPRK is also attempting to transition to a digital economy. Evidence suggests, for example, that the DPRK is raising human capital in software, which appears to have brought positive outcomes in artificial intelligence.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Sanctions, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

248. Mobile Internet and income improvement: Evidence from Viet Nam

Author:
Trang Thi Pham
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
New developments of existing technologies over time have led to emergent patterns of technology adoption and, accordingly, changing impacts on economy and society. Focusing on the arrival of mobile internet in the early 2010s in developing countries, this paper identifies significant positive effects on provinces’ average household income in Viet Nam. The effect sizes are larger for lower-income quintiles and for rural areas, suggesting the more inclusive changing impact of the innovation over the last decade. Preliminary evidence of impact mechanisms via skilled employment rates and (formal) wages is also presented. The evidence from Viet Nam, a lower-middle-income country, can bring further understanding in terms of the extent of development impacts of second-generation mobile for development (M4D 2.0) in particular and information and communication technologies for development (ICT4D) in general.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, Rural, Economic Development, Social Mobility, and Income
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia and Viet Nam

249. Unlocking Africa’s agricultural potential

Author:
Aubrey Hruby and Fatima Ezzahra Mengoub
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The rise of agriculture technology (AgTech) solutions in Africa has opened significant avenues to transform food systems and tackle long-standing obstacles to enhance smallholder productivity. To effectively expand these promising, yet nascent, AgTech solutions, collaborative efforts involving African governments, development partners, and AgTech innovators are essential. Scaling these solutions requires African governments to establish comprehensive digital-infrastructure and development partners to prioritize investments in digital solutions tailored to alleviate market and financial barriers faced by smallholder farmers. Fostering economic growth in Africa’s agricultural sector hinges on millions of smallholder farmers effectively implementing new technologies. This issue brief explores the factors that have contributed to scaling prominent AgTech companies in Africa. Additionally, the brief examines a case study from India, where the digital revolution has helped AgTech solutions reach smallholder farmers. Drawing insights from this analysis, the brief provides recommendations to African governments and development partners to establish environments conducive to AgTech companies’ growth, thereby contributing to economic advancement and prosperity.
Topic:
Agriculture, Development, Science and Technology, Economy, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Africa

250. The Economic Impacts of the Proposed EUCS Exclusionary Requirements: Estimates for EU Member States

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Philipp Lamprecht
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is proposing a far-reaching “European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services“ (EUCS) to be established in the European Union (EU). According to the latest draft of August 2023, leaked by Politico in September 2023, the proposed EUCS would by design prevent non-European vendors from providing “high assurance level” cloud services in the EU. In this study, we show that the proposed “immunity” requirements, i.e., foreign ownership and headquarter restrictions, local staff requirements, and data localisation would lead to significant losses in Member States’ aggregate economic activity and drive a big wedge between economic growth in the EU and the growth of non-EU economies. The projected losses in annual EU GDP will vary from EUR 610 billion to EUR 29 billion within approx. two years of implementation, contingent upon the specific sectoral coverage of high-assurance use cases under the cloud service evaluation level CS-EL4. The results fit into the overall picture of EU digital policy, which has weakened rather than strengthened the competitiveness of EU industries in the past. Our findings align with the broader impacts of EU digital policy, which runs the risk of exacerbating the growth gap and technology disparity between the EU and other advanced economies. Cloud services have become increasingly popular and integral to Europe’s economy. Cloud services are granting businesses of all sizes equal access to global data and resources, stimulating collaboration, and bolstering competitiveness. Advanced cloud services are levelling the playing field in domestic commerce and international trade. Smaller enterprises can harness advanced IT capabilities, particularly cloud-based supply chain management, to streamline their operations. Cloud computing solutions are also playing a crucial role in modernising public services, offering transformative potential for government administrations and service quality. Cloud services adoption is expected to grow substantially in the years ahead, driven by data analytics, AI applications as well as quantum and edge commuting solutions. The global cloud computing market is on a rapid growth trajectory and is expected to reach some EUR 2,080 billion by 2030. Industry forecasts indicate that cloud services and transversal cloud-based technologies like AI applications, quantum, and edge computing will experience consistent growth in innovation and are increasingly finding broader applications across various industries. Overall, the global market for IT services is highly competitive and dynamic, with global cloud service providers competing against a broad range of IT service providers of varying scale, including on-premises hardware vendors, private and co-located data centre providers and software providers. Despite showing a trade deficit in international cloud services trade, trade in ICT and digitally enabled services is not a one-way-street for the EU. Recent trade data reveals that the total value of EU exports in digital and digitally enabled services to the rest of the world is roughly equivalent to the total value of EU imports from the rest of the world. This balance in trade is also observed in EU digital trade with the US, where EU exports of ICT services to the US nearly match US exports of digital services to the EU. The proposed EUCS exclusionary requirements entail various negative consequences. As recognised by the European Commission’s latest progress report on digitisation in the EU, European companies have yet to reach the “Digital Decade” targets, especially when it comes to embracing cloud-supported technologies such as AI and big data, as the adoption of digital technologies remains significantly below these objectives.[1] Exclusionary requirements would create operational inefficiencies and increased production costs for cloud services providers and cloud adopters. They would undermine investments in the domestic economy, resulting in reduced international trade, competition, and innovation. The imposition of exclusionary requirements by the EU could create a domino effect of restrictions caused by retaliation and protectionism. Data localisation and nationality requirements stifle innovation and competition, particularly in data-driven industries. The creation of redundant capacities in the EU would have adverse environmental impacts, including increased energy consumption, land use, and electronic waste. Immunity requirements would increase rather than mitigate cybersecurity risks, creating a security deficit for EU cloud adopters that lose access to proven global risk detection and prevention solutions. This study provides estimates of potential GDP and industry output effects from the implementation of exclusionary requirements under the proposed EUCS framework.[2] It is shown that the strict “immunity” requirements in the EUCS cybersecurity certification framework would severely limit European customers’ access to advanced technologies, innovation and global ICT industry growth trends. The study’s findings highlight the significant economic consequences of potential restrictions on access to global cloud services across three scenarios of different sectoral coverage. It is shown that even in the least restrictive scenario, where “immunity” requirements would only be applied to a narrow spectrum of sectors and highly critical use cases, the reduction in the EU’s annual GDP could be substantial. In scenario 1 (broad critical sector coverage), reflecting political demands of the current French government, the EU’s annual GDP is projected to decrease by 3.9% when accounting for lost cloud capacities and forgone cloud capacity and productivity growth, within 2 years of implementation. For scenario 2 (medium critical sector coverage) and scenario 3 (narrow critical sector coverage), the estimated annual losses in GDP amount to -2% and -0.2%, respectively. In terms of current EU GDP, annual losses would amount to EUR 610 billion, EUR 317 billion, and EUR 29 billion, respectively, underscoring the significant magnitude of the potential impacts. For the broad critical sector coverage scenario, our results also show that the EU’s annual GDP losses accumulate over longer periods of time. After 5 years following the implementation of exclusionary EUCS requirements, the annual growth losses for the EU and its Member States remain significant. This is due to the inability of European businesses and the EU’s public sector to tap into the worldwide innovation and productivity gains offered by globally accessible technologies and services. For the EU, we estimate the annual GDP loss to be -3.6%, with a trend to further accumulate in subsequent years.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Europe