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132. Taking Stock of the Taliban’s Perspectives on Peace
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- What’s new? On 29 February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement meant to prompt peace talks between the militant group and the Afghan government. Many issues have delayed those talks, including widespread concerns about the Taliban’s willingness to compromise in a political settlement ending the war. Why does it matter? The U.S.-Taliban deal opened a fragile window of opportunity to settle the world’s deadliest conflict. But for talks among Afghans to progress, the Taliban will need to move beyond vague governing principles and put forth concrete negotiating positions on reconciliation, power sharing and governance. What should be done? The Taliban should swiftly determine clear negotiating positions and be prepared to debate – and eventually reach compromises – on these as intra-Afghan talks unfold. The U.S. and other donors should leverage prospects of post-transition assistance as encouragement, while the Afghan government and civil society should engage the group and its ideas.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Non State Actors, Taliban, Negotiation, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America
133. Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- With the Syrian regime’s offensive in Idlib paused, the time is now for a deal sparing the rebellion’s last stronghold the full wrath of reconquest. The parties should pursue an improved ceasefire including the regime, Russia, Turkey and the Islamist militants entrenched in the province. What’s new? A Russian-backed Syrian regime offensive against rebel-held Idlib halted when Russia and Turkey negotiated a ceasefire in March. Turkey is sending reinforcements, signalling a military response to what it deems a national security threat. For now, this step may dissuade Russia from resuming the offensive, but the standoff appears untenable. Why does it matter? Successive Russian-Turkish ceasefires in Idlib have collapsed over incompatible objectives, diverging interpretations and exclusion of the dominant rebel group, Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is UN-sanctioned and considered by Russia and others a terrorist organisation. A Russian-backed regime offensive to retake Idlib likely would result in humanitarian catastrophe. What should be done? All actors should seek a more sustainable ceasefire – optimally including HTS, notwithstanding legitimate concerns about the group – that avoids the high military, political and humanitarian price of another offensive. Turkey should push HTS to continue distancing itself from transnational militancy and display greater tolerance for political and religious pluralism.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Conflict, Syrian War, Islamism, and Proxy War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib
134. Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt: The Role of External Actors
- Author:
- Ayfer Erdogan
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
- Institution:
- Sakarya University (SAU)
- Abstract:
- In 2013, Egypt’s first democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi was overthrown by a military coup. Since then the country has undergone serious setbacks in terms of democracy, individual freedoms, and social justice. Egypt’s failed revolution and the military coup could not be thought independently from the role of external actors - either directly or indirectly involved in this process. Despite their political rhetoric emphasizing democracy promotion and political reforms, both the US and the EU failed to pursue consistent and contributory policies in promoting democratic transition in Egypt out of fear that the electoral victory of Islamist groups would harm their interests in the region. On the other hand, the Gulf Monarchies played a pivotal role in the entrenchment of the military rule by providing financial and political support to the military-backed government as a shield against the democratically elected government in Egypt. This article investigates how the policies adopted by Egypt’s key allies, the European Union, the US and the Gulf Monarchies, impacted the trajectory of Egypt’s political transition in the face of the January 25 revolution and 2013 military coup. The main thesis of the article is that the policies pursued by external actors created a political environment unfavorable for democratic change in Egypt.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, European Union, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, and Egypt
135. Waiting for blowback: The Kurdish question and Turkey’s new regional militarism
- Author:
- Engin Yüksel
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- Recent Turkish interventions in parts of Syria, Iraq and Turkey itself, look like pushing various Kurdish armed forces and political groupings towards ‘defeat’ via a concerted regional strategy that combines battlefield action with repression and co-optation. But the ‘anti-terrorist’ frame and tactics that Ankara uses in a bid to solve its Kurdish problem feature many sticks and no compromises to improve Kurdish collective minority rights. It is likely that this approach will inhibit peaceful resistance and fail to reduce support for armed groups like the PKK and PYD despite their own authoritarian practices. Moreover, Turkey’s new regional militarism risks escalating conflict across the Middle East because of the complex international and transnational contexts in which Ankara’s interventions take place.
- Topic:
- International Affairs, Non State Actors, Conflict, and Kurds
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria
136. The evolution of the revolution: The changing nature of Iran’s Axis of Resistance
- Author:
- Kenneth Pollack
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
- Abstract:
- For the first two to three decades after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” was little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity of effort to an amalgam of states, semi-states, and non-state actors that opposed the Middle Eastern status quo than was ever the reality. Because of the events of 2014–16, when key Shi’a groups and governments faced severe threats, there has been a significant shift in the Axis’ composition and effectiveness. Today, the Axis is comprised of an increasingly cohesive coalition of groups functioning more directly under Iranian guidance. Iranian support for these groups has also shifted from covert terrorist collusion, funding, intelligence sharing, rhetorical support, and tacit diplomacy to overt force deployments, joint military operations, economic assistance, deterrence, and alliance solidarity. Nevertheless, Iran’s successes have led to additional problems. The Axis of Resistance strategy was born out of necessity, and it is unclear, especially without Soleimani, whether Iran will be able to adapt moving forward.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Non State Actors, and Qassem Soleimani
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
137. Breaking out: Brazil’s First Capital Command and the emerging prison-based threa
- Author:
- Ryan C. Berg
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
- Abstract:
- Much of Brazil’s deadly urban violence is the direct result of territorial battles involving the country’s powerful transnational organized crime groups, many of which trace their origins to the country’s dangerous and overcrowded prisons. The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), or First Capital Command, took shape in São Paulo during the early 1990s, as inmates organized against poor prison conditions to impose order and preserve lives. Eventually, the PCC developed an ability to project its influence and control well beyond prison walls and into Brazil’s sprawling urban slums. The PCC has vanquished many of its domestic rivals, enjoys a footprint in every state in Brazil, runs operations in almost every country of South America, and is now more globally minded than ever before, recruiting guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Venezuelan refugees and partnering with European mafia groups and Lebanese Hezbollah. Law-and-order strategies that “stuff” Brazil’s crowded prisons with new inmates may actually exacerbate the problem, given that the PCC has effectively converted the country’s prisons into logistical hubs and training centers of illicit activity. To fight the PCC, the US should designate it as a transnational organized crime group to confer the benefits of multiple pieces of legislation and seek extradition of key PCC leaders.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Non State Actors, Law Enforcement, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Violence
- Political Geography:
- Brazil and Latin America
138. Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel
- Author:
- Katherine Zimmerman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
- Abstract:
- Sahel-based Salafi-jihadi groups including al Qaeda and the Islamic State coordinate and cooperate across organizational divides united by common objectives, shared histories, and ethnic ties, creating a unique ecosystem of ideology and terror. The Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel is strengthening rapidly. The number of attacks will continue to rise and will become deadlier as groups’ capabilities improve. The groups’ coordinated effort to transform Sahelian society and governance into their vision under Islam has helped destabilize the region and has created additional opportunities for Salafi-jihadi growth.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Non State Actors, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Salafism, and Jihad
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, North Africa, and Sahel
139. Nonstate Actors and Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies: The Coming Challenge
- Author:
- Jean-loup Samaan
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- This monograph explores the emerging challenge of nonstate actors’ anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies and their implications for the United States and its allies by looking at two regions, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, with case studies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen, and separatist groups in Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Hezbollah, Houthis, and Hamas
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, Yemen, Gaza, Lebanon, and United States of America
140. Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future
- Author:
- Andrew Watkins
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- The U.S. and Afghan governments have, at various times, intentionally pursued strategies of “divide and defeat” in an attempt to fragment and weaken the Taliban. These approaches have proved ineffective and, as long as peace efforts are being pursued, should be discontinued. Contrary to lingering narratives from earlier eras of the Afghan conflict, the Taliban today are a relatively cohesive insurgent group and are unlikely to fragment in the near term. This has not happened by accident: the Taliban’s leadership has consistently, at times ruthlessly, worked to retain and strengthen its organizational cohesion. To this day, the group is unwilling to cross internal “red lines” that might threaten that cohesion. The literature on insurgency and negotiated peace suggests that only cohesive movements are capable of following through and enforcing peace agreements. Many of the feared scenarios of Taliban fragmentation, including the defection of “hard-liners” or mass recruitment by the Islamic State, do not correspond to current realities on the ground. Fragmentation of the Taliban is not impossible, and the group is certainly far from monolithic, but ideological rifts are not a sufficient explanation of why this has taken place in the past—or might again. By studying what makes the Taliban cohesive and what has caused instances of its fragmentation, all parties invested in an Afghan peace process might be better equipped to negotiate with the Taliban under terms the movement would be willing to accept, even if it has not defined those terms publicly. This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Taliban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertook as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace, is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Taliban, Conflict, Negotiation, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Asia, North America, and United States of America