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101. Alternative East Asian Nuclear Futures, Volume II: Energy Scenarios

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The 13 chapters contained in this book’s two volumes were prompt- ed by a single inquiry in 2012 from the MacArthur Foundation. Was there any way, I was asked, to further clarify the economic and nonproliferation downsides if further production of civilian pluto- nium proceeded in East Asia? My initial reply was no. So much already had been done.But the more I thought about it, two things that had yet to be at- tempted emerged. The first was any serious analysis of just how bad things could get militarily if Japan and South Korea acquired nuclear weapons and North Korea and Mainland China ramped up their own production of such arms. Such nuclear proliferation had long been assumed to be undesirable but nobody had specified how such proliferation might play out militarily. Second, no serious consideration had yet been given to how East Asia might be able to prosper economically without a massive buildup of civilian nucle- ar power. Since each of the key nations in East Asia—China, the Koreas, and Japan—all would likely exploit their civilian nuclear energy infrastructure to acquire their first bombs or to make more, such inattention seemed odd.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, North Korea, and Global Focus

102. Will North Korea Denuclearize after the Singapore Summit? Lessons from the past

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Policy-makers, scholars, and analysts disagree about whether North Korea will take any meaningful denuclearization steps after its leader Kim Jong Un met with U.S. President Donald Trump in Singapore in June 2018. Many believe that the breakdowns of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks process in the 2000s show that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program cannot be constrained through cooperation. According to this view, Pyongyang violated its previous commitments once it received economic and political benefits, and it will do so again. The underlying assumption is that Washington was fully implementing its own commitments until Pyongyang broke the deal. But is this true? This paper discusses three key findings drawn from an analysis of U.S. implementation of past denuclearization agreements with North Korea. The first is that the United Stated did not always follow through with its cooperative commitments because of domestic political constraints, even when North Korea was fulfilling its commitments. This makes it difficult to determine whether North Korea ultimately did not honor its obligations because it never intended to or because it was responding to U.S. actions. The second is that some parts of past deals were more susceptible than others to being undercut by domestic opposition because they received insufficient political attention. The third is that such domestic interference could be minimized by obtaining the widest possible coalition of domestic support from the negotiation stage. The roadmap for North Korea’s denuclearization is unclear, as the Singapore summit did not determine concrete steps toward that goal. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to Pyongyang in early July also did not yield specifics such as the scope and timeline of denuclearization. But based on the findings from past agreements, this paper argues that the only way for the United States to find out if engagement will work this time is to test North Korea’s intentions by carrying out Washington’s own cooperative commitments more consistently than in the past.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

103. International Collaboration Efforts to Denuclearize the Korean Peninsula

Author:
George Hutchinson
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The international community’s confrontation with North Korea reached crisis proportions in 2017, following Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches and its sixth nuclear test. In the wake of a series of high-level summits, tensions began to thaw in 2018. At the inter-Korean summit in Panmunjom on April 27, 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un agreed to seek support from the international community to denuclearize. But the international community, led by the U.S. in concert with the United Nations Security Council, has already worked tirelessly over the past 26 years to coordinate efforts to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Successive U.S. administrations have worked through the cycle of confrontation, crisis, discussions and agreements with North Korea. Nonetheless, all these agreements have ultimately fallen apart, allowing North Korea to advance its nuclear program. This paper focuses on two key questions: How has the international community contributed toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and what is its role in facilitating the complete, verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program? Ultimately, the success of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula will be measured by whether North Korea completely dismantles its nuclear program. Fortunately, the international “tools” are on the table, but successfully denuclearizing North Korea will, in the end, be a matter of effectively enforcing existing international measures.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

104. Revitalizing Diplomatic Efforts to Advance CTBT Entry Into Force

Author:
Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
More than two decades after the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty has near universal support and has established a global norm against nuclear test explosions. The nuclear testing taboo impedes the development of new and more advanced nuclear warhead designs, which helps prevent dangerous nuclear competition, and maintain international security. Although the CTBT has created a norm against testing and a robust technical organization responsible for the operation and maintenance of a highly sensitive global nuclear test monitoring system, the treaty has not entered into force due to the failure of eight key states, including the United States and China, to ratify. The CTBT is and will continue to be an essential pillar in the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament enterprise. Moving closer to the goal of the CTBT’s formal entry into force is the task of every CTBT state party, every nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) state-party, every state that supports the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and any other state that considers itself a “responsible” nuclear actor. But in order to realize the full potential of the treaty and to close the door on testing, friends of the CTBT will need to rejuvenate and update their efforts to achieve its entry into force and reinforce the taboo against nuclear testing.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

105. Findings from the 2016 Symposium on Export Control of Emerging Biotechnologies

Author:
Steven Fairchild, Caroline R. M. Kennedy, Philippe Mauger, Todd J. Savage, and Raymond A. Zilinskas
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The Symposium on the Export Control of Emerging Biotechnologies was held during October 18-20, 2016 in Monterey, California, USA. Co-hosted by the International Biosecurity and Prevention Forum (IBPF) and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, the symposium’s objectives were to identify emerging biotechnologies that are candidates for export control as well as effective mechanisms for their enforcement. A total of sixty experts from fifteen countries participated in the symposium. They represented the scientific, policy, industry, legal, and enforcement fields in roughly equal proportions. Attendees participated in one of nine working groups that were tasked with identifying emerging biotechnologies of concern and which, therefore, could be subject to realistic mechanisms for export control. In the event, participants identified seventeen emerging biotechnologies and services and debated whether each posed significant biosecurity risks. Participants then assessed options for new hard controls (export controls) and soft approaches (e.g., industry codes-of-conducts). Most participants flagged four biotechnologies and associated services as engagement priorities: ground-based aerosol generating systems; DNA synthesis and assembly equipment; high-throughput screening systems; and facility-wide production control software. Findings from the symposium have been documented in a final report that was published in April 2017 as CNS Occasional Paper #26.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

106. “Stress Testing” the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova and Andrea Berger
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
On June 7, 2017, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey brought together thirteen experts for a one-day workshop “stress testing” the draft convention to ban nuclear weapons. The exercise was designed to examine key provisions of the draft, identify potential problems in terms of their implementation, compatibility with other existing instruments and practices, and reactions of states not participating in the negotiations, and seek possible solutions. The organizers did not seek to forge consensus among the participants but rather generate discussion and proposals on ways to address the issues raised by the experts. Participants were also asked to set aside their views on the desirability of a convention as a whole, and instead assume that a ban, as currently drafted, was concluded and opened for ratification. As a result, the views presented in this report are not intended to serve as arguments for or against a convention banning nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

107. The Verification Clearinghouse: Debunking Websites and the Potential for Public Nonproliferation Monitoring

Author:
Bryan Lee and Kyle Pilutti
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The rapid pace at which information spreads online has been a boon for information gathering but poses risks with respect to the truth of the information. This risk increases with high-stakes information, such as treaty compliance judgements, and it is one of the main reasons why publicly available information is usually excluded from verification efforts. Nevertheless, just as military and intelligence experts have developed techniques to counter deception, techniques to debunk online deception have grown in power and sophistication. Most of these techniques can be applied by a dedicated amateur and allow the user to identify manipulations of images, video, and audio. Coupled with the rise of open source analytical tools, there is now the potential to construct a “verification clearinghouse,” an online website that would allow both experts and members of the public to monitor and evaluate arms control treaties. There are a number of existing online debunking sites available to the public. The majority of them focus on smaller niche topics, such as sites dedicated to political fact checking or Internet hoaxes. In other cases, sites are maintained by enthusiastic experts who work to debunk cases that are of particular interest or importance to themselves or their fields. These sites are important building blocks for future verification clearinghouse efforts. In our analysis, we characterize the existing attempts to address online deception, identifying the factors that make them particularly advantageous, and group them into three different types as shown below.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Internet, Nonproliferation, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

108. Crowdsourcing Systems and Potential Applications in Nonproliferation

Author:
Bryan Lee
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of crowdsourcing systems and identifies the key elements in their successful operation. It also offers an examination of best practices for US government implementation of crowdsourcing projects. Finally, it describes four instances of crowdsourcing projects with applicability to arms control and nonproliferation. Crowdsourcing systems have been used to address a variety of problems, but government applications are typically restricted to one of four types
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Governance, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

109. Revisiting Compliance in the Biological Weapons Convention

Author:
James Revill
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Since the collapse of negotiations around a protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2001, states parties have begun to discuss several novel issues linked to the broader implementation of the BWC as part of a series of intersessional meetings. While initially fruitful, this approach has generated diminishing returns in the last five years. Moreover, in addressing these broader issues of implementation, biological disarmament diplomacy has largely neglected the thorny issue of compliance. Compliance with the BWC is more than a simple binary choice to sign a commitment not to develop or produce biological weapons. It requires the adherence to all the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties in signing and ratifying the convention. In the BWC context, this is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding certain obligations, changes in science and security, and the limited resource capacity of some states to fulfill their obligations. Under such circumstances, without episodically revisiting compliance, there remains the risk that BWC will become ever more fragmented, outmoded and poorly implemented. Although many states insist strengthening the convention can only be achieved through a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocol, this is not politically feasible for the foreseeable future. Nor is this necessarily true; an incremental approach to strengthening the convention could be pursued, dealing with mutually reinforcing components of the regime in a balanced manner and laying the foundations for future work, if and when it becomes politically expedient to proceed. This Occasional Paper proposes a number of activities that could be pursued as part of an incremental approach to revisiting compliance with the BWC.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Biological Weapons, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

110. Open-Source Monitoring of Uranium Mining and Milling for Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications

Author:
Jeffrey Lewis, Melissa Hanham, Joshua Pollack, Catherine Dill, and Raymond Wang
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Uranium mines and mills offer an important focus for the analysis of fissile-material production. It is possible to combine traditional research techniques with new tools and technologies to estimate the production of yellowcake uranium. Such estimates can, in turn, be used to roughly estimate the throughput of a country’s nuclear fuel cycle. In some cases, this may help researchers to determine whether undeclared fuel cycle facilities exist and to estimate their capacity. This CNS Occasional Paper is the first in a series of papers funded by the MacArthur Foundation. It deals primarily with how researchers can use open-source information to monitor uranium mining and milling in the service of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation goals. Additional monographs will provide regional cases studies in North Korea, China, India, and Pakistan to demonstrate what these methods can reveal—and what they cannot. The final monographs look at the emerging, and potentially revolutionary, role of remote sensing for this application and gives policy recommendations.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Mining, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus