Search

Begin New Search Topic Risk Publication Year within 25 Years

61. Taking Stock of the Arms Trade Treaty: Universalization

Author:
Rachel Stohl
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The rate at which states are joining the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has naturally slowed. Universalization efforts have been carried out through a variety of different frameworks, both within the ATT regime—including the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), a sponsorship programme and the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF)—and by the United Nations, regional organizations and civil society. Universalization of the ATT contributes to the development of standards and norms in the international arms trade. If a party flouts the treaty’s require­ments, it undermines the treaty and makes universal­ization less meaningful. Thus, universalization means both expanding the number of states parties and ensuring that they live up to their obligations. This is one of a series of five papers that are being produced as part of a wider project aimed at taking stock of specific aspects of the ATT—its scope, the application of the risk-assessment criteria, its processes and forums, universalization efforts, and international assistance to support ATT implementation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Arms Trade, and Risk
Political Geography:
Global Focus

62. Taking Stock of the Arms Trade Treaty: Application of the Risk-assessment Criteria

Author:
Paul Beijer
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
A central element of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the risk-assessment criteria in articles 6 and 7. The flexibility in the wording of the two articles has required efforts to reach common interpretations of the criteria in order to lessen the scope for different assessment outcomes. These efforts, as well as improved and aligned national practices, will enhance the treaty’s long-term impact. While there are limits to how far some states parties will want to go, there is a genuine preparedness to look at ways to increase the effectiveness of the ATT that should be encouraged and supported. This is one of a series of five papers that are being produced as part of a wider project aimed at taking stock of specific aspects of the ATT—its scope, the application of the risk-assessment criteria, its processes and forums, universalization efforts, and international assistance to support ATT implementation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Arms Trade, and Risk
Political Geography:
Global Focus

63. Advancing the Role of the OSCE in the Field of Climate Security

Author:
Niklas Bremberg and Anniek Barnhoorn
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This SIPRI Policy Brief assesses the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of climate security, in terms of its current and possible future commitments. Despite growing political momentum among most OSCE participating states about the need to address the issue of climate security, there appear to be divergent views on how to move forward on this important issue. Based on an assessment of recent OSCE activities linked to climate-related security risks and interviews with representatives from OSCE participating states, this policy brief suggests four avenues for the OSCE to advance its role in the field of climate security: (a) agree to new commitments; (b) engage in agenda setting; (c) strengthen the mandate of institutions; and (d) develop existing resources.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, Risk, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe

64. A Reassessment of the European Union’s Response to Climate-related Security Risks

Author:
Anniek Barnhoorn and Elise Remling
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This SIPRI Insights paper examines how climate-related security risks (CRSRs) are framed and responded to within different bodies of the European Union (EU). The paper finds that CRSRs are framed differently across the EU and that the kinds of actions proposed vary. Although this is not necessarily a problem, a key challenge is that across the EU the prescriptions for addressing CRSRs largely focus on long-term prevention in the form of climate mitigation, on the one hand, and reactive crisis responses, on the other. As a result, the substantial climate change that is already locked in and its related security risks are currently not being addressed. Similarly, this focus overlooks the varied and often complex ways in which climate change can increase risks. The paper concludes that the EU needs to broaden its understanding of and response to CRSRs if it wants to take—and inspire—more effective action to reduce such risks.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, and Risk
Political Geography:
Europe and Arctic

65. Climate-related Security Risks in the 2020 Updated Nationally Determined Contributions

Author:
Elise Remling and Amar Causevic
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are the central instrument for states to communicate their con­tribution to the 2016 Paris Agreement on climate change and reflect their wider approach to climate mitigation and adaptation. This SIPRI Insights paper analyses how the 2020 updated NDCs (16 submissions as of October 2020) discuss climate-related security risks and compares them with 2015. It finds that climate change is mainly seen as a risk to socio-economic development and human security and almost never as a risk to societal stability or the functioning of the state. The assessment of risks in NDCs largely focuses on direct climate impacts. This suggests that countries are currently not considering the risks from indirect climate impacts, including those that cross national borders, or the unintended adverse con­sequences of adaptation or mitigation responses. Going forward, countries will need to take account of the multi­faceted and transboundary character of climate risks in their NDCs in order to meet global expectations and goals.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, Risk, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

66. Risky Business: Future Strategy and Force Options for the Defense Department

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the overarching strategic priorities laid out by the Biden administration and initial indicators provided by the Department of Defense (DoD), it is unclear how the next National Defense Strategy (NDS) will prioritize threats and the primary role of the U.S. military. Will the DoD clearly preference China (and to a lesser extent Russia)? Or will it hedge and try to more equally meet the expanded list of threats detailed in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance? Is the Pentagon’s priority to compete below the threshold of armed conflict, or is it to prepare to defeat a great-power adversary in a large-scale war to strengthen deterrence? Answering these questions is critical to developing a clear strategy that emphasizes the right priorities, activities, and resources. To consider the next defense strategy and the tradeoffs associated with different options, we developed three possible strategies—high-end deterrence, day-to-day competition, and full-spectrum competition—that alter the factors highlighted above and reflect the Biden administration’s stated priorities. Our analysis of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 budget indicates that the DoD is trying to do more than constrained budgets can support over the next few years and is moving toward what we term as a strategy of “full-spectrum competition.” It appears as if the Biden administration is pursuing a strategy that seeks to strike a balance between competing in the near term while still enhancing preparedness for great-power conflict, as well as hedging against a range of threats and mitigating risk over time. The forces and posture that are necessary for this competition are quite different from those that are needed to defend against a conventional fait accompli attack by China on Taiwan or Russia on the Baltics. It is unlikely that the United States can build a force that can achieve both of these objectives with the current topline. Our testing of the budget-constrained force associated with the full-spectrum competition strategy finds that it could not successfully fulfill its two primary aims: defeating sub-conventional aggression and Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics, and building a force capable of defeating a great-power adversary attack on its neighbor. Moreover, this strategy risks significant overstretch, the potential for long-term technological overmatch, and inadvertent escalation. The other two strategies focus on China, but day-to-day competition emphasizes the daily military contest with Beijing and the threat of sub-conventional conflict, while high-end deterrence focuses on defeating conventional aggression and achieving a long-term military technological advantage. The day-to-day competition strategy would lose a high-end conflict in East Asia and Europe; it also would fail to halt or overturn sub-conventional land grabs. The competition strategy bets that a large and visible force that actively contests daily military provocations will deter both sub-conventional and conventional aggression, even if the force is not capable of stopping either type of attack. The risk that this assumption fails grows over time because this strategy forgoes investments in advanced technologies, while China and Russia are rapidly seeking to wrest the military technological advantage from the United States. There are also significant escalatory risks associated with an approach that regularly and assertively contests Chinese and Russian forces. We conclude that it is unlikely that competition can be won by the military, even one optimized to face this challenge. More optimistically, our analysis suggests that it is possible to build a force capable of winning one big conflict and overturning sub-conventional aggression with this topline—but only if the department is willing to accept some near-term risk in competition, against other threats, and in other regions. The high-end deterrence strategy mitigates the temporal risk by making near-term improvements in combat capabilities, including expanding stockpiles of preferred long-range munitions, investments to improve the resiliency of U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and additional investments in cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. It also relies on frontline allies and partners to be responsible for the daily competition. We assert that the high-end deterrence strategy is the best path forward, but it requires a better delineation and ranking of threats and responsibilities for the joint force and strategic discipline over the long run. Congress must also support this strategy and allow the Defense Department to make the hard choices, such as cutting capacity and retiring weapons systems, that are required to rebalance the force for this mission and to sustain its military technological advantage over the long run. Senior Pentagon leaders will need to partner with Congress to help them understand how specific changes are connected to higher order objectives. It is important to note that the FY22 budget is largely an inherited one and the Biden administration is making some significant investments that align with a high-end deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, the 2022 NDS and the FY23 budget will need to accept more risk and further prioritize to prepare the force for the most challenging and consequential threats. If the Biden administration does not make these hard choices or Congress refuses to support this strategy, the chasm between U.S. strategic and military objectives and the costs of achieving them will only grow significantly. Trying to do too much is a risky business that could result in the United States losing its military technological edge and, ultimately, a war against a great power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Risk, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

67. 2020 Sudikoff Interdisciplinary Seminar on Genocide Prevention: Rapporteur's Report

Author:
Alex Vandermaas-Peeler
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
On June 10, 2020, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum brought together scholars, practitioners, and civil society representatives to discuss possible effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global risk of mass atrocities and efficacy of mass atrocity prevention. This seminar was the first in a series designed to stimulate new policy-relevant research and begin building a network of scholars and practitioners focused on global trends and their implications for mass atrocities and atrocity prevention. Future seminar series topics include the global distribution of power, new technologies, demographics, climate change, and resource competition, and norms and ideologies. This rapporteur’s report summarizes major observations raised during the workshop.
Topic:
Genocide, Risk, Atrocities, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Global Focus

68. Expert Meeting on Assessing Atrocity Risk in Northwest and Southwest Cameroon: Rapporteur's Report

Author:
Alex Vandermaas-Peeler
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
In response to ongoing atrocities in Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions, this expert meeting focused on ways in which atrocity risk could be heightened. In order to better specify the mass atrocity risks, meeting participants explored plausible scenarios in which atrocities would significantly worsen. These “worst-case” scenarios, detailed below, can inform atrocity prevention efforts and assist in generating targeted policy suggestions. The scenarios are not predictions, but they highlight some of the ways atrocities could worsen in coming months and years.
Topic:
Violence, Public Policy, Risk, and Atrocities
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

69. Extraregional Migratory Flows in Transit as Complex Unbounded Emergency (Risk): Conceptual Challenges and Empirical Lessons in Costa Rica

Author:
Juan C. Mendez
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
Recent migratory flows transiting through Central America have led to unprecedented institutional and humanitarian responses across the sub-region. Between 2015 and 2016, the small Central American countries and Costa Rica in particular experienced at least two major “migration waves,” triggered by thousands of “extraregional migrants” in transit from Cuba, Haiti, and many countries from Asia and Africa who became stranded for months in Central America. The article examines how these recent and unusual migratory flows led to novel state responses, including the use of disaster risk management principles and operational mechanisms. Based on empirical data from Costa Rica, the article explores how the concept and notion of complex unbounded emergency (risk) may be appropriate in understanding the practical implications of this new migratory reality in terms of disaster risk reduction and management. It aims to shed new insights on the complexities of extraregional migratory flows, which are likely to continue into the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Migration, Risk, Humanitarian Crisis, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, and Costa Rica

70. Risk-Limiting Audits: A Guide for Global Use

Author:
Erica Shein and Alexandra Brown
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:
Contentious elections are a stress test for governments. Trust is hard won, easily lost and very difficult to restore. Election audits can enhance voters’ confidence in the results, if they are grounded in the law and performed by well-trained officials, and follow a predictable, transparent and observable process. A new guide from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) focuses on the risk-limiting audit (RLA), a type of post-election tabulation audit that relies on statistical evidence to confirm that the election outcome is correct. Compared to other types of audits, RLAs can be more effective and efficient. The U.S. has been the primary laboratory for RLA testing, with more than 60 piloted and 10 states currently requiring or allowing them. A long-time partner of election administrators around the world, IFES is dedicated to expanding the range of tools available to reinforce confidence in the electoral process and ensure that outcomes reflect the will of the voters. Risk-Limiting Audits: A Guide for Global Use considers how RLAs could have global application and utility – particularly to build trust in election results. The guide provides a basic framework for testing RLAs in diverse contexts by outlining foundational prerequisites and operational, legal and regulatory considerations. IFES will continue to refine and expand on this primer as new findings emerge.
Topic:
Elections, Risk, and Audit
Political Geography:
Global Focus