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331. Nuclear Developments in North Korea

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Three years ago, Pyongyang expelled the international inspectors from its Yongbyon nuclear complex and abandoned the Six - Party talks. The crisis atmosphere on the Korean peninsula sparked by Pyongyang's military actions in 2010 turned into diplomatic calm in 2011, but Pyongyang continued to expand its nuclear program. It conducted a second nuclear test in 2009, unveiled a modern, sophisticated uranium centrifuge facility, and rolled out a road - mobile intermediate - range ballistic missile in 2010. Its coopera tion in missile technologies with Iran continued and nuclear cooperation is suspected. Beijing protected Pyongyang from crippling sanctions while Washington and Seoul remained reluctant to engage having been burned by Pyongyang's unveiling of its clandestine uranium enrichment program. Prospects for resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis looked grim. Then, surprisingly in December 2011, just before the death of Kim Jong - il, American and North Korean diplomats nearly reached a deal to return to the negotiating table. Even more surprisingly, the new Kim regime agreed to take initial steps with Washington in February. In this paper, I describe the troubling nuclear developments in 2011 and suggest targets for the upcoming negotiations to further reduce the nuclear risks while the parties resume the long road toward eventual denuclearization and normalization of relations on the Korean peninsula.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
North Korea

332. A Winning Gambit

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
CISAC Co-Director Siegfried Hecker explains why nuclear arms states stand to gain more than they lose by ratifying the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). He explains why it is crucial to prevent states from testing nuclear weapons, with the strongest barrier to testing being the CTBT.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and International Security
Political Geography:
United States

333. Preparing for a Constructive 2012 Conference on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

Author:
W.P.S. Sidhu (ed), Bruce Jones (ed), and Colette Jaycox
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The consensus decision reached at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East was, perhaps, the most salient outcome of the quinquennium gathering.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arabia

334. Looking Beyond the Chicago Summit: Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Future of NATO

Author:
George Perkovich, Steven Pifer, Malcolm Chalmers, Paul Schulte, and Jaclyn Tandler
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will meet for a summit in Chicago this May to conclude their Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR), which was intended to be a vehicle for resolving key questions about the future role of nuclear weapons in NATO policy. However, NATO is unlikely to resolve the question of what to do about its forward deployed nuclear weapons before the summit.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Europe and Chicago

335. CNS NPT Monitoring Report - Disarmament

Author:
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The Eighth Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded on May 28, 2010 with the adoption by consensus of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions, which contain 64 action items across the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. An additional set of recommendations contained in the final document pertains to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East. While the adoption of the “action plan” was widely and deservedly regarded as a success, its long-term impact will depend on the implementation by the NPT member states.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Peace Studies, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Middle East

336. Inching Forward at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

Author:
Sharon Squassoni
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A few days before Seoul hosted the official Nuclear Security Summit in late March, experts met to discuss progress on nuclear security. The keynote speaker, Dr. Graham Allison from Harvard University, suggested a strategy of three “No's” to reduce future nuclear risks: no loose nuclear weapons or materials; no new national enrichment or reprocessing facilities; and no new nuclear weapon states. This strategy links traditional “nuclear security”—physical protection of nuclear material—with nuclear nonproliferation and fuel cycle management. Yet at the summit a few days later, the 52 heads of state, along with leaders of four international organizations on nuclear terrorism, focused on doing exactly the opposite: separating out nuclear security from nonproliferation, and putting as much distance between the growth of nuclear power and nuclear risks as possible. The result: underwhelming progress and no surprises.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
South Korea

337. China-North Korea: Renewal of the "Blood Alliance"

Author:
Masako Ikegami
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As North Korea's latest rocket-missile launch approaches, there is speculation whether Beijing can halt Pyongyang's missile ambitions. In my view, Beijing will turn a blind eye towards North Korea's latest provocation, while simultaneously calling for restraint by all parties. Recently, the China-North Korea “blood alliance,” a concept of allies that originated during the Korean War, has been renewed, and it is in China's interests that North Korea consolidates its “absolute deterrence” capability to deter US forces in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, and North Korea

338. Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Nuclear-Weapon States

Author:
Peter Crail and Xiaodon Liang
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Following a decade-long impasse, the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) is finally on a path to being endorsed by the world's five recognized nuclear-weapon states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Agreement by these nuclear powers to respect the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia and to provide legal assurances that they will not use such weapons against zone members helps to strengthen the commitment by regional states not to pursue nuclear weapons, and contributes more broadly to global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts,
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, France, and Southeast Asia

339. Turkey and the Iranian nuclear programme: Key to progress in regional disarmament?

Author:
Hanna Ojanen and Barbara Zanchetta
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The increasing tension around the Iranian nuclear programme and the uncompromising positions of the protagonists have made the goal of creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East seem utopic. Yet, the current strategy of maintaining a low profile in the discussions on the zone, while keeping the focus exclusively on Iran, is not likely to lead to progress. Instead, combining the Iranian question with the zone and enlarging the content and scope of the negotiations even further by including Iran's neighbours could be a better strategy. Turkey could play a key role because of its unique relations with Iran, and because of its strong quest for a more prominent international position — if it can only strike the right balance between the role of lead actor and team player. Turkish-Iranian relations could notably inspire the consideration of accompanying pragmatic agreements on regional cooperation in other fields as a way forward for the upcoming Middle East disarmament negotiations in Finland.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and Finland

340. The P5 +1, Iran and the Perils of Nuclear Brinkmanship

Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West have had their share of dashed expectations, but even by this peculiar standard, the recent diplomatic roller coaster stands out. Brimming with hope in Istanbul, negotiators crashed to earth in Baghdad, a few weeks later. That was not unexpected, given inflated hopes, mismatched expectations and – most hurtful – conviction on both sides that they had the upper hand. But if negotiations collapse now, it is hard to know what comes next. Washington and Brussels seem to count on sanctions taking their toll and forcing Iran to compromise. Tehran appears to bank on a re-elected President Obama displaying more flexibility and an economically incapacitated Europe balking at sanctions that could boomerang. Neither is likely; instead, with prospects for a deal fading, Israeli pressure for a military option may intensify. Rather than more brinkmanship, Iran and the P5+1 (UN Security Council permanent members and Germany) should agree on intensive, continuous, technicallevel negotiations to achieve a limited agreement on Iran's 20 per cent enrichment.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Europe and Middle East