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11. The Navy Working Capital Fund and Operational Resource Management Decisions: A Case Study Analysis

Author:
James Taylor, Elliott Branch, Lewis Crenshaw, Peter Levine, Dorothy Robyn, and Sean Stackley
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
Abstract:
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASN (FM&C)) commissioned the National Academy of Public Administration (Academy) to evaluate how resource management decisions impact the NWCF and identify strategies for improving decision-making processes to safeguard the fund's integrity and DON’s operational efficacy. This report of an Academy Panel of Fellows (Panel) examines the effect of resource management decisions—including programmatic, budgetary, and execution—on the NWCF. Furthermore, it assesses whether program and budget development decision-makers consider the potential impacts of their choices on the NWCF. Finally, it provides actionable recommendations to enhance and improve DON's resource management decision-making processes, delivery methods, organizational support structures, and forecasting (near-, mid-, and long-term), as well as guidance for their effective implementation.
Topic:
Government, Navy, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
United States of America

12. Partnership of convenience: Ream Naval Base and the Cambodia–China convergence

Author:
Rahman Yaacob
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
It is unlikely that Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be a Chinese military base or outpost such as the facility in Djibouti fully operated by the People’s Liberation Army. However, China could gain preferential access to the base or use its facilities there to collect intelligence against other states. The Cambodia–China defence convergence is driven by differing motives. Cambodia seeks a partner to modernise its military so it can meet perceived security threats from Thailand and Vietnam, while China wants to expand its political influence and military reach in Southeast Asia. New political and military leadership in Cambodia offers Australia and other like-minded partners an opportunity to deepen defence relations with the kingdom to counter China’s influence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Navy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Cambodia

13. Deterrence and alliance power: Why the AUKUS submarines matter and how they can be delivered

Author:
Ross Babbage
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Significant progress has already been made in the program to deliver advanced nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. The AUKUS partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom is well placed to deliver on its objectives in a reasonable timeframe. A largely unrecognised near-term benefit of AUKUS is that Australia will host up to five allied nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) within three years. These jointly crewed submarines will make a significant contribution to joint deterrence and theatre defence. By the mid-2030s, the AUKUS partners will have more than doubled the number of forward-deployed allied SSNs that can be operational in the critical first ten days of any Western Pacific crisis or conflict. Personnel expansion for the Royal Australian Navy will be one of the greatest challenges for the AUKUS program. Nevertheless, provided that upskilled Australian engineers and technical specialists are supplemented by British and American experts, this task will likely prove manageable.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Navy, Alliance, Deterrence, AUKUS, and Nuclear-Powered Submarines (SSNs)
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Australia, and United States of America

14. China Maritime Report No. 27: PLA Navy Submarine Leadership - Factors Affecting Operational Performance

Author:
Roderick Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The way the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) selects and manages its submarine officers increases the likelihood of human performance errors onboard a PLAN submarine. First, PLAN submarine officers are selected from applicants with among the lowest college entrance examinations of any PLA educational institution, suggesting that PLAN submariners are among the service’s least talented officers. Second, the Party Committee system at the apex of decision-making aboard PLAN submarines may be less agile than other approaches to command, at least in certain circumstances. Lastly, while the policy of embarking flotilla leaders senior to the submarine captain may reduce some of the negative effects associated with the first two conditions, it could lead to reduced performance when senior leaders are not present. If external events during wartime stressed these factors, the likelihood of human-induced error events in the PLAN submarine force could increase substantially.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15. China Maritime Report No. 31: China's Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Sarah Kirchberger
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of production infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards: Bohai Shipyard, Huludao; Wuchang Shipyard, Wuhan; and Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai. Nevertheless, China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining undersea technology secrets.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Industry, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

16. Australia and India’s New Military Bases: Responses to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Felix K. Chang
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Australia and India have built and expanded military bases in and around the Indian Ocean in anticipation of a larger Chinese naval presence in its waters. Most of the construction has focused on creating the capacity to monitor the three main passages into the ocean through the Indonesian archipelago, namely the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits. India has established two new naval air stations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and boosted its maritime patrol forces at others nearby. Australia is working to establish a military base in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and is beefing up its Stirling naval base near Perth to support and sustain nuclear-powered attack submarines.
Topic:
Security, Navy, Military, and Military Bases
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

17. Naval Incident Management in Europe, East Asia and South East Asia

Author:
Ian Anthony, Fei Su, and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Navy, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

18. Fighting into the Bastions: Getting Noisier to Sustain the US Undersea Advantage

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Airpower enthusiasts concluded after World War I that “the bomber will always get through.”1 Fast, high-flying aircraft seemed to hold a decisive edge over air defenses and offered commanders the assurance they could attack targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. But airpower advocates’ spirits were quickly dampened during World War II by the advent of interceptor fighters, radar-guided artillery, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), which together demonstrated that bombers could be stopped—often with devastating results. Air forces adapted, adding escort fighters, radar jammers and decoys, and higher-altitude bombers to sustain their ability to strike behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, this move-countermove competition continued. New surface- and air-launched missiles targeted bombers, and countries developed specialized aircraft and weapons to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses or use stealth to avoid detection and targeting altogether. Today, the US submarine force faces a similar challenge. The US fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has long been considered an asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which lacked robust and effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Relying on this advantage, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on SSNs to compensate for the impact of improved air defenses on the ability of bombers and strike fighters to execute attacks.2 However, the unfailing ability of US SSNs to reach their targets is eroding as emerging technologies and weapons proliferation combine in new approaches to ASW that could neutralize America’s undersea advantage. During the last decade, the PRC and Russian Federation began fortifying their undersea defenses in the South and East China Seas and Arctic Ocean, respectively. Leveraging geographic constraints, US adversaries have instrumented these bastions with networks of fixed and mobile acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, complemented by aircraft and ships capable of pouncing on contacts or deploying dense mine barriers.3 Improved adversary defenses could degrade or defeat US undersea operations, preventing US submarines from conducting critical missions such as sinking a Chinese invasion fleet or tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To sustain its offensive undersea advantage, the US Navy will need to take some lessons from air warfare and begin supporting submarines with systems designed to suppress or destroy enemy undersea defenses. This imperative will fundamentally shift the paradigm for US submarine operations from “alone and unafraid” to “it’s all about team.” Moreover, the emergence of new generations of capable long-range active sonars will demand that the US undersea force increasingly rely on jamming and deception to counter enemy sensors, much as their counterparts already do above the water. The US submarine force will need to learn how to use noise, rather than avoid it. The Navy should pursue four lines of effort, outlined below, to sustain its offensive undersea advantage. Except for features to be incorporated into the next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, the SSN(X), the concepts and capabilities proposed in this report leverage mature or maturing technologies and can be fielded within five years. Implementing these recommendations will require the US Navy to refine its use cases for offensive undersea warfare to use available uncrewed vehicle technologies, rather than continue pursuing purpose-built systems that may take a decade or more to be fielded.4
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

19. Naval rearmament, European perspectives

Author:
Nicolas Mazzucchi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The increase in international crises, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the continuing rhetoric of future Sino-American confrontation in the Indo-Pacific, are resulting in a period of profound geopolitical upheaval, with rising maritime and naval challenges. Several trends are thus interlinked, between the strengthening of the transatlantic nexus, the continuous increase in the importance of the Indo-Pacific and the wish for strategic rebalancing on the part of the countries of the South. Faced with these multiple challenges, underscored by an unprecedented trend in naval rearmament, the European Union is seeking a new strategic-military balance at sea. Between the strengthening of the European Union-NATO link, the resolve of member states to invest more in their naval assets and the need to work to defend and enforce respect for international law, the European Union must show determination and also support this effort to rearm. The various institutional frameworks, as well as cooperation formats, have meant that defence equipment projects have been developed in a more flexible way in recent years, notably with the progressive maturity of the European Defence Fund. Interoperability, joint operations and new capabilities are needed jointly, so that Europe can continue to play its part in the global naval game.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Navy, Maritime, Crisis Management, and Armament
Political Geography:
Europe

20. An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the Royal Australian Navy

Author:
Jennifer Parker
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia is a maritime nation. The sheer scale of our sovereign maritime territory and responsibilities, our dependence on maritime trade for our prosperity and the increasing value of activity in the maritime environment must all be recognised in our maritime strategy. In a highly interconnected world, we face fundamental vulnerabilities from the realities of our geostrategic situation. In this report, the author argues that the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) lacks the resources to adequately protect Australia’s vast maritime interests. This concern isn’t unique to our time: maritime strategists have long lamented that, despite being uniquely an island, a continent and a nation, Australia struggles to understand the central importance of a maritime strategy to our defence and security. The underappreciation of Australia’s dependence on the maritime domain and that domain’s significance for the nation’s prosperity and security has consistently produced a RAN that’s overlooked and under-resourced. In this report, the author examines whether the bipartisan thesis of a structural change in our strategic circumstances, as articulated in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), also requires a structural change and an expansion of the RAN. The author argues that both are needed, through both an increased surface-combatant fleet that’s designed on the principle of a balanced fleet and a review of the RAN’s structure. Such a structural review should include consideration of bold changes, including reconsideration of a fleet auxiliary, a coastguard or forward basing of assets to support the workforce requirements of an expanded fleet. This report looks mainly at the structure of the surface-combatant fleet, noting the recent finalisation of the surface-combatant fleet review. In the light of the Australian Government’s consideration of that review’s recommendations, the report makes eight recommendations for government consideration. The author also argues that the status quo of 11–12 major surface combatants is insufficient for Australia. That was the case even when the force was structured around the concept of Australia having 10 years warning time of military conflict. That problem has become more acute today, given the new era of strategic competition and the capability and size of our potential adversaries, in particular China, as recognised in the DSR. The report recommends that a major surface-combatant fleet structure of 16–20 ships is needed.
Topic:
National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Australia