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452. NATO's Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Beyond "Yes" or "No"
- Author:
- Karl-Heinz Kamp
- Publication Date:
- 09-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- "NATO is a nuclear alliance," stated US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at NATO's informal ministerial meeting in Tallinn in April 2010. NATO always was, but many had forgotten about this constituting element of the North Atlantic Alliance. Today, the nuclear question and the so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons (TNW), i.e. the US nuclear bombs stationed in five European member countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey) are back on the political agenda. Ignited by some European member governments, a debate on the pros and cons of the American nuclear presence in Europe has started. Some are in favor of a rapid withdrawal of these weapons from European soil and claim that the strategic rationale for these types of weapons, which are supposed to be used against Warsaw Pact forces, had long gone. Opponents of quick removal point out that a credible nuclear deterrence posture remains essential for NATO - not least to reassure most of the new NATO members who still harbor concerns with regard to a potentially aggressive Russia (which keeps an estimated number of 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons in its European part - about 10 to 15 times as many as NATO).
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States, India, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Netherlands
453. Coping with the North Korean Survival Game: The Cheonan Incident and Its Aftermath
- Author:
- Seong-Ho Sheen
- Publication Date:
- 07-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- While on a routine patrol along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a South Korean Navy corvette, Cheonan was hit by an external explosion and rapidly sunk at 9:22pm on March 26, 2010. Of the one hundred and four South Korean crew members on board, forty six were found dead or remain missing (Cha 2010). After weeks of a scientific investigation supported by an international team of twenty four American, British, Australian, and Swedish experts, the South Korean government announced on May 20, that the ship was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean midget submarine. The South Korean government and the public are now weighing the various measures in how to respond to this major North Korean provocation. Experts, on the other hand, are trying to understand what might have been the cause of such a bold aggression by the North Korean regime. While some have suggested a combination of various reasons for the alleged attack, a prominent North Korean insider has argued that the Cheonan incident may have to do with the North Korean leadership succession issue. Cho Myung-chul, a former professor at Kim Il-sung University, has suggested that the Cheonan incident was the work of the emerging leadership surrounding the young and unknown Kim Jong-eun, the son of Kim Jong-il and possible future successor. The motivation then would be for Kim Jong-eun and his supporters to prove themselves to Kim Jong-il and North Korean people. Leadership succession in a dictatorship tends to create a lot of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion for its governance and the state apparatus. There will be competition and rivalry among different groups and factions for survival and to take a lead in the power transition. In that process, hard liners tend to command a stronger voice. Given the mounting pressures of a deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation since the famine of 1995-98, sinking a South Korean warship could score an important political victory domestically, inducing the North Korean people to be proud of its regime and new leadership. At the same time, it could teach a lesson to the Lee Myung-bak government which has insisted on linking the nuclear issue with North-South exchanges. Indeed, North Korea issued a series of warnings to South Korea after criticizing the Lee administration for refusing to restart the Mount Kumkang Tours that had been canceled after a South Korean tourist had been shot by a North Korean guard on July 11, 2008. Pyongyang was further upset by alleged contingency planning for a sudden collapse of the regime and the hosting of military exercises with the United States. In particular, just a couple of weeks before the Cheonan incident, the Korean People’s Army issued a statement that it would no longer remain bound by the Korean War Armistice or the 1992 North-South Non-Aggression Agreement, therefore it “will legitimately exercise their force for self defense, unhindered, just as they had determined to do.” The worry now is that such provocations may eventually be aimed at the Obama administration which has hardened its position toward North Korea since the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. While not completely excluding the possibility for bilateral dialogue, the United States has insisted that Pyongyang must return to the multilateral Six-Party Talks by implementing its obligations under previous agreements. North Korean demands for nuclear arms control and a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization has only strengthened Washington’s deep mistrust of Pyongyang’s true intentions. Considering that the Obama administration has adopted a policy of wait and see, or what it calls “strategic patience,” the North Korean leadership might have concluded that there is not much to gain from making a deal with Washington for now. Furthermore, President Obama’s designation of North Korea along with Iran as an outlier in his drive for a “World Without Nuclear Weapons” and a possible target of U.S. nuclear weapons in the recently published 2010 Nuclear Posture Review can only have made Pyongyang’s conviction even more pessimistic. The problem is that the sinking of the Cheonan may not be an isolated incident. North Korea may become more desperate and brazen as they face increasingly harsher measures from South Korea and the international community, particularly the United States. The race for completing succession by 2012 may further strengthen the voice of hardliners who wish to heighten tensions with South Korea and the United States. More importantly, the Cheonan incident could be a sign of increasing instability in North Korea. The regime there faces the critical question of Kim Jong-il’s health and the issue of succession amidst a deepening economic crisis and international isolation. The Cheonan incident not only presents the immediate challenge of crisis management but also poses a medium to long-term question about the regime’s future.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
454. Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime
- Author:
- Pierre Goldschmidt
- Publication Date:
- 04-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Today's nuclear nonproliferation regime is increasingly challenged by states that exploit ambiguity in rules and rifts in the international community to pursue nuclear weapon capabilities without fear of reprisal. At present, lax and inconsistent compliance practices threaten nonproliferation efforts by giving some states more leeway for evading rules than should be tolerable in an effective nonproliferation regime.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, International Organization, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
455. Controversies over missile defense in Europe
- Author:
- Raimo Väyrynen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The plan to deploy an anti-missile system in Central Europe has been one of the most controversial security policy issues in the past few years. The Bush Administration pushed hard for the deployment of the radar site in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland, largely because it would provide an additional layer in the global anti-ballistic missile defense of the United States. In both of these countries, public opinion has been against the deployments and the governments have had to negotiate between external and internal pressures pushing them in different policy directions. Russia has been adamantly opposed to the missile defense plan, issuing both threats and suggesting alternative ways to diminish the threat that the United States feels from Iran. The result has been a political stalemate that has further complicated otherwise tense relations between Moscow and Washington, D.C. With the arrival of the Obama Administration, there is a pause in the missile dispute, but no permanent resolution of the conflict is in sight.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, Iran, Washington, Poland, Moscow, and Czech Republic
456. The Russian Handicap to U.S. Iran Policy
- Publication Date:
- 04-2009
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- Abstract:
- There are voices in the Obama Administration who believe that the Kremlin is able and willing to exert pressure on Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, perceived geopolitical and economic benefits in the unstable Persian Gulf, in which American influence is on the wane, outweigh Russia's concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran. The Kremlin sees Iran not as a threat but as a partner or an ad-hoc ally to challenge U.S. influence. Today, both Russia and Iran favor a strategy of "multipolarity," both in the Middle East and worldwide. This strategy seeks to dilute American power, revise current international financial institutions, and weaken or neuter NATO and the OSCE, while forging a counterbalance to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Russian technological aid is evident throughout the Iranian missile and space programs. Russian scientists and expertise have played a direct and indirect role in these programs for years. According to some reports, Russian specialists are helping to develop the longer-range Shahab-5, and Russia has exported missile production facilities to Iran. Moscow has signed a contract to sell advanced long-range S-300 air-defense systems to Iran. Once Iran has air defenses to repel Israeli or American air strikes and nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, it will possess the capacity to destroy Israel (an openly stated goal of the regime) and strike targets throughout the Middle East, in Europe, and the Indian subcontinent. Beyond that, if and when an ICBM capability is achieved, Tehran will be able to threaten the U.S. homeland directly. Given the substantial Russian interests and ambitions, any grand bargain would almost certainly require an excessively high price paid by the United States to the detriment of its friends and allies. Russia simply does not view the situation through the same lens as the U.S.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, and Middle East
457. North Korea: Getting Back to Talks
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- The motivations for North Korea's second nuclear test are, as with many of its actions, mostly impenetrable. It may be the latest step in an unrelenting drive to become a permanent nuclear state or it could be advertising nuclear wares to potential buyers. It may be driving up the price others will pay for the North to give up its weapons or it might be about ensuring that the military will accept whatever decision Kim Jong-il has made on his successor. Most likely, North Korea's nuclear weapons program serves multiple purposes for the leadership. Whatever the rationale, there are no good options in response. Finding a way to resume talks on ending the nuclear program may appear to reward Pyongyang's bad behaviour, but diplomacy is still the least bad option. At the same time, the UN Security Council's strong and united condemnation of the test in Resolution 1874 must be enforced, while containment of proliferation and deterrence of North Korean provocations need to be boosted.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- Israel, Asia, and North Korea
458. U.S.-Iranian Engagement: The View from Tehran
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- For perhaps the first time since Iran and the U.S. broke ties in 1980, there are real prospects for fundamental change. The new U.S. president, Barack Obama, stated willingness to talk unconditionally. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, implicitly blessed dialogue, and presidential candidates are vying to prove they would be the most effective interlocutor. Yet, while U.S. objectives and tactics are relatively familiar, little is known of Iran's thinking, even as much is assumed. Western interaction with its opaque political system and decision-making has both shrivelled and been narrowly focused on the nuclear file. Under-standing Iran's perspective is critical if engagement is to succeed. This briefing, based on meetings with officials and analysts, seeks to shed light on what Tehran thinks about dialogue, its goals and visions of a future relationship. It concludes that while full normalisation might be out of reach for now, there is a chance to achieve a more realistic objective: the start of a long-term dialogue that minimises risks of confrontation and advances areas of mutual interest.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iran, and Tehran
459. Iran's Role and Power in the Region and the International System
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
- Abstract:
- The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Liechtenstein Institute in Vienna, Austria (LIVA) convened the colloquium, “Iran's Role and Power in the Region and the International System,” March 5-8, 2009 in Triesenberg, Liechtenstein. This colloquium was funded in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, by the SIBIL Foundation, Vaduz, and by the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein. It was organized by Miriam Schive, Resident Director of LIVA, and chaired by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Director of LISD.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Power Politics
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
460. Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Publication Date:
- 05-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Peace Institute
- Abstract:
- The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) remains a key challenge to international peace and security. Yet the member states of the United Nations are still deeply divided on how to meet this challenge.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- United Nations