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581. Iranian Nuclear Weapons? Iran's Missiles and Possible Delivery Systems

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
Publication Date:
04-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is one thing to have nuclear weapons; it is another to deliver them. This depends on being able to build them small enough to fit current missile warheads or build new missile technology to carry such weapons. In the case of Iran, this depends on knowing the extent of its nuclear technology. For example, if its P-1 or P-2 designs were provided by AQ Khan—the same warhead that was sold to—then it is the Chinese design with 500 kg and 1 m diameter, which can fit Iran's current Shahab-3 missile.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Libya

582. Fuelling confrontation: Iran, the US and the oil weapon

Author:
Anthony Bubalo, Mark P Thirlwell, and Dr. Michael Fullilove
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The Iranian nuclear issue has entered a critical phase. A draft UN Security Council resolution has been circulated that could pave the way for political and economic sanctions. Should these fail to change Iran's position, the likelihood of military action will grow towards the end of 2006 and into 2007. At the same time, high oil prices have bolstered Iran's ability to defy demands that it give up uranium enrichment and provide greater transparency with respect to its nuclear program. Given current supply, demand and price indicators, oil provides Iran with a very potent weapon with which to respond to punitive measures. However, the economic and political fallout produced by the use of the oil in this way makes it likely Tehran would use such a weapon cautiously.
Topic:
International Relations, Energy Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and Australia/Pacific

583. Iran Means What It Says

Author:
Michael Rubin
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
On February 2, 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency will meet in Vienna to discuss the nuclear crisis in Iran and, in all likelihood, refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council for being in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's safeguards agreement. Such a referral will mark a turning point in a decade-long saga. Europe's engagement with Iran has failed. The United States and its European allies have been resolute in their condemnation of the Iranian government decision to resume uranium enrichment. In contrast to previous diplomatic impasses with Tehran, neither Washington nor its European allies appear willing to make further concessions. On January 23, U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice said, “I don't see much room for further discussion in any format [with Iran].” At a January 13, 2006, press conference with German chancellor Angela Merkel, George W. Bush condemned Iran. “Iran, armed with a nuclear weapon, poses a grave threat to the security of the world,” Mr. Bush said. “We will not be intimidated,” Ms. Merkel added. Already, though, there has been one casualty of the diplomatic crisis: the European Union's policy of engagement.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Washington, Middle East, Tehran, Germany, and Vienna

584. Iranian President Ahmadinezhad's Relations with Supreme Leader Khamenei

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As part of their close consultation over how to respond to the Iranian nuclear challenge, top officials from the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany met in Berlin on September 7. In developing a plan for influencing Iran, a key consideration is, who are the key decision-makers in Iran? In particular, what are the relative roles of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad? The record from Ahmadinezhad's first year in office suggests that at least on domestic policy, his actions have systematically reinforced Khamenei's authority.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iran and Germany

585. Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program

Author:
Patrick Clawson and Michael Herzog
Publication Date:
07-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On July 17, 2006, Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog and Patrick Clawson addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. General Herzog, an active officer in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), is a visiting military fellow at The Washington Institute. General Herzog recently published Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program: A Potential Asset for the International Community, an Institute monograph available for free download. Dr. Clawson is deputy director for research at The Washington Institute, and recently published Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos. Mehdi Khalaji also contributed to the panel; his remarks appear in a separate PolicyWatch. The following is a rapporteur's summary of General Herzog and Dr. Clawson's remarks.
Topic:
Civil Society, Nuclear Weapons, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iran, Washington, and Israel

586. Ahmadinezhad's Popularity One Year On

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
07-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Westerners believe Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad to be popular in Iran, in no small part because of his strong support for Iran's nuclear program. However, there is much evidence to the contrary. There is limited information available with which to form a judgment about the popularity of any politician or political program in Iran. The government forbids any independent opinion polling on matters as ordinary as the raging problem of drug addiction, let alone sensitive issues like negotiations with the United States or the nuclear program. The main sources of information for Western media are the statements and photographs that come from Iranian state media, or other Western journalists who go to Iran but cannot work freely in the face of government controls. The Western newsmedia has taken the massive turnouts at demonstrations in support of Ahmadinezhad and his nuclear policy as evidence of popular support for both. But the size of such demonstrations has no meaning beyond illustrating the efficiency of the regime's propaganda machine. Unfortunately, Western media take this propaganda for the truth. The Iranian regime has nearly succeeded in fashioning its own image and imposing it on its critics. Official results show Ahmadinezhad was elected by only 35 percent of eligible voters—in an election that was not free and fair, according to many top Iranian officials. Most of Ahmadinezhad's support came from rural regions and the poorer classes of Iranian society; these voters hoped that Ahmadinezhad's election would reduce corruption and raise their standard of living. Today there are clear signs of dissatisfaction within these constituencies. The evidence comes from independent journalists, blogs, and independent Iranian news websites which have reported increasing discontent with Ahmadinezhad's domestic policies.
Topic:
Government, Nuclear Weapons, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

587. Facing Iran's Challenge: Safeguarding Oil Exports from the Persian Gulf

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
06-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In a June 4 speech marking the anniversary of the death of his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a warning to the United States in the crisis of over Iran's nuclear program. “If the Americans make a wrong move toward Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face danger, and the Americans would not be able to protect energy supply in the region,” Khamenei said. This raises questions about the strength of the Iranian military and how the United States could counter it, using military power, alternative export routes, or a combination of both.
Topic:
Energy Policy and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

588. Perils and Promise of U.S.-Iranian Negotiations

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 7, Lebanese Druze leader and member of parliament Walid Jumblat told reporters in Cairo that Hizballah should disarm. These comments came just four days after Jumblat offered his assistance to the Syrian opposition in establishing "a democratic and free Syria." Jumblat has always been an enigmatic and unpredictable interlocutor, and his recent statements on Syria and Hizballah typify his disregard for the conventions of the Lebanese political establishment. While many Lebanese may quietly support Jumblat's truth telling, his statements are sure to increase his list of powerful enemies.
Topic:
International Relations and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Syria

589. Assessing the Iranian Nuclear Threat with Reference to Pakistan's Experience

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On April 30, the Sunday Times of London reported that Israeli Mossad chief Meir Dagan had warned U.S. officials during a secret visit to Washington of covert Iranian plans for enriching uranium, which may mean Tehran was "nearer to acquiring nuclear weapons than widely believed." The same report quoted Knesset Foreign and Defense Committee chairman Yuval Steinitz as saying that Iran might be only a year from developing a bomb. Meanwhile, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director-general and Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohammed ElBaradei is on the record as saying that, once Iran can enrich uranium in quantity, making an actual bomb would only take "a few months." And, in August 2005, the Washington Post reported that the new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate "projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing [sufficient highly enriched uranium] for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years." In such circumstances it is small wonder if the public is confused, wondering whether some officials are exaggerating the potential danger of a nuclear-armed Iran while others seem to be almost irresponsibly unconcerned. In fact, the statements above are not mutually inconsistent, reflecting instead the discrepancy between hard fact and plausible interpretation. Since Iran's controversial uranium enrichment technology was initially acquired from Pakistan, an examination of that country's progress toward a nuclear bomb is both worthwhile and illuminating.
Topic:
Security and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Iran, Washington, Middle East, and Tehran

590. Preventing Turkey's Popular Slide away from the West

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
04-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iran's nuclear program presents one more issue on which Washington sees Middle East developments in a different light than does the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey. Since coming to power in November 2002, AKP leaders have pursued rapprochement with Damascus and enhanced dialogue with Iran. In March 2006, the AKP welcomed Hamas leaders in Ankara. It is surprising that Turkey, a traditional bastion of Western policies in the Middle East, is promoting close ties with anti-Western actors that have hurt Turkey for decades—Syria provided safe haven to the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Iran supported the PKK and radical Islamist terrorists. Why do the Turkish people not resent such policies? The Iraq war and the U.S. agenda for political transformation in the Middle East have clashed with the Turkish people's desire to preserve the Middle Eastern political landscape. What is more, U.S. inaction against the PKK's Qandil enclave in Northern Iraq is angering most Turks in the way Syrian and Iranian support for the PKK upset them in the 1990s. Turkish confusion and anger toward the United States stands in sharp contrast with the improved image of Syria and Iran in Turkey. Meanwhile, with AKP discussing Middle Eastern politics in terms of Islamic codes, some Turks now identify with the region through Islam and not their national identity. The challenge for Washington is to find a way to prevent Turkey's popular slide away from the United States.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Washington, Turkey, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Syria