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Begin New Search Topic Non State Actors Publication Year within 25 Years

31. How non-state armed groups engage in environmental protection

Author:
Jairo Munive and Finn Stepputant
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Non-state Armed Groups have a mixed - and mostly negative - impact on the environment, but there are ways in which NSAG’s engagement can have positive effects on the environment during and after armed conflict. The adoption of the UN principles for the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict can provide an avenue for constructive engagement.
Topic:
Environment, United Nations, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

32. Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia

Author:
Tom Connolly
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.
Topic:
National Security, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

33. Fact Sheet: Crisis in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Violence is escalating in Amhara region, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency Nearly 30 clashes between government forces and Fano militias were recorded in Amhara last week, with most concentrated in North Wello and West Gojam zones, though fighting has been spread throughout the region. This marks an almost eightfold increase in armed clashes in the region relative to the weekly average since the start of the crisis in April. While Amhara was among the least volatile regions in the country prior to the start of the northern Ethiopia conflict in 2021, it is now one of the most unstable. Persistent insecurity in Amhara poses a significant threat to the federal government, the Abiy administration, and Ethiopia’s stability at large.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Amhara

34. Shades of grey: The evolving links between the Houthi and Iran

Author:
Mona Saif
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing Tehran’s bidding, voluntarily or under pressure. Yet, the movement can be viewed as an informal partner of Tehran. Their relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more strategic one. Despite this evolution, the Houthi have remained autonomous with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy and battlefield operations. For the purpose of peacemaking in Yemen today, as well as subsequent efforts to maintain any peace, this suggests that the Houthi should be considered an autonomous, domestically legitimate (in part) and capable actor, but that Iran also needs to be consulted behind the scenes due to the growth of its relation with the Houthi.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Houthis, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Yemen

35. A Conversation with ELN Commander and Peace Negotiator Aureliano Carbonell

Author:
Jerano Abraham
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
National Liberation Army Commander Aureliano Carbonell speaks about prospects for peace in the guerrilla organization’s second round of dialogues with the Colombian government.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Peace, and Guerrillas
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

36. Actor Profile: The March 23 Movement (M23)

Author:
Ladd Serwat
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The March 23 Movement (M23) — Mouvement du 23 Mars in French — is an armed group operating in Nord Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with alleged backing from the Rwandan government. The roots of the M23 go back to the disrupted integration process of Rwandophone militants following the Congo Wars, splitting those willing to return to Rwanda and others desiring to stay in DRC.1 Many fighters remained in Nord Kivu province to form the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) under the leadership of a former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) militant, Laurent Nkunda. A precursor to the M23, the CNDP claimed to protect Congolese Tutsi and received Rwandan support.2 The M23’s name comes from the failed negotiation process between the CNDP and the Congolese government on 23 March 2009.3
Topic:
Political Violence, Non State Actors, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

37. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?

Author:
Emile Roy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

38. Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)

Author:
Sandra Pellegrini and María Fernanda Arocha
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is a Mexican criminal group that emerged as a splinter group of the Milenio Cartel – one of the Sinaloa Cartel’s allies – after the capture of its leader in 2009 led to internal divisions.1 Initially, the group operated as an armed wing of the Sinaloa Cartel. As part of this alliance, it engaged in a deadly turf war against Los Zetas in Veracruz state, where the group stood out for its use of violence and involvement in numerous massacres.2 Under the leadership of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as El Mencho, the CJNG grew as an independent organization and one of the most powerful actors in Mexico’s criminal underworld. Rivaling its erstwhile ally, the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG turned from an armed wing into a complex drug-producing and trafficking structure, which supplies markets across the globe.3 It has diversified its activities and sources of income, relying on extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, illegal mining, and oil theft,4 such as the capture of the avocado and oil trade in Michoacán and Guanajuato states.5 To support its growth and international ambitions, the CJNG has expanded its presence to at least 27 of Mexico’s 32 states.6 The presence of the CJNG has often driven increased violence at the local level, notably in areas of territorial dispute with other criminal groups.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violence, Organized Crime, and Cartels
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

39. The Muqawama and Its Enemies: Shifting Patterns in Iran-Backed Shiite Militia Activity in Iraq

Author:
Luca Nevola and Miran Feyli
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The post-2003 security landscape in Iraq has seen the proliferation of dozens of militias identifying with Shiite Islam. Many of these actors are integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – a paramilitary group established in 2014 to counter the Islamic State and later incorporated into the Iraqi state forces – and have strong relations with the Iranian regime and its security apparatus.1 These Iran-backed groups include prominent militias such as Kataib Hizbullah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and Haraka Hizbullah al-Nujaba (HHN), as well as a number of recently formed ‘facade groups’ like Ashab al-Kahf and Qasim al-Jabarin. Such facade groups are generally assumed to operate on behalf of KH, AAH, and HHN (see graph below). These groups are notable for portraying themselves as the Muqawama, or the ‘resistance’ against the United States and other foreign forces.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Militias
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

40. Actor Profile: The Islamic State Sahel Province

Author:
Heni Nsaibia
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) is a salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of the transnational Islamic State (IS) organization. It is primarily active in the border areas between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — known as the tri-state border area, or Liptako-Gourma — but it has also engaged in sporadic activity in Algeria, Benin, and Nigeria. The group’s composition reflects the social fabric in the areas where it is active. Its members belong to the Fulani, Arab, Tuareg, Dawsahak, Songhai, and Djerma ethnic groups, although its core leadership was historically composed of Western Saharan militants.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
North Africa and Sahel