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652. Afghanistan Report: A Ten-Year Framework for the Future
- Author:
- Ashraf Ghani
- Publication Date:
- 04-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Describing the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan as increasingly perilous, President Obama has committed his administration to enhancing the military, governance, and economic capacity of the two countries. On March 27, 2009, he announced plans to launch a new strategy in the region: To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban's gains and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government. . . . Afghanistan has an elected government, but it is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency. The people of Afghanistan seek the promise of a better future. Yet once again, they have seen the hope of a new day darkened by violence and uncertainty.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Military Strategy, and Governance
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan and Afghanistan
653. Counterinsurgency: the challenge for NATO strategy and operations
- Author:
- Christopher M. Schnaubelt
- Publication Date:
- 11-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- This paper presents an analysis of the so-called "Af-Pak" strategy and what it means for the NATO and its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. Because the role of NATO in the Pakistan portion of the strategy is extremely limited, this paper focuses on the elements directed toward efforts in Afghanistan. It is based completely upon open-source materials. The primary sources are three key documents: the White House press release on what's new in the strategy, President Obama's remarks announcing the strategy, and an interagency white paper that was released simultaneously. These are complemented by published interviews with and newspaper quotes from key individuals such as General David Petraeus, the commanding general of US Central Command and head of the American combatant command responsible for US military efforts in Afghanistan.
- Topic:
- NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, and America
654. Securing the Commons: Towards NATO's New Maritime Strategy
- Author:
- Brooke Smith-Windsor
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Reminiscent of the late Cold War period, in recent years debate in official circles surrounding the purpose of Allied naval forces in transatlantic security policy has increasingly come to the fore. While in the mid-1980s preparations for the land campaign on the European Central Front dominated NATO military planning, the Soviet Union's emergent interest in becoming a powerful ocean-going nation with global reach cast new attention on the importance of securing the Alliance's maritime flanks in the event of conflict - notable the North Atlantic and Mediterranean.
- Topic:
- NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, and Maritime Commerce
- Political Geography:
- North Atlantic and Soviet Union
655. Arguing Afghanistan: what the detractors of NATO's mission get wrong
- Author:
- Patrick Keller
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Over the last few years, Afghanistan has become less stable and less secure. There were more than 2,000 civilian casualties in 2008 - more than in any other year since the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001, and an increase by 40% in comparison to 2007. Coalition forces suffered 294 casualties in 2008, also the highest number so far. This is the direct consequence of a rise in Taliban and insurgent activity, mostly in eastern and southern Afghanistan.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Insurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Asia, and Taliban
656. NATO and the new US "Af-Pak" Strategy
- Author:
- Christopher M. Schnaubelt
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Operations in Afghanistan pose a strategic challenge for NATO, not only because it is the largest and longest duration combat operation in the history of the Alliance, but also because of the fissures that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has exposed among NATO members. These difference include questions on how to characterize and approach the violence in Afghanistan and the relative military contributions by member states to the first and thus far only operation conducted by NATO under Article V. Allegations that some members have not been carrying their fair share of the burden have raised the specter of a "two-tier" alliance.
- Topic:
- NATO, International Security, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and Asia
657. Moving From a North Korean Nuclear Problem to the Problem of North Korea
- Author:
- Chaesung Chun
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- North Korea, in conducting its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, is repeating its earlier pattern of nuclear diplomacy: raising the level of military tensions by launching a long-range rocket and performing a nuclear test, and then searching for the most favorable position once negotiations resume. This vicious circle, composed of North Korea's brinkmanship and other countries’ multilateral sanctions will continue without any prospect of solving the North Korean nuclear problem in the near future. The so-called action-to-action paradigm cannot succeed, because the most fundamental principles of North Korea and the countries conflict with each other. Japan, South Korea, and the United States hope that a "stick and carrot" approach will elicit concessions from North Korea during the process of negotiations, but North Korea will not take steps toward giving up its nuclear program, unless its leaders feel sure that they are being given reliable, material guarantees for the survival of their entire regime, system, and state. Because their nuclear program is their ultimate bargaining chip, “sticks and carrots” focusing only on specific issues of the negotiations will be fall far short of solving the problems of North Korea as a whole. Sixteen years have passed since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. The Geneva System, based on the Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea in Geneva in 1994, lasted for eight years (from October 1994 to October 2002), but failed to manage the problems of nuclear proliferation and the normalization of relations. The success or failure of the new system of Six-Party Talks is yet to be seen, but as of now in 2009, negotiations based on the approach of the George W. Bush administration and, more specifically, the February 13 agreement of 2007 seem to be in a stalemate. The North Korean problem is older than the North Korean nuclear problem. From the perspective of North Korea, the latter is its desired solution to the following questions: How will North Korea survive in the post-Cold War world, in which most socialist countries are no longer socialist? What kind of regime and system can North Korea sustain in this environment? How will North Korea compete with South Korea and resist absorption by the South? North Korea developed a nuclear program and pursued militaristic diplomacy as the most plausible shortcuts to solve the problems indicated by these questions. For countries outside of North Korea, diplomacy has failed to solve either the North Korean nuclear problem or the more general North Korean problem. The Six-Party Talks that have been held by South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russian Federation, and North Korea are stalled at the last phase of the second stage of what is termed “disablement,” and participants are now struggling to find a way to get into the third stage of the agreement of February 13. Reaching the issue of North Korea’s declaration and verification of its nuclear program is critical, because it will demonstrate a genuine intention to begin the process of giving up its program. Yet North Korea is desperately trying to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Obama administration by first launching a long-range rocket and then by testing a nuclear weapon for the second time, reversing the achievements of the disablement stage and rejecting the Six-Party Talks altogether. North Korea desires to strike a comprehensive deal with the Obama administration through bilateral talks, and seeks a variety of political, economic, and diplomatic rewards such as a peace treaty, diplomatic normalization, economic assistance, the lifting of international economic sanctions, and possibly light-water reactors. The five countries in the Six-Party Talks except North Korea have tried to evade facing up to the North Korean problem, because it is difficult to know how best to influence the future orientation of the North Korean regime, system, and diplomatic position. The structure of the Six-Party talks has also been narrowly focused on the problem of the nuclear program, leaving broader questions aside. The Northeast Asian international order, which is based on a strict and competitive balance of power, will be gravely influenced by the future orientation of North Korea, and therefore it is appropriate for the five countries most affected to deal with the North Korean problem directly. But by focusing so narrowly on the North Korean nuclear issues, these countries have maintained only minimal agreement on how to manage the nuclear problems that are involved, sometimes showing strategic and tactical differences on various specifics. In spite of the five countries’ agreement on the Six-Party presidential statement criticizing North Korea's rocket launch on April 9, they have had a hard time finding common ground to deal with future North Korean problems. The United States has been determined to impose economic sanctions on North Korean firms by using a specifically targeted list, as well as to punish North Korea diplomatically by refusing to give serious and close attention to the North Korean nuclear problem. South Korea and Japan have maintained a policy of neglecting North Korea for different reasons. The two countries seem to continue minimal interactions with North Korea even if the North fails to meet the conditions suggested by these countries. China and Russia do not want to take the initiative either to punish or to side with North Korea, and only reluctantly facilitate cooperation among the other countries.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
658. A Smart Alliance in the Age of Complexity
- Author:
- Seongho Sheen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States today faces a complex security environment, in which the threats it confronts are more diverse, more complicated, and require a more delicately balanced approach than ever before. In particular, expectations—even demands—are growing for South Korea to contribute to world peace and stability as a global partner for the United States in pursuing their mutual security interests (Campbell et al. 2009). Do the ROK and the United States share enough strategic interests to sustain such an alliance in the twenty-first century? And should South Korea assume an increasing role in maintaining regional and global peace? During the Cold War, the two countries' alliance was a military one, focused on the clear and direct threat from North Korea. Now, in the twenty-first century, the two security partners must transform their hard alliance into a "smart" alliance to meet more diverse security challenges together. A different set of hard and soft approaches are required, and a smart alliance will call for a more flexible combination of roles played by each partner, depending on the circumstances.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
659. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`
- Author:
- EAI Security Net
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
660. Muddling along with Missiles
- Author:
- Dongho Jo
- Publication Date:
- 07-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- On April 5, 2009, North Korea carried out a rocket launch. North Korea argued that it was a satellite launch vehicle rather than a warhead-carrying ballistic missile, and portrayed the launch in innocuous and civilian terms, even naming the rocket “Unha,” which means “Galaxy” in Korean, to emphasize its space-oriented function. However, most nations, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, suspect that these words were only a cover for a test of North Korea’s long-range missile technology. In addition, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, followed by several launches of short-range missiles from its east coast. Furthermore, North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles on July 2 and additional seven missiles on July 4, despite the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1874 on June 12, condemning North Korea’s hostile activities in the strongest possible terms. Why has North Korea gone ahead with its provocative actions in the face of serious opposition from most of the outside world? To date, analysts have focused on the political aspects of the missile launch. They speculate that its purpose was to push the United States toward bilateral dialogue or to pressure the South Korean government to return to its more positive stance known as the “sunshine policy.” Others argue that the launch was meant to strengthen leadership’s weakening hold inside the country and to ensure its dynastic line of succession. All of these explanations are plausible, and North Korea, of course, may have had multiple goals. But observers seeking to understand the North Korea’s actions are missing one critical component: the economic factor. The North Korean economy was in very poor shape in the 1990s and is still experiencing difficulties. This economic hardship, however, has not only been evident in recent decades but had already begun in the early 1970s, mainly due to lack of capital. Since then, the country’s top economic priority has been to determine how to encourage foreign capital to help the North Korea escape from economic shortages. One alternative pursued since the mid-1990s has been to develop the missile program as an effective means of earning foreign exchange. Understanding the part played by the economic situation in North Korea’s decisions about its missile program is the purpose of this brief article.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea