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361. A Detour Strategy for the Test Ban Treaty

Author:
Liviu Horovitz
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Arms control supporters are impatient with the Obama administration as it completes its third year in office. Neither the strength nor the pace of nuclear policy reform has been to their liking. In retrospect, the credit they gave the administration for the New START treaty with Russia appears somewhat tarnished. Once the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty in December 2010, the obvious next step on the agenda was to push for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). But in spite of the promises made by the White House, the prospects for a swift CTBT approval process are grim. The administration traded away all its chips in exchange for New START support, and the political landscape for the rest of President Obama's term appears anything but promising. The road to success requires a new approach.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and India

362. Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security

Author:
Micah D. Lowenthal
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The history of science diplomacy for nuclear security is rich and includes, for example, establishing confidence in the verifiability of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, paving the way to many nonproliferation efforts, and damping potentially drastic responses to actions perceived by adversaries as provocative. The ingredients for success in science diplomacy may be summarized in terms of seven factors: openness to new possibilities, vision and leadership, good science, human connections, communication, time, and self-interest. Experts from Russia and the United States have identified topics that would benefit from or demand science diplomacy: nuclear energy and nonproliferation, nuclear arms reductions, countering nuclear terrorism, cooperation on ballistic missile defense, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Differing perspectives on goals in these areas, however, provide new opportunities to work together to promote security. A variety of policy measures and physical safeguards have been put in place to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Because of the technical complexities of nearly every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle and its potential for exploitation and terrorism, science diplomacy can continue to make substantial contributions on these topics. Verification of treaties, including nuclear arms reductions and test bans, is perhaps the topic within arms control most susceptible to technical options. Joint exploration and development of technical options to enable proposals for verification of treaties is a valuable topic in which science diplomacy has an essential role to play. Cooperation on ballistic missile defense (BMD) is an area of tension between the United States and Russia today. Such cooperation has technical and political dimensions. So far, the political discussions have resurfaced underlying suspicions, suggesting that science diplomacy is the stronger option for building confidence and identifying technical options that enable BMD cooperation. Although the Cold War is over, the variety of nuclear and other threats has grown, and science diplomacy is needed now more than ever to address those threats. Science diplomacy practitioners who are daunted by the sensitivity of the topics of the day must remember the successes in science diplomacy between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning nuclear weapons. The topics are important in part because they are so sensitive, and today's generations owe it to future generations to take on the challenge of science diplomacy to address the new and vexing security challenges the world faces in the twenty-first century.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

363. Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph was presented at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference connected with the Council's U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset policy with Moscow that concern arms control and proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the question of whether further reductions in strategic offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes to have Russia reduce.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, North Atlantic, and Moscow

364. Forecasting Zero: U.S. Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament

Author:
Jonathan Pearl
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
When four luminaries of U.S. policymaking—Cold Warriors, all—penned a 2007 op-ed calling for global nuclear disarmament, a shock wave emanated through the policy community in Washington and abroad. Had age or the stress of public life finally taken its toll on these elder statesmen? How could the goal of disarmament be practically achieved? Was their plea, in fact, a cynical ploy to strengthen a conventionally dominant United States? Were not communist sympathizers, naïve world government types, or a periodically randy anti-nuclear movement the only ones who took disarmament seriously? Perhaps most important, did their statement reflect a convergence of sentiment in the United States in favor of abolition? Might the United States abolish nuclear weapons in our lifetime?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

365. Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Author:
Stephen J. Blank (ed.)
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As of November 2010, the so-called “New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)” treaty between the United States and Russia that was signed in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, awaits a ratification vote in the Senate. Regardless of the arguments pro and con that have emerged since it was signed, it is clear that the outcome of the ratification vote will not only materially affect the Obama administration's reset policy towards Russia, but also the strategic nuclear forces of both signatories. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, both sides built up their forces based on what each was thought to have or be building. Although the Bush administration (2001-09) rhetorically announced its intention to sever this mutual hostage relationship, it failed in that regard. As a result, critical aspects of that relationship still survive in Russia's orientation to the United States and in the language of the treaty, especially in its preamble, which explicitly affirms a link between nuclear offense and defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Czech Republic

366. Implementing an Arms Trade Treaty: Lessons on Reporting and Monitoring from Existing Mechanisms

Author:
Mark Bromley and Paul Holtom
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The aims, scope and coverage of an arms trade treaty (ATT) will determine the format and types of information to be provided to an ATT reporting mechanism. It is expected that one of the obligations under the mechanism will be for states parties to provide information on their arms transfers and transfer control systems. A key consideration when designing an ATT reporting mechanism is its future interaction with existing reporting mechanisms. In this context, voluntary reporting of information on arms transfers to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and of information on transfer control systems to the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in A ll Its Aspects (POA) and the UN Exchange of National Legislation on Transfer of Arms, Military Equipment and Dual-use Goods and Technology (UN Legislation Exchange) are particularly relevant. Other UN instruments that provide potential lessons and areas of potential over- lap, include UN Security Council resolutions imposing arms embargoes and UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which obligate states to provide information on aspects of national transfer controls. At the regional level, member states of the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are requested to provide information on transfer controls and international arms transfers, while members of the Organization of American States (OAS) are required to provide information on arms acquisitions. It is inevitable that the reporting requirements under an ATT will overlap with some of these instruments, particularly the voluntary UN reporting mechanisms. If an ATT is to increase transparency, then existing obligations should serve as the baseline for reporting under the new treaty.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe

367. Waking the Nuclear Dragon? NATO's Defence and Deterrence Posture Review

Author:
Trine Flockhart
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
NATO is currently busy with preparations for a comprehensive Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR) to be ready for the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012. Yet despite the hectic activity and despite the importance of the review, almost nothing is being said in public. NATO is well aware of the potential for a damaging nuclear decision crisis in NATO and the outcome of the process seems likely to stay close to the current status quo.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, Peace Studies, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Chicago

368. "India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb"

Author:
Andrew B. Kennedy
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Why did India merely flirt with nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 1970s only to emerge as a nuclear power in the 1990s? Although a variety of factors informed India's prolonged restraint and subsequent breakthrough, new evidence indicates that India's “nuclear odyssey” can be understood as a function of Indian leaders' ability to secure their country through nonmilitary means, particularly implicit nuclear umbrellas and international institutions. In the 1960s and 1970s, India was relatively successful in this regard as it sought and received implicit support from the superpowers against China. This success, in turn, made acquiring the bomb a less pressing question. At the end of the Cold War, however, nonmilitary measures ceased to be viable for India. In the late 1980s, waning Soviet support and the failure of Rajiv Gandhi's diplomatic initiatives led to the creation of India's de facto nuclear arsenal. In the 1990s, India developed a more overt capability, not simply because the pro-bomb Bharatiya Janata Party came to power, but also because its external backing had vanished and because its efforts to improve its security through diplomacy proved unsuccessful.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
China, India, and Soviet Union

369. The Political Ontology of Catastrophe: Inventing the Vulnerable Society, 1953-1958

Author:
Stephen J. Collier
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs
Abstract:
This paper explores “system vulnerability thinking” as a specific response to the exigencies of thermonuclear war in the 1950s. It is one part of a collaborative project with Andrew Lakoff on the government of catastrophe in the post - World War II United States. The project focuses on the forms of expertise, the knowledge practices, and the governmental institutions that have been invented to anticipate and manage potential catastrophes, from natural disasters, to pandemic disease, to terrorism, to energy crises. In this project we have identified the reconfiguration of US government in the early years of the Cold War as a crucial moment in which the government of catastrophe in the post - World War II US took shape.
Topic:
Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, War, and History
Political Geography:
United States

370. Paradox of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

Author:
David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear. Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side's increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce-and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability-depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States. All three strategic domains are "offense dominant"-technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have. Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment-in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors-increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace. Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered "nonviolent." As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Communism, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia