241. Verifying a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Technical and Organizational Considerations
- Author:
- Shannon N. Kile and Robert E. Kelley
- Publication Date:
- 08-2012
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
- Abstract:
- In recent years there has been renewed momentum behind international efforts to open negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Should these efforts finally bear fruit, a key question that will have to be addressed in the negotiations is what organization should be given the responsibility for verifying compliance with the proposed fissile material production ban. One widely mentioned choice for this role is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in light of its long experience in implementing nuclear safeguards agreements mandated by the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non- Proliferation Treaty, NPT). Many of the tools and procedures developed by the IAEA for safeguards purposes could be directly applied to verifying a future FMCT.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Governance, and Nuclear Power