Search

Begin New Search Topic Navy Publication Year within 25 Years

61. La génesis ibérica del moderno poder naval (The Iberian Genesis of Modern Sea Power)

Author:
Manuel Vila González
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
En las postrimerías del siglo XV surgió de la mano de los dos pueblos ibéricos atlánticos una revolucionaria aproximación al uso en beneficio propio del mar, caracterizada por tener que enfrentarse al reto de la navegación oceánica y de la exploración de nuevas tierras, algo jamás siquiera concebido con anterioridad. Como ya había ocurrido en otras etapas históricas con otros protagonistas, la principal motivación para lanzarse al mar fue económica. Sin embargo, la escala geográfica del empeño en esta ocasión dio lugar a una nueva era, caracterizada tanto por un acelerado desarrollo científico como por una globalización del comercio, de la política, de la tecnología y de la cultura (el lenguaje, la educación y el cristianismo). Portugal conquistó los océanos con el ánimo de establecer una red de enclaves comerciales, creando el molde de lo que desde entonces se ha considerado el lógico proceder de las potencias marítimas, empeñadas en moverse con libertad por los mares que unen las colonias con la metrópoli. De esa guisa, lo que desde hace apenas poco más de un siglo se denomina poder naval no era sino la parte del poder marítimo que se encargaba de proteger el comercio propio de la ambición ajena. España, sin embargo, acometió una epopeya similar con una mentalidad más territorial (y más patrimonial), debido a la cual los mismos océanos pasaron a ser considerados parte integrante de las posesiones monárquicas como vínculo que unía las distintas partes del reino. Esa asunción engendró un concepto nuevo de poder naval, por el que en tiempo de paz complementaba al poder marítimo, que se convertía en tributario del primero en caso de conflicto bélico. Lo que los tratadistas clásicos anglosajones (Alfred T. Mahan y Julian S. Corbett, en particular) describieron como poder marítimo y naval al estudiar la historia basándose en fuentes documentales británicas no es más que la trasposición de los principios que rigieron la constitución del Portugal renacentista en una talasocracia de ámbito planetario. El caso español es mucho más complejo, pues no solo fue igualmente ignorado en los estudios histórico-estratégicos tardo-decimonónicos y posteriores (no solo anglosajones, lo que es aún más inexplicable), sino que se mantiene en la bruma de lo inexplorado al no haber tenido continuidad histórica reconocida, lo que ha contribuido a impedir una comprensión adecuada de la dimensión histórica del éxito (por su resiliencia, durabilidad, prosperidad…) del “imperio” de la Monarquía Hispánica.
Topic:
Navy, History, Maritime, and Seapower
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, and Portugal

62. The Strategic Implications of Chinese-Iranian-Russian Naval Drills in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In early December, Major General Shao Yuanming (邵元明), the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), traveled to the Islamic Republic of Iran for rare high-level military meetings. These meetings were held for the purpose of organizing a series of unprecedented joint naval drills between China, Iran, and Russia, which were held in the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman from December 27–29. The drills took place just as escalating tensions between the United States and Iran reached a crisis point at the end of 2019. The exercise also signified a deepening relationship between Iran and the PRC in economics, diplomacy, and security affairs. China and Russia have both increased military and economic cooperation with Iran in the year and a half since the U.S. government pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, while Iran’s government has repeatedly touted its deepening relations with China and Russia as a show of diplomatic strength, its allies have been less public about the growing relationship. In December, Iranian officials lauded the trilateral exercises—titled “Marine Security Belt”—as proof that Iran can outlast crippling sanctions with aid from its non-Western allies, and declared that the drills signaled a new triple alliance in the Middle East (Tasnim News, December 29, 2019). [1] By contrast, officials from Russia and the PRC were more restrained, framing the joint exercises as part of routine anti-piracy operations, highlighting their peacekeeping priorities and seeking to depoliticize the drills (South China Morning Post, September 23, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), October 2, 2019).
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Navy, Maritime, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

63. New Wine Into New Wineskins: The Evolving Role of the PLA Navy Marine Corps in Amphibious Warfare and Other Mission Areas

Author:
Ying Yu Lin
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Historically, the Marine Corps was not a branch greatly valued by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The explanation for this had much to do with the PLA’s mission priorities: the PLA has looked to the Taiwan Strait as its main focus area for amphibious warfare, and the PLA Army (PLAA) has traditionally held the primary role in this functional area, with the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) operating in a secondary role. The former Nanjing Military Region—since reorganized as the Eastern Theater Command (China Brief, February 4, 2016)—has amphibious mechanized units that were subordinate to the PLAA 1st and 73rd Group Armies (now reorganized as the 72nd and 73rd Group Armies, respectively) (China Military, December 2, 2018). The amphibious mechanized units of the PLA Army feature heavier firepower and greater mobility than the PLAN Marine Corps (which originally consisted of only two brigades, the 1st and 164th, both subordinate to the South Sea Fleet). The PLAA amphibious forces focused on “big island” targets: these “big island” targets obviously included Taiwan, the PLA’s top priority scenario for resources and contingency planning. By contrast, the PLANMC was oriented largely towards the defense of islands or reefs in the South China and East China Seas. As the PLAN has become increasingly stronger in recent years, its efforts to field greater numbers of modern warships—and the deployments and training of these ships—have attracted ever-greater attention. In line with the expansion of its parent service, the PLAN Marine Corps has also grown, in terms of both numbers and missions, to align with China’s growing overseas interests. The two original brigades of the Marine Corps have been augmented in recent years by six more—four combined arms brigades, a special operations brigade, and elements of a shipborne helicopter aviation brigade—based in multiple locations along the length of China’s coastline (China Brief, February 1, 2019). Only in recent years has the PLA as a larger institution started to rethink the value and use of the Marine Corps—a change resulting from the PLAN’s improvements in capability, and China’s growing national power and increasing overseas interests. Recent training exercises provide some indication of likely future missions for the PLAN’s larger and more capable Marine Corps branch.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
China and Asia

64. China Maritime Report No. 10: PLAN Force Structure Projection Concept, A Methodology for Looking Down Range

Author:
Christopher P. Carlson
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Force structure projections of an adversary’s potential order of battle are an essential input into the strategic planning process. Currently, the majority of predictions regarding China’s future naval buildup are based on a simple extrapolation of the impressive historical ship construction rate and shipyard capacity, without acknowledging that the political and economic situation in China has changed dramatically.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Navy, Economy, Maritime, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China and Asia

65. China Maritime Report No. 9: Organizing to Fight in the Far Seas, The Chinese Navy in an Era of Military Reform

Author:
Roderick Lee and Morgan Clemens
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been laying the organizational groundwork for far seas operations for nearly two decades, developing logistical and command infrastructure to support a “near seas defense and far seas protection” strategy. In the context of such a strategy, the PLAN’s ability to project power into the far seas depends upon its ability to dominate the near seas, effectively constituting a “sword and shield” approach. Along with the rest of the PLA, the PLAN’s peacetime command structure has been brought into line with its wartime command structures, and in terms of near seas defense, those command structures have been streamlined and made joint. By contrast, the command arrangements for far seas operations have not been clearly delineated and no one organ or set of organs has been identified as responsible for them. While this is manageable in the context of China’s current, limited far seas operational presence, any meaningful increase in the size, scope, frequency, and intensity of far seas operations will require further structural reforms at the Central Military Commission and theater command levels in order to lay out clear command responsibilities.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, Maritime, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

66. China Maritime Report No. 8: Winning Friends and Influencing People: Naval Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Timothy R. Heath
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
In recent years, Chinese leaders have called on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to carry out tasks related to naval diplomacy beyond maritime East Asia, in the “far seas.” Designed to directly support broader strategic and foreign policy objectives, the PLAN participates in a range of overtly political naval diplomatic activities, both ashore and at sea, from senior leader engagements to joint exercises with foreign navies. These activities have involved a catalogue of platforms, from surface combatants to hospital ships, and included Chinese naval personnel of all ranks. To date, these acts of naval diplomacy have been generally peaceful and cooperative in nature, owing primarily to the service’s limited power projection capabilities and China’s focus on more pressing security matters closer to home. However, in the future a more blue-water capable PLAN could serve more overtly coercive functions to defend and advance China’s rapidly growing overseas interests when operating abroad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Navy, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

67. The Sea as Catalyst of Geopolitics: from Mahan to the Chinese Boom / El mar como catalizador de la geopolítica: de Mahan al auge chino

Author:
Josep Baqués Quesada
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
China is the State that has grown the most economically and militarily in the past decades. Although its armed forces are still far from the US, the enormous Chinese commercial projection and its policy of providing facilities in ports on all continents, together with the creation of a powerful fleet of the high seas, recall the path traveled years ago by other great powers. But China, unlike the United Kingdom of the nineteenth century or the USA in the twentieth century, is rather a Rimland´s power with one foot in the Heartland. Precisely for this reason, this analysis tests the Chinese capacity from the theoretical framework least favorable for her, that is, the maritime power of Mahan. The conclusion is that, despite certain deficits in purely geographical issues, many of the parameters once defined by Mahan endorse the Chinese candidacy.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Geopolitics, Navy, Economic Growth, and Maritime
Political Geography:
China and Asia

68. Global Britain's Arctic security policy: Going forward while looking back

Author:
Agne Cepinsktye
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Britain’s Arctic security policy has been shifting from abandoning the region after the Cold War to developing a non-military security approach, to reintroducing the military defence dimension, most notably by the announcement of the UK Defence Arctic Strategy (DAS). These changes are both reactive to regional factors, namely the increasing geostrategic importance of the Arctic and Russia’s military expansion in the North, and reflective of the UK’s redefined post-Brexit identity as Global Britain. The focus on expanding the naval presence in the Arctic is consistent with the Global Britain vision, which underlies the UK’s broader foreign and security policy direction and emphasises the reassertion of naval strength and global maritime influence. While Britain’s ambition to restore the naval power in the Arctic and the North Atlantic is currently constrained by a lack of resources in the defence budget, it indicates an aspiration to strengthen historically rooted naval defence relations with the Arctic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, and Arctic

69. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Great Power Competition

Author:
Christopher C. Harmon, T. J. Linzy, Jack Vahram Kalpakian, Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Ryan Burke, Jahara "Franky" Matisek, Zsofia Budai, Kevin Johnston, Blagovest Tashev, Michael Purcell, David McLaughlin, Kashish Parpiani, Daniel De Wit, and Timothy Chess
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
In this issue of MCU Journal, the authors discuss various concepts of power and great power competition. For generations, scholars have debated changes in power and how that evolution could potentially impact the United States, its allies, and those hovering on the edge of greatness in whatever form that may take. The concept of power has taken on many meanings as the character of warfare has adapted to the time—hard power, soft power, sea power, airpower, space power, great power, combat power, etc. So how do we define such an abstract concept as power? The Department of Defense (DOD) defines combat power as “the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.” Clearly, power must be projected; and for our purposes, that means an entity has the “ability . . . to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.”
Topic:
Security, NATO, Climate Change, International Cooperation, Migration, History, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Navy, Populism, Grand Strategy, Alliance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, Geography, Ottoman Empire, Information Technology, and Clash of Civilizations
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Europe, Sudan, India, Norway, Asia, France, North America, Egypt, Arctic, United States of America, and Antarctica

70. China Maritime Report No. 4: Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection

Author:
Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has ambitious goals for its power projection capabilities. Aside from preparing for the possibility of using force to resolve Beijing’s territorial claims in East Asia, it is also charged with protecting China’s expanding “overseas interests.” These national objectives require the PLA to be able to project significant combat power beyond China’s borders. To meet these needs, the PLA is building organic logistics support capabilities such as large naval auxiliaries and transport aircraft. But it is also turning to civilian enterprises to supply its transportation needs.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Seapower, Transportation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
China and Asia