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Begin New Search Topic Non State Actors Publication Year within 25 Years

51. A Tale of Two Jihads: Unraveling the Atrocities of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel

Author:
Frederick Appiah Afriyie
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The Sahel area of West Africa has become the latest battleground for Al-Qaeda affiliated Jama`at Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State affiliated Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS). This piece as far as possible identifies the heightened atrocities perpetuated by both groups in the Sahel region. With little or no doubt, the strategies and ascendancy in atrocities orchestrated by the JNIM and ISGS could be largely hypothesized to have negative implications for Africa’s Sahel region (Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania). As a matter of concern, the paper confirms the said hypothesis and finds that the activities of the two Jihad-descent groups poses adverse security, social and political ramifications for the Sahel region and even beyond. With the theory of deprivation as the undergirding framework, the work explores how lack of basic needs and legitimate entitlements of citizens have catalyzed the dominance of JNIM and ISGS in the Sahel. Aside discussing the formation, trends of events, atrocities and strategies of JNIM and ISGS, the paper advances for a swift, action-oriented and collective efforts of governments within the Sahel region. In order to restore Sahel’s stability, increased security collaboration and strengthening the tenets of good governance are some worthwhile recommendations postulated.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, Jihad, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
Political Geography:
Africa, Sahel, and Sahara

52. Three frontlines in Africa's resource conflicts

Author:
Peter Albrecht and Marie Ladekjær Gravesen
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Conflicts over land and resources are nothing new on the African continent. However, as global attention has turned towards environmental issues – as well as Africa’s rich renewable energy sources and precious minerals – the nature of these conflicts has changed. Research shows three frontlines that investors, humanitarian actors, and policymakers need to be aware of as they invest or engage in green initiatives in Africa.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Development, Migration, Water, Food, Non State Actors, Governance, Inequality, and Land Rights
Political Geography:
Africa

53. Despite military progress, it’s not going well in Northern Benin

Author:
Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Government of Benin has shown a remarkably strong commitment to stopping the spread of violent extremism. It has invested in its military and its relations with the population and has largely been able to stand its ground against Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). Yet, from July 2022 onwards levels of violence in the region have increased by more than four times compared to the year before. And worse, they continue to show an upward trend. This policy brief makes three contributions. First, it shows that three distinct fronts have opened up, each with different social demographics. In these fronts VEOs target different constituencies and tailor their socio-political and religious message accordingly. A second contribution is a warning that the conflict is transforming from an outside problem into a localized insurgency. More and more, village infiltration takes place and VEOs develop deep ties with the population. This is dangerous. The final contribution is advice to the Government of Benin and its partners to develop a new and flexible response mechanism to directly follow up to VEO visits, identify social tensions and have flexible funding available to address peoples real and immediate needs.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

54. Understanding Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s Uses of Information Technology

Author:
Daniel Byman and Emma McCaleb
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s information technology (IT) strategies heavily reflect their roles in governance. Terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and the Islamic State eschew nationalism in favor of a broad pan-Islamist vision and focus media operations primarily on recruitment and at times operations. In contrast, Hamas and Hezbollah are nationalist as well as Islamist in orientation and favor traditional forms of communication over social media in order to legitimize their political power—a preference reinforced by the policies of technology companies and, in general, the limited capacity of these terrorist groups to use social media without considerable risk. Because Hamas and Hezbollah govern and provide goods, services, and information to their constituents, it is harder to target their IT infrastructure without risking humanitarian consequences.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Hezbollah, Hamas, Information Technology, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Lebanon

55. The Wagner Group's Playbook in Africa: Mali

Author:
Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
What is the Wagner Group doing in Mali? Since it rose to prominence after its involvement in the Syrian Civil War alongside the Assad regime, Wagner Group, a Russian-owned Private Military Contractor (PMC), has expanded its footprint into Africa. [1] Wagner has immersed itself in Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, leading training exercises, fighting anti-government forces, and brutally quelling protests. Wagner Group often overlaps with Russian state foreign policy aims, but its position as an independent contractor lends it unpredictability, while giving Russia plausible deniability. The group offers the Russian state a valuable tool: the ability to test new environments for military cooperation without appearing heavy-handed or overtly involved. Wagner has established a pattern of political, military, and economic involvement in Sudan and CAR since 2015. Wagner Group and its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have followed this strategy successfully in Mali, contributing to France’s recent decision to withdraw its military forces from the country. Although Wagner group still needs to adapt its strategy to succeed in a new environment in Mali, the Kremlin has strong-armed a key competitor out of the country. This creates potential contagion effects for the rest of the Sahel, particularly those countries facing long-term insurgencies, such as Burkina Faso.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Wagner Group, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Mali

56. Northern Afghanistan and the New Threat to Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The contest for control of northern Afghanistan between the Taliban, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups is a major security concern for the states of Central Asia. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have relied on the Taliban to prevent non-state actors from operating in northern Afghanistan and launching cross-border attacks. In recent months, however, the Islamic State has bombed mosques near the border with Central Asia, and claimed to have launched a rocket attack into Uzbekistan. The deteriorating situation in the region demonstrates the limits of Central Asian states’ security strategies, and highlights that they have few options in dealing with a new threat on their border.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Taliban, Borders, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and United States of America

57. US Has an Opportunity to Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Just over one year ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan. Leading up to this takeover, in February 2020 President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2021, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued the fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. While the US does not have many good policy options in Afghanistan because of the Biden administration’s actions, the US and international community need to consider how to support the NRF at this perilous time. This assistance can include establishing formal contact with the NRF leadership and inviting Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC; refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; providing the NRF with winter gear; allocating a certain percentage of all frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing, and consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnic Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Taliban
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

58. Risks, Recruits, and Plots: Understanding and Mitigating the Influence of the Islamic State in Malaysia

Author:
Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, Elina Noor, Marley Carroll, and William Frangia
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report traces the evolution of the Islamic State’s influence in Malaysia between January 2014 and December 2019, shedding light on the various local and international factors that facilitated the rise of the Islamic State’s influence in the country. In addition to considering underlying historical and current sociopolitical factors, the report draws on original data on Islamic State-affiliated arrests and plots to uncover new insights about the men and women who were arrested due to their involvement with the Islamic State’s brand of militancy in Malaysia. The overall findings of the report indicate a few macroscopic trends about the Islamic State’s activities in Malaysia over six years. First, the Syrian civil war played a major role in shaping Malaysia’s militant landscape with respect to the Islamic State threat—both as a destination and as a source of radicalization and recruitment for the Islamic State—which is largely characterized by disparate cells and social media platforms. Second, between 2014 and 2019, there were a total of 23 reported plots in six Malaysian states or federal territories, with only one resulting in casualties—indicative of the Islamic State’s limited operational capacity in the country. Third, with regard to tactics, compared to the Philippines and Indonesia, Malaysian plotters did not turn to suicide attacks to the same extent: Per the authors’ data, there was only a single report of a planned suicide attack. However, Malaysian fighters were involved in planning or conducting suicide attacks in Iraq, Syria, and the Philippines. Finally, the report also yields interesting findings about the profiles of the arrests of Islamic State-affiliated individuals in Malaysia, which totaled 319 people between 2014 and 2019 across 15 provinces. The majority of the individuals arrested were Malaysian men, although the arrests also included women, with limited numbers of Indonesians and Filipinos. For men, the largest number of arrests was in the “planning/threatening attack” category while for women, the largest category across the six years was “attempted/planned travel.” Overall, the findings of this report suggest that one of the most dangerous characteristics associated with the Islamic State’s influence in Malaysia is its potential to radicalize and mobilize both men and women inspired by its extreme ideology without the existence of a formal Islamic State affiliate. The report concludes with a discussion of the need and potential pathways to strengthen community resilience to violent extremism within Malaysia.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Recruitment
Political Geography:
Malaysia and Southeast Asia

59. AQIM’s Imperial Playbook: Understanding al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s Expansion into West Africa

Author:
Caleb Weiss
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In 2021, the United Nations noted the newfound threats of the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), a branch of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), that extended into Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast, stretching farther yet into Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Had an observer in 2006 had this information presented to them, they might have scarcely believed it. That year, in which AQIM was formed, the group was a thoroughly North African organization and based primarily in Algeria. Fast forward 15 years, how did AQIM end up nearly 1,300 miles away, now posing immediate threats in the states of littoral West Africa? Relying on a combination of primary source jihadi propaganda and historical research, this report argues that over the past 30 years, al-Qa`ida and its branches and allies in North and West Africa have followed what this report calls “al- Qa`ida’s Imperial Playbook,” as they have sought to expand their areas of influence southward. Al-Qa`ida’s “playbook,” this report shows, is composed of five fundamental tactics: befriending or creating militant groups operating in the midst of conflict; integrating themselves into communities where those militants exist; exploiting grievances of those communities to gain sympathy; addressing internal or external dissent either passively or aggressively; and looking toward new theaters once their base is solidified. Al-Qa`ida has subsequently utilized this playbook to expand southward from its Algeria base in five distinct historical periods: from 1992- 1998; 1998-2006; 2006-2012; 2013-2017; and 2017-present. The report concludes that al-Qa`ida and its affiliates in northern and western Africa are likely to continue to use this playbook as they continue their contemporary expansion into West Africa.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, and History
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

60. From Warlords to Statelords: Armed Groups and Power Trajectories in Libya and Yemen

Author:
Eleanore Ardemagni and Federica Saini Fasanotti
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Armed groups play a central role in Libya and Yemen. Pervading weak and contested institutions, they have gradually brought their survival, profit and governance strategies under the state umbrella: warlords have become the new lords of the state. Armed groups control most of the energy revenues, critical infrastructure, smuggling and illicit trafficking. Their leaders are multifaceted: they are simultaneously military commanders, tribal chiefs, politicians and businessmen. Combining comparative analysis and case studies, this Report sheds light on the “economic face” of the armed groups and their power trajectories. How do armed groups build networks of profit and loyalty in the territories they hold? How does clientelism mark a continuity trend with former authoritarian regimes?
Topic:
Non State Actors, Governance, Armed Forces, and Economy
Political Geography:
Libya, Yemen, and North Africa