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Begin New Search Topic Nonproliferation Publication Year within 25 Years

111. The role of Brazil in multilateral disarmament efforts

Author:
Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
This article examines Brazil’s motivations, objectives, and action in international instances related to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, particularly the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The paper describes the evolution of Brazilian attitudes and decisions and discusses prospects for nuclear disarmament opened by the proposal of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, Multilateralism, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Brazil and South America

112. Brazil’s Nuclear Submarine: A Broader Approach to the Safeguards Issue

Author:
Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz Costa
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The article discusses the issue of nuclear-propelled submarines as a nuclear non-proliferation question, addresses the issue of safeguards procedures and arrangements, and suggests a broader, political approach to allay international concerns. Such safeguards arrangement would set the precedent for future arrangements, and particularly if integrated into a more comprehensive approach, might strengthen Brazil’s hand in nuclear negotiations, including on disarmament.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Maritime, and Submarines
Political Geography:
Brazil, Argentina, and South America

113. Nuclear Infrastructure and Proliferation Risks of the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Erica Wenig, David Albright, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Apart from Saudi Arabia, which our Institute views as currently the largest proliferation risk in the Middle East, three key neighbors of Iran also warrant intensive study as to their nuclear capabilities and plans, safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and future proliferation risks. After Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt are seen by the Institute as states in the Middle East most poised to seek advanced nuclear capabilities in response to a resurgent nuclear Iran, or as the limitations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) conclude or otherwise end. Egypt has the most experience of the three in working with nuclear materials and facilities under efforts dating back decades. Turkey may pose the greatest risk as far as surprise proliferation given the state of political affairs in that country and growing impulse of President Erdogan to consolidate power. The UAE, which was the first Middle Eastern country to adopt a so-called “gold standard” of renouncing enrichment and reprocessing, will be a country to watch for reversing course on its pledge. Each of these countries has varying security concerns with regard to Iran, and each has nuanced domestic goals that could propel proliferation attempts. A common recommendation for all three countries is that the United States and its allies should seek strong defensive relationships with those countries potentially affected by the end of JCPOA limits; others include the United States should work to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in the region and use national intelligence and diplomatic capabilities to detect and work to reverse proliferation if it emerges. A summary of findings on each country follows, with a technical look at their emerging nuclear capabilities and plans, the security context with regard to Iran, status of their safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and recommendations for preventing the spread of advanced nuclear capabilities in the region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

114. Strengthening the Counter-Illicit Nuclear Trade Regime in the Face of New Threats: A Two-Year Review of Proliferation Threats Associated with the Middle East

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, Sarah Burkhard, and Erica Wenig
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The United States’ and associated global export control regime is losing ground due to several global events and trends underway in the United States and the Middle East. The developments at home and abroad are reducing controls and oversight over the flow of commodities vital to the development of nuclear weapons. Unless these trends are reversed, U.S. efforts to stem and stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and elsewhere will weaken. Events contributing to this greater proliferation danger include: 1) relaxed U.S. export control regulations and greater emphasis on global trade with streamlined exchange of intellectual property and commodities, including nuclear commodities; 2) on-going questions over the strong regulation of sensitive trade to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and 3) the expected actions of additional states to obtain nuclear capabilities to counterbalance Iran. This report provides findings from four studies that were part of a two-year Institute for Science and International Security review which identified threats to the United States’ and interconnected global export control regime and actions to take now to mitigate damages. The review found that U.S. policy goals should include strong efforts to restrict the flow of sensitive technologies to the Middle East where proliferation and security concerns are currently high. This includes examining its own export control reforms and repairing new or ongoing deficiencies that contribute to the spread of sensitive military or other technologies. It should work to negotiate or otherwise impose the extension of limitations on Iran’s nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), since the legitimization of Iran’s advanced nuclear program exacerbates proliferation concerns. It should counter illicit nuclear and missile trade in the Middle East and elsewhere, which could support nuclear weapons development. The United States should affirm its strong defensive commitment to allies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt, while working against their development or import of advanced fuel cycle capabilities. The United States should also support the implementation of strong controls and transparency measures in the Middle East to ensure that burgeoning civilian nuclear programs remain peaceful, such as commitments not to enrich or reprocess, implementation of the Additional Protocol, and provision of secure, lifetime fuel supplies for nuclear reactors. It should monitor via national intelligence capabilities any concerning research or imports by Middle East nations that could signify proliferation intentions, and use all available diplomatic or coercive means to prevent additional nuclear proliferation. Finally, the United States and its allies should work to reduce Middle East security tensions and develop threat reduction efforts more broadly.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Middle East

115. The Challenge From North Korea

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro and Ettore Greco
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
A nuclear-armed North Korea is a threat to the fragile strategic equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula and to international security at large. Emboldened by a nuclear arsenal, the highly militarized regime of President Kim Jong-un could be tempted to embark on aggressive acts. Meanwhile, the United States could opt for preventive military action. Even if neither party seeks a military confrontation, conflict could ensue due to miscalculation or simple misreading of each other’s intentions. Limited military exchanges could spiral out of control, eventually involving not only North Korea, the United States, and its allies in the region—Japan and South Korea—but also China. The repercussions of North Korea’s nuclear challenge may not be limited to Northeast Asia, not least because the nonproliferation regime, a pillar of international security, would be dealt a serious, if not fatal, blow if regional adversaries sought to meet it by acquiring their own nuclear arsenals. The destabilizing effects of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programs on regional and international security cannot be overestimated. In devising a response to the North Korean challenge, regional actors should remain committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but they should also implement security measures with observable results short of full denuclearization. Specifically, the United States and its allies should concentrate on sanctioning North Korea and on diplomatic action, actively seeking the involvement of China and Russia, while employing a strategy of deterrence and containment.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

116. Seeing Missile Defense as U.S. Hostility, North Korea Aims at More and Better Weapons

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have spurred Japan and South Korea to develop their own ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and to regenerate their interest in regional missile defense cooperation with the United States. Has North Korea reacted to such developments, and if so, how? This paper looks at North Korea’s missile capacity development as well as its official proclamations and concludes that while Pyongyang likely does not believe that it is the region’s sole target for U.S. and allied BMD, it feels deeply threatened by its deployment. Existing and potential BMD systems have not discouraged Pyongyang from building its own missiles. Rather, North Korea is accelerating its efforts to improve and expand its missile arsenal to develop a survivable force, likely perceiving BMD systems as part of an overall U.S. strategy that is hostile to Pyongyang.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

117. Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat

Author:
Joshua Pollack
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Some of the most enduring disagreements in the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) concern ballistic missile defenses (BMD). At the same time that South Korea has expanded its conventional offensive missile program, it has declined American proposals for a regionally integrated BMD architecture, insisting on developing its own national system in parallel to the defenses operated by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). American appeals for interoperability between U.S. and ROK systems have been received cautiously, as were proposals to enhance its own BMD in Korea by introducing the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Peninsula for several years. A desire for expanded autonomy in national security appears to underpin Seoul’s attitudes on BMD. Rather than rely passively on American protection against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, South Korea’s military leaders have focused on developing precision-strike capabilities to intimidate Pyongyang, and resisted simply accepting an American BMD umbrella. Even more than they desire greater independence from their American patron-ally, South Koreans are suspicious of entanglements with Japan, their former colonial master, whose own defensive systems are already integrated with the American regional BMD architecture. This outlook encourages the pursuit of independent defense capabilities and discourages institutionalizing trilateral security arrangements.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

118. Stability at Low Nuclear Numbers

Author:
Catherine Kelleher
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
What conditions are needed for a stable transition to a new nuclear order, one in which the total number of nuclear weapons would be reduced to very low numbers, perhaps even zero? We have addressed the myriad issues raised by this question with funding from a grant on “Creating Conditions for a Stable Transition to a New Nuclear Order,” co-directed by Catherine Kelleher and Judith Reppy, from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation to the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University. Our project had three goals: to take a fresh look at the theoretical underpinnings of the arguments about strategic security and nuclear doctrines; to encourage members of the younger generation (NextGen) scholars working on nuclear security issues to see themselves as part of a network that stretches from scholars in the field to active participants in the policy process; and to disseminate the products of the project to the policy community, in Washington and elsewhere. We convened five workshops—in Berlin (December 2014); Ithaca, NY (November 2015 and November 2016); Monterey, CA (February 2016); and Washington, DC (May 2016)—and held five discussion (“reach-in”) meetings with Washington insiders at the Cosmos Club in Washington, DC. This essay concentrates on our project’s first goal: a re-assessment of the deterrence literature and the conditions for stability during a transition period to low nuclear numbers, perhaps nuclear zero. It is based on the work of the participants in the workshops and on our own reading of the literature, both from the early days of the nuclear age and more recent contributions following the end of the Cold War.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, South Korea, and North Korea

119. KEDO: How Multilateral Cooperation Helped an Unprecedented North Korean Project

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang promised to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid and improvement of relations with Washington. An international consortium led by the United States was created to implement the key provisions of the deal, including the delivery of two light water reactor (LWR) units. While multi-national efforts are common in commercial nuclear projects, the case of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was unique. KEDO’s challenges ranged from the lack of diplomatic relations between its main members and North Korea, to the country’s poor infrastructure. This paper examines KEDO’s experience and concludes that cooperation among its member states—Japan, South Korea, the United States and others—helped ensure the project’s financial and political feasibility, even if work did not proceed smoothly. While the construction of the LWRs was never completed due to larger political changes, KEDO’s experience offers lessons for future nuclear projects that face similar hurdles. EXPLORE:
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

120. Vienna meeting on Nuclear Energy and Proliferation Risks

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
There was general agreement that the JCPOA was a very positive solution to a complex issue, providing a constructive and peaceful way forward for the Middle East in particular, and the non-proliferation regime in general. The deal contained in the JCPOA is working as intended. Iran has been determined by the IAEA on multiple [6] occasions to be in full compliance with its obligations, and now has the most comprehensive safeguards and verification regime in history. World powers have followed through with some sanctions relief thereby aiding the Iranian economy. Furthermore, there have been other positive dimensions, including an effective joint commission process, greater transparency among parties, as well as communications and interactions taking place in a more positive atmosphere. At the same time, it was recognized that the deal is unstable: although the terms of the JCPOA were ring-fenced from the wider geopolitical environment of the Middle East, political manoeuvring can threaten its continued implementation. The spill-over of non-nuclear issues, often labelled under “Iranian behaviour”, should not be allowed to derail the process. It was noted in a positive sense that all the main candidates in the Iranian Presidential campaign have signalled their desire to continue with the JCPOA. However, several participants felt that some of Iran’s regional policies could undermine this, risking a negative reaction from the US and other states. Some argued that given Iran’s disputed compliance history with IAEA safeguards agreements (which even two years later remains heated) and, in general, the uneasy relations in the past between Iran and IAEA, it is important that Iran continue to strictly comply to the letter of the JCPOA. The US domestic context provides perhaps the greatest potential risk to the sustainability of the JCPOA. It was noted that President Trump may not, after all, ‘tear up’ the deal. The possibility was raised that, because many in his national security team were seen as hostile to Iran, any minor safeguards violation may be seized upon to terminate the deal. Such a hard-line approach could isolate the US from a global consensus and weaken its hand in other relevant matters. There is further danger that Congress could act alone in enacting a bill (of which many are on the table) that would be in contravention of the JCPOA. This possibility was considered unrealistic by some participants. Some details of Security Council resolution 2231 were seen as problematic in a number of ways: the explicit provisions on ballistic missiles were viewed as an unnecessarily punitive measure unrelated to the main goals of the JCPOA; equally, some of the inquiry and resolution mechanisms were seen by some as unbalanced. The JCPOA should in any case be understood as a temporary solution. Even though continuing to implement it effectively would build more confidence, ultimately trust between Iran and some Western states will likely never be high. However, the deal does hold the potential for transformative progress in Iran-US relations, pending further steps to de-escalate and normalize relations. Many of Iran’s neighbours worry that the remaining latent nuclear capacity has only delayed the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran down the road; at the same time, many regional states are also pursuing nuclear fuel cycle programs. The JCPOA should also offer the international community an opportunity to consider how to extend some measures indefinitely and extend them to other countries. Regional stability and non-proliferation could be enhanced by extending some of the JPCOA provisions to the Middle East and beyond it. As such, Pugwash should make efforts to convene and organize meetings to explore far-reaching initiatives that are in the spirit of the agreement; for example: initiatives to discuss ‘internationalizing’ the nuclear fuel cycle; forward-looking regional agreements, such as a threshold of uranium enrichment, a ban on plutonium reprocessing, or limits on stockpiles of LEU; innovative safeguards measures, such as advanced monitoring technology, enhanced access to centrifuge production facilities, or explicitly set times for snap inspections; further multilateral scientific and technical cooperation, such as the SESAME project.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and Israel