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Begin New Search Topic Non State Actors Publication Year within 25 Years

91. Sahel 2021: Communal Wars, Broken Ceasefires, and Shifting Frontlines

Author:
Heni Nsaibia and Jules Duhamel
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In 2021, the Sahel crisis entered its tenth year. Despite the transnational nature of the crisis, each country has experienced different patterns of violence and transformations in the midst of a protracted conflict. This report looks at the patterns of violence in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. It concludes with a review of the wider Sahel region. The report finds that both the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) have shifted their efforts to geographic areas beyond the immediate reach of external forces in the face of military pressure in the tri-state border region (or Liptako-Gourma). Renewed engagement in local conflicts has allowed jihadist militant groups to enlarge their scope of action, reassert their influence, remobilize, and gain resources to rebuild. This can be seen clearly in Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua regions, the eastern parts of Burkina Faso, and central Mali (see figure below).
Topic:
War, Non State Actors, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Sahel

92. Aden Security

Author:
Matthias Sulz
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
This series maps the activity of little-known military brigades and armed groups proliferating throughout the conflict in Yemen. Mapping these actors has become relevant for understanding future trajectories of violence in Yemen as some of them have developed significant combat capabilities with shifting allegiances. While some follow their own interests, others have clear allegiances to the internationally recognized government or the Southern Transitional Council. As with actors in other conflict scenarios, such allegiances are, however, never set in stone. Rather, allegiances are a fluid process, shifting due to changes of outside circumstances (e.g. the behavior of a patron) or battlefield victories. In order to be better prepared for these changes, this series maps the activity of such military brigades and armed groups — some of them have become relevant already, while others may see their turn towards increased relevance in the future.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

93. Rebuffing Accusations: Implications of Esmail Qaani to Iraq Following Attempted Assassination of al-Kadhimi

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iraqi media outlets such as Dijlah, Al-Rafidain TV and Al-Sharqiya, on November 7, reported that Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force, a branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), had arrived in the Iraqi capital on November 7 on an unannounced visit. Qaani met with the chiefs of Shi’ite militant groups, as well as Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and the Iraqi President Barham Salih. Qaani expressed rejection of the assassination attempt on al-Kadhimi. Qaani’s visit was part of Iran’s efforts to bring its Iraqi armed groups under control in exchange for giving their parties a share in the next government.
Topic:
Government, Non State Actors, Media, and Assassination
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

94. Successive Setbacks: Can the United Front seize control of Addis Ababa?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
From October 31 to November 3, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) managed to achieve strategic gains at the expense of the Ethiopian government, as it continues to draw closer to the Ethiopian capital, especially after its seizing control of the cities of Dessie and Kombolcha. Meanwhile, contrary to regional and international appeals, the Ethiopian Prime Minister continues to mobilize citizens to fight, refusing a ceasefire and any negotiations with the Tigray Front.
Topic:
Government, Non State Actors, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Tigray

95. Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State

Author:
Ido Levy
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The IS military project led not only to the announcement of a “caliphate,” but to the proliferation of jihadist franchises that devastated countries, displaced millions, and killed tens of thousands. In 2014, the Islamic State shocked the world when it defeated national armies on the battlefield and seized large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. The group’s military success can be traced to four key variables: organizational innovation, shaping operations, will to fight, and a knack for retaining the initiative. The IS military project led not only to the declaration of a “caliphate,” but to the proliferation of jihadist franchises that devastated countries, displaced millions, and killed tens of thousands. Yet the group’s weaknesses ultimately led to the collapse of its territorial achievement. Expert Ido Levy begins this pioneering study by surveying jihadist warfare from the 1970s to the present. He then incorporates primary sources and interviews with military officers, experts, and journalists to explain how IS used conventional military capabilities to defeat larger, better-equipped state armies and conquer land in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Philippines, and Nigeria. Anchored by four case studies—Ramadi, Kobane, Mosul, and Baghuz—the volume illuminates potential strategies to prevent a resurgence by IS or similar groups.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

96. The “Non-State” State in Iraqi Political Discourse and Action

Author:
Ofra Bengio
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
For several years, the concept of “Iraq as a ‘non-state’” (Iraq al-ladawla) has been circulating within the Iraqi political sphere. This concept became the focus of heated debate among politicians, intellectuals, and journalists across the entire Iraqi political spectrum since the outbreak of the popular uprising in Iraq in October 2019. What is the meaning of this term? What were the circumstances that led to the development of the debate in Iraq? What political and socio-economic problems does it reflect?
Topic:
Politics, Non State Actors, and Governance
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

97. Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Sometimes, slow, steady changes produce revolutionary results. A case in point is missile and space technologies, which Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits will examine. Long-range missiles, satellites, and space launch vehicles used to be high technology exclusive to the superpowers. Now, scores of states have both. As for ballistic missiles and drones, even non-state actors have them, and these systems are far more accurate than anything the superpowers had even at the height of the Cold War. Then, long-range missiles could only be certain of destroying their targets if they were nuclear-armed and wiped out areas as large as cities. Now, drones are so accurate they can pinpoint and kill single individuals. As for space satellite launchers, they originally were derived from nuclear delivery missiles. None were privately owned. Similarly, almost all space satellites were government property and, until 1965, the owners were only American and Soviet. Now, the French, Chinese, Japanese, British, Indians, Israelis, Ukrainians, Iranians, and North Koreans have all launched satellites of their own. In addition, more than 60 nations own and operate their own satellites and increasingly, satellites are launched, owned, and operated entirely by private entities. These developments are nontrivial. They will define the military competitions with China, Russia, and other hostile states for the next two to three decades. Will the spread of accurate missiles embolden weak actors – small states and terrorist organizations – to threaten stronger states with missile attacks against key civilian targets (dams, reactors, petrochemical plants)? Will weak actors be tempted to use accurate drones to assassinate their adversaries’ key leaders? Will such attacks catalyze war, producing modern Sarajevos that draw in nuclear-armed states (e.g. Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, or the superpowers)? With so many new space actors, will anyone be able to attribute hostile actions in space? Will states attack satellites mostly in low Earth orbit or geosynchronous orbit? Will the most important attacks come from antisatellite systems based on Earth, in low Earth orbit, or on or near the moon? This volume is designed to answer these questions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Drones, Nonproliferation, Space, Missile Defense, Satellite, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

98. November 2021 Issue

Author:
Andrew Watkins, Seth Morrow, Nicholas Tallant, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Matthew Bamber
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
It has been three months since the Taliban entered Kabul and retook control of Afghanistan. According to the head of the U.N. World Food Programme, “23 million people [are now] marching toward starvation. 95% of Afghans don’t have enough food. The economy is collapsing. Winter is coming. This is going to be hell on earth.” In this month’s feature article, Andrew Watkins assesses the Taliban’s efforts to rule Afghanistan so far. He writes that “The Taliban have busied themselves consolidating control, reacting swiftly and harshly to perceived threats. They have not clearly defined the scope or structure of their state, nor have they shared long-term plans for their rank-and-file, many of which continue to operate as they did before August 15, 2021. Taliban leaders have demonstrated the continued primacy of maintaining internal cohesion, a longstanding trait that will likely stunt the group’s response to Afghanistan’s impending economic and humanitarian crises.” Watkins writes that from their perspective, “accepting aid that might sustain their state would prove worthless if doing so fueled a fissure within their own organization. The Taliban would become the very thing their origin story professes they rose up to eradicate and replace: a fractious constellation of militant bands. To put it another way, if Afghanistan’s compounding crises pose the Taliban with the prospect of either failing to provide for the desperate needs of the Afghan people or their own potential fragmentation, the Taliban will put their own organization first.” This month’s interview is with General Richard D. Clarke, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. In a commentary, Jerome Bjelopera argues that “given that the U.S. national security establishment has taken up great power competition (GPC) as its primary concern recently, and terrorism has slipped from the top position, it is time for the security policy community to place terrorism within a new conceptual framework, one that combines terrorists, violent criminals, drug traffickers, insurgents, and others under the heading of violent non-state actors (VNSA).” Interviews that Matthew Bamber conducted with 43 former Islamic State civilian employees shed light on two distinct categories: those who became full members of the group and those who did not. He writes that “there are significant differences in how these two categories were treated by the Islamic State, the positions they were able to fill, the financial benefits they received, and the processes through which they joined and left Islamic State employment ... Understanding the nuances is important in assessing the culpability of the Islamic State’s civilian workers and the danger they may pose in the future.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, and United States of America

99. Non-State Actors’ Cyberattacks and States’ “Cyber-due diligence”/Los ciberataques de los actores no estatales y la “ciberdiligencia debida” de los Estados

Author:
Andrea Cocchini
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Peacetime cyberattacks by groups of hacktivists, transnational criminal organizations or terrorist groups, increase every year, being the most frequent cyber threat against States’ IT infrastructures. Given this reality, the international community does not have developed yet an effective legal tool in order to attribute international responsibility to those States from whose territory non-State actors launch their cyberattacks against other countries. Therefore, this article suggests that the adoption of the “cyber-due diligence” concept – based on the classic notion of “due diligence” – would make easier to identify responsible States and attribute them their responsibility for failing to adopt preventive measures, such as monitoring activities./Los ciberataques en tiempos de paz – por parte de grupos de hacktivistas, organizaciones criminales transnacionales o bandas terroristas – aumentan cada año más, suponiendo para los Estados la ciberamenaza más frecuente contra sus infraestructuras informáticas. Ante esta realidad, la comunidad internacional no cuenta todavía con una herramienta jurídica eficaz para atribuir la responsabilidad internacional a aquellos Estados desde cuyo territorio dichos actores no estatales lanzan sus ciberataques contra otros países. Por tanto, en el presente artículo se propone la adopción del concepto de “ciberdiligencia debida”. Partiendo de la noción clásica de “diligencia debida” desarrollada en el Derecho internacional del medioambiente, se sugiere que la “ciberdiligencia debida” permitiría identificar con más facilidad al Estado responsable y atribuirle la responsabilidad por no adoptar las medidas preventivas, como las de monitoreo, necesarias para oponerse a las actividades cibernéticas ilícitas de estos grupos privados.
Topic:
Crime, Non State Actors, Cybersecurity, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

100. Reputation Building as a Strategy for Terror Group Survival

Author:
Efe Tokdemir
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
In this paper I investigate terror groups' survival. The fate of terrorists hinges heavily on the power the terror group derives from its reputation. The reputation, which depends on policies and actions the group takes within their constituency, determines the degree to which each group can find recruits, resources, and support for its cause. I contend that terror groups investing on positive or negative reputation within their constituency— the people they claim to represent==are likely to survive longer. Yet, I argue, building a positive reputation has a greater impact on a group’s staying power given that this attracts loyal and committed supporters. Conversely, groups with no clearly defined reputation-building policies undergo an organizational change. I find support for my expectations by testing my arguments over all domestic terror groups active between 1980 and 2011 using the RTG and GTD databases. The findings reveal that once a terrorist group is formed, it is exceedingly difficult to obliterate it so long as it follows a clear reputational strategy to achieve their goals.
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Group Survival, and Reputation
Political Geography:
Global Focus