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91. Risk of Mass Atrocities in Cameroon

Author:
Kyra Fox and Andrea Gittleman
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
Cameroon currently ranks number nine of countries at risk of mass killing in the Simon-Skjodt Center’s Statistical Risk Assessment.1 The situation has deteriorated significantly since 2017, when Cameroon ranked 36th. After Anglophone civilians launched protests in late 2016 alleging marginalization by the Francophone-majority government, state security forces responded violently, allegedly arresting, beating, and shooting demonstrators.2 Clashes ensued, with security forces reportedly killing over 20 people in a 12-day period in largely peaceful protests in September and October 2017.3 Shortly after, Anglophone separatists began fighting for independence for the territory they referred to as Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia. The crisis emerged from the long-standing political grievances of the Anglophone community. Yet today, fighting between the two sides makes it difficult to discern motives. Security forces are reportedly targeting Anglophone civilians accused of supporting separatists. It is unclear to what extent security forces are also targeting the Anglophone linguistic and cultural identity. Meanwhile, armed separatists claiming to represent the Anglophone population are reportedly targeting civilians they perceive as supporting the government. This policy brief provides an overview of the risks of mass atrocities in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions and provides recommendations to the Cameroonian government, armed separatist groups, and international actors to prevent atrocities and protect civilians.
Topic:
Non State Actors, State Violence, Risk, Atrocities, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

92. Burma’s 2020 Elections and Ongoing Atrocity Risks Facing the Rohingya Population

Author:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
Burma’s 2020 national elections, scheduled for November 8th, will take place in a fragile context of ongoing risk of genocide for the country’s minority Rohingya population and continuing mass atrocities—including war crimes and crimes against humanity—against other ethnic populations. While the elections themselves may not be a trigger for mass atrocities in Burma, the responses to the elections from within the country and internationally has the ability to either exacerbate or mitigate future atrocityrelated risks. Parliamentary seats at the national and state level will be voted upon in the November elections. Only 75% of the total seats will be contested, as the country’s constitution reserves 25% of seats for the military.1 At the time of writing, it appears as though most Rohingya within Burma—members of an ethnic and religious minority that has been the victims of genocide—will be denied the right to vote.2 The approximately one million Rohingya who now live as refugees in Bangladesh will likewise be unable to vote in the elections. At least six Rohingya candidates have been prevented from running for office by the Union Election Commission (UEC), despite some of them having been approved candidates in the past and, in one case, having won a parliamentary seat. These candidates were blocked from running because they were unable to confirm the citizenship of their parents at the time of their birth.3 The UEC has applied such policies in a discriminatory fashion against Rohingya politicians,4 raising concerns that key Rohingya politicians will be unable to contest seats in the elections. This is not the first time the government has denied these rights, and the continued disenfranchisement and exclusion of Rohingya heightens their vulnerability to future atrocities. An election in which a people, who have been the victims of genocide, are denied the right to vote on the basis of their identity, is not a free, fair, or inclusive election. Any foreign government’s praise and support of Burma’s elections would be seen as endorsing a discriminatory process and lending support to the policies and behaviors that contributed to the genocide of the Rohingya and to ongoing risk. Instead, leaders around the world should use their available levers to mitigate atrocity risks, press for inclusivity regarding voting and political participation, and encourage other changes within Burma that advance the protection of the Rohingya and other vulnerable groups.
Topic:
Genocide, Elections, Risk, Atrocities, and Rohingya
Political Geography:
Burma and Southeast Asia

93. Low-Carbon Transition Risks for Finance

Author:
Gregor Semieniuk, Emanuele Campiglio, and Neil Edwards
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
The transition to a low‐carbon economy will entail a large‐scale structural change. Some industries will have to expand their relative economic weight, while other industries, especially those directly linked to fossil fuel production and consumption, will have to decline. Such a systemic shift may have major repercussions on the stability of financial systems, via abrupt asset revaluations, defaults on debt, and the creation of bubbles in rising industries. Studies on previous industrial transitions have shed light on the financial transition risks originating from rapidly rising “sunrise” industries. In contrast, a similar conceptual understanding of risks from declining “sunset” industries is currently lacking. We substantiate this claim with a critical review of the conceptual and historical literature, which also shows that most literature either examines structural change in the real economy, or risks to financial stability, but rarely both together. We contribute to filling this research gap by developing a consistent theoretical framework of the drivers, transmission channels, and impacts of the phase‐out of carbon‐intensive industries on the financial system and on the feedback from the financial system into the rest of the economy. We also review the state of play of policy aiming to protect the financial system from transition risks and spell out research implications.
Topic:
Climate Change, Finance, Economy, Risk, Fossil Fuels, Carbon Emissions, and Financial Systems
Political Geography:
Global Focus

94. The Army in Indian Military Strategy: Rethink Doctrine or Risk Irrelevance

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Indian Army’s prevailing doctrine leaves the military with two main choices: do nothing or risk wars it cannot win. The Indian Army needs to rethink its use of force to meet today’s new challenges. Ground forces dominate Indian military strategy. Since its independence, India has fought five wars along its unsettled northern land borders, and its most vexing security threats today—as illustrated by the ongoing Chinese incursions in the northern region of Ladakh—still loom across those same borders. The Indian Army commands a clear and growing majority of military budget allocations and an even larger share of military personnel. But how does India use its ground forces, and how well do they serve Indian security interests? This paper argues that the Indian Army—and by extension, Indian defense policy more generally—is dominated by an orthodox offensive doctrine. This is an approach to the use of force that centers on large army formations, operating relatively autonomously from political direction, seeking to impose a punitive cost on the enemy. The punitive cost often takes the form of capturing enemy territory as a bargaining chip, even though India usually pursues strategically defensive war aims to maintain the territorial status quo. This paper advances four analytic propositions before concluding with recommendations for the Indian Army. First, the orthodox offensive doctrine has been at the center of the Indian military’s wartime experience, organization, and doctrine. It defined India’s strategy during the wars against Pakistan in 1965, 1971, and 1999, and has shaped Indian crisis behavior since. Doctrinal innovations along the way, such as the Cold Start doctrine, have sought to optimize rather than rethink the orthodox offensive doctrine.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Risk, and Army
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

95. China’s Emerging Disaster Diplomacy: What It Means for Southeast Asia

Author:
Lina Gong
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The Chinese government formed two new bodies in 2018 that have been expected to improve China’s response to natural hazards and humanitarian emergencies in other countries. What are the implications for Southeast Asia, where the risk and threat of different types of disaster persist?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Government, Risk, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

96. Risk Realism: The Arms Control Endgame for North Korea Policy

Author:
Van Jackson
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
While the reasons for seeking North Korean denuclearization are sensible, continuing to pursue that goal makes the United States and its allies less secure. In word and deed, North Korea has shown it has no interest in nuclear disarmament. Because denuclearization is antithetical to Kim Jong Un’s bottom line, U.S. attempts at diplomacy to that end are self-sabotaging. As long as disarmament of North Korea remains America’s professed goal, Kim Jong Un has every incentive either to avoid the negotiating process or favorably manipulate it at America’s expense—by stalling for time, making unfulfilled promises, and securing concessions without reciprocity. Worse, as the 2017 nuclear confrontation showed, making denuclearization an actionable goal of U.S. policy creates real risks of crisis instability—justifying extreme measures and extreme rhetoric in the name of what has become an extreme aim. But policymakers can avoid the pitfalls of the past by attempting something more realistic than denuclearization—an arms control approach to North Korea. The United States has significant unexploited margin to take diplomatic and political risks aimed at probing and potentially shifting North Korea’s approach to its nuclear arsenal. An arms control approach would seek to reorient U.S. North Korea policy to prioritize what matters most: reducing the risk of nuclear or conventional war without forsaking other U.S. interests at stake in Korea. Using diplomacy to enhance regional stability and foreclose the possibility of an avoidable nuclear war requires pursuing a negotiated outcome that both sides can accept, and that tests North Korea’s willingness to uphold commitments short of disarmament. U.S. policy often seeks to test North Korean intentions, but without offering the accommodations and concessions that would serve as a meaningful test. Remedying this problem through an arms control approach requires taking considerable unilateral actions consistent with U.S. interests before proceeding to a phased negotiating process.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Risk, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

97. Climate Security: Making it #Doable

Author:
Karolina Eklöw, Florian Krampe, Malin Mobjörk, and Dan Smith
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Climate-related events left no region unaffected in 2018. These events demonstrate how climate change impacts are worsening. Despite increased geopolitical tensions that seem to undermine the Agenda 2030 or the Paris Agreement, global and regional organisations have been able to achieve some progress in addressing and mitigating climate-related security risks. This report, prepared for the Planetary Security Conference taking place in The Hague on 19–20 February 2019, feeds into the conversation by sketching the past year’s trends in relation to climate and security.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Geopolitics, Risk, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

98. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume I, Euro-Atlantic perspectives

Author:
Dr Vincent Boulanin, S. M. Amadae, Jean-Marc Rickli, Shahar Avin, Frank Sauer, John Borrie, Dimitri Scheftelowitsch, Justin Bronk, Page O. Stoutland, Magnus Hagström, Petr Topychkanov, Michael Horowitz, Anja Kaspersen, and Chris King
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This edited volume focuses on the impact on artificial intelligence (AI) on nuclear strategy. It is the first instalment of a trilogy that explores regional perspectives and trends related to the impact that recent advances in AI could have nuclear weapons and doctrines, strategic stability and nuclear risk. It assembles the views of 14 experts from the Euro-Atlantic community on why and how machine learning and autonomy might become the focus of an armed race among nuclear-armed states; and how the adoption of these technologies might impact their calculation of strategic stability and nuclear risk at the regional level and trans-regional level.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Risk, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

99. A Confluence of Crises: On Water, Climate and Security in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Johan Schaar
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) faces simultaneous crises of security, water scarcity and climate change. They are interlinked—the water crisis is exacerbated by climate change and may fuel conflict, while insecurity is an obstacle to dealing with other pressing issues. Together, the three constitute a confluence of crises that need to be addressed together. Authoritarian and militarized governments in MENA countries repress public discourse and action related to water and climate crises, viewing critics as threats to national security. But the elite’s own economic interests and role in the political economy make them vulnerable to the new risks and threats. The water and climate crises are mostly transboundary and require states to act together. But by prioritizing narrow security interests, states accord weak mandates to regional institutions, preventing agreements on shared challenges. A regional security framework is needed, encompassing water, climate and the current conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Water, Disarmament, and Risk
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

100. Advancing United Nations Responses to Climate-related Security Risks

Author:
Camilla Born, Karolina Eklöw, and Malin Mobjörk
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The security implications of climate change have increasingly been debated in the United Nations Security Council. Yet, there is a growing concern by many UN member states about the lack of adequate responses to the risks that climate change poses to peace and security. In recent years, some modest but notable changes at the UN have taken place, of which the creation of the Climate Security Mechanism is the primary example. This SIPRI Policy Brief summarizes the recent evolution of the climate security debate in the UN and highlights three priority areas for future action: (a) supporting and establishing climate security action in the field, (b) nurturing knowledge provision and (c) building sustainable sources of financing for climate security action. All these steps will require committed actors, innovation and long-term investment. Escalating climate impacts make the mitigation of climate-related security risks by the UN and its member states not only demanded but urgent. Recent institutional progress demonstrates that committed and cooperative actors can drive institutional change. This progress must be bolstered and action delivered in the field.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, United Nations, and Risk
Political Geography:
Global Focus